Limited-access Privilege Programs in the Mid-Atlantic Fisheries

Fishery and Environmental Managers’ Attitudes About and Support For Lake Trout Rehabilitation in the Great Lakes

Worldwide fisheries management has been undergoing a paradigm shift from a single-species approach to ecosystem approaches. In the United States, NOAA has adopted a policy statement and Road Map to guide the development and implementation of ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM). NOAA’s EBFM policy supports addressing the ecosystem interconnections to help maintain resilient and productive ecosystems, even as they respond to climate, habitat, ecological, and social and economic changes. Managing natural marine resources while taking into account their interactions with their environment and our human interactions with our resources and environment requires the support of ecosystem science, modeling, and analysis. Implementing EBFM will require using existing mandates and approaches that fit regional management structures and cultures. The primary mandate for managing marine fisheries in the United States is the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. Many tenets of the Act align well with the EBFM policy, however, incorporating ecosystem analysis and models into fisheries management processes has faced procedural challenges in many jurisdictions. In this paper, we review example cases where scientists have had success in using ecosystem analysis and modeling to inform management priorities, and identify practices that help bring new ecosystem science information into existing policy processes. A key to these successes is regular communication and collaborative discourse among modelers, stakeholders, and resource managers to tailor models and ensure they addressed the management needs as directly as possible.

We heartily applaud Bromley's paper. As expected, it is provocative. We agree with his premise that are important insights to be gained by a more careful specification of the traditional steady-state/yield-effort models and by viewing the economics of extended jurisdiction in a welfare theoretic framework. However, we are concerned with two particular aspects of the paper. Bromley seems to go beyond the identification of distributional consequences of fishery policy and suggests certain fishery policies because of their distributional consequences. Economists generally employ theoretical constructs in order to predict the consequences (distributional or otherwise) of alternative policies. Theoretical constructs do prescribe policy the greatest possible benefit of all of us. Economists must therefore doff their economists' hats when they enter the policy-making arena. Bromley does tell us when he is wearing his economist's hat and when he is wearing his manager's hat (nor do Crutchfield or Bell, as quoted in Bromley's paper). We would prefer a clearer distinction between Bromley's use of welfare theory to provide policy prescriptions (normative) and Bromley's use of welfare theory in predicting consequences of policy decisions (positive). Our second concern relates to the role of distribution in welfare theory. Bromley argues that efficiency (or maximum net economic rent) is only one socially relevant variable. We agree. He then introduces distributional considerations. Does this imply that distribution is another socially relevant variable, or is distribution another dimension of efficiency? If distribution is another socially relevant variable, are there many more that deserve consideration? The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 contains an extensive list of socially relevant variables. Our own experience suggests that fishery participants would rank efficiency fairly low on an extensive list of socially relevant variables. If distribution is another dimension of efficiency (as implied in Bromley's discussion of access), what of the distributional dimensions of the other socially relevant variables? We suspect that the current controversy over allocation of fish (or fishing rights) is more closely related to who gets fish, flexibility, etc., than to who gets what share of the maximum net economic rent. In substituting the net economic rent criterion for the maximum sustainable yield criterion, economists have exposed themselves to the same criticisms leveled at proponents of the maximum sustainable yield criterion. Our model is still single valued and incomplete. Fortunately, the new management regime created by the Fishery Management and Conservation Act of 1976 provides for public hearings where potential gainers and losers cannot only identify socially relevant variables but can express priorities for distribution. Bromley emphasizes that fishing families are not mere pounds of fertilizer, acre-feet of water, or tons of bauxite. We find it unfortunate that he dismisses, by implication, the rewards accruing to owners of fertilizer, water, and bauxite, who may also have families. The international model presented by Bromley appears to have a variety of interesting applications. For example, it might be used to predict the reaction of Japan (i.e., country B) to the current management policies under the U.S. (country A) Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. In contrast to BromRichard S. Johnston and Frederick J. Smith are with the Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Oregon State University.

Objectives of fisheries management: case studies from the UK, France, Spain and Denmark

<i>Abstract</i>.—There is a strong desire to move toward ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) in New England. However, there are many other problems in U.S. fisheries that have prevented timely adoption of EBFM. Changes in the Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, requiring catch limits for federally managed fisheries, may help speed the movement toward ecosystembased approaches to fishery management. In the meantime, the term “integrated fishery management” (IFM) is being used by the New England Fishery Management Council to mean incorporating flexibility between fishery management plans to allow, and account for, mixed catch. If IFM is going to provide a step toward EBFM, there are several actions that must be taken: (1) adequate monitoring across all fisheries must be provided, (2) flexibility across existing management plans must encourage reporting and landing rather than discarding, (3) interjurisdictional coordination within and among states and federal management bodies must improve, and (4) application of the U.S./Canada Resource Sharing Understanding must expand.

