Kripke on Proper and General Names

In this chapter we review Keith Donnellan's introduction of a distinction in definite descriptions between referential and attributive uses. Saul Kripke (and others) have argued that Donnellan's referential use is nothing more than a variety of speaker's reference – that is, not semantic. However, others (including Donnellan) have argued that the distinction is indeed a semantic one. This chapter supports that position by responding to arguments against it being semantic, and reviewing and developing arguments in favor of the semantic view.

There is reason to think that the distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions is an instance of a general distinction that also applies to uses of proper names (Saul Kripke, “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy II 1977). This means that if, as many have argued (against Kripke), the referential-attributive distinction has semantic significance, then the reference of a proper name, as used on a given occasion, may depend on whether or not the name is used referentially on that occasion. The present paper aims to do two things. First, the paper generalizes the referential-attributive distinction in a way that is different from Kripke’s generalization, but still applies to proper names as well as to definite descriptions. This general distinction is between what I call targeted and untargeted uses of noun phrases, including both definite descriptions and proper names. Second, the paper aims to show that targeted uses of proper names are regular and standard, just as targeted (i.e., referential) uses of definite descriptions are. This is important because the most prominent argument for the semantic significance of the referential use of definite descriptions, known as the “Argument from Convention,” is based on the referential use being regular and standard. Having established that the targeted use of proper names is also regular and standard, we are in a position to make a similar argument for the semantic significance of the targeted use of proper names.

GENERAL COMMENTARY article Front. Psychol., 03 November 2016Sec. Cognition Volume 7 - 2016 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01701

In a very short time Saul Kripke provided a suitable and rigorous semantics for different axiomatic modal systems and established a series of related results. Many key ideas were already in the air in the late Fifties, but it was Kripkean articles’ merit to system atically introduce comprehensive devices and solutions. Later on, the spreading of possible-worlds semantics massively changed the approach to modal logic, which enormously increased in popularity after that. Since Kripke’s work in modal logic is central to the development of the discipline, the aim of this essay is to present the fundamental results published between 1959 and 1965. Indeed, it was in such a brief and early phase of his career that Kripke was able to conceive the main novelties that would become central to the subsequent academic debates about modality. Here, their presentation will follow the original historical progressive introduction. Particular attention will be given to the interconnection between articles, their similarities in structure and the unified analysis produced by means of them. It actually appears quite impressive that, already in 1959, Kripke seemed to have planned all the developments he would present, one after the other, in the following years. First, an overview of the background where Kripke’s ideas start to rise is given. Then, each text’s results are individually briefly analysed.

SAUL KRIPKE AND POSTSTRUCTURALISM: A REVALUATION by Michael P. Spikes Christopher norris has claimed diat in Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke offers a "powerful critique" of "the view of language more or less taken for granted in post-structuralist dieory." ' Kripke, according to Norris, "asserts the case for determinate reference," thereby reversing the Saussurean precept "that the signified is always already constructed by die system of interrelated signifiers which bring it into play."2 I find diese claims curious in light of the fact diat in Naming and Necessity Kripke does not talk about language in general, but rather, as the tide ofhis book suggests , restricts his observations to names, primarily proper names and names for natural kinds. It would seem that at best his view implies a challenge for but a limited aspect of die poststructuralist position, specifically, how a name — not any and every word — signifies. Nonetheless , I concur with Norris's central contention that Kripke's insights call into question contemporary theories founded on Saussure's principle. What I propose to do in diis essay is explain, as Norris does not, how diese insights may be extended to all of language and dius how diey actually work to controvert poststructuralism. This extension will involve a careful scrutiny of Kripke's notion of reference and a consequent critique of the way Norris, and odiers, have interpreted it. In short, my reading of Kripke will affirm the challenge his arguments pose for much modern literary theory but will present that challenge from a different perspective and in fuller terms than Norris does. The key concept in Kripke's theory of names is rigid designation, a notion which he defines very simply and straightforwardly in the following 301 302Philosophy and Literature terms: "Let's call somediing a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates die same object."3 This concept is designed to counter the view, having its genesis in the language philosophy of Gotdob Frege and Bertrand Russell, diat proper names are abbreviated definite descriptions or disguised families of descriptions, diat a name's referent, and by implication its meaning, is equatable with and dierefore given by some property or set of properties it embodies (pp. 27-30). For example: "Joe Doakes" is short for "the man who corrupted Hadleyburg" (p. 28), or "Aristotie" means "Plato's disciple," "die teacher ofAlexander die Great," etc. (p. 30). Kripke admits that die Frege-Russell thesis is "really very powerful" (p. 27), but he nevertheless rejects it outrighdy. He, to die contrary, believes that a name represents something which cannot be equated widi any or all of its properties that might be cited in a description of it. One of die ways he makes his case is through counterfactuals, showing mat in odier possible worlds the referent of a given name may lack key qualities it possesses in diis world, yet die name would have die same referent in this and die odier worlds alike. For example, Nixon was die winner of the 1968 election , owned a dog named Checkers, etc. But it is possible to imagine some counterfactual situation in which Nixon did not win die 1968 election, did not own a dog named Checkers, etc. Still, according to Kripke, Nixon would still be Nixon, die same Nixon in the imagined world diat he is in reality (pp. 40-47). In Kripke's own words: "We can simply consider Nixon and ask what might have happened to him had various circumstances been different" (p. 47). "Nixon" is a rigid designator; it picks out the same object — in this case a particular man— in every possible world. This object constitutes a sense, a meaning, of"Nixon" which remains constant from context to context. Proper names, such as "Nixon," are not the only terms Kripke identifies as rigid designators. He shows, for example, that the natural kind term "gold" picks out die same object in every possible world (p. 127). Furthermore , he insists that not only can diings be known apart from their contingent properties — properties which may be detached from a thing widiout altering its fundamental identity — but diey may also be identified apart from their essential properties — properties which...

