Intentionalistic Explanations in the Social Sciences

ABSTRACTBrian Epstein’s The Ant Trap is a praiseworthy addition to literature on social ontology and the philosophy of social sciences. Its central aim is to challenge received views about the social world – views with which social scientists and philosophers have aimed to answer questions about the nature of social science and about those things that social sciences aim to model and explain, like social facts, objects and phenomena. The received views that Epstein critiques deal with these issues in an overly people-centered manner. After all, even though social facts and phenomena clearly involve individual people arranged in certain ways, we must still spell out how people are involved in social facts and phenomena. There are many metaphysical questions about social properties, relations, dependence, constitution, causation, and facts that cannot be answered (for instance) just be looking at individual people alone. In order to answer questions about (e.g.) how one social entity depends for its existence on another, we need different metaphysical tools. Epstein thus holds that social ontological explanations would greatly benefit from making use of the theoretical toolkit that contemporary analytical metaphysics has to offer. He focuses specifically on two metaphysical instruments: grounding and anchoring. This paper examines Epstein’s understanding and use of these tools. I contend that Epstein is exactly right to say that contemporary metaphysics contains many theoretical instruments that can be fruitfully applied to social ontological analyses. However, I am unconvinced that Epstein’s tools achieve what they set out to do. In particular, I will address two issues: (1) How is grounding for Epstein meant to work? (2) Is anchoring distinct from grounding, and a relation that we need in social ontology?

The view that social sciences are very different from other forms of science is common, hence the need to develop special methods. In section 1.1 it is argued that, although there are some important differences, modern developments both in social sciences and in what are called here natural sciences tend to reduce them, pointing towards a common methodological framework. This idea serves as an introduction to further sections where the scientific method for the social sciences is outlined, and then is shown the role that models play in it. Natural and social sciences: the hypothesis of convergency Traditionally, social sciences have been considered a very special form of science, different from biology, physics or natural sciences in general. Many arguments are put forward to support this distinction. By contrast, social phenomena are considered to be ever:changing. It may well be that in natural sciences theories themselves change and old ones are replaced by new ones, but once adopted, they are considered as permanent. If social phenomena are ever:changing, social theories may be valid only for a short period of time; that is, they have a particular historical reference. Because it is generally assumed that natural phenomena are permanent, theories that successfully explain their past behaviour have strong predictive power. In social sciences, even if a theory has been very successful in explaining a phenomenon that occurred in the past, it can only provide predictions as long as the historical conditions prevail. Another difference that is commonly pointed out is that natural phenomena can be reproduced in the controlled conditions of a laboratory, which isolates them from unwanted externalities. The use of experiments has become a key element in the creation of knowledge in natural sciences.

The debate about explanations in social and human sciences is multifaceted. In my view the fundamental dispute concerns deep metaphysical convictions about the relations between individuals and society and how one conceives a human being, a person. The dividing line goes between those who conceive individual human beings as basically independent of society and other persons, (which seems to be implicit in the liberal political tradition), and those who rejects this view, holding that a human being is constituted by its social relations. The former view is taken for granted by thinkers in the liberal tradition, and latter view is clearly expressed by Marx and is also stated by Aristotle. These views give rise to different methodological views regarding scientific explanations; those who conceive man to be constituted by its social relations are naturally methodological collectivists, while those who think of people as independent individuals are methodological individualists. The difference concerns what is explanans and explanandum: collectivists hold that explanans are social structures and explanandum consists of individual’s actions, whereas methodological individualists have it the other way round: explanans consists of individual’s actions and explanandum consists of social structures and facts.

A biologist and an anthropologist use evolutionary biology to explain the causes and inform the prevention of rape. In this controversial book, Randy Thornhill and Craig Palmer use evolutionary biology to explain the causes of rape and to recommend new approaches to its prevention. According to Thornhill and Palmer, evolved adaptation of some sort gives rise to rape; the main evolutionary question is whether rape is an adaptation itself or a by-product of other adaptations. Regardless of the answer, Thornhill and Palmer note, rape circumvents a central feature of women's reproductive strategy: mate choice. This is a primary reason why rape is devastating to its victims, especially young women. Thornhill and Palmer address, and claim to demolish scientifically, many myths about rape bred by social science theory over the past twenty-five years. The popular contention that rapists are not motivated by sexual desire is, they argue, scientifically inaccurate. Although they argue that rape is biological, Thornhill and Palmer do not view it as inevitable. Their recommendations for rape prevention include teaching young males not to rape, punishing rape more severely, and studying the effectiveness of chemical castration. They also recommend that young women consider the biological causes of rape when making decisions about dress, appearance, and social activities. Rape could cease to exist, they argue, only in a society knowledgeable about its evolutionary causes. The book includes a useful summary of evolutionary theory and a comparison of evolutionary biology's and social science's explanations of human behavior. The authors argue for the greater explanatory power and practical usefulness of evolutionary biology. The book is sure to stir up discussion both on the specific topic of rape and on the larger issues of how we understand and influence human behavior.

