Introduction

This research explores the acculturation of Sufi values and Javanes mysticism as manifested in the Keduk Beji tradition in Tawun, Ngawi, East Java. Indonesia. Beyond the aim of honoring ancestors by cleaning the sacred well, this tradition contains profound elements of self-cleansing, meditation and communal prayer, along with with mass chanting of dhikr and other sacred ritual processions. Whel many studies focus on religious syncretism. This research is crucial because it offers a unique insight into how a specific local tradition serves as dynamic vehicle for spiritual transformation and social cohesion amidst the pressures of modernization. The process of writing this article uses a qualitative approach with the type of anthropology. This research applies Peter L.’s social construction theory through the collection of primary and secondary data, aiming to construct a deeper understanding. Berger & Thomas Luckman. This theory consists of subjective reality, symbolic reality, objective reality, as well as extrenalization, objectification and internalization. Then in order to find the main values contained in the “Keduk Beji” tradition using explorative descriptive analysis. The result of the analysis of this article is that the symbolic use of water in these rituals becomes an important element, symbolizing purification and renewal, while reflecting a deep meaning about life and spiritually. The tradition emphasizes the transformative nature of these practices, which not only enhance individual spiritual experiences but also strengthen community bonds through shared beliefs and values. This research highlights the significance of sustaining the tradition in the context of modernization, showing that Keduk Beji continues to serve as a cultural anchor for the local community. By integrating Sufi principles with Javanese mystical practices, this tradition exemplifies the harmonious coexistence of diverse spiritual heritages. Ultimately, the Keduk Beji tradition is described as a vital expression of the rich cultural and religious identity of Javanese society, demonstrating the continued relevance of spirituality in contemporary society and encouraging a deeper understanding of the complexity of faith and culture.

Today, many concepts from the dictionaries of academic psychology have entered the language of everyday communication. Perhaps the most common are the concepts of «subjective» and «objective». In many textbooks of psychology, «objective» is understood as something that belongs to the object itself, something that does not depend on the subject. The objective is opposed to the subjective-personal. Experimental research in the field of quantum physics questioned the division of the world into an impartial «objective reality» and its «subjective» (not impartial, biased) reflection, which provoked a crisis in this field of knowledge and the methodology of science as a whole. The main methodological problems of psychology are the question of the place of the mental in nature; on the relationship of mental and material phenomena, on the possibilities of human cognition - questions that also arose in the depths of quantum physics and were predetermined by the internal logic of their development. An excursion into quantum physics was necessary, firstly, for a deep understanding that reality is given to us in our sensations, perceptions, ideas and mental constructs (this was evidenced by the so-called «double slit experiment» and its interpretations) and we cannot say anything about reality as it is «in itself»; secondly, the realization that the foundations on which our knowledge is built differ from those in quantum physics. Currently, there is a dichotomy between material (physical) and conceptual reality. Thus, the principle of locality, which professes ordinary consciousness and according to which specific objects occupy a specific place in time and space, contradicts the principle of non-locality, according to which isolated systems do not exist at all and every particle of the universe is in «instantaneous» communication with all other particles. The world is created from the same quantum substance and it is impossible to say that one is the cause of the other. (This statement implies, in particular, a rethinking of the «principle of determinism» which requires the establishment of unambiguous causal relationships). The reality in which we live is not quantum, our language and stereotypes of thinking do not correspond to the nature of the phenomena described by quantum physics. It is about the deep properties of matter. Personally, I got the impression that the deeper you plunge into the world of atomic and subatomic, the more the outlines of the specific, material world familiar to us become blurred and the thinner the line between the physical and conceptual world, between the material and the spiritual becomes. The purpose of this article is to define the concepts of "objective" and "subjective" based on the analysis of achievements in quantum physics in the context of psychology.

Anomie is one of the few uniquely sociological concepts (Parsons 1968). Yet it continues to be shrouded in conceptual difficulty (Shoham and Grahame 1982). Doubts revolve around the identification and measurement of anomie and its status outside of individuals, independent of individuals, with phenomenal and behavioral consequences for individuals (Schacht 1982; Seeman 1982). Our purpose in this paper is to address this confusion by way of clarification, to locate anomie as an empirically available phenomenon, and to recover anomie theory from the classics and put it to work on behalf of recent trends in sociological theory. We begin in the first section with a reading of Durkheim's sociology which leads us to the conclusion that anomie as moral deregulation is simultaneously the withdrawal of reality and of the possibility of objective experience. In the second section we review recent developments in sociology, specifically a broad area that hangs together loosely as reality construction theory, with special attention to ethnomethodology. We shall argue that reality withdrawal amounts to trouble in the social production of reality. In the third section we probe three empirical examples of anomie as we have formulated it and describe the consequences anomie necessarily has for the individual. Finally we conclude with a discussion of the misgivings concerning anomie theory cited above and how our reformulation addresses these misgivings.

