K-Basin spent nuclear fuel characterization data report 2

The water-filled K-Basins in the Hanford 100 Area have been used to store N-Reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) since the 1970s. Because some leaks in the basin have been detected and some of the fuel is breached due to handling damage and corrosion, efforts are underway to remove the fuel elements from wet storage. An Integrated Process Strategy (IPS) has been developed to package, dry, transport, and store these metallic uranium fuel elements in an interim storage facility on the Hanford Site (WHC 1995). Information required to support the development of the drying processes, and the required safety analyses, is being obtained from characterization tests conducted on fuel elements removed from the K-Basins. A series of whole element drying tests (reported in separate documents, see Section 7.0) have been conducted by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)(a)on several intact and damaged fuel elements recovered from both the K-East and K-West Basins. This report documents the results of a test ''dry-run'' conducted prior to the eighth and last of those tests, which was conducted on an N-Reactor outer fuel element removed from K-West canister6513U. The system used for the dry-run test was the Whole Element Furnace Testing System, described in Section 2.0, located in the Postirradiation Testing Laboratory (PTL, 327 Building). The test conditions and methodologies are given in Section 3.0. The experimental results are provided in Section 4.0 and discussed Section 5.0.

The water-filled K-Basins in the Hanford 100 Area have been used to store N-Reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) since the 1970s. An Integrated Process Strategy (IPS) has been developed to package, dry, transport, and store these metallic uranium spent nuclear fuels in an interim storage facility on the Hanford Site (WHC 1995). Information required to support the development of the drying processes, and the required safety analyses, is being obtained from characterization tests conducted on fuel elements removed from the K-Basins. A series of drying tests (reported in separate documents, see Section 8.0) have been conducted by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) on several intact and damaged fuel elements recovered from both the K-East and K-West Basins. This report documents the results of the fifth of those tests conducted on an N-Reactor outer fuel element (6603M) which had been stored underwater in the Hanford 100 Area K-West basin from 1983 until 1996. This fuel element was subjected to a combination of low- and high-temperature vacuum drying treatments which were intended to mimic, wherever possible, the fuel treatment strategies of the IPS. The system used for the drying test was the Whole Element Furnace Testing System, described in Section 2.0. The test conditions and methodologies are given in Section 3.0. Inspections on the fuel element before and after the test are provided in Section 4.0. The experimental results are provided in Section 5.0. Discussion of the results is given in Section 6.0.

The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has a large inventory of diverse types of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). This legacy derives from the history of the INL as the National Reactor Testing Station, and from its mission to recover HEU from SNF and to test and examine SNF after irradiation. The INL also has a large diversity of SNF storage facilities, some 50 years old. SNF at INL has many forms—from intact assemblies down to metallurgical mounts, and some fuel has been wet stored for over 40 years. SNF is stored bare or in metal cans under water, or dry in vaults, caissons or casks. Inspection shows varying corrosion and degradation of the SNF and its storage cans. SNF has been stored in 10 different facilities: 5 pools, one cask storage pad, one vault, two generations of caisson facilities, and one modular Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). The pools range in age from 40 years old to the most modern in the US Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The near-term objective is to move SNF from older pools to interim dry storage, allowing shutdown and decommissioning of the older facilities. This move involves drying methods that are dependent on fuel type. The long-term objective is to have INL SNF in safe dry storage and ready to be shipped to the National Repository. The unique features of the INL SNF requires special treatments and packaging to meet the proposed repository acceptance criteria and SNF will be repackaged in standardized canisters for shipment and disposal in the National Repository. Disposal will use the standardized canisters that can be co-disposed with High Level Waste glass logs to limit the total fissile material in a repository waste package. The DOE standardized canister also simplifies the repository handling of the multitude of DOE SNF sizes and shapes.

