Institutional Framework for Arctic Governance: Do We Need Reforms?

The article emphasizes that the Arctic Council (AC) is a high level forum of cooperation, based on taking decisions by consensus that are carried out by member states on a voluntary basis and in accordance with their national interests. The AC does not meet the criteria of a classical international intergovernmental organization – IGO and may not be referred to as an international non-governmental organization – INGO due to its members. The high performance of the AC activity in the absence of a complex organizational structure, any executive body and a court is rooted in respect for national sovereignty of its member states. This informal international organization of new type became the core, around which a significant group of states, IGOs and INGOs, that received observer status at the AC, is created. Within the framework of its activity innovative tools of financing of ongoing programs have been developed. Participation of other member states of the AC in the anti-Russian sanctions does not become an obstacle for continuation of the close cooperation of all Arctic states in addressing the major problems of common concern in the Arctic. During the sanctions they established the Arctic economic council, signed the agreements on cooperation between coastal guards of all Arctic states, on scientific cooperation in the Arctic and on preventing unregulated fishing in the central part of the Arctic ocean. Negotiations on possible new agreements are going on between them. The model of informal international cooperation, demonstrated by the Arctic Council, is being successfully implemented also in the activities of the Nordic Council of Ministers, the Council of Barents/Euro-arctic Region, BRICS and other international organizations. This gave the authors the reason to conclude that this type of international organizations will be further developed in contemporary international relations.

Thinking about Russian Arctic council chairmanship: Challenges and opportunities

The Arctic Council (AC) is a high-level international intergovernmental forum founded by the Ottawa Declaration of 1996. Its eight member states are Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States. Six organizations representing Arctic Indigenous peoples have “Permanent Participant” status. The AC is not an international organization based on a legally binding instrument, such as a treaty. It does not have the legal personality of an international organization under international law, which would enable it to develop legislation or conclude treaties with other subjects of international law. However, although the AC is not a legislative body it has been contributing to the development of international law as it relates to the Arctic. In particular, the Arctic Council was engaged in the development and negotiation of three legally binding agreements concluded by the eight Arctic states: the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011); the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013); and the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017). By looking at the “law-making” activities of the AC and, specifically, the agreements concluded under its aegis, this article investigates how these agreements have shaped the nature and evolution of this forum. Then the article explores the potential for further legally binding agreements negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic Council.

The article covers the legal aspects of the establishment of a new international forum – the Arctic Economic Council – and its role in the existing international legal framework for governing the Arctic Ocean, including the Arctic seas. The status and the functioning of this international forum, particularly with regard to the activities within its Working Groups, are examined based on an analysis of the documents adopted by the forum since its establishment. Special attention is paid to the legal analysis of the coordination of the newly established forum with the Arctic Council and the prospects of such institutional cooperation. The research is based on the relevant documents released by the Artic Council, in the context of legal and scientific sources on the topic of the Arctic Ocean and its seas, as well as on the Reports of the Arctic Economic Council submitted to the Senior Officials of the Arctic Council. The article also takes into consideration the political and legal research into the Arctic Council’s work, aimed at the sustainable development of economic activities in the region, as well as respective archive documents from the electronic database of the Arctic Council, including relevant press releases. The Arctic Economic Council (AEC), established at the initiative of the Arctic Council in 2014, is a new circumpolar business forum, which aims at fostering the sustainable development of the Arctic region by substantive cooperation with entrepreneurs who carry out economic activities in the region or plan to do so. The new international organization has the potential to become an effective international legal mechanism to promote greener economies in the Arctic. At the same time, however, the organization is yet to become a constructive platform for dialogue on fostering economic activities in the region. The AEC foundational documents determine the structure and the course of action of the organization. The article, nevertheless, suggests that the executives and the Secretary of this newly established international forum ensure that business representatives, committed to conducting activities in the Arctic, seek to comply with international environmental standards, applicable to the Arctic, namely, the exchange of best practices, with due account of the unique vulnerability of the Arctic environment. Moreover, in view of the growth in shipping and other marine activities in the region, Arctic business standards need to be more environmentally oriented, while also taking into account the possibility of diversifying the Arctic economy. The AEC could focus its efforts on enhancing the quality of regional regulation of the economic activities in the Arctic, paying particular attention to the coordinated self-regulative measures of the legal entities in different countries. In this case, its activities may prove to be more relevant and effective.