In “The Virtual and the Real,” David Chalmers argues that there is an epistemic and ontological parity between VR and ordinary reality. My argument here is that, whatever the plausibility of these claims, they provide no basis for supposing that there is a similar parity of value. Careful reflection upon certain aspects of the transition that individuals make from interacting with real-world, physical environments to interacting with VR provides a basis for thinking that, to the extent that there are good reasons to deny the reality of virtual objects, there are also reasons to place a correspondingly higher value upon the experience of interacting with a VR environment. Chalmers’ assumption to the contrary arises from a subtle misrepresentation of how the phenomenon of cognitive penetration works in the perception of virtual objects, and from an unwillingness to acknowledge how our attitudes toward virtual environments are conditioned by the values we adopt when engaged in gameplay.

The article investigates conceptual metaphor as a linguo-instrumental tool by which a person is able to know, evaluate and transform the world. The history of metaphor study has been considered in detail, from its complete denial to understanding as a mechanism of objective reality cognition, and it has been found that most approaches to the interpretation of metaphor were demonstrated in the twentieth century. In particular, it has been considered as a means of forming concepts, and as a semantic-two-dimensional, clearly connoted unit, and as a figurative structure of language, as a marker of idiosyncrasy, and as an object of linguistic and cultural research etc. The twentieth century witnessed the emergence of new scientific linguistic directions, which laid the foundations for understanding the conceptual metaphor associated with understanding the processes of transformation of mental categories into the language during cognition of the world, interpretation of metaphorical meaning, mechanisms of metaphorical renaming and suggestion, and manipulative potential of metaphor, etc. Within different scientific approaches a metaphor is considered as a mental phenomenon, an important way of creating concepts in the language world, which contributed to the emergence of new theories of cognitive study of metaphors as descriptive theory blends, metaphorical modelling, cognitive-onomastic analysis, etc. Further study of the conceptual metaphor, primarily on specific textual material, will reveal the cognitive-linguistic mechanisms of a person, taking into account national specifics, to identify the deep links between the language of the people and its intellectual heritage.

This article argues that – despite the value of distinguishing between insiders and outsiders in a contingent and relative sense – there is no fundamental insider–outsiderproblem. We distinguish weak and strong versions of ‘insiderism’ (privileged versus monopolistic access to knowledge) and then sociological and religious versions of the latter. After reviewing critiques of the sociological version, we offer a holistic semantic critique of the religious version (i.e. the view that religious experience and/or language offers sui generis access to knowledge). We argue that all evidence for mental states is overt, public, and observable, and, hence, that there can be no significant difference in the access to knowledge of insiders and outsiders.

This doctoral study is grounded in the work of cultural studies and its concern for pedagogy and education. The study investigated a local pedagogical issue— Independent Enquiry Study (IES)—a specific form of social inquiry in the core subject Liberal Studies (LS) in Hong Kong senior secondary schools. It took a designated IES classroom as the point of intervention and as the basis for exploring transformed pedagogical practices in Hong Kong secondary school education. My vantage point of the intervention rested on participant-observation through action research and critical contextual analysis of the action-research site and its relations to the wider social contexts. With a conceptual-analytical framework of drama and the performative, developed from William’ notion of drama and Schechner’s notion of make-belief and make-believe performances, this study examined how the method of drama could mediate a group of senior secondary students’ extended process of inquiry into social issues in contemporary Hong Kong society. Findings reveal that IES in Hong Kong senior secondary schools is almost already performative in nature and IES students were almost already performers eager to present themselves to their teacher-assessors as knowledge builders capable of reflective thinking. In fact, these students subscribed to the positivistic and cynical practices of reproducing existing curricular (and media) discourses and applying them to understanding the social. In performing seeming acts of inquiry, these IES students would re-enact the prescribed curricular (and media) discourses of understanding and reproducing the existing social order. Research findings indicate that drama can be a method of work that supports student inquirers socially as a group. Liminal dramatic spaces and the use of dramatic role and real-life image afforded the participant-students the opportunity to create, experience, and interpret an imaginary world, promoting social inquiry. The spaces helped give shape to students’ diverse roles including those of IES co-informant, member of society, and peer IES learner-assessor. By activating these roles, students momentarily suspended self-other relations and the mechanically induced perceptions of social realities typified by conventional IES method. Drama also functions as a lens. It reflects how the method of IES typifies students’ roles as performers and sustains their dependence on templates of work and on the teachers’ assessment guides. Research findings further show that the performative make-belief schooling practices encompassed the everyday school life of the participating students and their teachers, and indeed subsumed and contained the effects of my dramatic interventions within the action-research context. The IES

Axel Honneth’s recognition-based social and political theory has attracted much attention and for good reason. It offers a clear counterweight to the individualist theories so dominant at present, and it claims to carry forward the emancipatory project of the Frankfurt School by giving it new critical tools. Its key idea is that of mutuality (or reciprocity). Honneth wants to transform the central thesis of Hegel’s Phenomenology — that self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness — and put it to an empirical, post-Hegelian use in a theory of recognition whose conclusion is that each of ‘us’ can successfully be ‘individuals’ only if others are successful individuals. In that way he also hopes to show that the concerns of liberal, individualist thinkers, who have focused their critical attention on the fairness of the distribution of primary goods (such as, most obviously, Rawls), are expressing concerns that are themselves only intelligible (and in possible need of reform) in the larger social-psychological context of what is required for fully mutual recognition.