Kevin Mulligan has defended the view that perception is necessary for proper names to refer to spatiotemporal objects and, if the disjunctivist account of perceptual content is accepted, then the category of object-dependent singular terms must also be accepted, and proper names belong to it. I intend to take a different, more direct, route to reach the conclusion that proper names are object dependent. To ask whether, e.g., if Nixon had not existed, the name Nixon would have existed or whether the same name could have undergone a change in referent, is to ask whether it is a mere accident that the name Nixon as we have it now, names Nixon. Could our name Nixon have named, say, David Kaplan, either because it was originally given to him or because, at a certain stage, it changed its referent? This is what the issue of object dependence, as I understand it, amounts to. Here, I only address one half of the problem, namely the possibility of a change in referent. A familiar case of apparent change is that of the name Madagascar, first brought to our attention by Gareth Evans, and then briefly discussed by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity. Was it a real change in referent or was a new name created? I claim that the latter is the case. The chapter is mainly intended to clarify the Madagascar example, without drawing any general conclusion. But the issue has some obvious bearing on a number of well-known problems, including Kripke’s puzzles about belief and linguistic consumerism.

Stig Kanger — born of Swedish parents in China in 1924 — was professor of Theoretical Philosophy at Uppsala University from 1968 until his death in 1988. He received his Ph. D. from Stockholm University in 1957 under the supervision of Anders Wedberg. Kanger’s dissertation, Provability in Logic, was remarkably short, only 47 pages, but also very rich in new ideas and results. By combining Gentzen-style techniques with a model theory a la Tarski, Kanger obtained new and simplified proofs of central metalogical results of classical predicate logic: Godel’s completeness theorem, Lowenheim-Skolem’s theorem and Gentzen’s Hauptsatz. The part that had the greatest impact, however, was the 15 pages devoted to modal logic. There Kanger developed a new semantic interpretation for quantified modal logic which had a close family resemblance to semantic theories that were developed around the same time by Jaakko Hintikka, Richard Montague and Saul Kripke (independently of each other and independently of Kanger).

This article opposes a view widely accepted in studies concerning the history of modal logic, according to which (i) the approach of C. I. Lewis towards constructing modern modal logic was purely syntactical (i.e. limited to the construction of axiomatic systems S1–S5 of propositional modal logic), and (ii) the notion of a possible world was incorporated into modern logic and philosophy mainly by authors such as Rudolf Carnap and Saul Kripke. The article presents Lewis' definition of a possible world, and his formulation of the truth-conditions of statements containing strict implication as their main connective in terms of possible worlds. The main question of the article is whether it is possible to consider Lewis' work in this area as an early stage of the development of possible world semantics, and if so, in what sense? The article concludes by answering affirmatively, due to soundness and completeness proofs with respect to S5 using Lewis' semantics.

Chains, well I can't break away from these chains[… ]And they ain't the kind that you can see.(“Chains,” Gerry Goffin and Carole King)The main aim of this paper is to present a certain notion — that of Coordination — and an associated requirement — the Coordination Requirement (CR) —,and to show how they help us to better understand the communicative role of proper names. A second aim of the paper is to use these notions to defend the kind of view I favour regarding the meaning of proper names — a certain kind of descriptivist theory — by showing that this view is not subject to two seemingly powerful considerations against it that have been provided from two different camps: one from the anti-descriptivist camp (by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity), another from the neo-Fregean camp (by Richard Heck in The Sense of Communication). In dealing with these matters, I will have to discuss the role that complex individual concepts (or ideas) play in allowing us to understand and use proper names.

