Issue Evolution in Political Science

This article sets out to examine the extent of party system change in Scandinavia since the ‘earthquake elections’ in the early 1970s witnessed the parliamentary breakthrough of new parties and, in particular, the rise of a populist radical right. It deploys an analytical framework derived from Berglund and Lindström's five‐party Scandinavian model and an identification of the ‘core structures’ of the frozen party system in the region. In assessing party system change the significance of changes in the patterns of interaction between parties at the elite level, that is in the governmental and parliamentary arenas, is emphasised over and above electoral change. It is argued that the core features of the Scandinavian party systems have changed much less since 1970 than the structure of party competition and that the single most important development in the party politics of the region has been that the historic non‐socialist groupings have acquired increased ‘relevance’ as coalition parties both severally and collectively. The article concludes by asking: ‘so what?’ Can an indication of the extent of party system change be of assistance in understanding the wider workings of the political system and the operation of the legislative process?

This is the third of three chapters on political party systems and structures of competition, and presents an overall review. In the first section, Approaches to the Classification of Party Systems: A Review it looks at the principal existing approaches to the classification of party systems, pointing to both their limits and possibilities when applied within comparative analysis. It then goes on in the second section, Party Systems and the Competition for Government, to underline the importance of understanding the structure of competition in any given party system, since in many ways the whole notion of a party system is centred on the assumption that there exists a stable structure of competition. Structures of competition can be seen to be either closed (and predictable) or open (and unpredictable), depending on the patterns of alternation in government, the degree of innovation or persistence in processes of government formation, and the range of parties gaining access to government. The emphasis in the third section, Party Systems and Electoral Outcomes, is on the need to distinguish between processes of electoral change on the one hand, and changes in party systems and the structures of competition on the other, a distinction which also allows the possibility of situations in which electoral change is the consequence rather than the cause of party system change.

Party systems represent parts of political systems which arise as a result of interactions between political parties. Party relations produce characteristics which place a particular party system within the typology of party systems. A number of factors can be considered in explaining the nature of party competition, most often placed within the categories of institutional and sociostructural factors. This paper analyses the impact of full and partial social cleavages on party systems. Given that the theory of social cleavages has proved insufficient in explaining party differences and the dynamics of party systems, especially in new democracies, we will improve the analysis by including the concept of partial social cleavages. This research shows the unequivocal influence of dominant social cleavages on the situation and changes in party systems. Although in some cases no changes in the type of party system have occurred, it can be concluded that exactly in those cases there exist permanent and ingrained social cleavages, but also partial cleavages which affect the relations in the party system at the given time. Identity issues stand out as the dominant topic in political competition, especially in the countries where ethnic relations have not been resolved.

This article considers party system effects and change in government-opposition dynamics in EU referendums. Relying on the analysis of party stances, party-voter alignments and campaign dynamics in 12 EU referendums in France, Ireland, Great-Britain and Spain, it shows that EU referendums tend to interfere with traditional party system dynamics in majoritarian democracies. By clearly manifesting a pro-European convergence between incumbent and mainstream opposition parties, they constitute a fertile ground to awake the ‘sleeping giant’ under certain conditions. EU referendums favor the temporary displacement of the partisan cleavage, create recurrent tensions for mainstream opposition parties and consistently reinforce the role played by protest parties. The recurrent intra-party factionalism or the limited mobilizations of pro-European opposition parties in referendum campaigns are thus not so linked with their ideologies or with endogenous factors, but are rather largely induced by their specific party system ‘situations’.

This article is part of the special cluster titled Parties and Democratic Linkage in Post-Communist Europe, guest edited by Lori Thorlakson, and will be published in the August 2018 issue of EEPS This article introduces a special section on parties and democratic linkage in post-communist Europe. It sets out the main objectives and research questions that guide the four articles in this special section, presenting these in the context of the comparative politics literature on party and party system change and democratic development. It introduces the key arguments of the articles in the section, arguing that the contributions identify regionally distinctive patterns of party and party system behaviour in Central and Eastern Europe. These patterns have fuelled a quest for more suitable conceptual and measurement tools and call for diversity in comparative analysis, combining intra and inter regional comparison.

