Is second order practice possible?

In his 1958 seminal paper “Saints and Heroes”, J. O. Urmson argued that the then dominant tripartite deontic scheme of classifying actions as being exclusively either obligatory, or optional in the sense of being morally indifferent, or wrong, ought to be expanded to include the category of the supererogatory. Colloquially, this category includes actions that are “beyond the call of duty” (beyond what is obligatory) and hence actions that one has no duty or obligation to perform. But it is a controversial category. Some have argued that the concept of supererogation is paradoxical because on one hand, supererogatory actions are (by definition) supposed to be morally good, indeed morally best, actions. But then if they are morally best, why aren't they morally required, contrary to the assumption that they are morally optional? In short: how can an action that is morally best to perform fail to be what one is morally required to do? The source of this alleged paradox has been dubbed the ‘good-ought tie-up’. In our article, we address this alleged paradox by first making a phenomenological case for the reality of instances of genuine supererogatory actions, and then, by reflecting on the relevant phenomenology, explaining why there is no genuine paradox. Our explanation appeals to the idea that moral reasons can play what we call amerit conferring role. The basic idea is that moral reasons that favor supererogatory actions function to confer merit on the actions they favor—they play a merit conferring role—and can do without also requiring the actions in question. Hence, supererogatory actions can be both good and morally meritorious to perform yet still be morally optional. Recognition of a merit conferring role unties the good-ought tie up, and (as we further argue) there are good reasons, independent of helping to resolve the alleged paradox, for recognizing this sort of role that moral reasons may play.

There is an explanatory constraint on practical reasons: practical reasons have to be the kinds of things that we can act for. Some philosophers, notably Bernard Williams, have argued that the explanatory constraint favours internalism about reasons: for an agent to have a reason to Ф it is at least a necessary condition that she would, after ideal deliberation, be motivated to Ф. Internalism suggests that naturalism about reasons is more plausible for, in this view, reasons are psychological states. However, reasons must not only be the kinds of things we can act for, at least some reasons must be good reasons, i.e. normative requirements. Derek Parfit argues that internalist, naturalist accounts cannot capture the normative aspect of reasons. He takes this to be a point in favour of his own externalist, non-naturalist account. I ask first whether Williams’ account does fail to account for the normativity of reasons as Parfit argues, and second whether Parfit’s externalist account can adequately meet the explanatory constraint. Although I claim that the answer to the first question is yes and the second no, the answer to both questions turns on the nature of practical rationality. My case stands if practical rationality is procedural, and falls if practical rationality is substantive. I argue, however, that the burden of proof is on those who, like Parfit, wish to defend a substantive account of practical rationality.

For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character, and the Ethics of Belief. By Eugene Garver. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004. 264p. $55.00 cloth, $22.50 paper. Does reason advance democratic values, or is it a manifestation of the will to power, used by elites to justify coercion? Eugene Garver seeks a middle way through this question by claiming that certain uses of reason oppress, but others do not. Practical reason can build democratic community, but only if it is carefully delineated from manipulative sophistry and an excessively theoretical reason that seeks logical rigor to the detriment of decent practices. Garver makes rhetoric a central case of practical reason to argue his point. This is understandable, given his previous work on Aristotelian rhetoric and the history of prudence.

What does deep ethical understanding look like and how can we measure the progression of this aptitude? Qualitative and quantitative data collected from students in Contemporary Moral Problems courses over two successive semesters revealed that the development of moral reasoning skills is a slow process. The progression of moral reasoning does not occur in a linear fashion nor is there a point at which a person will have satisfied all of the necessary and sufficient conditions for good moral reasoning. Student artifacts collected present moral reasoning skills as more of an ebb and flow, a type of coherence model with ongoing adjustment of one’s beliefs, moral principles, values, and factual information.

What makes an episode of practical reasoning good? In one kind of view, practical reasoning succeeds just in case it leads the agent to do what she ought to do or to respond correctly to her reasons. Even if it is capricious, inconsistent, or habitual, it will count as good insofar as it hits its target. An alternative approach holds that reasoning can be assessed for its correctness independently of its outcome. The standard way of fleshing this out posits the existence of formal rational requirements. In this view, reasoning is good if it leads the agent to satisfy these structural requirements, independently of whether the result accords with what she actually ought to intend or do. But might there be norms of practical reasoning that do not just collapse into successful reasons-responsiveness or universal structural requirements? For instance, in certain contexts where the future is fairly predictable and resources are abundant, a norm that enjoins you to "stick to your plans" will be quite useful. In contexts that are unpredictable and resource scarce, however, this norm might not be as useful and thus not pass muster as a universal rational requirement. This chapter articulates a view in which there are genuine norms of practical reasoning that go beyond mere reasons-responsiveness but that are substantive, contingent, and context sensitive rather than universal and structural. We argue that such norms are needed to capture much of what is meant by "good practical reasoning."