Saul Kripke’s thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite descriptions. If we, like Kripke, account for this difference by means of the intensions of names and descriptions, we have to conclude that names do not in general have the same intension as any normal, identifying description. However, the difference in scope behavior between names and description can be accounted for alternatively by appeal to the semantics of the modal expressions. On the account we suggest, dubbed ‘relational modality’, simple singular terms, like proper names, contribute to modal contexts simply by their actual world reference, not by their (standard) intension. The relational modality account turns out to be fully equivalent with the rigidity account when it comes to truth of modal and non-modal sentences (with respect to the actual world), and hence supports the same basic intuitions. Given an alternative definition of consequence for relational modality, and a restriction to models with reflexive accessibility relations and non-empty world-bound domains, relational modality also turns out to be model theoretically equivalent with rigidity semantics with respect to logical consequence. Here we introduce the semantics, give the truth definition for relational modality models, and prove the equivalence results.

Book synopsis: New work on a hot topic by an outstanding team of authors At the intersection of several central areas of philosophy It is the linguistic job of singular terms to pick out the objects that we think or talk about. But what about singular terms that seem to fail to designate anything, because the objects they refer to don't exist? We can employ these terms in meaningful thought and talk, which suggests that they are succeeding in fulfilling their representational task. A team of leading experts presents new essays on the much-debated problem of empty reference and thought. In the 1960s and 1970s Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam initiated a revolution in the then standard conception of reference—a concept at the core of philosophical inquiry. The repercussions of the revolution, particularly felt in metaphysics and epistemology, were soon refined by other influential writers such as Tyler Burge, Gareth Evans, and John Perry. They argued that some linguistic and mental representations have contents individuated by what they are about—by ordinary referents of expressions such as proper names, indexicals, definite descriptions and common nouns, i.e. by planets, people or natural kinds. The view was at odds with a central philosophical presumption at that time: that cognitive and linguistic access to objective reality is indirect and accidental, mediated by general descriptive characterizations, the only constitutive semantic feature of the expressions; hence its ontological and epistemological repercussions. A turning-point in the debate about how linguistic and mental representation reach external contents concerned the nature of empty mental and linguistic representations, framed by means of the very same expressions crucially invoked in the Donnellan-Kaplan-Kripke-Putnam arguments. The papers in this volume address different aspects of reference and thought about the (apparently) non-existent.

The article is devoted to the study of English-language toponymic names of Celtic origin. The notions of toponym, toponymic system, toponymy, toponymikon are defined in the article. Key attention is paid in it to the facts of emergence and area of distribution of toponyms of Celtic origin on the territory of the British Isles, as well as semantic peculiarities of their Celtic components. Ways of translation of the toponyms into the Ukrainian language are revealed and analyzed in the article. Reasons of use of non-anglicized Celtic toponyms and ways of their translating into the Ukrainian language are also clarified in it. Toponym is a proper geographic name used for designation of natural object or object, created by a person. A set of such names, united according to its territorial and time criteria is called a toponymic system. The notions of toponymy and toponymicon are synonymous to the notion of toponymic system. The notion of toponymy is also viewed for designation of a linguistic discipline studying toponyms. English-language toponymic system of Great Britain include toponymic names of Celtic origin. Such units have general names designating natural geographical objects or places created by a person. These units are translated by Ukrainian proper names. General names used for their explanation can be added in their translations. Along with anglicized and assimilated Celtic toponyms that became a part and parcel of the toponymic system of the British English, non-anglicized Celtic toponyms are used in the British English literary and tourist discourse, as well as in everyday life discourse. Their use is aimed at attracting attention, making an impact, providing character characteristics etc. Translation of these units into Ukrainian is carried out by means of transcoding. Common names clarifying their meanings may be added in translation. Anglicized counterparts of the original Celtic toponyms are also translated by transcoding. The choice of ways of their translation is predetermined by the context, sphere and purpose of their use.

As is well known Saul Kripke believes that identities hold of necessity.' That is, if a is identical with b then a is identical with b in any possible world in which either a or b exists. This metaphysical thesis is, in Kripke's view, supported by the linguistic thesis that certain terms, notably proper names, function as rigid designators. More precisely, if 'a' and 'b' are rigid designators then the identity sentence 'a = b' is, if true, necessarily true. *Let us call this thesis the rigid designation thesis. The main argument for the rigid designation thesis is set forth by Susan Haak in her book Philosophy of Logics:

The Semantics of Entailment

We will begin our study of modal logic with a basic system called K in honor of the famous logician Saul Kripke. K serves as the foundation for a whole family of systems. Each member of the family results from strengthening K in some way. Each of these logics uses its own symbols for the expressions it governs. For example, modal (or alethic) logics use □ for necessity, tense logics use H for what has always been, and deontic logics use O for obligation. The rules of K characterize each of these symbols and many more. Instead of rewriting K rules for each of the distinct symbols of modal logic, it is better to present K using a generic operator. Since modal logics are the oldest and best known of those in the modal family, we will adopt □ for this purpose. So □ need not mean necessarily in what follows. It stands proxy for many different operators, with different meanings. In case the reading does not matter, you may simply call □A ‘box A’.