ABSTRACT.Several key elements go into Searle's construction of social reality, namely, collective intentionality, constitutive rules, and status functions. But by far the most important and arguably contentious of these is collective intentionality. Searle postulates his notion of collective intentionality as a solution to a conflict between two of his own problematic claims: the irreducibility of collective intentions to singular intentions and what he sees as the requirements of methodological individualism. According to Searle, methodological individualism seems to require that we reduce collective intentionality to individual intentionality; however, this contradicts his claim that collective intentionality is irreducible to individual intentionality plus some mutual beliefs. I will show that at least part of what is really at stake here is Searle's internalism or, as he puts it, his “brain in a vat condition.” My strategy will be to examine his internalism and show that Searle's account is far more radical than other internalists in that he extends internalism beyond its usual domain of the mental to incorporate social facts. While there are no knockdown arguments in favor of either internalism or externalism as normally construed in the philosophy of mind, I will show that Searle's account of collective intentionality introduces an element of privacy to social facts that denies us the public access to the conditions on the basis of which we normally take collective facts to obtain.

In this paper we examine the question of whether complexity-like explanations can be applied to the psychology of individuals, and its implications for the scope of complexity explanations of social phenomena. We start by outlining two representational-cum-computational models of the mind—a symbolic model and a networks or connectionist one—and their pros and cons. Based on this we then outline a radical, non-representational and non-computational alternative model that has been gaining ground recently, and which has significant affinities with complexity explanations in social science. Deploying neo-Kantian considerations, we then argue that due to the discursivity, or conceptual dimension of our cognitive system, the radical alternative must be incorrect insofar as humans are concerned. Indeed, human psychology must involve, at least partly, a representational understanding of the sort provided by the symbolic model. Relatedly, we show how the discursiviry of human cognition complicates our psychology and makes it difficult to account for. Finally, we briefly address the question of how the complicated nature of individual psychology, implied by human discursivity, may affect complexity explanations of social behavior.

There was proximity between natural and social science in the history.It couldn't be say that, this proximity continues now.Because sciencis were divided into specialist areas.Scholar who lived even in the middle age or new ages could have profound knowledge in the field of social sciences and natural sciences.While explaining social science scholars that could benefit from the basic information in the field of natürel science.Social science concepts can be intangible.At this point it may be necessary to explain some concepts concretization.It makes it easier to understand and permanence of the affects if we tell you a thing or terminology by concretizing.For this, social science was used from natural science terminology that time to time.We could give some example for this hypothesis.An example of relationship between sociology and biology or political science and sociology-biology-physics which was particularly marked.Especially middle age and eastern scientists have put forward opinions about relationship between social and natural science.For example, Ibn Khaldun, likened the individual to the state.These smilarities has established relevance between science of political and science of biology.On the other side the west scholars have demonstrated many examples of ideas or hypotheses that relationship in new age.

Complex legal issues often involve contested facts that require expert knowledge. In such cases, legal decision makers look to experts from fields as diverse as the behavioral, social, biomedical, or physical sciences to help settle disputes. More Than the Law provides a fascinating and accessible introduction for students and other readers to the ways in which behavioral and social knowledge can and should inform legal decisions, as well as ways in which such knowledge can be misused. Eleven different stories are presented, highlighting major legal decisions such as mandatory testing for drug use in schools, abortion, use of the death penalty, and jury selection, among others. Chapters include a presentation of each decision and an analysis that critically explores the behavioral and social facts relevant to the case. Through these stories, students will discover the complexities and problems that can result from the application of behavioral science to legal decisions. Behavioral and social science experts will come to understand the special duty they bear to provide legal decision makers with the most accurate information available. And empirical researchers will recognize vast opportunities for research that could have a real impact in the courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies. This exceptional book fills a gap in the field of legal studies, offering a sophisticated examination of the use of behavioral and social science facts in judicial, legislative, and administrative determinations.

