IP Security Policy (IPSP) Requirements

Policies that address security and privacy are pervasive parts of both technical and social systems, and technology that enables both organizations and individuals to create and manage such policies is a critical need in information technology (IT). This paper describes the notion of end-to-end policy management and advances a framework that can be useful in understanding the commonality in IT security and privacy policy management.

Effectively managing security policies in a large distributed Web Services environment is the key to secure e-business transactions. Security policy must ensure the end-to-end agreement for many-to-many interoperation; ensure the versioning interoperability and privacy of collaborating partners; and ensure the dynamic establishment of security policies because any statically defined security policy tends to be unsecured after a certain period of time. The traditional security policy configuration mechanisms, either the local configuration mechanism or the centralized configuration mechanism, cannot fully meet the above requirements. In this paper we describe a solution for managing security policies in a collaborative Web Services environment. This solution is based on ebXML CPP/CPA model and uses Interoperability Contract Document (ICD). It allows the collaboration parties to establish security policy dynamically for each individual interoperation; makes the selected policy confidential; and addresses the software, message, and policy versioning and interoperability issues. Our experience reveals the advantages of this approach over others.

This paper considers the development of security policy models for networks which can operate in a multilevel security environment. We outline an abstract security policy model which addresses the access control and information flow requirements in a multilevel network. The network security policy is formulated by drawing as much parallel as possible with the computer security policy. The model is defined and the associated security requirements are given and the model is used to prove that the security conditions are not violated by the defined network operations. In developing network security policies, it is necessary to relate them to specific layers of the network architecture. We conclude this paper by outlining another network security policy model with different network subjects and objects supported by different layers in the architecture.

18 - Windows Server 2003 Security Management

The increasing use of wireless technologies in enterprise networks demands strong security management and policy enforcement mechanisms. The conventional security management frameworks used in wired LAN do not suit in wireless domain due to dynamic topology and mobility of hosts. The enforcement of organizational security policies in wireless LAN requires appropriate access control models as well as correct distribution of access control rules in the network access points. In this paper, we propose a WLAN security management framework supported by a spatio-temporal RBAC (STRBAC) model. The concept of mobile IP has been used to ensure a fixed layer 3 address of a mobile host. Each wireless policy zone consists of a Policy Zone Controller that coordinates with a dedicated Local Role Server to extract the low level access configurations corresponding to the zone access routers. The system can be mapped into a reconfigurable hardware to exploit the parallelism in computing. We also propose a formal STRBAC model to represent the global security policies formally and a SAT based decision procedure to verify the access configurations

Consideration is given to the development of security policy models for networks which can operate in a multilevel security environment. An outline is presented of an abstract security policy model which addresses the access control and information flow requirements in a multilevel network. The network security policy is formulated by drawing as much parallel as possible with the computer security policy. The model is defined, and the associated security requirements are given. The model is used to prove that the security conditions are not violated by the defined network operations. >

Federated cloud networks are formed by federating virtual network segments from different clouds, e.g. in a hybrid cloud, into a single federated network. Such networks should be protected with a global federated cloud network security policy. The availability of network function virtualisation and service function chaining in cloud platforms offers an opportunity for implementing and enforcing global federated cloud network security policies. In this paper we describe an approach for enforcing global security policies in federated cloud networks. The approach relies on a service manifest that specifies the global network security policy. From this manifest configurations of the security functions for the different clouds of the federation are generated. This enables automated deployment and configuration of network security functions across the different clouds. The approach is illustrated with a case study where communications between trusted and untrusted clouds, e.g. public clouds, are encrypted. The paper discusses future work on implementing this architecture for the OpenStack cloud platform with the service function chaining API.

Security policy is a main mechanism of information security management. While there are a lot of security-related standards and guidelines which specify requirements for high-level security policies, implementation of network security policy still depends on interfaces provided by network security systems (NSS). Obviously, diversity of policy representation languages affects efficiency of policy deployment process. The paper proposes a concept of unification of policy rules for NSSs as a solution for the problem. The idea is based on a formal language which makes it possible to formalize network security policies independently of particular NSSs.

Network security polices are essential elements in Internet security devices that provide traffic filtering, integrity, confidentiality, and authentication. Network security perimeter devices such as firewalls, IPSec, and IDS/IPS devices operate based on locally configured policies. However, configuring network security policies remains a complex and error-prone task due to rule dependency semantics and the interaction between policies in the network. This complexity is likely to increase as the network size increases. A successful deployment of a network security system requires global analysis of policy configurations of all network security devices in order to avoid policy conflicts and inconsistency. Policy conflicts may cause serious security breaches and network vulnerability such as blocking legitimate traffic, permitting unwanted traffic, and insecure data transmission. This article presents a comprehensive classification of security policy conflicts that might potentially exist in a single security device (intrapolicy conflicts) or between different network devices (interpolicy conflicts) in enterprise networks. We also show the high probability of creating such conflicts even by expert system administrators and network practitioners.

This paper presents a formal model, called SELAC, for analyzing an arbitrary security policy configuration for the SELinux system. A security policy for SELinux is complex and large: it is made by many configuration rules that refer to the access control sub-models implemented in the system. Among the rules composing a security policy configuration, many relationships occur and it is extremely difficult to understand their overall effects in the system. Our aim is to define semantics for the constructs of the SELinux configuration language and to model the relationships occurring among sets of configuration rules. Finally, we develop an algorithm based upon SELAC, which can verify whether, given an arbitrary security policy configuration, a given subject can access a given object in a given mode.

