Introspection Dynamics in Asymmetric Multiplayer Games

On equilibrium properties of evolutionary multi-player games with random payoff matrices

Childhood and social interaction in everyday life: An epilogue

We perform convergence analysis on networks of agents playing public goods games, choosing between the strategies cooperation and defection, and updating asynchronously according to the (unconditional) imitation update rule. The agents earn payoffs by participating in multiplayer games, which greatly differs from the situation when the interactions are pairwise, and hence, requires a more sophisticated analysis. We show that, regardless of the initial condition and the order of the activated agents, in typical topologies including the star, ring and well-mixed networks, an equilibrium state is reached under the imitation dynamics in finite time. The proof for the ring networks is algorithmic; namely, we design a computational algorithm to find particular quadruple or quintuplet strategy patterns, whose amount in the entire network serves as a potential-like function. We also study the final strategy state in the well-mixed and star cases, and show that cooperation is more likely to survive in less-connected networks such as the star compared to completely-connected networks. Our results shed light on how network structure affects the evolution of cooperation among imitative individuals participating in multiplayer games, and serves as a stepping stone to controlling such decision-making populations.

We consider the optimal operating policies of a free-to-play multiplayer game with a premium subscription to maximize its lifetime operating profit. Accounting for social comparisons between free and premium players, we model the game attracting or losing players with a hybrid of the Bass diffusion model and the replicator equation in evolutionary game theory. Leveraging optimal control theory, we characterize optimal dynamic pricing and advertising policies and show that the developer should prioritize initial growth through aggressive advertising, while postponing the introduction of a premium subscription. Surprisingly, the optimal subscription price may start high and gradually decrease. We further show that the developer should strengthen social-comparison effects, that payment-based matchmaking can be an effective monetization driver, and that our main findings remain robust when allowing individual in-game item purchases/partial premium subscription. These findings are potentially instructive for game developers adopting the premium subscription model.This paper was accepted by Víctor Martínez-de-Albéniz, operations management.

In this contribution, we propose to reexamine and expand the conceptual frameworks of intersubjectivity within the context of International Relations through the lens of the interdisciplinary sub-field of politics and performance. Performance, whether on the theatrical or political stage, whether in a political or in everyday life, is that which unfolds within a set of actions through which political negotiations unfold and also through which social interactions in everyday life take place. Understood as repeated or rehearsed behavior, performances are reflexive actions, events, or manners that are relational and self-conscious: to perform is to be aware of the act of doing something and to show doing it. We read politics through performance (and as performance) and performance as political to understand the status of the international and the working of its intersubjectivities on various levels.

ABSTRAK Tujuan penelitian ini mengkaji bentuk variasi bahasa pada interaksi sosial masyarakat di Kabupaten Sambas. Tuturan masyarakat yang sangat beragam yang dipengaruhi kegiatan sehari-hari yang dilakukan oleh masyarakat. Metode penelitian yang digunakan metode kualitatif dengan bentuk deskriptif. Lokasi penelitian di Desa Tanjung Mekar. Teknik pengumpulan data berupa wawancara dan simak libat cakap yang berupa turuan masyarakat Desa Tanjung Mekar. Teknik analisis data melalui pengumpulan data, reduksi data, penyajian data, analisis data, dan penarikan kesimpulan. Hasil penelitian dapat diklasifikasikan berdasarkan bentuk variasi bahasa dalam interkasi sosial dalam kehidupan sehari-hari. Pertama variasi bahasa dari segi pemakaian yang terdiri dari bidang Perekonomian dan Pendidikan. Kedua, variasi bahasa dari segi keformalan yaitu ragam santai, ragam akrab, dan ragam formal. Data penelitian yang di dapatkan sebanyak 12 data dalam bentuk variasi bahasa. ABSTRACT The aim of this research is to examine the forms of language variation in social interaction in Sambas Regency. The speech of the community is very diverse which is influenced by the daily activities carried out by the community. The research method used is a qualitative method with descriptive form. The research location is Tanjung Mekar Village. The data collection technique is in the form of interviews and listening to expert involvement in the form of stories from the people of Tanjung Mekar Village. Data analysis techniques through data collection, data reduction, data presentation, data analysis, and drawing conclusions. The research results can be classified based on the form of language variation in social interactions in everyday life. Firstly, language variations in terms of usage consisting of the fields of Economics and Education. Second, language variations in terms of formality, namely casual variety, familiar variety and formal variety. The research data obtained was 12 data in the form of language variations.