Sociology is a social science which is the last result of knowledge development. Furthermore, the sociology of literature is applied in the research because it increases the understanding of literature in relation to society, explains that imagery is not contrary to reality although literary works are imaginatively consumed, but the imaginative framework cannot be understood outside the empirical framework and literary work is not merely an individual symptom but a social phenomenon. The objective of this study is to find out and to describe the elements of sociology of literature in short story Senyum yang Kekal created by Korrie Layun Rampan. Technically, this study discussed the relation between literature and sociology; also, this study used sociological methods by describing the facts and characteristics related to population or particular areas systematically and accurately. Hereafter, this paper explained several aspects such as: (1) introduction; (2) discussion and description which included (a) sociological aspects such as social facts, social history, social behavior and social event, and (b) literature aspects as a social condition such as jobs, residence, customs, and romance; and (3) closure.

Understanding the reciprocal interactions between humans and marine ecosystems has several fundamental difficulties, in particular compatible methodologies and different analytical scales. The issue of scale is central, as the scales chosen for studies of marine systems and human interactions can constrain recognition of the drivers and responses of these systems to global changes. The essential task is to discover how to combine social and natural science scale analyses to understand the impact of natural systems on people and the impact of people on natural systems. We identify characteristic spatial, temporal and organizational scales in marine ecosystems and human interactions, and the difficulties inherent in their cross‐disciplinary application. An approach is suggested focusing on communities of fish and fishers that makes explicit: (1) the need to manage marine resources in such a way as to encompass global to local scales; (2) recognition of the complementary nature of organizational scales between the natural and social sciences and use of appropriate natural science scales in the development of management policies; (3) the need to be aware of shifting temporal baselines and the representative nature of the data over time, for both social and natural sciences; and (4) caution regarding predictive models when humans are included. In terms of methodologies, good scale matches occur across large‐scale social and natural science models and surveys, but problems remain in small‐scale qualitative social studies and in cross‐scale studies. Cumulative case studies appear to provide the best approach, although ‘integrating up’ remains a challenge. Natural and social scientists need to work together to identify these issues of ecosystem processes and human interactions, and their appropriate scales.

Interdisciplinary research within the field of sustainability studies often faces incompatible ontological assumptions deriving from natural and social sciences. The importance of this fact is often underrated and sometimes leads to the wrong strategies. We distinguish between two broad approaches in interdisciplinarity: unificationism and pluralism. Unificationism seeks unification and perceives disciplinary boundaries as conventional, representing no long-term obstacle to progress, whereas pluralism emphasizes more ephemeral and transient interdisciplinary connections and underscores the autonomy of the disciplines with respect to one another. Both approaches have their merits and pitfalls. Unification runs the risk of scientific imperialism, while pluralism can result in insurmountable barriers between disciplines. We made a comparison of eight distinct interdisciplinary attempts at integration of knowledge across social and natural sciences. The comparison was carried out as four pairwise comparisons: environmental economics versus ecological economics, environmental history versus historical ecology, resilience theory versus political ecology, and socio-biology versus actor-network theory. We conclude by showing that none of these prominent eight interdisciplinary fields in and of itself manages to provide, in a satisfactory way, such an integrated understanding of sustainability. We argue for pluralism and advocate complex ways of articulating divergent ontological assumptions. This is not equivalent to pursuing knowledge unification either through scientific imperialism or by catering to the requirements of narrow practical utility. It means prioritizing interdisciplinary integration by simultaneously acknowledging the role of societal and natural factors in accounting for sustainability issues.

This chapter discusses the inferiority complex status of social sciences when compared to natural sciences. The social sciences and the natural sciences are compared and contrasted on many scores, and the discussions are often quite unsystematic. If one tries to review them systematically, one shall encounter a good deal of overlap and unavoidable duplication. Nonetheless, it will help if one enumerates in advance some of the grounds of comparison most often mentioned—grounds on which the social sciences are judged to come out second best. There is a great deal of truth, and important truth, in this comparison. Some philosophers were so impressed with the invariance of nature and the variability of social phenomena that they used this difference as the criterion in the definitions of natural and cultural sciences. This implies a rejection of the contention that all fields that are normally called social sciences suffer from a lack of invariance; indeed, economics is here considered so much a matter of immutable laws of nature that it is handed over to the natural sciences.