Many researchers have considered security policy management, including how to configure policies manually and even how to automatically generate security policies based on security requirements. Both can be error prone, especially when properties of the network topology change, because security requirements are usually not bound to any particular route path. Our DETER lab emulation results show that conflicts could be caused by these factors. Therefore, a systematic way to validate the correctness of the security policies is essential. This paper presents an approach, CLID (conflict and looping identification and detection), to verify whether a set of security policies (e.g. IPSec/VPN tunnels) satisfy the given security requirements, without causing any conflicts. This approach utilizes the definition of a security policy lo include network routing data as well as traffic selector information, thus it works for general network topologies. We also analyze and justify the correctness of the approach. The paper concludes with our simulation results and addresses future work.

The healthcare industry faces significant challenges in safeguarding data security and integrity, particularly with the rise of digital health systems and the sensitive nature of patient information. Blockchain technology offers a decentralized, immutable, and secure solution to address these issues, allowing healthcare organizations to protect and manage patient data effectively. This paper examines how blockchain can enhance data security and integrity within healthcare by examining its key features, such as immutability, transparency, and decentralized access, which collectively provide a robust framework for secure data management. The potential applications of blockchain in healthcare, including patient consent management, access control through smart contracts, and data-sharing solutions, are analyzed alongside challenges such as regulatory compliance, cost, and interoperability. By integrating blockchain, healthcare systems can achieve improved data security, fostering trust and resilience in patient data management. This paper concludes with case studies and discusses future trends in blockchain implementation within healthcare, underscoring its transformative potential for securing data while addressing privacy and ethical concerns. Keywords: Blockchain, healthcare, data security, data integrity, patient data management, smart contracts.

It is our great pleasure to welcome you at the 3rd International Conference on Security of Information and Networks -- SIN 2010, organized in technical cooperation with the ACM Special Interest Group on Security, Audit and Control (SIGSAC). The conference, similar to SIN 2009 and SIN 2007, covers practically all aspects of security of information and networks. The SIN 2009 Conference had such sections as "Security Assessment, Policies, Educational Programs", "Security and Integrity Management and Models", "Cryptography, Security and Networks", "Access Control and Security Assurance", and "Attacks, Intrusion Detection". Based on accepted submissions, the following sections are presented at SIN 2010: Security Assessment, Policies, Privacy, and Educational Programs (12 papers);Management and Models of Security and Integrity (9 papers);Cryptography, Security, and Networks (10 papers);Attacks and Intrusion Detection (7 papers). We received 73 submissions of which only a small portion was accepted based on at least two independent reviews. At times three, even four, reviews were secured before a decision could be made. Among all the submissions, 31 were accepted as full papers (42%), 6 as short (8%), and 1 as a position statement (1%). The authors of the submitted papers hail from China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, North Cyprus, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and USA. The papers of "Security Assessment, Policies, Privacy, and Educational Programs" section consider such topics as security standards and regulations, privacy, anonymity, educational issues, and digital forensics. "Management and Models of Security and Integrity" section papers consider various security management policies, models and architectures. "Cryptography, Security, and Networks" section features papers on cryptographic algorithms and protocols, as well as networks security. And finally, "Attacks and Intrusion Detection" section combines the papers discussing the detection and prevention of intrusions. SIN 2010 Conference gives researchers and practitioners a unique opportunity to share their perspectives with others interested in the various aspects of security of information and networks. We hope that these proceedings will serve as a valuable reference for security researchers and developers.

Communications networks are valuable in proportion to the trustworthy information they carry. Network security policies are designed to classify nodes as trustworthy or not with some probability of error when the true status of each node is unknown. By making an analogy with the binary symmetric channel model, properties of networks with optimal security policies are derived. Additive and multiplicative utility models with and without aversion to misclassification risk are considered.

Network traffic classification is the process of analyzing traffic flows and associating them to different categories of network applications. Network traffic classification represents an essential task in the whole chain of network security. Some of the most important and widely spread applications of traffic classification are the ability to classify encrypted traffic, the identification of malicious traffic flows, and the enforcement of security policies on the use of different applications. Passively monitoring a network utilizing low-cost and low-complexity wireless local area network (WLAN) devices is desirable. Mobile devices can be used or existing office desktops can be temporarily utilized when their computational load is low. This reduces the burden on existing network hardware. The aim of this paper is to investigate traffic classification techniques for wireless communications. To aid with intrusion detection, the key goal is to passively monitor and classify different traffic types over WLAN to ensure that network security policies are adhered to. The classification of encrypted WLAN data poses some unique challenges not normally encountered in wired traffic. WLAN traffic is analyzed for features that are then used as an input to six different machine learning (ML) algorithms for traffic classification. One of these algorithms (a Gaussian mixture model incorporating a universal background model) has not been applied to wired or wireless network classification before. The authors also propose a ML algorithm that makes use of the well-known vector quantization algorithm in conjunction with a decision tree—referred to as a TRee Adaptive Parallel Vector Quantiser. This algorithm has a number of advantages over the other ML algorithms tested and is suited to wireless traffic classification. An average F-score (harmonic mean of precision and recall) > 0.84 was achieved when training and testing on the same day across six distinct traffic types.