Judgment aggregation in dynamic logic of propositional assignments

The kinds of models that are usually considered in separation logic are structures such as words, trees, and more generally pointer structures (heaps). In this paper we introduce the separation logic of much simpler structures, viz. sets. The models of our set separation logic are nothing but valuations of classical propositional logic. Separating a valuation V consists in splitting it up into two partial valuations v 1 and v 2. Truth of a formula φ 1 * φ 2 in a valuation V can then be defined in two different ways: first, as truth of φ 1 in all total extensions of v 1 and truth of φ 2 in all total extensions of v 2; and second, as truth of φ 1 in some total extension of v 1 and truth of φ 2 in some total extension of v 2. The first is an operator of separation of resources: the update of φ 1 * φ 2 by ψ is the conjunction of the update of φ 1 by ψ and the update of φ 2 by ψ; in other words, φ 1 * φ 2 can be updated independently. The second is an operator of separation of processes: updates by ψ 1 * ψ 2 can be performed independently. We show that the satisfiability problem of our logic is decidable in polynomial space (PSPACE). We do so by embedding it into dynamic logic of propositional assignments (which is PSPACE complete). We moreover investigate its applicability to belief update and belief revision, where the separation operators allow to formulate natural requirements on independent pieces of information.

Judgment aggregation is a mathematical theory of collective decision-making. It concerns the methods whereby individual opinions about logically interconnected issues of interest can, or cannot, be aggregated into one collective stance. Aggregation problems have traditionally been of interest for disciplines like economics and the political sciences, as well as philosophy, where judgment aggregation itself originates from, but have recently captured the attention of disciplines like computer science, artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Judgment aggregation has emerged in the last decade as a unifying paradigm for the formalization and understanding of aggregation problems. Still, no comprehensive presentation of the theory is available to date. This Synthesis Lecture aims at filling this gap presenting the key motivations, results, abstractions and techniques underpinning it.

Preference aggregation and judgment aggregation are two basic research models of group decision making. And preference aggregation has been deeply studied in social choice theory. However, researches of social choice theory gradually focus on judgment aggregation which appears recently. Judgment aggregation focuses on how to aggregate many consistent logical formulas into one, from the perspective of logic. We try to start with judgment aggregation model based on logic and then explore different solutions to problem of judgment aggregation.

Judgment aggregation is a field in which individuals are required to vote for or against a certain decision (the conclusion) while providing reasons for their choice. The reasons and the conclusion are logically connected propositions. The problem is how a collective judgment on logically interconnected propositions can be defined from individual judgments on the same propositions. It turns out that, despite the fact that the individuals are logically consistent, the aggregation of their judgments may lead to an inconsistent group outcome, where the reasons do not support the conclusion. However, in this paper we claim that collective irrationality should not be the only worry of judgment aggregation. For example, judgment aggregation would not reject a consistent combination of reasons and conclusion that no member voted for. In our view this may not be a desirable solution. This motivates our research about when a social outcome is `compatible' with the individuals' judgments. The key notion that we want to capture is that any individual member has to be able to defend the collective decision. This is guaranteed when the group outcome is compatible with its members views. Judgment aggregation problems are usually studied using classical propositional logic. However, for our analysis we use an argumentation approach to judgment aggregation problems. Indeed the question of how individual evaluations can be combined into a collective one can also be addressed in abstract argumentation. We introduce three aggregation operators that satisfy the condition above, and we offer two definitions of compatibility. Not only does our proposal satisfy a good number of standard judgment aggregation postulates, but it also avoids the problem of individual members of a group having to become committed to a group judgment that is in conflict with their own individual positions.

In recent years, judgement aggregation has emerged as an important area of social choice theory. Judgement aggregation is concerned with aggregating sets of individual judgements over logically connected propositions into a set of collective judgements. It has been shown that even seemingly weak conditions on the aggregation function make it impossible to find functions that produce rational collective judgements from all possible rational individual judgements. This implies that the step from individual judgements to collective judgements requires trade-offs between different desiderata, such as universal domain, rationality, epistemological quality, and unbiasedness. The typical application for judgement aggregation is the problem of group decision making. Juries and expert committees are the stock examples. However, the relevance of judgement aggregation goes beyond these cases. In this survey, I review some core results in the field of judgement aggregation and social epistemology and discuss their implications for the analysis of distributed thinking.