In this article, we are trying to grasp the role of hisroricism in the understanding of epistemology in the late of XX century. From Bacon to enlightenment, it has been understood that the only criterion of science based on natural sciences. The extent of science has also been determined as study according to the method of the natural sciences, therefore the sciences concerned with history and society has also determined according to method of the natural sciences. In this article authors aims to introduce to movement called Historicism. Which is emerged in XIX century as a critical viewpoint against classical approach to the science. Most influential figure of this movement was German thinker Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey had an anti-positivist attitude towards the established methodology by natural science. Which was saying that in order to be a science every researcher must have rigorous set of rules and their research must based on experiment results, observable facts, and objective evidence. Starting from Dilthey and with help of other philosophical schools new movement called historicism starts its journey to establishing new methodology to human and social science. And this movement made a classification of science. They divided science into natural and spiritual science. Each of science has its own methods and object of study. They believed that to social and human study we cannot apply natural science methods of research due to it is not a physical or biological subject but it is social life and human destiny and history. Considering this process of change, is it possible to talk about historicism as a contemporary epistemological approach? As a methodology, can we talk about history in the separation of positive science? What is the subject of history in social and human sciences? By moving from this questions, we will try to understand the role of historicism in the contemprory philosophy on the hermeneutical phenomenological approach.

ion. 5. Positivism/non-(post-, anti-) positivism. A breach with positivism was no more required. is thus not unusual to find early Parsons embracing analytical theory and upholding, simultaneously, methodological model of natural sciences and, with it, search for uniform laws. The interpretive literature runs to opposite extremes on question of Parsons's positivism because it takes now analytical theory, now natural-scientific model as main focus, when to Parsons two strands were one. It is natural sciences, he wrote generalized [analytical] theory present sense-the sense required for progress of social sciences-has been most highly developed past (1937b, p. 623; 1937c, pp. 18-19). Among attractions to him of analytical method of neoclassical economics was its closenesss] form to th[is] natural science model; and by developing an equivalent method for sociology, he hoped to situate his field methodological company of sciences like theoretical physics, chemistry and general biology (1937b, pp. 301, 598). Commentators who claim that Parsons viewed social and natural sciences as distinct method contradict his stated position here (see 1937b, pp. 595, 622). 14 Misleading, as well, have been those scholars who acknowledge Parsons's belief unity of method, but contend that by conjoining this to a program of analysis and theory, he produced a synthesis of positivism and other traditions that transcended former. The historical evidence suggests that Parsons did no such thing. To champion analytical theory within his context was not to surpass positivism, but simply to throw off comparatively atheoretical brief for approach that was furnished by those like institutionalists and to align oneself with a more up-to-date and nuanced case on positivism's behalf. Parsons said as much his neglected writings on Pareto. In Parsons's view, Pareto set out to make economics and sociology positive sciences on model of physical sciences; he did 12 Common sense itself, Parsons suggested, is an amalgam of aphorisms and statements about what experience has taught men to expect (1936a, p. 359). 13 His adherence to this point of view should make one cautious of accepting prevalent opinion that, matters of method, early Parsons was a Kantian-at least insofar as is equated with epistemological activism on part of scientist. is true that, toward end of his career, Parsons welcomed attention by scholars to his 'epistemological activism' (1978a, pp. 1353-54; see also 1974a); but prior to this, nowhere, according to Bershady (1973, p. 72), had Parsons ever acknowledged followingn] Kant's procedure. In Structure, Parsons set his own position apart from (what he curiously called) empiricism, stating that in Kant's time view of analytical abstraction [advocated Structure] was not known (1937b, pp. 474, n. 1, 597; see also 1965, p. 180). Even amid his late positive assessment of Kant, Parsons insisted that he would modify Kantian stance so as to salvag[e] concept of empirical ordering (1978b, p. 400). 14 In Parsons's view, the differences [between natural and social sciences] all lie on a substantive level sense that there are basic substantive differences between concrete phenomena involved behavior of stars and of human beings (1937b, pp. 591, 623). To neglect these latter differences, to ignore human voluntaristic domain of ends, values, and like-the domain so vital campaign for sociology-was to succumb to extreme positivistic thinking; and this, of course, was a brand of (positivist) thought that Parsons strongly opposed. Treatment of this substantive issue, however, lies outside bounds of

Core contributions from John Hagan’s scholarship on genocide are at stake in this article. First, this article examines, for the Rwandan genocide, the applicability of Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond’s multi-level causal model of genocide, developed in Darfur and the Crime of Genocide. Asking how causal factors and processes highlighted in that model play out in scholarship on the Rwandan genocide, it moves toward answering the question of external validity versus historical specificity. Second, the article examines, again with a focus on Rwanda, the relationship between social scientific explanation and judicial thought. While it highlights—in line with the first author’s previous work—how judicial narratives address or select out core factors highlighted in the Darfur model, the article focuses—in line with Hagan’s Justice in the Balkans—on the question of what knowledge social science can nevertheless gain from court proceedings. An analysis of a sample of cases processed by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda identifies overlaps with social science analyses, but it also highlights distinctions.