Reviewed by: Secret Weapons and World War II: Japan in the Shadow of Big Science Loyd E. Lee Secret Weapons and World War II: Japan in the Shadow of Big Science. By Walter E. Grunden. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005. ISBN 0-7006-1383-8. Photographs. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xi, 334. $39.95. The title of Secret Weapons and World War II belies the full achievement [End Page 267] of this important book. This is not just a book about secret weapons, nor only about Japan's secret weapons. It is instead, a comparison of the scientific and technological programs of all the major Allied and Axis powers with developments in Japan. This is "Big Science," the linking of government, universities, research institutes, strategic planners, and economic institutions into large-scale coordinated projects. Opening with a chapter on mobilizing science and technology, Grunden continues by devoting fully half of the 204 pages of text to summarizing four key areas of prewar and wartime weaponry research among the belligerents: nuclear physics, radar and other electronic devices, rockets and jet propulsion, and chemical and biological weapons. The other half is a detailed discussion of what Japanese scientists did in each of these areas. Notoriously, especially in the case of Unit 731, it was in the fields of chemical and biological weapons that Japan made the most progress. These five chapters plus epilogue are fully accessible to upper division undergraduates with no special scientific background. The role of science in the history of the Second World War, and especially as it relates to wartime strategy and mobilization, is too often a stepchild of historiography. In the case of Japan, it is mentioned, if at all, only in passing. Walter Grunden's Secret Weapons goes a long way toward correcting this problem. He brings to the task the necessary linguistic skills, archival and personal research, plus an understanding of science, to relate a persuasive narrative. Unlike the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Soviet Union, Japan did not have the mature economy, the requisite material resources or the bureaucratic infrastructure to support "Big Science" programs. Japan had many well-trained scientists, but they were isolated from the military, underfunded and generally ignored. In addition, strategic long-term technological preparation suffered from rivalry between the army and the navy and a belief in a short-war strategy. Grunden concludes, however, that a more coherent science program would not have altered the outcome of the war. On the other hand, the shock of losing the war and the knowledge of how important science had been in Allied victories led Japan's leadership to reevaluate their wartime course, building the basis for the country's later successes. Nearly half of the book includes an extensive appendix, notes, and bibliography. The appendix contains twenty-two tables (thirty-five pages) of military research institutions (army, air, and navy), principal researchers, their projects and institutional affiliations, laboratory equipment, nomenclature, various radar systems, rocket ordnance, missiles, bacteriological bombs, the careers of Unit 731 personnel, and more, which alone makes the book necessary for the serious researcher of Japanese science in World War Two. There are also extensive notes, a bibliography of archival collections, unpublished primary documents, and the usual, and very useful, list of articles, books and monographs from all of the countries discussed in the text. Japanese language material is romanized. Loyd E. Lee State University of New York at New Paltz New Paltz, New York Copyright © 2006 Society for Military History
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