La dignità dell'uomo e il diritto

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.

HUMAN DIGNITY IN ENVIRONMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION — SELECTED ISSUESEnvironment of public administration is built by many subjective and objective elements among which the most important is human being and communities created by him/her. They are the reason of public administration existence which is establish in order to fulfill social needs resulting from the people’s coexistence in communities. The concept of human dignity, consider as normative rule or value which always should be taken into consideration by public administration, is insep­arably linked with the concept of human being treated as an individual or as apart of community. Public administration cannot act where human dignity is violated and is obliged to act when human dignity is in danger. Protection of human dignity should always be fundamental feature of public administration activities.

We argue that using human dignity as a criterion for determining social protection measures is an effective method. Although the concept of human dignity used in the constitutions of individual countries and international documents is vague and contradictory, it can be taken as a basis when justifying the human right to such a level of social protection that guarantees life with human dignity. That is, we adhere to the widespread opinion that human rights are justified by human dignity. We discuss how the concept of human dignity can influence the coercion of state authorities in Kazakhstan to fulfil their obligations to citizens on social assistance, how this concept can influence state social policy. Thus, the submissions can serve as a basis for the improvement of the regulatory legal framework in rights and freedoms protection.

Summary The first aims of the article is to trace the origins of the notion of human dignity in international law. It is emphasized that the concept of human dignity appeared in international law relatively late, in 1940s. and such concepts as “principle of humanity” or “laws of humanity”, used in the 19th century, are not identical with and do not even have to include human dignity. Moreover, a very different concept of “dignity of sovereign states” existed in international law from Vattel’s time until the 20 th century. Nowadays, human dignity appears in international law as a value, legal principle and law. However, the right to dignity is less often explicitly mentioned in international law documents than the principle of human dignity. The minimum content of human dignity appears to include the recognition of the intrinsic value and moral autonomy of every human being.

Human dignity has a prominent role in the Hungarian Constitution. The concept of human dignity and its interpretations play an important role both in the field of bioethics and in the Hungarian law. On different levels of the Hungarian law human dignity serves as a basic pillar for the legal provisions. Reference to human dignity provides especially important arguments in the debates on euthanasia by emphasizing the right to self-determination of the terminally ill. In the debates both on the risks of emerging technologies and on the protection of vulnerable groups, such as children and psychiatric patients, human dignity plays an essential role in protecting people who are not yet or no longer fully able to exercise their right to self-determination.

The article elaborates on the threats to human dignity in both Ukrainian national and global contexts. It emphasizes the significance of human dignity as the basis for creating a contemporary legal order in Europe, and the current obstacles to its preservation amidst rising international security threats to Euro-Atlantic civilization from authoritarian regimes. The author concludes that the development of an effective system for regulating interstate relations is crucial for protecting democracies, and therefore human dignity as its foundational value. The concept of human dignity, and the justifiability of conscription—particularly in German constitutional doctrine—are examined. The author identifies a chain of systemic links between constitutional values, with dignity as the primary basis, and military duty as an essential component in establishing the constitutional order. The current challenges for constitutional governance in Ukraine during martial law are analyzed. The author argues that martial law actions, pursuing a legitimate aim of strengthening defense capability, still fail to pass the “three-part test” due to a lack of necessity and proportionality. Numerous infringements of the rule of law principle by public authorities—leading to instrumental treatment of individuals and acts of brutality during conscription—are revealed. The author draws attention to the destructive social tendencies of disintegration and disregard for the law resulting from such actions. The writer concludes that, regardless of the circumstances, it is imperative for a humancentered state based on the rule of law to abstain from measures that violate human dignity. Failing to do so delegitimizes the state and strips it of its core values, ultimately transforming it into a repressive mechanism where human dignity is excluded.