The Nordic Embrace:Why the Nordic Countries Welcome Asia to the Arctic Table Leiv Lunde (bio) A range of Asian countries—China, India, Japan, Singapore, and South Korea—were welcomed by the Arctic countries as observers to the Arctic Council in May 2013. This was a controversial decision long resisted by Arctic powers Russia and Canada, with the United States undecided until right before the final decision. The Nordic countries, on the other hand, led by Norway, emphasized the positive aspects of Asia’s interest and saw the region’s greater participation in Arctic affairs as strengthening governance and making the Arctic Council a more relevant and future-oriented forum. This essay examines the Nordic countries—Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden—as Arctic nations and describes their Arctic geography, identity, and economic, political, and security interests. It then seeks to explain the Nordic countries’ basically positive attitude toward Asian involvement in the Arctic, while also identifying the limits and elements of skepticism that still exist. In concluding, the essay looks into the future and discusses challenges and opportunities for the Nordic countries arising from increased Asian ventures into Arctic lands and waters. Nordic Arctic Interests There are commonalities as well as differences in the Nordic countries’ Arctic interests. The commonalities among the Nordic states are most striking: history, geography, culture, trade, and politics today knit them closely together such that they cooperate intimately in Nordic as well as international institutions. Sweden and Norway fought a brief war in 1814 and were on the verge of war as recently as 1905. Yet despite this history, as well as their different experiences during World War II and varying security alliances to date, the Nordic countries enjoy strong and peaceful cooperation along virtually every thinkable dimension. Yet one of the surprises meeting the Asian countries in their quest for Nordic support for their participation in the Arctic Council was the relative lack of a formal Arctic identity in the Nordic region. Arctic politics [End Page 39] is decided in the capitals located far south of the Arctic, and there are no Arctic budgets or regional planning units in national ministries. Even the small minority of indigenous peoples in the high north (mainly the Saami people) pay their taxes to the national governments, and the majority of the Arctic Nordic populations view themselves primarily as national citizens rather than Arctic citizens in any significant sense. Nevertheless, the Arctic matters a lot to the Nordic countries, and increasingly so in the wake of growing global attention to the region’s affairs. A potentially important difference between these states stems from Norway and Iceland not being members of the European Union (EU). Back in May 2013, for example, the admittance of the five Asian countries to the Arctic Council hung in the balance partly due to a spat between the EU (also an applicant for a formal observer role) and Canada over seal hunting. Canada is furious at the EU for boycotting Canadian sealskin production, which is seen as a traditional custom and important business opportunity in Canada’s Arctic region. Although the Nordic EU members found this spat frustratingly difficult and were skeptical of some of the EU’s reasoning, they had to align with Brussels. For this and other reasons, Norway became a major broker in Kiruna, ensuring that a decision was made. The Asian countries, along with Italy, were accepted as formal observers, while the EU still must wait in the wings for some hard-won concessions from intransigent Canada—the current Arctic Council president. The differences among the Nordic countries—which again are moderate and should be seen in a holistic context—are mainly due to three factors: • Geography. Some Nordic countries are Arctic coastal states, while others are not. • Economy. The level of economic activity and interest in the Arctic differs significantly among the Nordic countries. • Political and security alliances. Norway and Iceland are outside the EU, while Finland and Sweden remain outside NATO. Norway is by most definitions the most important Nordic Arctic country, trailing only Russia in global Arctic significance. Mainland Norway includes considerable land, coast, and ocean areas that reside north of the Arctic Circle...