Judgment aggregation is a recent theory that combines aggregation problems previously studied by social choice theory with logic. Social choice theory is a vast subject, including not only the study of preference aggregation and voting theory but also topics like social welfare and justice. Given the tight links between judgment aggregation and preference aggregation, in this first chapter we give a concise survey on some historical aspects of preference aggregation and then introduce and motivate the more recent field of judgment aggregation. The chapter builds on [Sen99, Sen86, Bla58] for the historical overview on social choice theory, and on [KS93, Kor92] for the informal introduction to judgment aggregation.

Computational social choice is a new interdisciplinary research area at the intersection of social choice theory and computer science that studies computational aspects of social choice mechanisms as well as applications of social choice ideas in the design and analysis of computing systems. Research on computational social choice now encompasses a variety of topics, including the algorithmic aspects of voting rules, computational barriers to strategic behaviour, collective decision-making in multi-agent systems, preference elicitation and communication issues in voting, fair division, computational aspects of weighted voting games, collective decision-making in combinatorial domains, logic-based formalisms for social choice problems, belief and judgement aggregation, and social software. The aim of this special issue is to build on the spectacular success of two workshops on computational social choice (COMSOC’06, Amsterdam and COMSOC’08, Liverpool), and provide a forum for reseachers in the area to present their ideas on a variety of topics. This special issue is composed of nine research articles and a short note that span a fairly wide range of issues, including voting, mechanism design, judgment aggregation, and fairness, and a similarly wide range of techniques, such as logic, experiments, and computational complexity. The paper by Agotnes, van der Hoek and Wooldridge defines a new modal logic for representing and reasoning about preference and judgment aggregation. The authors show that their logic can be used to express a variety of concepts and results from the social choice domain, including majority voting, the discursive paradox, Arrow’s theorem and Condorcet’s paradox. Baharad, Goldberger, Koppel and Nitzan propose a maximum likelihood estimation-based approach for aggregating voters’ opinions over several issues. They argue that their method is vastly superior to simple majority voting, and use both analytical and empirical evaluation to support their argument. Balan, Richards and Luke deal with the problem of selecting a sequence of actions when the actions have multiple beneficiaries. Their goal is to select the actions according to a lexicographic fairness criterion. The explore the complexity of this problem for both finite and infinite sequences of actions and present both algorithms and intractability results for this problem. The paper by Caminada and Pigozzi applies argumentation theory to judgment aggregation, and proposes aggregation operators satisfying not only the usual property of collective rationality, but another highly desirable property,

An allocation problem is a type of aggregation problem in which the values of individuals' opinions on some set of variables (canonically a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities) sum to a constant. This paper shows that for realistic allocation problems, namely ones in which the set of possible opinion values is finite, the only universal aggregation methods that satisfy two commonly invoked conditions are the dictatorial ones. The two conditions are, first, that the aggregate opinion on any variable depends only on the individuals' opinions on that variable and not on their opinions on any other variable and, secondly, that the aggregate opinion minimally preserves unanimous individual opinion. Connections between this result and similar ones in the literature on judgment aggregation are explored and their significance assessed.

We explore how judgment aggregation and belief merging in the framework of fuzzy logic can help resolve the “Doctrinal Paradox.” We also illustrate the use of fuzzy aggregation functions in social choice theory.

Description logics provide powerful languages for representing and reasoning about knowledge of static application domains. The main strength of description logics is that they offer considerable expressive power going far beyond propositional logic, while reasoning is still decidable. There is a demand to bring the power and character of description logics into the description and reasoning of dynamic application domains which are characterized by actions. In this paper, based on a combination of the propositional dynamic logic PDL, a family of description logics and an action formalism constructed over description logics, we propose a family of dynamic description logics DDL(X @) for representing and reasoning about actions, where X represents well-studied description logics ranging from the to the , and X @ denotes the extension of X with the @ constructor. The representation power of DDL(X @) is reflected in four aspects. Firstly, the static knowledge of application domains is represented as RBoxes and acyclic TBoxes of the description logic X. Secondly, the states of the world and the pre-conditions of atomic actions are described by ABox assertions of the description logic X @, and the post-conditions of atomic actions are described by primitive literals of X @. Thirdly, starting with atomic actions and ABox assertions of X @, complex actions are constructed with regular program constructors of PDL, so that various control structures on actions such as the "Sequence", "Choice", "Any-Order", "Iterate", "If-Then-Else", "Repeat-While" and "Repeat-Until" can be represented. Finally, both atomic actions and complex actions are used as modal operators for the construction of formulas, so that many properties on actions can be explicitly stated by formulas. A tableau-algorithm is provided for deciding the satisfiability of DDL(X @)-formulas; based on this algorithm, reasoning tasks such as the realizability, executability and projection of actions can be effectively carried out. As a result, DDL(X @) not only offers considerable expressive power going beyond many action formalisms which are propositional, but also provides decidable reasoning services for actions described by it.