This study employed empirical, case, and comparative analysis methods to examine how Hong Kong’s courts have judicially interpreted the concept of human dignity. It aimed to understand the concept of human dignity in Hong Kong law and its role in judicial adjudication and to explore the contributions that Hong Kong’s courts have made to interpreting and developing the concept of human dignity in support of the development of national and international human rights. In this study, cases heard in Hong Kong’s courts from 1997 to 2019 were analyzed. The results showed that Hong Kong’s courts interpreted the concept of human dignity in cases concerning the right to equality, right to privacy, right to work, right to dignity, and the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment, despite the fact that some of them are not found in the Hong Kong Basic Law. The concept of human dignity provides a foundation on which judges can interpret human rights and is a useful tool for litigants to safeguard their human rights. Although Hong Kong’s courts have cited interpretations of human dignity made by the European Court of Human Rights and other common law courts, they have also interpreted it in their own unique way. Hong Kong’s courts have made great contributions to shaping the concept of human dignity to increase justice around the world.

This article seeks to explore the conception of human dignity prevailing among social workers in Lisbon through a qualitative-type study. This departs from analysis of the concepts of humanity and the rule of law as guarantees for exercising social work in order to locate the concept of human dignity as a historical, social and cultural construct. The qualitative analysis of the data collected by interviews demonstrates that social workers, while not having a deep-reaching conceptual understanding of this theme, prioritize a Kantian conception of human dignity, perceiving this as an absolute value.

Emergency care research sometimes involves incapacitated adults as research participants. The ethical principle of respect for autonomy may not necessarily apply to an incapacitated person unable to act in an autonomous manner, although it can be argued that researchers still have a duty of respect towards such people because they have moral status despite being incapacitated. Sharing some common ground with theories of moral status based on ‘humanness’ and the ability for rational thought is the notion of human dignity, which features in arguments regarding researcher conduct with incapacitated patients. However, human dignity premised upon the unique ability of humans for rational thought and moral self-regulation is contingent upon these capabilities – a limitation that possibly makes dignity a less useful framework for research conduct in emergency care research. In this article, I will discuss the different conceptions of human dignity – as equality, status and virtue – and then draw on more recent literature that explains human dignity as a social constraint and as a factor influencing the conduct of healthcare professionals and researchers. I will address questions of whether dignity as a principle ought to apply only to those who have the ability to think rationally, or to all humans regardless of their condition or mental status. I will argue that, in relation to offering protection to research participants in emergency conditions, it is immaterial which view is taken.

El trabajo describe las tensiones en torno a la definición del concepto de dignidad humana, entendiéndolo como una herramienta hermenéutica sin contenido concreto que sirve a los operadores jurídicos para interpretar los Derechos Humanos y reconociéndolo como el fundamento último de la constitución de los derechos fundamentales de todos los seres humanos. Se lo aborda desde un punto de vista ético refiriendo a breves consideraciones de Imannuel Kant y Jürgen Habermas, en relación al concepto y desde un punto de vista semántico y jurídico en el análisis de las interpretaciones que de éste realizan los órganos de protección de Derechos Humanos.

The concept of human dignity is nowadays challenged by new problems and questions stemming from the bioethical debate. After the formal inclusion of this principle in the post-WWII Constitutions, the need to re-open the discussion on both the meaning and the limits of human dignity has been urged by the scientific and medical progress. The article underlines the development of “human dignity”, from its Christian origins to its philosophical and historical studies. Starting from this unavoidable premise and through the looking glass offered by some leading cases concerning embryos’ rights, this paper aims at analyzing the new challenges that the Constitutionalism and the concept of human dignity are increasingly called to tackle.