China's Arctic Policy and Engagement:Review and Prospects Yitong Chen (bio) The Arctic is experiencing greatly accelerated change under the influence of climate change, economic globalization, and world power shifts. After China became an official observer state of the Arctic Council in 2013, its involvement in Arctic affairs has grown increasingly and intensively. It has been particularly prominent in three areas: science, economics, and governance. When China became an observer state, few people could have predicted the extent to which the world would change over the next decade. At that time, China did not stand out so much from the other four new observer countries in Asia (Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and India). Features such as Japan's close scientific cooperation with Arctic countries, South Korea's shipbuilding skills, and Singapore's important shipping position are why they have been granted observer status. A year later, however, a series of black swan events occurred, starting with the Crimean crisis in 2014. Like dominoes, the world landscape has since shifted dramatically. In 2016, Britain announced its departure from the European Union, while Donald Trump was elected president of the United States. After then U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo delivered an infamous speech at the ministerial meeting in 2019 warning China and Russia against "aggressive behavior," the Arctic Council closed for the first time without issuing a joint statement.1 In the speech, Pompeo used metaphorical and parallel questions to warn about China's presence in the Arctic, such as "Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims?"2 However, this situation cannot happen because China has no legal right to claim any territorial sovereignty in the Arctic. Moreover, the only territorial dispute in the Arctic—over the small island Hans Island between Canada [End Page 29] and Denmark (via Greenland)—was peacefully settled with an agreement.3 When Covid-19 arrived, China was the first to respond with a strict epidemic prevention policy, but the country also entered a three-year self-imposed quarantine that slowed communication with the international community. At the same time, however, China has further deepened cooperation with Russia. In February 2022, after meeting at the Winter Olympics opening ceremony in Beijing, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin issued a joint statement that announced their intention to develop a "polycentric world order."4 The world now is a very different place than it was in 2013. China released its official white paper on Arctic policy in 2018.5 The white paper marked the culmination of a five-year period of gradual outreach and initial involvement in the Arctic governance arena as an Arctic Council observer state. Therefore, its release announced the beginning of the first year of the country's full participation in Arctic affairs in a mature and steady manner, guided by defined objectives and principles. This essay reviews China's involvement in Arctic affairs, using the white paper as a blueprint. Following a discussion of China's Arctic identity, the subsequent two sections concentrate on Arctic science and technology development and international cooperation in polar science. The essay then concludes by commenting on the implications of the current Russia-Ukraine conflict for Arctic governance and China's position and prospects in the region. China's Identity in the Arctic If there were keywords to describe China's identity in the Arctic, they would be "near-Arctic state" and "stakeholder." The logic behind the description of China as a near-Arctic state is that it is one of the continental states closest to the Arctic Circle. The proximity is not only geographic. Environmental changes in the Arctic have caused a series of direct impacts in China as well as indirect implications for its economic interests in agriculture, forestry, fishery, marine industry, and other sectors. [End Page 30] The white paper has to some extent responded to long-standing international speculation and questions about China's Arctic position and whether China will disrupt the established international order in the Arctic. However, China's self-perception as a near-Arctic state remains the most attacked concept in the paper. For example, one scholar...

The article analyzes the role of China in the most important areas of international scientific cooperation in the Arctic, in which non-Arctic players are involved along with the Arctic countries. The legal basis for scientific cooperation in the Arctic is the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the other is the Arctic Council. In 2013, China became the official observer state of the Arctic Council, thus taking an important step towards participating in Arctic international cooperation. Despite the fact that China is a non-Arctic country, factors such as climate change in the Arctic, the prospects for the development of the region’s resources and the Arctic Channel contribute to China’s interest in the Arctic and its policy towards the region. Taking into account the interests of China in the Arctic, as well as the legal framework and responsibility in the Arctic, under the existing mechanisms of international cooperation in the Arctic, China is involved in a number of Arctic international scientific research, mainly in the field of natural sciences. At the same time, China introduced its new platform for international cooperation in the Arctic – the Polar Silk Road, which is making some progress in international scientific cooperation.

This article focuses on the question to what extent wilderness protection receives attention in the international governance systems for the Polar Regions (Arctic Council and Antarctic Treaty System). First, on the basis of a definition of the term ‘wilderness’, the role of law in protecting wilderness is discussed. Next, attention is focused on wilderness protection in the Arctic and Antarctic. It is concluded that the international governance systems pay very little attention to the preservation of the Polar Regions as the last relatively untouched wildernesses on earth. The applicability of various multilateral environmental agreements (particularly the Arctic) is not very helpful in this respect as wilderness protection does not receive substantial attention in these legal instruments either. In view of the broad acknowledgement of the wilderness values of the Polar Regions and the fast increase of commercial activities in these regions, the author urges stakeholders involved in the Arctic Council and the Antarctic Treaty System to open the debate on relevant questions: What are wilderness values in the context of the Polar Regions and when would these values be affected? For the Arctic, how could wilderness protection be integrated in the efforts regarding sustainable development to ensure the right balance between wilderness protection and the protection of indigenous peoples rights? The questions are certainly complex; however, excluding these questions from the international governance debate with the argument that the concept is too vague, subjective or sensitive will most certainly result in a continuing loss of untouched nature, both in the Arctic and Antarctic.