This chapter outlines what it is to legislate well, which is to choose to change the law in some specific way for some good reasons. The way to understand how the well-formed legislature acts is to reflect on the many good reasons there are to authorize some person or body to change the law by deliberate action. The chapter goes on to consider how one person — a prince — would reason to legislate, arguing that legislating involves a complex mix of empirical, technical, and moral reasoning and culminates in reasoned (intentional) choice. It outlines in further detail the content and scope of the intention on which the sole legislator acts in legislating, before considering the relevance of compromise and integrity to the character of legislative reasoning and choice.

An attempt is made to evaluate performance of concrete practices in terms of quality using relationship among three factors: concrete practice scores, influential degree of concrete practice to concrete properties, and important degree of concrete properties in concrete structures. Results show that performance of concrete practices in five public building projects in Thailand was neither excellent nor disastrous. Typical problems were in the curing process, both in delay in curing and insufficient curing periods. For column, the separation problem due to placing process was also serious. It seems that concrete practice may be much improved with minor attention.External coordination problem among parties is a most serious managerial problem perceived by practitioners.Fundamental reasons for poor practice are lack of proper knowledge and low beliefs in the benefits of observing standard. Thus, concrete practice training programs are effective to improve knowledge and enhance concerns of practitioners, particularly headman. Strong beliefs, high levels of concern and sufficient knowledge of players, together with more systematic concrete practice procedures provided by managerial levels are keys for better quality practice.

Practice what you preach? Children's evaluations of parents' verbal messages and social modeling of honesty and lie-telling.

What are the conditions under which an agent has an aesthetic reason to stop appreciating something? In this paper, I argue that such a reason is dependent not only on the aesthetic properties of the object of appreciation but also on the hedonic state of the agent. Virtuous aesthetic agents who are responsive to aesthetic reasons need to be sensitive to hedonic changes in relation to the object and to recognise when these changes make it appropriate to sever one’s appreciative focus. The resulting view has implications for how to understand aesthetic fittingness, aesthetic obligation, and the difference between aesthetic and moral reasons.

A Modern Defense of Religious Authority Linda Zagzebski (bio) 1. The Modern Rejection of Authority It has often been observed that one characteristic of the modern world is the utter rejection of authority, or at least, the rejection of authority in so far as that is possible without leading to societal collapse. The need for political authority is grudgingly accepted to avert social disaster, but the fact that there is no moral authority is generally thought to be too obvious to require argument. For example, Patrick Hurley claims in his college textbook on logic that the appeal to authority for a moral judgment is an example of the Ad Verecundiam fallacy: “If someone were to argue that abortion is immoral because a certain philosopher or religious leader has said so, the argument would be weak regardless of the authority’s qualifications. Many questions in these areas are so hotly contested that there is no conventional wisdom an authority can depend upon.”1 Not only does Hurley think it is obvious that there is no moral authority in disputed domains, but his reason for thinking so is just that those domains are disputed. He does not consider the possibility that someone could actually have the authority to give moral prescriptions. [End Page 15] The rejection of authority extends to most domains of belief, not only moral beliefs. The ascendancy of modern science is usually credited with convincing people of the untrustworthiness of traditional sources of belief, including, of course, the teachings of the Church. The prestige of science has made scientific experts the closest thing we have to authorities over belief, and if there is any vestige of authority left in the epistemic realm—the realm of belief, then it is science. But although people will often accept the word of experts in an esoteric scientific field, scientific experts are not authorities in any robust sense. It is entirely up to the individual person whether she chooses to believe an expert. There is no question of commanding belief, and no duty to obey. Are there any good reasons for rejecting authority in belief and morals? I think there are two interesting and influential reasons. One comes from John Locke, who argued that nobody may command belief because it is impossible to obey it. “It is absurd that things should be enjoined by laws which are not in men’s power to perform. And to believe this or that to be true does not depend upon our will.”2 If authority is the right to command, there is no authority over beliefs. Locke’s claim that belief is not under the control of the will has a measure of truth that has led to an extensive debate in epistemology, but I do not see that it is any harder to believe on command than to believe what ordinary people tell me. It depends on the circumstances. Suppose my friend Ann says to me, “She will never marry him.” Surely it is possible for me to believe her, and if I have good reason to think she is reliable and sincere, I can also be justified in doing so. We all believe plenty of things we are told, often with good reason. But imagine the same situation except that Ann chooses her words a little differently. Instead of saying to me, “She will never marry him,” she might say, “Believe me, she will never marry him.” She could even make the command mode stronger by saying, “She will never marry him. You must believe that.” In each case I know that Ann intends for me to believe what she says, and I know that she believes it herself. Whatever reasons I have to think that Ann is privy [End Page 16] to inside information on our friend’s marital intentions can be the same in each case. I may not like the tone of the last case, but I see no reason to think that I am unable to follow the command. If I can accept Ann’s testimony about this particular matter, why would I find myself unable to do so once she turns her testimony into an explicit imperative? The...