This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger.

has become an iconic figure of liberalism. Nevertheless, his credentials as a liberal have occasionally been doubted. For instance, in a recent study, Gregory Claeys claims: "We make Mill 'liberal' by rendering invisible his illiberal themes, in a manner not unlike the old Stalinist erasing of unpersons from pictures." 1 Anti-liberal strands in Mill's work have been alleged before. In particular, Mill allows and even encourages certain interactions, which seem to be fairly similar to undue interference with individual autonomy, with other people's self-regarding conduct. Among the important examples of this type of interpersonal engagement are what Mill calls "natural penalties," upon which this article focuses. I argue that, far from being an aberration in Mill's thinking, natural penalties play a vital role in his brand of liberalism: they serve to enable the interpersonal negotiation, within society, of the proper boundaries of the self-regarding sphere. Natural penalties express personal convictions regarding which conduct should be subject to social coercion. Because natural penalties can themselves be answered and rejected, they are part of an expressive dialogue within society about the normative status of types of behavior; whether they are acceptable or should be considered harmful to others.

Some modern scholars such as Loeb have defended Descartes’ doctrine of mind-body interaction by arguing that it is not inconsistent with his Causal Adequacy Principle. This chapter seeks to extend this line of defence by focusing on the causation of mental events by bodies. It is shown that Descartes’ position here is complicated by his distinction between the formal and objective reality of ideas and by his subscription to the Augustinian principle that minds are more perfect than bodies. It is argued, however, that even when these complications are recognized, Descartes’ position emerges largely unscathed; at most the Causal Adequacy Principle is a source of difficulty only for a strong version of interactionism.

Our increased understanding of the biology of ageing has revived prospects for radical anti‐ageing medicine. Ethicists have often tried to argue against these endeavours, but with little success. Their arguments, which appeal to the natural order, are either circular or self‐defeating. Invoking the invariance of the human condition cuts no ice as rational argument and often turns into an avowedly irrational appeal to the ‘yuk reaction’ that exotic technologies evoke. Does that mean that anti‐mortality technologies are ethically innocuous? Not if we consider the reality of unequal death in today's world, in which differences in longevity highlight the gap between the haves and the have‐nots. Even in affluent societies, in which the basics of food, shelter and medicine are widely available, the grim reaper is very much class conscious. Without returning to the concern for equality that was once the hallmark of the Enlightenment, radical life extension may well add to these existing inequalities, and create more resentment and strife in the future. Many aspects of current biomedical research, especially in the more avant‐garde areas of neuroscience and stem‐cell research, are united under the alluring label ‘regenerative medicine’. These developments fuel legitimate hopes for new treatments of degenerative diseases, which, in an age of increasing longevity, represent the main focal point for prevailing anxieties about ill health and the frailties of old age. But regenerative medicine is often taken more literally to mean rejuvenation—a genuine turning back of the clock—which leads to more florid speculations about massive increases in human lifespan. These futuristic views are often criticized by scientists as daydreams that owe more to science fiction than to a sober appraisal of predictable advances. But they are taken more seriously by a different category of opponents, namely those who condemn these prospects on ethical grounds. For many conservative critics, …

This article deals with the particular aspects regarding the criminal treatment that applies to a special category of offenders, namely the category of juvenile offenders.
 Beyond any attempt by society to involve in educating man from the earliest age, his antisocial manifestation is a reality of contemporary society and society in general, since ancient times.
 An unexpected violence on the part of a child, seemingly harmless, always produces a surprise effect, often associated with some form of misunderstanding on the part of the child of what he has manifested.
 To the child, the adult associates an image of purity and innocence.
 Unfortunately, at the level of objective reality, things are not always like that, so an important segment among children, minors, is drawn into a complex and extremely harmful phenomenon for society, the criminal phenomenon.
 Although part of the general criminal phenomenon, the criminality of minors raises some special problems within the penal legislation, completely different from those concerning the criminality of adults. This aspect is determined by the special quality of the criminal, that of a child, a minor.
 In this article, we will address the particular aspect of the quality of a minor in order to observe that minors benefit from a distinct criminal treatment compared to adults, when they intentionally or accidentally enter what is called the field of criminal law.

Neo-republicans claim that Hobbes’s constitutional indifferentism (the view that we have no profound reason to prefer one constitutional form over another) is driven exclusively by a reductive understanding of liberty as non-interference. This essay argues that constitutional indifferentism is grounded in an analysis of the institutional presuppositions of well-functioning government that does not depend on a conception of liberty as mere non-interference. Hence, indifferentism cannot be refuted simply by pointing out that non-domination is a distinctive ideal of freedom. This result does not suffice to defend the strong version of indifferentism put forward by Hobbes. But it does point to an important limitation of neo-republican constitutional theory: Neo-republicanism will amount to a distinctive paradigm of constitutional thought only if it is understood in a way that conflicts with Hobbes’s understanding of the institutional presuppositions of well-functioning government. It is doubtful that we have good reason to embrace neo-republicanism, so understood.