Introduction: South Korea–China Relations

China and South Korea have come a long way since they were adversaries. The arc of their relationship since the late 1970s is an excellent model of East-West cooperation and, at the same time, highlights the growing impact of China's "rise" over its regional neighbors, including America's close allies. South Korea-China relations have rarely been studied as an independent theme. The accumulation of more than fifteen years of research, Between Ally and Partner reconstructs a comprehensive portrait of Sino-Korean rapprochement and examines the strategic dilemma that the rise of China has posed for South Korea and its alliance with the United States. Jae Ho Chung makes use of declassified government archives, internal reports, and opinion surveys and conducts personal interviews with Korean, Chinese, and American officials. He tackles three questions: Why did South Korea and China reconcile before the end of the cold war? How did rapprochement lay the groundwork for diplomatic normalization? And what will the intersection of security concerns and economic necessity with China mean for South Korea's relationship with its close ally, the United States? The implications of Sino-Korean relations go far beyond the Korean Peninsula. South Korea was caught largely unprepared, both strategically and psychologically, by China's rise, and the dilemma that South Korea now faces has crucial ramifications for many countries in Asia, where attempts to counterbalance China have been rare. Thoroughly investigated and clearly presented, this book answers critical questions concerning what kept these two countries talking and how enmity was transformed into a zeal for partnership.

This book analyses the dynamics of South Korea’s post-Cold War foreign policy through an interpretive approach, which focuses on non-material factors and on the influence of the domestic political traditions of conservatives and progressives on the decision-making process in foreign and security policy. In recent years, the growing economic interdependence among the countries in the region has not mitigated strategic mistrust and intense security competition, creating the so-called ‘Asian paradox’. This challenge has become a major concern especially for South Korea. Seoul, in fact, is ‘trapped’ between the necessary economic interdependence with China and the security alliance with the US: therefore, the ‘Asian paradox,’ in the last few years, has increasingly become a ‘Korean paradox.’
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\nAccording to these premises, the aim of the present volume is to answer to three main and interrelated questions: How have progressive and conservative political traditions in South Korea influenced the country’s foreign and security policy? How has this domestic political divide influenced South Korea’s reactions to the ‘Asian paradox’? How have the orientations of these political traditions shaped continuity and change in the recent administrations?
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\nIn order to comprehensively answer these questions, the book will be divided into two sections. The first lays the foundations of the volume explaining the theoretical framework of the interpretative approach, analysing the emergence of the ‘Asian paradox’ and examining how the different political traditions have influenced the country’s foreign and security policy. The second section deals directly with the main challenges of South Korea’s current foreign policy, with an emphasis on the specific characteristics of the progressive and conservative approaches to these challenges: the North Korean threat, the alliance with the US, the problems between economy and security in dealing with China, the complicated cohabitation with Japan, relations with Russia, and the emerging role of South Korea outside Northeast Asia.

Garlic is widely cultivated and frequently used as a spice in South Korea, due to its characteristic flavor. It is rich in sulfur-containing compounds (for example, allicin) and nonsulfur elements (for example, phosphorus and potassium). During the last few years, the cultivation area of garlic in South Korea has gradually decreased, one of the reasons being the increase in low-priced imported garlic from China. Several studies have reported the discrimination of foods originating from different geographical areas by analyzing their physicochemical properties using various statistical methods. In this study, the differentiation of geographical origin of garlic between South Korea (60 samples) and China (41 samples) was performed by analyzing their physicochemical properties (for example, pH, soluble solid, moisture, free sugars, mineral elements, total flavonoid, and total phenolic contents) combined with statistical methods. The significant difference between domestic garlic from South Korea and imported garlic from China was investigated in terms of pH, moisture content, total flavonoid content, and all trace minerals except for manganese and magnesium. Logistic regression analysis was performed to determine the geographical origin (South Korea or China) of garlic after selecting the appropriate independent variables. As a result, the calculated logistic regression equation from the analysis of copper, iron, phosphorus, zinc, and sucrose contents could be used to determine whether the geographical origin of garlic was South Korea or China. PRACTICAL APPLICATION: Despite being widely used in South Korea, the cultivation area of garlic in South Korea has gradually decreased over the last few years. One of the reasons is the increase in low-priced imported garlic from China. To discriminate the geographical origin of garlic between South Korea and China, analyzed physicochemical properties (that is, Cu, Fe, P, Zn, and sucrose contents) of garlic in combination with logistic regression analysis can be helpful for scientists working on food forensics. This discrimination technique can help to maintain the quality of garlic and prevent economic fraud by confirming the authenticity of garlic from South Korea.