With the increasing popularization and application of the smart grid, the harm of the data silo issue in the smart grid is more and more prominent. Therefore, it is especially critical to promote data interoperability and sharing in the smart grid. Existing data-sharing schemes generally lack effective incentive mechanisms, and data holders are reluctant to share data due to privacy and security issues. Because of the above issues, a dynamic incentive mechanism for smart grid data sharing based on evolutionary game theory is proposed. Firstly, several basic assumptions about the evolutionary game model are given, and the evolutionary game payoff matrix is established. Then, we analyze the stabilization strategy of the evolutionary game based on the payoff matrix, and propose a dynamic incentive mechanism for smart grid data sharing based on evolutionary game theory according to the analysis results, aiming to encourage user participation in data sharing. We further write the above evolutionary game model into a smart contract that can be invoked by the two parties involved in data sharing. Finally, several factors affecting the sharing of data between two users are simulated, and the impact of different factors on the evolutionary stabilization strategy is discussed. The simulation results verify the positive or negative incentives of these parameters in the data-sharing game process, and several factors influencing the users’ data sharing are specifically analyzed. This dynamic incentive mechanism scheme for smart grid data sharing based on evolutionary game theory provides new insights into effective incentives for current smart grid data sharing.

We analyze the main dynamical properties of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ℰ𝒮𝒮) for asymmetric two-population games of finite size and its corresponding replicator dynamics. We introduce a definition of ℰ𝒮𝒮 for two-population asymmetric games and a method of symmetrizing such an asymmetric game. We show that every strategy profile of the asymmetric game corresponds to a strategy in the symmetric game, and that every Nash equilibrium (𝒩ℰ) of the asymmetric game corresponds to a (symmetric) 𝒩ℰ of the symmetric version game. We study the (standard) replicator dynamics for the asymmetric game and we define the corresponding (non-standard) dynamics of the symmetric game. We claim that the relationship between 𝒩ℰ, ℰ𝒮𝒮 and the stationary states (𝒮𝒮) of the dynamical system for the asymmetric game can be studied by analyzing the dynamics of the symmetric game.KeywordsNash EquilibriumMixed StrategyPure StrategyEvolutionary GameStable StrategyThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Working with dreams is a technique commonly used in psychotherapy. The present study showed that by presenting two different dreams from one dreamer differing estimations of the dreamer’s personality results. The implication for clinical practice is that single dreams should not be over-interpreted regarding their meaning or what they may reveal concerning any pathology in the dreamer’s state. In addition, the subtle effects of dream telling on the attitude and, thus, the therapeutic relationship, should be recognized. The present study is only the beginning of a project to study the effect of dream sharing on social interactions in everyday life and in the clinical setting in a more detailed way.

Childhood and social interaction in everyday life: Introduction to the special issue

How to create positive word of mouth (WOM) in the world of gaming? The social side of multiplayer games

