Irreversible Commitments

This paper discusses the influence of ethnicity in the formation of early political parties in Sarawak. The cession of Sarawak to the British government has led to the emergence of the people’s nationalism awareness leading to the formation of political parties in Sarawak. Discussion is done through the library method by analysing books, dissertation and articles by previous researchers. The results of this study found that the plurality of races in Sarawak played a significant role in shaping the political pattern in Sarawak. The evidence can be seen in the formation of political parties that are heavily influenced by racial elements. Thus, ethnic factors have become the main factor in the formation of political parties in Sarawak. This considering that the purpose of establishing the parties is to safeguard the interests of their respective races. Therefore, the influence of ethnicity in a party can be seen according to the composition of party membership which is dominated by certain races. However, there are also several other factors that influence the formation of early political parties in Sarawak. Among them are, differences in idealism, the effects of the 1956 municipal elections, the desire for independence, regional sentiments and the influence of a party's ideology. Overall, this study can disclose to the public that the racial nature has been rooted in political parties in Sarawak since the beginning. Therefore, it is suggested for the future studies, the researcher can analyse whether this race-based party has an impact on the political development in Sarawak.

The aim of the article is to indicate potential causes for formation of a government coalition with the extreme right-wing League of Polish Families (LPR) in Poland in 2006. The aim is to determine the motivation of the right-wing mainstream Law and Justice party to cooperate with LPR, but also to indicate potential reasons why the coalition was not concluded until nine months after the elections. The goal is therefore to highlight potential constraints in the formation of the coalition. The analysis uses theories of coalition formation based on the rational choice paradigm (office, policy and vote) combined with an empirical approach to coalition research, with particular emphasis on factors such as the structure of competition in the party system and the internal dynamics of parties. The starting point for this analysis is the result of research on the causes of cabinet collaboration with the extreme right in Western Europe. The aim is to indicate whether the motivations for forming a coalition with the extreme right in Poland are based on similar premises and mechanisms. The analysis combines the deductive approach resulting from the theory of coalition formation with the inductive analysis of facts and factors that accompanied the formation of the coalition. In order to achieve the assumed goals, the article uses quantitative and qualitative methods and systemic analysis.

Core-Periphery Trading Networks

This paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions. Under certain conditions, free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare. Moreover, greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and, in most cases, more protection for each of these lobbies. Furthermore, industries with higher levels of capital stock, fewer capitalists, more inelastic demand, and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized. (JEL F10, F13)

The Constitution of Ukraine and the Law «On Political Parties in Ukraine» not only define and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian citizens to freedom of association in political parties, but also provide for a comprehensive system of restrictions on the formation and activity of political parties by state authorities, which is fully in line with international the practice of legal regulation of political parties’ status. The purpose and task of the article is to study the problems of banning political parties as a measure of constitutional and legal responsibility under martial law. Art. 5 of the Law «On Political Parties in Ukraine» establishes restrictions on the formation and activity of political parties, which are normative grounds for the constitutional and legal responsibility of political parties. The beginning of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation in Ukraine and the introduction of martial law led to radical changes in the regulation and functioning of the institution of political parties. Thus, on March 18, 2022, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine adopted a Decision on the suspension of the activities of certain political parties, which was put into effect by the Presidential Decree and for the period of martial law, it was decided to suspend any activities of 11 political parties in Ukraine. It should be noted that in the period from March to May 2022, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine changed the grounds for banning political parties four times. Expanding the grounds for applying such a constitutional and legal sanction as banning political parties through the adoption of amendments to the relevant legislation and changing the jurisdiction of such cases were positive steps, which made it possible to quickly respond to the challenges of martial law to prevent the illegal activities of political parties that encroach on the foundations of the constitutional order, territorial integrity and security of the state, promote pro-Russian ideas and justify Russian aggression. The judicial practice of banning political parties in Ukraine is studied. During 2022–2023, decisions were made to ban 18 political parties. It is positive that in the cases of banning political parties, the Administrative Court of Appeal repeatedly referred to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights and the concept of militant democracy. In the conditions of a full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into the territory of Ukraine, in accordance with the concept of a «democracy capable of defending itself», the activities of political parties that encroach on the territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of Ukraine, support the aggressor state should be prohibited by court order. The decision to apply such a constitutional and legal sanction as the banning of a political party must be properly substantiated, based on a proper evidence base, not taken hastily, meet international standards, in order to make it impossible to challenge Ukraine’s actions to the European Court of Human Rights. The constitutional and legal regulation of the grounds for banning political parties and the mechanism for its implementation also needs improvement. Key words: prohibition of a political party, constitutional and legal responsibility, constitutional delict, constitutional and legal sanction, political party, constitutional order, martial law.