In the wake of the financial crisis in East Asia in the second half of 1997/8, East Asia has taken serious consideration of the prospects for regional community building. Since then, East Asian countries became more competitively engaged with their region. South Korea and Japan, who had limited engagements in foreign/regional policy during the Cold War, developed different responses and approaches toward East Asian regionalism in East Asia. Observing their efforts in building regional cooperation during the period between 1998 and 2007, it is notable that South Korea had been relatively active, whereas Japan had been passive in response to its neighbour’s involvement in the East Asian regional framework, particularly in regard to China’s role in shaping regional cooperation. South Korea’s EU-inspired vision of regional integration and its assimilation of European ideas about regional integration associate strongly with its active engagement in a newly emerged East Asian regionalism. While precedent explanations such as external crises/shocks and external influences can account for the stimulation of regionalism in East Asia, these factors alone cannot explain the different approaches taken by South Korea and Japan to shape regional cooperation frameworks. In order to solve the puzzle, the thesis investigates two specific questions: (1) How can we explain South Korea’s active engagement with (North) East Asian regionalism in contrast to Japan’s passive, reluctant involvement? (2) Why have European ideas concerning regional integration been accepted by South Korea but ignored by Japan? Drawing on four mechanisms of diffusion (coercion, competition, lesson- drawing, emulation), this thesis tries to explain the differential approaches of South Korea and Japan towards East Asian regionalism. Although the mechanisms of coercion and competition do not give satisfactory explanations for the different approaches of the two countries, both the role of the US (coercion) and the rise of China (competition) should be considered as significant explanatory factors which still prevail in South Korea and Japan. Therefore, the thesis incorporates structural conditions and domestic constraints which mediate the impact of coercion and competition on South Korea and Japan into the theoretical framework. The empirical part of the thesis analyzes the differential approaches of the two countries in light of the theoretical framework. By complementing inductive narrative and process tracing, this dissertation employs comparative analysis of different stances of South Korea and Japan toward East Asian regionalism during the period 1998-2007. This thesis argues that South Korea was inspired to form policy ideas concerning regionalism by drawing lessons from the European experience and emulating European ideas concerning regional integration. It is this which explains South Korea’s active participation as a pace-setter in regional cooperation arrangements as well as FTAs. Japan, however, has taken an ambivalent and unstable stance toward East Asian regionalism. It has lacked policy ideas, followed the dictates of U.S. interests in the region, and only became involved in regionalism as a means to oppose China’s rise to prominence. Whilst, South Korean leaders developed policy ideas for regionalism and attempted to overcome its structural condition and domestic constraint such as national division by balancing its relations with the United States and China, the Japanese, under Koizumi, reinforced the U.S.-Japan alliance and displayed indifference or ignorance toward their neighbours. This thesis provides not only explanations for the two countries’ differential approaches toward East Asian regionalism, but also advances a plausible account of how European ideas concerning regional integration were transmitted to South Korea´s political leaders.

Early Response to COVID-19

This study investigated the effect of the concentration of ambient fine particulate matter , a transboundary air pollutant, on the livability of neighboring areas of China and South Korea with the aim of informing common policy development. Grey relational analysis (GRA) and panel regression analysis were performed to examine the effect of concentration on various livability indicators. The results revealed that urban living infrastructure was an indicator of effect in both South Korea and China. Based on the high correlation between urban living infrastructure and concentration, it can be seen that clearly affects livability, shown by panel regression analysis. Other key livability indicators were traffic safety, culture and leisure, and climate indicators. Spatial analysis of the livability index revealed that from 2015 to 2019, livability improved in both South Korea and China, but there was a clear difference in the spatial distribution in China. High-vulnerability areas showed potential risks that can reduce livability in the long run. In South Korea and China, areas surrounding large cities were found to be highly vulnerable. The findings of this research can guide the establishment of policies grading pollution at the regional or city macro-level.