In recent years, classical evolutionary models have been extended to incorporate realistic multiplayer interactions rather than the traditional pairwise modelling approach. Several papers have introduced a new evolutionary framework involving population structure, evolutionary dynamics, multiplayer games and movement processes. The theory underlying the framework has been explored in several directions, identifying strong predictors of fixation probability, such as mean group size and temperature. A recent study developed an evolutionary model where individuals move in a coordinated manner via newly developed movement mechanisms, resulting in herding or separation within the population. This analysis demonstrated that these movement mechanisms impact the fixation probability of cooperation. This paper extends this analysis by investigating whether the previously identified predictors of fixation probability retain their strong influences under different games on complete graphs and by considering a different social dilemma in the form of the Stag-Hunt game. We show that previously defined measures of aggregation are directly related to mean group size and that these fundamental measures can be analytically calculated. In the Stag-Hunt game, we demonstrate that herding opposes the evolution of cooperation. In the Public Goods game, we demonstrate that temperature and fixation share a linear relationship regardless of the movement mechanism considered. In the Hawk-Dove game, temperature is a stronger predictor of fixation but the linear relationship breaks down for higher temperatures and a similar relationship holds as for the Stag-Hunt game.

We consider interactions between players in groups of size [Formula: see text] with payoffs that not only depend on the strategies used in the group but also fluctuate at random over time. An individual can adopt either cooperation or defection as strategy and the population is updated from one time step to the next by a birth-death event according to a Moran model. Assuming recurrent symmetric mutation and payoffs to cooperators and defectors according to the composition of the group whose expected values, variances, and covariances are of the same small order, we derive a first-order approximation for the average abundance of cooperation in the selection-mutation equilibrium. In general, we show that increasing the variance of any payoff for defection or decreasing the variance of any payoff for cooperation increases the average abundance of cooperation. As for the effect of the covariance between any payoff for cooperation and any payoff for defection, we show that it depends on the number of cooperators in the group associated with these payoffs. We study in particular the public goods game, the stag hunt game, and the snowdrift game, all social dilemmas based on random benefit b and random cost c for cooperation, which lead to correlated payoffs to cooperators and defectors within groups. We show that a decrease in the scaled variance of b or c, or an increase in their scaled covariance, makes it easier for weak selection to favor the abundance of cooperation in the stag hunt game and the snowdrift game. The same conclusion holds for the public goods game except that the variance of b has no effect on the average abundance of C. Moreover, while the mutation rate has little effect on which strategy is more abundant at equilibrium, the group size may change it at least in the stag hunt game with a larger group size making it more difficult for cooperation to be more abundant than defection under weak selection.

Transforming Occupation in the Western Zones of Germany provides an in-depth transnational study of power politics, daily life, and social interactions in the Western Zones of occupied Germany during the aftermath of the Second World War. Combining a history from below with a top-down perspective, the volume explores the origins, impacts, and legacies of the occupations of the western zones of Germany by the United States, Britain and France, examining complex yet topical issues that often arise as a consequence of war including regime change, transitional justice, everyday life under occupation, the role of intermediaries, and the multifaceted relationship between occupiers and occupied. Adopting a novel set of approaches that puts questions of power, social relations, gender, race, and the environment centre stage, it moves beyond existing narratives to place the occupation within a broader framework of continuity and change in post-war western Europe. Incorporating essays from 16 international scholars, this volume provides a substantial contribution to the emerging fields of occupation studies and the comparative history of post-war Europe.

Economics games such as the Dictator and Public Goods Games have been widely used to measure ethnic bias in political science and economics. Yet these tools may fail to measure bias as intended because they are vulnerable to self-presentational concerns and/or fail to capture bias rooted in more automatic associative and affective reactions. We examine a set of misattribution-based approaches, adapted from social psychology, that may sidestep these concerns. Participants in Nairobi, Kenya completed a series of common economics games alongside versions of these misattribution tasks adapted for this setting, each designed to detect bias toward noncoethnics relative to coethnics. Several of the misattribution tasks show clear evidence of (expected) bias, arguably reflecting differences in positive/negative affect and heightened threat perception toward noncoethnics. The Dictator and Public Goods Games, by contrast, are unable to detect any bias in behavior toward noncoethnics versus coethnics. We conclude that researchers of ethnic and other biases may benefit from including misattribution-based procedures in their tool kits to widen the set of biases to which their investigations are sensitive.