The purpose of the reported effort is the development of a conceptual process for conversion of used nuclear fuel (UNF) from light water reactors (LWRs) to a fluoride salt form to facilitate its use for power generation in a Mu*STAR Accelerator-driven Subcritical Reactor (ADSR). This document evaluates potential processes for converting UNF into a fluoride salt, evaluates the costs/benefits of using enriched lithium in the carrier salt, and analyzes comparable costs of similar facilities to make a rough order of magnitude estimate for the cost to design, construct, and commission a Mu*STAR ADSR fuel conversion facility. This document also makes a high-level comparison of the Mu*STAR ADSR fuel cycle with other important fuel cycles. The results of the cost analysis show that the Mu*STAR ADSR fuel conversion facility will cost more than $100M, possibly up to around $1B, to design and construct. The cost will depend on the size of the hot cell required, which will depend on the processing options chosen for converting the UNF to a molten salt. Operations and maintenance of the facility will be on the order of $10M per year. The design, fabrication, and installation of the remote process equipment to support the fuel conversion will be an additional cost of more than $50M. Cost surveys of Department of Energy hot cell designs and previous Department of Energy hot cell construction suggest that the cost variance may be large, and the risk of escalating costs may be high in the regulation-mandated atmosphere of nuclear facility design and construction. The molten salt for the Mu*STAR ADSR contains all of the nonvolatile isotopes in the UNF, and there is never a separation of the plutonium from the fission products. This makes this conversion process much more proliferation resistant than the reprocessing options used for other closed fuel cycles. When normalized to the amount of electricity produced, the Mu*STAR ADSR fuel cycle’s expected cost might be less than any reprocessing fuel cycle and possibly less than the once-through cycle now used. Simulations show that once the conversion to fluoride is made, that up to seven times as much energy can be extracted from the UNF than was produced by the LWR while making it [Bowman, 2010]. Using once-only, on-site conversion to fluoride means no mining, no enrichment, no manufacturing of fuel rods, and no transportation costs. Typically, the UNF was produced over a 40-year period in an LWR; it can potentially be used for 280 years in Mu*STAR, producing the same power as the LWR did, ultimately requiring disposal of approximately the same volume of material as the LWR generated. Mu*STAR burns most of the higher actinides, which could reduce both the cost of disposal and significantly reduce the longevity of its radiotoxicity. Mu*STAR ADSR’s ability to demonstrate unique and valuable peripheral benefits are additional arguments for this technology, including (1) turning UNF into a valuable commodity (thus, its disposal will not be such an immediate problem, so continued operation of existing LWRs will be more acceptable); (2) burning fissile or fertile fuel including excess weapons-grade plutonium in subcritical mode; and (3) providing high-temperature process heat to convert natural gas to synthetic diesel fuel, water to hydrogen, or for other process-heat applications.

Currently the problem of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) reprocessing is relevant and studied in many countries. Existing methods of radiochemical reprocessing can not fully meet all the economic, energy and environmental needs of humanity [1]. Recently, the physical principles of magnetoplasma (MP) method of SNF separation is actively developed and investigated in NSC KIPT. This method consists in separation of nuclear fuel (NF) from fission products (FP) in the plasma phase [2]. During MP method application it is also expected the preliminary purification of SNF from some FP at the thermal heating stage [3]. At the next stage - the ionization stage - the complex multicomponent substance is converted into the plasma. Then directly NF is separated from FP at the magnetoplasma separation stage in plasma rotated in crossed electric and magnetic fields. The motion trajectories of NF and FP charged particles are greatly differ, therefore, NF and FP can be spatially separated [4]. Particles of NF and FP will get to the respective collectors, located in different places of SNF separation plant. Subsequently NF can be reused in different types of nuclear reactors.

The successful disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is one of the most serious challenges to the successful completion of the nuclear fuel cycle and the future of nuclear power generation. In the United States, 21 percent of the electricity is generated by 107 commercial nuclear power plants (NPP), each of which generates 20 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel annually. In 1996, the total accumulation of spent nuclear fuel was 33,700 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) stored at 70 sites around the country. The end-of-life projection for current nuclear power plants (NPP) is approximately 86,000 MTHM. In the proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain over 95% of the radioactivity originates from spent nuclear fuel. World-wide in 1998, approximately 130,000 MTHM of SNF have accumulated, most of it located at 236 NPP in 36 countries. Annual production of SNF is approximately 10,000 MTHM, containing about 100 tons of ''reactor grade'' plutonium. Any reasonable increase in the proportion of energy production by NPP, i.e., as a substitute for hydrocarbon-based sources of energy, will significantly increase spent nuclear fuel production. Spent nuclear fuel is essentially UO{sub 2} with approximately 4-5 atomic percent actinides and fission product elements. A number of these elements have long half-lives hence, the long-term behavior of the UO{sub 2} is an essential concern in the evaluation of the safety and risk of a repository for spent nuclear fuel. One of the unique and scientifically most difficult aspects of the successful disposal of spent nuclear fuel is the extrapolation of short-term laboratory data (hours to years) to the long time periods (10{sup 3} to 10{sup 5} years) as required by the performance objectives set in regulations, i.e. 10 CFR 60. The direct verification of these extrapolations or interpolations is not possible, but methods must be developed to demonstrate compliance with government regulations and to satisfy the public that there is a reasonable basis for accepting the long-term extrapolations of spent fuel behavior. In recent years ''natural analogues'' for both the repository environment (e.g., the Oklo natural reactors) and nuclear waste form behavior (e.g., corrosion and alteration of uraninite, UO{sub 2+x}) have been cited as a fundamental means of achieving confirmation of long-term extrapolations. In particular, considerable effort has already been made to establish that uraninite, UO{sub 2+x}, with its impurities, is a good structural and chemical analogue for the analysis of the long-term behavior of the UO{sub 2} in spent nuclear fuel. This proposal is based on the study of uraninite and the naturally occurring alteration products of UO{sub 2+x} under oxidizing and reducing conditions. The UO{sub 2} in spent nuclear fuel is not stable under oxidizing conditions. In oxic solutions, uranium has a strong tendency to exist as U{sup 6+} in the uranyl molecule, UO{sub 2}{sup 2+}. Uranyl ions react with a wide variety of inorganic and organic anions to form complexes. Throughout most of the natural range of pH, U{sup 6+} forms strong complexes with oxygen-bearing ions like CO{sub 3}{sup 2-}, HCO{sup 3-}, SO{sub 4}{sup 2-}, PO{sub 4}{sup 3-}, and AsO{sub 4}{sup 3-}, which are present in most oxidized stream and subsurface waters. In arid environments, the U{sup 6+} ion can precipitate as a wide variety of uranyl oxide hydrates, uranyl silicates and uranyl phosphates. This is well demonstrated in experimental work, e.g., in long term drip tests on UO{sub 2} and is confirmed by natural occurrences of UO{sub 2} in which a wide variety of uranyl phases form as alteration products. The most striking feature of these studies is the very close parallel in the paragenetic sequences (i.e. phase formation sequence) between the very long term (10 year tests) and the young (therefore, low-Pb uraninites) of the Nopal I deposit in Mexico.