India became an observer in Arctic Council in 2013 and has three research stations operational in the poles, including “Maitri” commissioned in 1989 and “Bharati” commissioned in 2012 at Antarctic and “Himadri” at Arctic. Though the Government of India has consistently been extending full support to the research endeavours yet the same is bogged by inadequate research output, lack of dedicated polar research vessel and other bureaucratic bottlenecks. A massive void in the Indian scientific pursuits is that India does not possess a polar research vessel or an icebreaker and has to rely on chartered vessels, seriously limiting its research timeframe as well as huge economic drain and thus compromising the scientific research. This cleft in the professed research narrative despite having a physical presence for over 3 decades in the polar regions and the proposal for acquisition of a polar research vessel having been approved in Jun 2010 yet the same is yet to be operationalised which is seriously impinging the scientific research as well as the professed commitment to Arctic research.Recently, India has released its draft Arctic Policy and had sought public comments thereon till 26 Jan 21 before its finalisation. India’s draft policy reiterates the oft stated goals of scientific research, connectivity, global governance and international cooperation, and human development with emphasis on Indian human resource pool. The inspiration of a delayed Indian policy on the High North appears to be the Chinese white paper of 2018. The scientific pursuits can propel the strategic engagement in the region to greater levels by extensive collaboration and cooperation with several other nations present there. Indian attempts so far have remained acutely short of the promise and India should build on its strengths for obtaining a leadership position in this strategically vital and economically lucrative region. Citation: Pareek N. Assessment on India’s involvement and capacity-building in Arctic Science. Adv Polar Sci, 2021, 32(1): 50-66, doi: 10.13679/j.advps.2020.0027

This seventh Synthesis with the Science Diplomacy Action serial emerged from the panel session on Arctic Science and Technology Advice with Ministries, which was convened during the Arctic Circle Japan Forum in Tokyo on 5 March 2023. This session built on transdisciplinary dialogues with the February-March 2022 webinar series on Enhancing International Scientific Cooperation: Arctic Science and Technology Advice with Ministries, which was funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan with coordination and logistics provided by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), as represented in Synthesis 6. Dialogues in both venues were strongly influence by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ongoing war with consequences for international Arctic scientific cooperation, as reflected by the 3 March 2022 “pausing” of the Arctic Council. With this background, the Arctic Circle Japan Forum session addressed three questions: 1. How can nations maintain as well as enhance international Arctic scientific cooperation, especially in the context of Open Science? 2. How can individual scientists work with ministries to build Open Science inclusively during times of geopolitical strain? 3. How can ministries facilitate continuity with the Arctic Council inclusively beyond the Arctic Council chairship rotation from Russia to Norway in May 2023? The panel involved leaders from the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research, International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC), National Institute for Polar Research (NIPR), Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Science Diplomacy Center™ and the University of the Arctic (UArctic). Panelists’ international perspectives from Finland, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States are represented in the transcript of their panel dialogue, which is reproduced herein to provide insights about continuity with international scientific cooperation and Open Science inclusively to achieve progress with Pan-Arctic sustainable development.