Party systems, that is, the number and the size of all the parties within a country, can vary greatly across countries. I conduct a principal component analysis on a party seat share dataset of 17 advanced democracies from 1970 to 2013 to reduce the dimensionality of the data. I find that the most important dimensions that differentiate party systems are: “the size of the biggest two parties” and the level of “competition between the two biggest parties.” I use the results to compare the changes in electoral and legislative party systems. I also juxtapose the results to previous party system typologies and party system size measures. I find that typologies sort countries into categories based on variation along both dimensions. On the other hand, most of the current political science literature use measures (e.g., the effective number of parties) that are correlated with the first dimension. I suggest that instead of these, indices that measure the opposition structure and competition could be used to explore problems pertaining to the competitiveness of the party systems.

This article examines the development of the east German party system from the peaceful revolution in the former GDR to the aftermath of the 1994 federal election. It takes into account its format, polarisation, fragmentation, asymmetry, volatility, legitimacy, segmentation and government durability. The analysis shows that there was not only a complete transformation of the former GDR's party system between autumn 1989 and autumn 1990 but also a general change of the east German party system between 1990 and 1994. Both at the federal and at the Land level, the high volatility resulted in a considerably less fragmented system with a parliamentary format reduced to three parties: the CDU, SPD and PDS. The change in the electoral dimension also led to an increase in segmentation and to government instability at the Land level and coincided with a decrease of legitimacy. Reasons for the party system change are to be be found in developments at the macro‐level, that is, the institutional framework party compe...

The main goal of this article is to analyse the role of social, political and ideological factors in explaining party system change in Portugal during the democratic period (April 1974June 2005). We begin with the evolving trends in the party system format, and their main effects on the patterns of parties' interactions as well as on the functioning of the political system. This first approach will enable us to divide the democratic period into two distinct phases and an interlude. Following this, we will analyse the dimensions and strength of policy competition between the parties before, finally, analysing the impact of social, political and ideological factors on party system change in Portugal.

For a given electoral system, what average number and size distribution of parties can we expect? This book makes specific predictions that agree with world averages. The basic factors are assembly size and district magnitude (the number of seats allocated in the district). While previous models tell us only the direction in which to change the electoral system, the present ones also tell us by how much they must be changed so as to obtain the desired change in party system and cabinet duration. These are quantitatively predictive logical models. Combined with known particularities of a country, these models can be used for informed institutional design. Allocation of seats among countries in the European Parliament is also put on a logical basis.

The nationalisation of politics is a major political phenomenon deriving from the historical trend towards the formation of national electorates and party systems brought about by the progressive reduction in the significance of territorial cleavages. During the last 50 years, though the issue of vote nationalisation has been addressed by a large volume of literature, serious analysis of the Italian case has never made much progress, having been limited to the reflections of a few isolated authors. Over the past 20 years, a period marking the passage from the long period of polarised pluralism to the so-called ‘Second Republic’, the Italian party system has undergone profound changes, with the continuing emergence and growth of new political parties and a sharp increase in the levels of party fragmentation and volatility. How has nationalisation of the vote evolved in this changing framework? This article analyses the process of (de)-nationalisation of the vote in Italy and explains its evolution between the first (1948–1992) and the second (1994–2013) phases of the republican era, assessing the impact of various possible determinants. The empirical analysis shows that vote nationalisation in Italy is strongly associated with competition factors and with the level of institutionalisation of the party system.

"Book Review: David Broughton and Mark Donovan (eds.), Changing Party Systems in Western Europe (London: Pinter, 1999), pp. xix, 307, £ 16.99." Political Science, 51(1), pp. 103–104