Investigative study of radiotoxicity of spent nuclear fuel assembly of some commercial nuclear power plants

At present, 240 000 t of spent nuclear fuel (SF) has been accumulated in the world. Its long-term storage should meet safety conditions and requires noticeable finances, which grow every year. Obviously, this situation cannot exist for a long time; in the end, it will require a final decision. At present, several variants of solution of the problem of SF management are considered. Since most of the operating reactors and those under construction are thermal reactors, it is reasonable to assume that the structure of the nuclear power industry in the near and medium-term future will be unchanged, and it will be necessary to utilize plutonium in thermal reactors. In this study, different strategies of SF management are compared: open fuel cycle with long-term SF storage, closed fuel cycle with MOX fuel usage in thermal reactors and subsequent long-term storage of SF from MOX fuel, and closed fuel cycle in thermal reactors with heterogeneous fuel arrangement. The concept of heterogeneous fuel arrangement is considered in detail. While in the case of traditional fuel it is necessary to reprocess the whole amount of spent fuel, in the case of heterogeneous arrangement, it is possible to separate plutonium and 238U in different fuel rods. In this case, it is possible to achieve nearly complete burning of fissile isotopes of plutonium in fuel rods loaded with plutonium. These fuel rods with burned plutonium can be buried after cooling without reprocessing. They would contain just several percent of initially loaded plutonium, mainly even isotopes. Fuel rods with 238U alone should be reprocessed in the usual way.

Nuclear fuel rod is composed of cladding tube and a specified number of fuel pellets contained. In the United States, spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is expected to be transported to at least one storage facility before permanent disposal. The fatigue behavior of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) rods under reversed cyclic bending must be understood in order to evaluate their vibration integrity in a transportation environment. This is especially important for high-burnup SNFs (>45 GWd/MTU). This report presents the experimental results related to Zircaloy (Zry)-4-based surrogate rods and high-burnup SNFs, based on recent work performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The surrogate rod was made of Zry-4 cladding and alumina pellets, and high-burnup fuel rods were discharged from H.B. Robinson pressurized water reactor. The reversed cyclic bending testing was conducted at 5 Hz under loading control. The effect of pre-hydriding and burnup or irradiation on the flexural rigidity and fatigue life of cladding-pellet system were discussed. The fatigue data obtained are extremely useful to the future certification of SNF storage and transportation cask.

Interim storage of power reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and its potential application to SNF separations and closed fuel cycle

We demonstrated the use of combinatorial methods to optimize the filling of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in metal canisters for final deep SNF repository, according to the maximal allowed thermal power per canister Pmax and the limit of n = 4 spent-fuel assemblies per canister. As a next step, the deposition time can be optimized by minimizing the required number of canisters M and the interim storage time. The method has been tested in detail for a typical pressurized water reactor (PWR), nuclear power plant (NPP) Krsko, SNF for different numbers of reactor cycles and different Pmax. The results show that the time interval between the last reactor cycle and the optimal deposition time varies between 3 and 30 yr for a typical PWR. The most significant contribution to the uncertainty of the calculated SNF decay heat (thermal power) is due to inaccurate cross sections taken from generic cross-section libraries. The quality of the results was verified by comparing the calculated M to the theoretical lower boundary Mmin. The idea behind the optimization method is universal and thus can be implemented for any SNF, canister, and repository design.