Rapidly melting sea ice and thereto related access to formerly ice-covered petroleum reserves and future shipping lanes place the Polar Regions (particularly the Arctic) at the nexus of discourses on geopolitics and on the Anthropocene. Against this background, various studies across distinct fields in the social sciences have focused on polar politics mostly from a state-centric perspective but often neglected the growing significance of non-state actors in regional cooperation. This article discusses how state actors who formerly shaped and to this day dominate regional polar politics increasingly rely on the expertise, knowledge and financial resources of non-state actors (NGOs, private actors and rightsholder groups) in order to meet the complex multi-level challenges arising from environmental changes in both Polar Regions. The article relates particularly to the thematic field of oil and gas development, which is regarded as a driver of environmental changes in the Anthropocene and to which the Polar Regions (also known as “Climate Change Barometers” due to their vulnerability to environmental change) are very sensitive. As this is a current concern controversially discussed particularly in view of the changing Arctic (oil and gas development is prohibited in Antarctica at least until 2048), this article draws particularly on empirical findings from policy-making in the Arctic Council. To illustrate the scope of the argument, however, this article also considers the role of non-state actors in the Antarctic Treaty System and shows how through the inclusion of non-state actors political constellations have changed in polar politics. Against this backdrop, this article argues that the growing significance of non-state actors in polar regional cooperation indicates how the general say of state and non-state actors in international politics likely changes in the light of the age of the Anthropocene.

The article analyzes the evolution of China's Arctic policy, which has expanded over three decades from individual polar research to observer status in the Arctic Council and the existence of a state Arctic strategy. China and Russia have established mutually beneficial cooperation in the Arctic region in such conditions, when in many areas there are fundamental contradictions between the countries. The West did not have a long-term strategy capable of responding to current security challenges, including in the Arctic. When Russia tried to regain lost positions on the world stage in 2007-2008, China became an increasingly influential player in the world. If before the Arctic had been outside the lines of rivalry for decades, the question of the Far North as an arena of military competition began to take first place. China has become a long-term threat to both the United States and Russia. In previous years, with the help of the China, Moscow had the opportunity to receive the necessary investments and technologies for large-scale Arctic projects. The more Beijing attempts to establish itself as an influential player in the Arctic, the more the threat to other Arctic countries will grow. The Russian Federation has positioned itself as a leader in the region. The country's policy was aimed at strengthening this status through regional control and expansion of the military presence. This led to a response from the United States and NATO countries. In Russia it was assessed as a threat. The question arises as to what the strategy of the United States should be, and whether it will be possible to resist the costly arms race. If not, then the competition will be concentrated in the political and economic spheres. A particular aspect is the rapid militarization of the Arctic region after 2014, primarily due to changes in Russia's military strategy, which extends to the North. This has led to the tensions between the United States and Russia. China has not yet resorted to expand its military power in the Arctic. China's policy of economic and infrastructural influence is opposed to military methods. The effectiveness of Chinese non-military methods of influence is assessed

Oil spill response in the Arctic: Norwegian experiences and future perspectives

The World Wide Fund for Nature/World Wildlife Fund (WWF) is one of the most recognizable international environmental non-governmental organizations in the world. The iconic panda symbol is known around the globe but in recent years a different bear has taken centre stage in the organization’s international work: the polar bear. The Arctic has become one of the organization’s key focus areas in the twenty-first century, but what the general public is less aware of is the fact that WWF has been involved in its northern work for decades. Within academic literature about WWF’s Arctic and northern engagement, much attention is given to cursory references to the organization’s participation as an observer within the Arctic region’s pre-eminent forum for environmental protection and economic development work – the Arctic Council. This book delves into the work of WWF in the Arctic and the North and focuses on how it has built its role in regional discussions and decision-making in order to engage different local, national, regional and international audiences.

The strengthening of Germany's position after 1990 allowed it to expand its geopolitical ambitions in regions previously little included in the foreign policy agenda of Germany. One of these regions has become the Arctic, the development and study of which takes place through participation in international Arctic organizations, as well as through bilateral agreements with Arctic states. However, at the end of the twentieth century, until 2013, Germany's Arctic position can be characterized as unambitious and passive, due to the lack of funding for German delegations to participate in Arctic Council working groups, insufficient coordination policy between federal ministries and agencies whose areas include the development and implementation of Arctic policy, as well as the lack of common interest in the implementation of national priorities in the region through the structures of the Arctic Council. Germany participates in the development of projects mainly related to ecology. This position creates a favorable image of Germany as the patron saint of the Arctic, which does not detract from the scientific value of German climate and environmental research. For the Arctic policy of Germany, it is also characteristic to involve broad segments of society in scientific research, thereby instilling the idea of a stable German presence in the Arctic.