This chapter takes up the more general problem of coalition formation when the symmetry assumption is dropped. The analysis is necessarily complex and several new considerations arise. The chapter proceeds in two main steps. First, a theory of coalition formation is developed for the theory for situations in which there are no payoff externalities across coalitions. The Markovian equilibrium payoffs for such games have a simple structure: they are unique for each set of active players, and they are amenable to computation by the use of a recursive algorithm. The efficiency properties of such equilibria are discussed in detail. The second step extends the theory to cover externalities across coalitions. The chapter therefore obtains a fairly general theory of coalition formation when commitments to form coalitions are irreversible.

The growing number of coalition governments in European states, many of which are minority governments, raises questions about how they form and function. The case of Denmark, where such governments have long become a part of political everyday life, helps to identify the main specific features of foreign policy portfolio allocation in the cabinet and the Danish parliament, since the Kingdom is one of the most successful examples of cooperation between the government and parliament in the field of foreign policy and defence. The article analyses the mechanisms and factors for the foreign policy portfolio allocation in 2001-2023, taking into account successive "blue" and "red" party blocs. Various theories of coalition formation and portfolio allocation in coalition governments are used to explain the distinguishing features of such allocation at a particular historical stage. In addition, general features of the development of the Danish political system at the present stage, the main trends and prospects for this development are considered. The authors conclude that when allocating portfolios in the government, preference is given to "junior" coalition partners, while in parliament - to "senior" ones; the opinion of the Danish People's Party is taken into account by coalition partners without the Party’s inclusion in the government; the choice is given in favour of popular and authoritative politicians constituting the foreign policy elite of Denmark over the past three decades; the functioning of the Foreign Policy Committee provides some kind of balance of power in the Danish Parliament on foreign and defence policy. It is also found out that the strategies for coalition formation and foreign policy portfolio allocation do not significantly differ between the "blue" and "red" party blocs, but follow the same logic aimed at maintaining the stability of the minority government’s position.

Martial and ritual arts groups are a set combination of sports activities in both physical and spiritual accomplishments to protect or defend themselves. This activity was banned a few years ago and decriminalized recently in 2022. However, the existence of these two sports activities reveals a significant controversial debate. This article attempts to analyze the relationship between the presence of political parties, especially the history of parties in Timor-Leste, then continues with a critical analysis of the relations of these groups in the formation of Political Parties in Timor-Leste in the current developments. This article used a secondary data approach, collected from the report documents from the government, non-governmental organizations, and academic publications from similar research. The results of this study indicate that there is indeed an interest in political parties. However, despite the motivation that mobilized this organization’s mass into political party affiliation, the influence of martial arts and ritual groups began to be the backbone of political parties’ support.

Can we always design a game form so that all its Bayesian equilibrium outcomes are either interim individually rational efficient or interim envy-free efficient in asymmetric information economies? We show that the answer is no. Given that such games exist in complete information economies, can this gap be filled by games that information endogenously without enlarging the equilibrium set? We adopt two approaches. First, we introduce a theory of cheap play as a natural model of such games. The second is an extreme approach that adopts an ex post viewpoint. Neither yields a possibility result. Information leakage does not recover efficiency. This paper addresses the following question: in any domain of asymmetric information economies, is it always possible to design a game form so that all its equilibrium outcomes are either interim individually rational efficient or interim fair (envy-free efficient)? Our first result is that with Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept, we can never design such a game form in a wide domain of economies. The impossibility result persists even if there were strong restrictions on the information structure guaranteeing incentive compatibility of all allocation rules. From the Nash-implementation literature (Maskin 1977, Hurwicz et al. 1984) we know that such games exist in complete information economies. Our first result indicates the cost, in terms of social welfare, imposed on society by the presence of information asymmetry. This raises a natural question: can the gap between the positive results under complete information and the negative ones under incomplete information be bridged by devising game forms that leak information endogenously? In an equilibrium of such a game, the players' optimality calculations are conditioned on the newly acquired information. Superficially, it appears that such games may yield a solution to the problem of nonexistence of efficient mechanisms. Information leakage is a mixed blessing since, typically, it would require pre-play communication which tends to enlarge the set of equilibria. Our negative findings using Bayesian equilibrium were primarily due to the presence of too many equilibria in every conceivable game form. Clearly, we need a game form that

This article investigates new political party formation in South Africa within the broader context of voter volatility. The political party system has displayed high levels of stability, but the unrestrained and rampant formation of new political parties that contest in each election could destabilise the system. The number of entrants rose to an unprecedented 28 before the 2019 elections and contradicts the support for older, established parties in each election since 1994. In theory, the within-system stability in South Africa, with an on average 90% voter share between established parties, impedes the scope for the formation of new smaller parties. In reality, support for new parties remains low. This article explores why this does not serve as a deterrent for the formation of new parties. The article shows that despite the increasing number of new entrants, their impact on stability and consolidation in the country is negligible.