Voluntarists in the early modern period speak of an agent’s following the law because she was ordered to do so or because it’s the law. Contemporary philosophers tend either to ignore or to dismiss the possibility of justified obedience of this sort – that is, they ignore or dismiss the possibility that something’s being the law could in itself constitute a good reason to act. In this paper, I suggest that this view isn’t taken seriously because of certain widespread beliefs about practical reason – in particular, it’s due to the belief that it’s impossible for reasons to be “bootstrapped” into existence. I argue, though, that a plausible account of practical reasoning should allow that reasons can be bootstrapped into existence, and so there’s no reason to be suspicious about the possibility of a person’s being justified in following the law because it’s the law. I end by suggesting that this conclusion opens up important new avenues of inquiry for philosophers working on topics related to legal obedience.

Recently it has been argued that some instances of germ‐line gene therapy will change the identity of the person who receives the benefit of therapy, and that in these instances there is no good moral reason to conduct germ‐line gene therapy. Against this we argue that even if gene therapy should have an effect on the identity of the resulting person, this would not diminish the urgency of the therapy. Not only would impersonal moral reasons speak in favour of such radical gene therapy, there would also be person‐affecting reasons to perform it.

What do we owe to non-human animals? How should we respond to the many injustices they face? Answering these questions requires philosophical attention to complicated questions about moral reasoning, moral status, and ethical theory. This first part of this chapter provides an overview of what both good and bad moral reasoning look like in the context of discussions about animal ethics. The second part of this chapter provides an overview of competing approaches to moral status, including anthropocentric, rationality, and sentio-centric approaches. The third, and final, part of this chapter provides an overview of competing approaches to ethical theory, including contractualism, rights theory, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics, as they apply to the moral treatment of other animals. And in its entirety, this chapter provides moral guidance to those who aim to protect animals in a world infested with animal injustices.

Arguing for a vegan economy, this book explains how we can and should alter our eating habits away from meat and dairy through sociocultural evolution. Using the latest research and ideas about the cultural ecology of food, this book makes the case that through biological and, especially, cultural evolution, the human diet can gravitate away from farmed meat and dairy products. The thrust of the writing demonstrates that because humans are a cultural species, and since we are evolving more culturally than biologically, it stands to reason for health and environmental reasons that we develop a vegan economy. The book shows that for many good reasons we don’t need a diet of meat and dairy and a call is made to legislative leaders, policy makers, and educators to shift away from animal farming and inform people about the advantages of a vegan culture. The bottom line is that we have to start thinking collectively about smarter ways of growing and processing plant foods, not farming animals as food, to generate good consequences for health, the environment, and, therefore, animals. This is an attainable and worthy goal given the mental and physical plasticity of humans through cooperative cultural evolution. This book is essential reading for all interested in veganism, whether for ethical, environmental, or health reasons, and those studying the human diet from a range of disciplines, including cultural evolution, food ecology, animal ethics, food and nutrition, and evolutionary studies.

Aesthetic reasons are reasons to do and think various things. For example, it makes sense to wonder if a tree stump on the lawn was left there for environmental rather than aesthetic reasons, or for no reason at all. Aesthetic considerations of this kind are often contrasted with non-aesthetic reasons—such as moral or epistemic reasons. For example, they seem connected to pleasure-in-experience in a distinctive way that differs from paradigmatic moral reasons. Relatedly, the authority of aesthetic reasons has often been thought to involve less of an “external demand” upon us than in the other cases. In this chapter, I suggest that such distinctiveness and modesty coheres well with an anti-realist treatment that views them as non-objective in nature. I then go on to consider an alternative, more robustly realist conception of aesthetic reasons.