A novel four-phase dynamic CMOS logic is proposed, analysed and chip-tested. There are two circuit configurations in the new dynamic logic. One of these can completely get rid of the problems of charge sharing and clock skew, which are inherent in most of the dynamic circuits. The other, although it can only prevent the charge sharing problem, has a larger tolerance of the clock skew than the conventional four-phase precharge-discharge logic. The second configuration is more flexible in logic design than the first configuration. Both configurations use only three clock phases to form the four-phase dynamic circuits. After a brief analysis of the clock skew problem of the conventional four-phase logic, the new dynamic logic is introduced and the two circuit configurations are described. Then, the basic analysis on the device size design and performance evaluations of the new logic are given. A serial full adder was designed and implemented by a 3.5 /jm p-well CMOS process and the experimental results obtai...

The advantages and disadvantages of using gallium arsenide (GaAs) dynamic logic in computers and digital systems are briefly discussed, especially with respect to space applications. A short introduction to the topology and operation of GaAs Two-Phase Dynamic FET Logic (TDFL) circuits is presented. Experiments for testing the SEU sensitivity of GaAs TDFL, using a laser to create charge collection events, are described. Results are used to estimate the heavy-ion, soft error rate for TDFL in a spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit, and the dependence of the SEU sensitivity on clock frequency, clock voltage, and clock phase. Analysis of the data includes a comparison between the SEU sensitivities of TDFL and the more common static form of GaAs logic, Directly Coupled FET Logic (DCFL). This is the first reported SEU testing of GaAs dynamic logic.< <ETX xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">&gt;</ETX>

Propositional dynamic logic with local assignment

Dynamic logic is a powerful framework for reasoning about imperative programs. An extension with a concurrent operator, called concurrent propositional dynamic logic (CPDL) [20], was introduced to formalise programs running in parallel. In a different direction, other authors proposed a systematic method for generating multi-valued propositional dynamic logics to reason about weighted programs [15]. This paper presents the first step of combining these two frameworks to introduce uncertainty in concurrent computations. In the proposed framework, a weight is assigned to each branch of the parallel execution, resulting in a (possible) asymmetric parallelism, inherent to the fuzzy programming paradigm [2, 23]. By adopting such an approach, a family of logics is obtained, called multi-valued concurrent propositional dynamic logics (\(\mathcal {GCDL}(\mathbf {A})\)), parametric on an action lattice \(\mathbf {A}\) specifying a notion of “weight” assigned to program execution. Additionally, the validity of some axioms of CPDL is discussed in the new family of generated logics.

Collective decision making is the process of mapping the individual views of several individual agents into a joint decision. The need for collective decision making mechanisms is abundant, not just in the realm of politics, but also for a wide range of scientific and technological applications. These include, for instance, logistics, grid computing, and recommender systems. The alternatives to be decided upon often have a combinatorial structure: an alternative is characterised by a tuple of variables, each ranging over a finite domain. Classical approaches to collective decision making, developed in social choice theory, do not take the computational limitations induced by the combinatorial nature of the problem into account. For instance, if we are asked to elect a committee consisting of k representatives, choosing from a pool of n candidates, then we are in fact faced with a social choice problem with $(^n_k)$ alternatives. Asking each voter for their full preferences over these $(^n_k)$ alternatives may not be feasible in practice. Similarly, if we have to choose between accepting or rejecting each of n different propositions, then we are dealing with a social choice problem with 2 n possible outcomes. In this talk I will report on a number of recent developments in the area of collective decision making in combinatorial domains. This includes the study of languages for the compact representation of preferences [2,4], the design of voting rules for multi-issue elections [1], and the analysis of the computational complexity of decision problems arising in judgment aggregation [3].