The article is devoted to a brief analysis of the history of the formation of political parties as a social phenomenon that arose with the appearance of the first political organizations in ancient times in the history of mankind. In particular, it examines aristocratic groups formed in ancient states, protoparty groups in ancient Greece, the activities of populations and optimists in ancient Rome, Confucian groups at the palaces of Chinese emperors, the processes of separation of the madhhabs in Islam. Also, based on historical examples, political groups are analyzed at the palaces of the Khorezmid dynasties, Temurids, Bukhara emirs, as well as the first party groups in medieval Italy and England. The article analyzes the place of interest groups and political parties in the formation civil society, the specifics of their activities and also explored the formation of political parties. Parties, being a structural element of the political system, an important institution of civil society, activate political life, establish links between different levels and branches of government. The full realization of this function of political parties depends on the existence of a rule of law state. The Confucianists were nominated for office, but were deprived of the positions they were seeking because of the success of their agents. These agents were often relatives of women in the imperial harem. This prompted the Confucians to unite and express public dissatisfaction with the ruler and to formulate a joint protest.

The main goal of this article is to highlight the Lithuanian political party system of legal regulation of formation of traditions and the disclosure of the legal framework in 1919–1940. This article discusses examination of the development of Lithuanian party system and identifies common patterns.The research is focused on the analysis of the legal regulation of the system of Lithuanian political party. The author discusses legal and historical issues and takes no notice of the issue of political considerations. The author also discusses the historical and political circumstances, which prompted the current legal framework, examines the influence of party system evolution of the statehood of Lithuania and the development of constitutionalism.There are a few authors, who made some researches on a few legal issues, e.g., in the monograph by Professor M. Romeris (“Lietuvos konstitucinės teisės paskaitos”, 1937), the development of political regime and its influence on the political party system was discussed. His monograph “Reprezentacija ir mandatas” (1926) studied the legal regulation of election and its influence of representation of citizenships in the government of the country. One of the most relevant to the subject of the research studies was conducted by E. Šileikis (“Politinių partijų instucionalizavimas”, 1997), where he presented the historical development of regulation of political parties in Lithuania and outlined the significance of modern political parties more extensively. In J. Bulavas’ monograph (“Rinkimai ir ‘tautos atstovavimas’ buržuazinėje Lietuvoje”, 1956), the legal status of political parties, military and emergency and high-security conditions in Lithuania during the interwar period were analyzed. His monograph „Klasės ir politinės partijos Lietuvoje 1919-1926 metais“ (1978) studied the legal regulation of the political parties in the independent Lithuania.This article analyzes the normative legal acts of the independence period of Lithuania, which have regulated the formation of political parties, the legal framework of their activities and meetings. These normative legal acts’ influence on the formation of the political party system of Lithuania is discussed. The research is made on the legalization process of illegal organizations and political parties. It pays attention to the changes of legal regulation of political parties and its dependence on the regime. Moreover, the article compares legal regulation in different periods of development of the regime of the Republic of Lithuania in 1918–1940. Furthermore, the comparison of the changes of legal regulation within the periods of 1918–1926 (the period of the democratic regime) and 1926–1940 (the period of the undemocratic regime) is made.

This study tested opposing predictions made by Gamson's Minimum Resource Theory and equity theory concerning the type of coalitions that are formed when members of a triad expect that rewards will be correlated with amounts of individual resources. Results supported equity theory in that subjects, whose work on a pretask was used as the basis for assigning resources in a bargaining game, formed conservative (strong against weak) coalitions. When subjects either did not work or were paid prior to playing the game, results replicated past research in that there was a tendency to form (weak against strong) coalitions. Findings were discussed in terms of their implications for the generality of existing theories of coalition formation. The present study was an investigation of the role that the norm of equity plays in the formation of coalitions within triads. Past research on coalition formation (e.g., Kelley & Arrowood, 1960; Vinacke & Arkoff, 1957) to a large extent has focused on the effect of differences in apparent power. Typically, power is denned as resources that enable their owner to achieve some goal; the greater the resources, the more easily the goal is reached. For example, in one case of Caplow's (1956, 1968) Type 5 triad, resources are distributed in the ratios 4/3/2. Thus, the person with the greatest resources (4) will reach the goal first unless two participants pool their resources, that is, form a coalition. In Type 5 triads, any coalition will triumph, since any combination of two sets of resources (e.g., 2 + 3, 2 + 4, or 3+4) is greater than the resources of the isolate. In spite of this equality in potential effectiveness, subjects in past studies have tended to overchoose the 2-3 combination and form what Caplow (1968) has termed revolutionary coalitions. This coalition is because the two weaker parties join together to overthrow the person who originally

Coordination problem and grand coalition: the puzzle of the government formation game in the Czech Republic, 1998

Generality and validity of some theories of coalition formation.