Traditional theories viewed memory as the “great storehouse of information.” Since the late 1960s, researchers have begun thinking of information as stored in the form of semantic networks. The general idea was that concepts were stored in nodes and that the links between nodes indicated an association between the concepts. Several decades later, it became clear that there is a fundamental problem with this view. The problem is that the concepts are merely labels in the network, for example the label “whale” or “tree.” The network is merely a connection of linked labels. The labels have no meaning to the network; they only have meaning to the user. As Harnad (1990) put it, the network is parasitic on us. He dubbed this the grounding problem. The grounding problem suggests that semantic networks as just described cannot be a model of human memory. A great deal of research since the publication of Harnad’s influential paper has tried to solvethe grounding problem. Mental representations need to be grounded in perception and action; they cannot be a free-floating system of symbols. A research tradition has emerged that tries to investigate how cognition is grounded in perception and action. Sometimes this research tradition is called “embodied cognition” but others, like the authors of this chapter, prefer the term “grounded cognition.” The first publications in this emerging field addressed the question of how language proces-sing is grounded in action and perception (Glenberg and Kaschak, 2002; Tucker and Ellis, 1998; Zwaan, Stanfield, and Yaxley, 2002). These studies suggested that there are interactions between language and perception and action. Over the years, convergent evidence on these mutual interactions of action and perception with cognitive processes have given rise to a promising line of research that explored ways in which different domains of cognition are grounded in various action and perception patterns (Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, and Wilson, 2003; Borghi and Cimatti, 2010; Price, Peterson, and Harmon-Jones, 2012). Theoretical discussions on the groundedness of cognition were initially of a general nature.They dealt with the intricate relations between body and brain (Damasio, 1994), perceptual symbol systems (Barsalou, 1999; Barsalou et al., 2003), views on embodied cognition (Glenberg, 1997; Wilson, 2002) and simulation (Gallese, 2003). What they have in common is a disagreement with the traditional view of cognition that is burdened with the grounding problem(Fodor, 1975, 1983). They also share a focus on the central role of the body in shaping the mind (Wilson, 2002). This chapter will review embodied cognition perspectives and examples of empirical researchwithin the context of a memory and action domain. Relevant insights on memory systems, the role of the body in cognitive processes, and neural substrates will be discussed here. This is followed by a more in-depth discussion of empirical research that relates to the memory and action theme with a focus on different motor domains, memory systems, and tasks involved. Expertise is addressed as a special form of action-cognition interaction and relates to memorybias issues that are the result of motor fluency. The chapter continues with an exploration of new directions in memory and action research in the psychology of economics, law and collective remembering, and concludes with the evaluation of boundary issues and limitations of the embodied cognition approach that have been brought up recently (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008).
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