This report summarizes some of the challenges encountered and solutions implemented to ensure safe storage and handling of damaged spent nuclear fuels (SNF). It includes a brief summary of some SNF storage environments and resulting SNF degradation, experience with handling and repackaging significantly degraded SNFs, and the associated lessons learned. This work provides useful insight and resolutions to many engineering challenges facing SNF handling and storage facilities. The context of this report is taken from a report produced at Idaho National Laboratory and further detailed information, such as equipment design and usage, can be found in the appendices to that report.

The management plan developed to characterize the K Basin spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and sludge was originally developed for Westinghouse Hanford Company and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to work together on a program to provide characterization data to support removal, conditioning, and subsequent dry storage of the SNF stored at the Hanford K Basins. The plan also addressed necessary characterization for the removal, transport, and storage of the sludge from the Hanford K Basins. This plan was revised in 1999 (i.e., Revision 2) to incorporate actions necessary to respond to the deficiencies revealed as the result of Quality Assurance surveillances and audits in 1999 with respect to the fuel characterization activities. Revision 3 to this Program Management Plan responds to a Worker Assessment resolution determined in Fical Year 2000. This revision includes an update to current organizational structures and other revisions needed to keep this management plan consistent with the current project scope. The plan continues to address both the SNF and the sludge accumulated at K Basins. Most activities for the characterization of the SNF have been completed. Data validation, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) document reviews, and OCRWM data qualification are the remaining SNF characterization activities. The transport and storage of K Basin sludge are affected by recent path forward revisions. These revisions require additional laboratory analyses of the sludge to complete the acquisition of required supporting engineering data. Hence, this revision of the management plan provides the overall work control for these remaining SNF and sludge characterization activities given the current organizational structure of the SNF Project.

During 2002–2005 the assessment of possibilities for disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in Lithuania was performed with support of Swedish experts. Potential geological formations for disposal of SNF were selected, disposal concept was developed, reference disposal site was defined and preliminary generic safety assessment was performed. Performing safety assessment the analysis of radionuclides migration from the repository as well as their impact to human and environment were also very important issues. In this paper results on the analysis of the radionuclide releases from the reference geological repository site for RBMK-1500 SNF in crystalline rocks in Lithuania are presented. For radionuclide migration in the near field region of the repository integrated finite difference method and the concept of compartments were used. For radionuclide migration in the far field the discrete channel network concept was used. The assessment of radionuclide migration in the near and far field region was performed using computer codes AMRER4.5 [1] and CHAN3D [2]. The results of analysis show that most of safety relevant radionuclides of RBMK-1500 SNF are effectively retarded in the near field region. The exposure due to possible release of the radionuclides from the crystalline rocks would be dominated by 129I firstly while after app. 250 thousand years 226Ra is dominating already.

The long-term performance of Department of Energy (DOE) spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in a mined geologic disposal system depends highly on fuel oxidation and subsequent radionuclide release. The oxidation rates of nuclear fuels are reviewed in this two-volume report to provide a baseline for comparison with release rate data and technical rationale for predicting general corrosion behavior of DOE SNF. The oxidation rates of nuclear fuels in the DOE SNF inventory were organized according to metallic, Part 1, and non-metallic, Part 2, spent nuclear fuels. This Part 1 of the report reviews the oxidation behavior of three fuel types prototypic of metallic fuel in the DOE SNF inventory: uranium metal, uranium alloys and aluminum-based dispersion fuels. The oxidation rates of these fuels were evaluated in oxygen, water vapor, and water. The water data were limited to pure water corrosion as this represents baseline corrosion kinetics. Since the oxidation processes and kinetics discussed in this report are limited to pure water, they are not directly applicable to corrosion rates of SNF in water chemistry that is significantly different (such as may occur in the repository). Linear kinetics adequately described the oxidation rates of metallic fuels in long-term corrosion. Temperature dependent oxidation rates were determined by linear regression analysis of the literature data. As expected the reaction rates of metallic fuels dramatically increase with temperature. The uranium metal and metal alloys have stronger temperature dependence than the aluminum dispersion fuels. The uranium metal/water reaction exhibited the highest oxidation rate of the metallic fuel types and environments that were reviewed. Consequently, the corrosion properties of all DOE SNF may be conservatively modeled as uranium metal, which is representative of spent N-Reactor fuel. The reaction rate in anoxic, saturated water vapor was essentially the same as the water reaction rate. The long-term intrinsic reaction rates of irradiated and unirradiated fuel were determined to be similar. The apparent reaction rate of irradiated metallic fuel increases as a function of swelling due to the increased surface area.