Purpose - This research is based on South Korea’s direct investment and trade status with China from 1992 to recent years, meaningful in establishing future strategies for China, which entered the New Normal era. Design/methodology/approach - This research used various economic statistics released in South Korea and China to identify the current situation and trends, and to present policy implications for South Korea’s direct investment in China and ways to expand trade. Findings - South Korea’s accumulated direct investment in China is continuing with steady investment, with the total accumulated amount of direct investment in China excluding tax havens and Hong Kong leading to its ranking in fourth place after Japan, Singapore and the U.S. in 2018. Meanwhile, the trade volume between South Korea and China at the time of the normalization of diplomatic ties has increased by 42 times to $268.6 billion as of 2018, with China being South Korea’s largest exporter since 2003 and Korea continuing its status as China’s largest importer since 2013. Research implications - The policy implications of this paper are thus: first, it is necessary to enhance efficiency in accordance with China’s push for “supply side reform”. Second, innovative manufacturing industries are urgently needed to establish industrial strategies in accordance with the implementation of new industrial policies, such as “Chinese Manufacturing 2025”, which is currently being promoted with the trend of the times. Third, it is necessary to find new models that conform to the ‘One-Belt and One-Road’ strategy and which expand cooperation using ‘AIIB’.

For China and the United States, South Korea is an important trading partner, and it is also highly concerned about the Sino-US trade war. Because South Korea's economy relies heavily on the external environment, it has also been impacted to a certain extent by the Sino-US trade war. Although some studies believe that the Sino-US trade war has brought new development opportunities to South Korea, from a practical perspective, South Korea's gross domestic product, export trade, and stock market have been greatly impacted, especially by the intensified competition among big countries and the reshaping of global value chains brought about by the Sino-US trade war. With the intensification of the Sino-US trade war, both China and South Korea should think about how to reduce the influence of Sino-US relations and maintain the stability of Sino-Korean relations. Therefore, South Korea needs to actively adjust its economic policies, speed up the upgrading of its economic cooperation with China, take the initiative to seize the American market, and play a certain role in promoting regional multilateral economic cooperation and economic and trade diversification, especially avoiding taking sides between China and the United States. China, on the other hand, should strengthen its economic and political cooperation with South Korea so as to alleviate other countries' worries about Sino-US competition and the rise of China and thus realise the stable, healthy, and sustainable development of China-South Korea relations.