One of the prime incentives for this dissertation was the renewed interest in the role of party agency for the emergence and structuring of party systems that came up in the course of the discussions about the third wave of democracy and the concomitant challenges to the theoretical fundamentals of common party system theory. In addition, scholarly discourse on the third wave brought up again the question as to how the party system as an independent variable impacts on processes of democratic consolidation, national integration and socio-economic development.Trying to examine the role of party agency in this regard and to assess the role of the party system as the independent variable, the dissertation deals with two regional and temporal contexts and a political phenomenon pertinent to these contexts that most often have ranked as unique or paradoxical in scholarly assessments. Academic accounts of post-colonial India are interspersed with references to a deviant case of, or an empirical anomaly to, party system and democratic theory, and the conventional vocabulary used to describe post-apartheid South African political development frequently resorts to such terms as political miracle or societal exceptionalism. A similar confusion and vagueness prevails with regard to the specific configuration of a democratic and competitive party system characterised by the towering and prolonged dominance of one party. The study is an attempt to shed light on these contexts and their party systems by departing from the conventional �paths� of party system theory as well as from the relativist assessments of post-independent India (1947-67) and post-apartheid South Africa (1994-). This is done by means of a diachronic comparison of the two countries� party systems with a distinct focus on the role of party agency in the shaping and maintenance of one-party-dominance and on the role of the two party systems as independent variables. Chapter 1 deals with the conceptual, theoretical and methodological problems, incentives and questions inherent in the kind of cross-national and diachronic comparison attempted in this study. Chapter 2 gives a brief outline of the regional settings at the time democratic party competition was beginning to take shape, outlines the institutional boundaries within which the two party systems were/are located, looks at the main characteristics of the electorate in post-independent India and post-apartheid South Africa and �takes stock� of the two party systems in terms of a broad outline of the dominant party and the relevant opposition parties. The next three chapters present the bulk of the empirical analysis and deal with the emergence, working and functions/effects of one-party-dominance in India and South Africa respectively. Each chapter refers to the basic outline of the analytical framework depicted above and combines theoretical arguments with empirical, as well as historical, givens of the two party systems under examination. Whereas chapter 3 examines how the two party systems were �shaped from above�, i.e. how party agency helped to achieve the dominant position of the INC and ANC respectively, chapter 4 examines the mechanisms of control employed to maintain dominance and the mechanisms of party competition prevailing in the two regional contexts. Both chapters deal with the party agentive factors identified in the analytical framework as responsible for the achievement and maintenance of one-party-dominance in the form of short analytical narratives. The last of these three chapters (chapter 5) sums up and discusses the effects and (redefined) functions of party systems in changing societies and gives an account of how both countries� party systems have fared with regard to these effects and in terms of fulfilling these functions. Chapter 6 takes up the differences and similarities of the two regional contexts as they have emerged out of the preceding three chapters, relates the �lessons� of the Indian experience to the prospects of one-party-dominance in South Africa by means of a comparison and reassesses the two key theses of the study, namely that a) party agency and strategy were among the most decisive factors in the formation and development of the two regional contexts� systems of one-party-dominance and are, in general, crucial for party system formation and development (they are especially relevant in the shaping of one-party-dominance in changing societies); and that b) systems of one-party-dominance have a potentially (but not necessarily) benign effect on processes of democratisation, national integration and democratic development in the crucial period of changing societies� transition to democracy and democratic consolidation.

Considerable evidence suggests that social diversity increases the number of political parties. While a vast literature examines this relationship by measuring social diversity as ethnic fragmentation, the convenience of capturing the level of social heterogeneity by using alternative indicators has been traditionally overlooked. In this article, I offer new evidence that documents the impact of social diversity on party system size by proxying the former as the number of social classes. Using both objective class positions and subjective class identifications and employing two different datasets that cover democratic legislative elections around the world between 1981 and 2015, I find that the effective number of social classes has a positive effect on party system fragmentation when the average district magnitude in a democracy is high. Given the difficulty to test these effects in a cross-country environment net of unobserved heterogeneity, I examine the robustness of the findings in Spain between 2000 and 2016, an ideal case due to large differences in district magnitude and a changing party system. Overall, the results suggest that high levels of social diversity are likely to increase party system fragmentation when the electoral system is permissive enough.

Inter-component communication (ICC) among Android apps is shown to be the source of many security vulnerabilities. Prior research has developed compositional analyses to detect the existence of ICC vulnerabilities in a set of installed apps. However, they all lack the ability to efficiently respond to incremental system changes—such as adding/removing apps. Every time the system changes, the entire analysis has to be repeated, making them too expensive for practical use, given the frequency with which apps are updated, installed, and removed on a typical Android device. This paper presents a novel technique, dubbed FLAIR, for efficient, yet formally precise, security analysis of Android apps in response to incremental system changes. Leveraging the fact that the changes are likely to impact only a small fraction of the prior analysis results, FLAIR recomputes the analysis only where required, thereby greatly improving analysis performance without sacrificing the soundness and completeness thereof. Our experimental results using numerous collections of real-world apps corroborate that FLAIR can provide an order of magnitude speedup over prior techniques.

Menu Modeling with MyPyramid Food Patterns: Incremental Dietary Changes Lead to Dramatic Improvements in Diet Quality of Menus