A BSTRACT: Kashmir is an intractable conflict between the two South Asian countries : India and Pakistan. It had affected people of tiny nation badly. Every individual suffered here in this vale of paradise which was known as the beautiful region across the globe. But its irony that due to unrest, turmoil , and cycle of violence , people lost their kiths and kens ; and because of all that , State of Jammu and Kashmir suffered a lot. This valley has seen plenty of untold stories of massive violations of human rights committed by Indian army, police , and by some of the militant groups. Since 1989, the people of Kashmir were killed, tortured, humiliated , and injured. Thousands of the people were killed due to cycle of violence prevalent in Jammu and Kashmir. Thousands of the people got injuries and they became disabled to work. Many are those who lost their beloved children’s, daughters, sisters, mothers , and some women have lost their beloved husbands, who were only the source to care for them. Due to turmoil situations , thousands of the houses and shops were burnt. This study will describe how fundamental rights of the people were encroached and curtailed. It will also highlight how the people of this region were suppressed due to misuse of the armed forces. It is pertinent to mention here that no democracy can be successful where draconian and inhuman laws are prevailing. Democracy can only survive when the dignity of every individual will be respected and safeguarded. Here are tears in every mother’s eyes that lost their beloved children. Everybody here hates violence and is ready to see peaceful Kashmir without any conflict and human rights violations, may this dream of so many become reality. K EY WORDS : Untold s tories , v iolations, f ake e ncounters, d raconian l aws , p sychological d isorder and s uicides, d isappearances in Kashmir , and human rights . About the Authors: Dr. Hilal Ahmad Wani is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies UoI (University of Ilorin) in Ilorin, Nigeria; Andi Suwirta, M.Hum. is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Social Studies Education UPI (Indonesia University of Education) in Bandung; and Dr. Joseph Fayeye is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies UoI in Ilorin, Nigeria. They can be reached via their e-mail at: wanihilal@gmail.com , andisuwirta@yahoo.com , and josephfayeye@yahoo.com How to cite this article? Wani, Hilal Ahmad, Andi Suwirta & Joseph Fayeye. (2013). “Untold Stories of Human Rights Violations in Kashmir” in EDUCARE: International Journal for Educational Studies , Vol.6(1) August, pp.55-68. Bandung, Indonesia: Minda Masagi Press owned by ASPENSI in Bandung, West Java; and FKIP UMP in Purwokerto, Central Java, ISSN 1979-7877. Chronicle of the article: Accepted (June 5, 2013); Revised (July 9, 2013); and Published (August 17, 2013).

In human rights practice, references to ‘dignity’ are as pervasive as they are difficult to pin down. ‘Dignity’ is used widely and often contradictorily. It underlies the privileged legal treatment afforded to states as a result of their sovereignty, but also the claims to strip states and state officials of the manifestations of such sovereignty, such as immunities. It also grounds the overriding character of human rights and social development, while at the same time adding legitimacy to the fight against ‘anthropocentrism’ and for the protection of nature for its own sake. From ‘sovereignty’, to ‘human dignity’, to ‘eco-centrism’, the concept of dignity underlies the normative claims of three competing circles. In this review essay, I rely on the distinction between these three circles of dignity to organize the survey and discussion of an extensive body of work that has helped to clarify the contours of the concept of ‘dignity’. The essay aims to empower practitioners not only to avoid the abuse of this concept but also the dilution that may result from casual and unconsidered reference to it. More fundamentally, it explores two conceptual battlefronts opened by the concept of human dignity. These battlefronts are interdependent because the very assertion of human dignity to protect the individual against the powers of the state may also lay the foundations for an over-exploitation of nature.

The essay discusses two different conceptions of human dignity. According to the first conception, ›respecting the dignity of a human being‹ means to respect something specific that is given by her being human. According to the second conception, however, ›respecting the dignity of a human being‹ means to respect her as a human being. With regard to the first understanding, one is bound to respect human dignity (as an abstract concept), whereas on the basis of the second conception, we owe respect to the human being herself. The duty to respect human dignity serves as a foundation for duties we have with regard to human beings as such. The duty to respect someone as the human being she is, however, is a duty towards her. This duty therefore justifies a right she may claim, namely the right to be respected as a human being. The core of human dignity, then, is this rights-conferring status of being human. This article reacts to the German debate on human embryonic research. Participants in this debate argue that human dignity depends on being human in a generic sense. According to them, the early embryo participates in this sense of being human, which allows them to apply the concept of human dignity, including the absolute protection it entails, to human embryos. The author criticizes this view, claiming that it undermines the very idea of human dignity by neglecting the rights-conferring status of being a particular human being which is at its core. Rather, a »decent society« (Avishai Margalit) is characterized by the fact that its members are treated and respected as (individual) rights-holders.

What is the concept of human dignity derived from? Does it have its foundation in the emotions or in reason? By dint of a differentiation between a premoral, sittliche orientation in acting (differentiated in premoral goods, duties and virtues) and a moral orientation, which is due to an external evaluating moral community, the author comes to the conclusion that human dignity finds its foundation in both the emotions and rationality. This has important implications for the task of a theological ethics insofar it is concerned with the concept of human dignity and its enforcement