In the nine years after the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in February 2008, the consensus regarding the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States was that it couldn't be better. Yet with the inauguration of new administrations in both capitals, despite the reaffirmation of each side's commitment to the alliance, there are some concerns and anxieties over North Korea policy, the implications of China's rise for the regional security architecture, and alliance management. In general, the United States is concerned about the possibility that Moon Jae-in will revive Roh Moo-hyun's Sunshine Policy of engagement with North Korea as well as adopt a pro-Chinese orientation and encourage anti-American sentiment. On the other hand, the ROK has concerns about the Trump administration's protectionism, hostile policy toward North Korea that eschews dialogue, unilateralism in the military sphere, and demand for greater burden-sharing.To maintain, strengthen, and upgrade the U.S.-ROK alliance, both Seoul and Washington should work very closely to increase trust and mutual respect and to iron out possible differences over the aforementioned issues. The following discussion will examine the two allies' areas of convergence and divergence on North Korea policy, China's rise, and alliance management. It will then conclude by assessing the prospects for the U.S.-ROK alliance in the aftermath of political transitions in both countries.Consultation and Coordination on North Korea PolicyFor both Washington and Seoul, North Korea's nuclear weapons program remains the most urgent and important challenge. The overall situation in and around the Korean Peninsula is very unstable and intense, as North Korea seeks acceptance as a nuclear state and relevant parties try to force the Kim Jong-un regime to give up its nuclear weapons.At the moment, Washington and Seoul appear to be on the same page in their commitment to a strategy of pressure and engagement. However, each side seems to have some suspicion about the other. The United States is concerned about the possibility that the new ROK government will revive Roh's Sunshine Policy, which strongly emphasized engagement and positive incentives. On the other hand, the Moon administration might have anxieties that the Trump administration's policies will be too militant and aggressive, potentially inducing a series of crises and confrontations without the possibility of dialogue and negotiation.1 Nonetheless, given North Korea's ongoing missile tests and threats to stage another nuclear test, both the United States and ROK are in a common stance of mounting more pressure on North Korea until it shows meaningful signs of denuclearization.At the moment, despite its desire to have some degree of autonomy in dealing with North Korea, South Korea does not have much room to maneuver. It would be difficult for the Moon government to go against the Trump administration's strategy of maximum pressure and engagement and pursue a completely new policy. From the South Korean perspective, the threat posed by North Korea goes beyond nuclear weapons and missiles. Human rights violations, as well as economic and social instability, are among the conventional security issues that must be resolved. Therefore, the United States must not restrict its North Korea policy to the nuclear and missile threats but should adjust its policy to address all of these issues. To gain the support and cooperation of the United States, and to reduce suspicion between the two allies, South Korea should also clarify its vision, strategy, and action plans to handle and solve the North Korea problem.At the same time, the United States and South Korea should discuss and come to an agreement on the level and scope of pressure to be applied and on the conditions, procedures, and agenda for dialogue. The United States is concerned that the Moon administration will rush into a dialogue with Pyongyang and has reservations about reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tours regardless of the progress toward denuclearization. …

The Republic of Korea (ROK) has a unique geostrategic position, sharing its sole land border with its greatest threat, and sandwiched between the region’s two traditional great power rivals in China and Japan. Since the end of World War II, the ROK’s foreign policy has been built on the bedrock of its alliance with the US, deterring threats from North Korea, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In recent years, the rise of China as a regional and world power has presented the ROK with a dilemma: to turn toward the emerging hegemon on its doorstep or to stay with the erstwhile – but increasingly unpredictable and relatively weaker – US. This chapter explores this dilemma, showing that while the ROK has maintained its alliance with the US to ‘hedge’ against the threat of a rising China, it is also the subject of a sustained attempt at a Chinese ‘wedge’, through which the PRC seeks to create division in the US–ROK alliance for its own benefit. While the alliance has thus far resisted, a continuance of the fluctuations in the US’ Asia policy would likely create the conditions under which such a policy might succeed.

Observations during the KORUS-AQ, MAPS-Seoul, and APHH-Beijing field campaigns of 2015-2017 reveal high concentrations of ethanol and methanol in urban air over South Korea and China, with median concentrations of 2-4 ppb for ethanol and 12-18 ppb for methanol. Simulations with the GEOS-Chem model show that these values cannot be captured by current emission inventories. They could originate from volatile chemical products (VCPs). Fitting observed ethanol concentrations with GEOS-Chem would imply per capita VCP emissions 2.4 times higher in South Korea and 1.5 times higher in China than in the U.S. The strong ethanol-methanol correlation suggests a major methanol component in VCP emissions, unlike in the U.S. where methanol use is largely banned. Including these emissions in GEOS-Chem increases the level of surface ozone over South Korea and China by 1-3 ppb. KORUS-AQ aircraft profiles also indicate a high free tropospheric methanol background of 3.2 ppb, which appears to be of terrestrial biospheric origin but cannot be reproduced by GEOS-Chem.

This study delves into the trade relationship between South Korea and China within Vietnam’s ICT market. Empirically examining the changes in import volume from both countries into Vietnam, it uncovers a complex interplay of dependency and competition. The research reveals that an increase in South Korea’s ICT exports to China indirectly boosts China’s export volume to Vietnam, suggesting a mutually dependent trade relationship. Conversely, the rise in China’s ICT exports to Vietnam is found to adversely affect South Korea’s export performance in the Vietnamese market, highlighting a competitive dynamic between the two nations. Under the SITC-76 and SITC-77 categories, South Korea demonstrates a relative comparative advantage. The study also observes a decline in both countries’ export volumes, indicating a shift in the Vietnamese market from a growth phase to maturity as Vietnam’s economy evolves. This transition, alongside the expected decrease in South Korea’s ICT export share, underscores the urgency for South Korean firms to strategically adapt, taking into account the evolving Vietnamese demands and the intricate competitive landscape with China.

Abstract. In this study, NO2 columns from the US EPA Models-3/CMAQ model simulations carried out using the 2001 ACE-ASIA (Asia Pacific Regional Aerosol Characterization Experiment) emission inventory over East Asia were compared with the GOME-derived NO2 columns. There were large discrepancies between the CMAQ-predicted and GOME-derived NO2 columns in the fall and winter seasons. In particular, while the CMAQ-predicted NO2 columns produced larger values than the GOME-derived NO2 columns over South Korea for all four seasons, the CMAQ-predicted NO2 columns produced smaller values than the GOME-derived NO2 columns over North China for all seasons with the exception of summer (summer anomaly). It is believed that there might be some error in the NOx emission estimates as well as uncertainty in the NOx chemical loss rates over North China and South Korea. Regarding the latter, this study further focused on the biogenic VOC (BVOC) emissions that were strongly coupled with NOx chemistry during summer in East Asia. This study also investigated whether the CMAQ-modeled NO2/NOx ratios with the possibly overestimated isoprene emissions were higher than those with reduced isoprene emissions. Although changes in both the NOx chemical loss rates and NO2/NOx ratios from CMAQ-modeling with the different isoprene emissions affected the CMAQ-modeled NO2 levels, the effects were found to be limited, mainly due to the low absolute levels of NO2 in summer. Seasonal variations of the NOx emission fluxes over East Asia were further investigated by a set of sensitivity runs of the CMAQ model. Although the results still exhibited the summer anomaly possibly due to the uncertainties in both NOx-related chemistry in the CMAQ model and the GOME measurements, it is believed that consideration of both the seasonal variations in NOx emissions and the correct BVOC emissions in East Asia are critical. Overall, it is estimated that the NOx emissions are underestimated by ~57.3% in North China and overestimated by ~46.1% in South Korea over an entire year. In order to confirm the uncertainty in NOx emissions, the NOx emissions over South Korea and China were further investigated using the ACE-ASIA, REAS (Regional Emission inventory in ASia), and CAPSS (Clean Air Policy Support System) emission inventories. The comparison between the CMAQ-calculated and GOME-derived NO2 columns indicated that both the ACE-ASIA and REAS inventories have some uncertainty in NOx emissions over North China and South Korea, which can also lead to some errors in modeling the formation of ozone and secondary aerosols in South Korea and North China.

The purpose of this article is to understand China's changing strategic views on North Korea during Hu Jintao's era and to consider the implications for South Korea's policies toward North Korea and China. Sino-North Korea cooperation can be theoretically explained by the alliance transition theory, a modified one from the political realist perspective. The implications of the alliance transition theory are that China would strengthen its alliance with North Korea, seek to weaken the South Korea–U.S. alliance, and induce South Korea to cooperate with China, while preventing North Korea from getting close to the United States. However, it is noteworthy that even in China, there exist various groups of strategic thinking in international relations on China's roles in North Korean issues. North Korea's incessant provocations have effects on mobilizing the Developing Country Diplomacy School as well as the Rising Great Power Diplomacy School against North Korea. Such incidences would soon reverse the...

In 2012, South Korea and India will celebrate 50 years of consular relations that have brought, for both countries, a massive transformation in their bilateral relationship. Although sharing the same tragedy of national partition and an uneasy relationship with China, South Korea and India were for decades at odds with each other. Only in recent years have the two Asian democracies recognised the threats and interests they have in common, which are primarily geared to China's rise. This chapter addresses the political relations between South Korea and India, describing in detail the development of Indo- Korean ties since World War II. It shows the paramount significance of the China factor for the Indo-Korean strategic rapprochement by analysing major common concerns and will discuss both the regional and international implications of the bilateral links between South Korea and India by exploring the prospects of an axis between the two. Keywords:China; India; South Korea's