NOAA's Deep Sea Coral Research and Technology Program (DSCRTP) is compiling a national database of the locations of deep-sea corals and sponges, beginning in U.S. waters. The DSCRTP will make this information accessible to resource managers, the scientific community, and the public over the World Wide Web. The database fulfills NOAA's requirements under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) to identify and map locations of deep-sea corals and to submit this information for use by regional fishery management councils. At present, there is no comprehensive, national-scale data portal for deep-sea corals and sponges. Given the authorities outlined in the MSA, NOAA's DSCRTP will serve as a central data aggregator and distributor. The DSCRTP will aggregate and make accessible historical records from samples archived in museums, research institutions, and reported in the scientific literature augmented by observations collected during deep-water in situ surveys conducted by NOAA and other research institutions. The database schema accommodates both linear (trawls, transects) and point data (samples, observations). The schema captures information in 95 fields across eight main categories related to surveys (e.g. cruises or expeditions), events (e.g. dives or transects), observations (e.g. specimens or images), as well as taxonomic identification, environment, occurrence details, metadata and record-keeping information. Not all fields are required for submission to the database. The minimal data requirements for point observations, transects, and trawls are outlined in this document. The database represents a new standard to catalyze progress in deep-sea coral and sponge resource management and habitat suitability modeling. Records will be compiled continuously by NOAA, and distributed online in a map atlas format beginning in 2015.

Law of the Sea negotiations and The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 create new options in fisheries management. Historical analysis of two major management programs in the United States of America, Columbia River chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) and Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis), shows two unresolved management problems. One is the innovativeness of fishermen in seeking ways to improve their harvests. The other is changing social priorities that are largely unpredictable and outside the control of fisheries managers. A method for analysis of patterning associated with management goals is illustrated. Since the general management goals are harvest improvement and more predictability, measures are used which show the adequacy of fit and reduction in variability between actual and predicted management outcomes.

<em>Abstract.</em>—Competition between commercial and recreational fishers for fishery resources is common throughout the United States. This competition for resources occurs throughout the south Atlantic region. However, competition around an area known as the Charleston Bump led to controversy and public calls for closure of that area to commercial fishing. In 1997, controversy erupted over the proposed lease of a fish processing facility at the newly completed Charleston Maritime Center. A group of commercial fishermen proposed to open the Maritime Center’s facilities to all types of commercial fishing craft, but with emphasis on longline vessels. The high level of public awareness and knowledge of South Carolina’s offshore fisheries helped to catapult the Charleston Bump to the forefront of state and federal marine fisheries policy, research, and management. Parties to this dispute looked to state fisheries managers for interpretation of technical information upon which to base their decisions. However, fisheries managers soon learned that the data on the significance of the Charleston Bump as a nursery area were inconsistent and spotty. This lack of reliable data left the managers in a policy dilemma: how to make technical recommendations on the management of the fisheries of the Charleston Bump given the lack of data. The fisheries managers responded by acknowledging the lack of data and suggesting that a comprehensive ecological analysis of the Charleston Bump be performed. In addition, the fisheries managers responded by interpreting the data based on the precautionary principle (i.e., do no harm to the resource) and advised the parties to the Maritime Center dispute against any move that might consolidate fishing effort on the Charleston Bump. The purpose of this paper is to: (1) document the approach taken by the State of South Carolina to analyze this public controversy and; (2) describe how public involvement in the development of a local public policy issue can create the need for further scientific inquiry and research. The authors present an overview of this controversy and highlight how public perceptions and demand for action resulted in a policy stance. The authors describe how the public’s direct involvement led not only to the colloquium but also to a renewed scientific interest in the Charleston Bump.

US catch share markets: a review of data availability and impediments to transparent markets

The biology and ecology of carcharhiniform sharks in the Gulf of Papua prawn trawl fishery

The role of scale within an Ecosystem Approach to fisheries management: Policy and practice in Southeast Asian seas

This dataset contains oxidative stress, genotoxicity, and immune response biomarkers measured in golden tilefish collected aboard the R/V Weatherbird II cruises WB-1602, WB-1603, WB-1701 and WB-1736 in the Gulf of Mexico from 2015-08-17 to 2017-07-29. The dataset contains the location, date and depth of sample collection. In addition it includes the fish species, fish biometric data (such as weight, sex, liver weight, gonad weight, fork and total length) and concentrations or percentages of biomarkers that indicate oxidative stress (plasma superoxide dismutase, plasma sorbitol dehydrogenase, plasma malondialdehyde), immune response (hematocrit and leukocrit percentages, differential white blood cell counts in whole blood, and plasma lysozyme), and genotoxicity (whole blood micronuclei and nuclear abnormalities). The cruise documentation was provided for the R/V Weatherbird II cruises WB-1602, WB-1603, WB-1701 and WB-1736, led by chief scientists Dr. Steven Murawski and Dr. David Hollander. This dataset supports the publication: Pulster, E. L., Gracia, A., Snyder, S. M., Deak, K., Fogelson, S., & Murawski, S. A. (2019). Chronic Sub-lethal Effects Observed in Wild-Caught Fishes Following Two Major Oil Spills in the Gulf of Mexico: Deepwater Horizon and Ixtoc 1. Deep Oil Spills, 388–413. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-11605-7_24

History of the West Coast groundfish trawl fishery: Tracking socioeconomic characteristics across different management policies in a multispecies fishery

The United States has a new national ocean policy that adopts ecosystem-based management (EBM) as its first principle for managing U.S. ocean spaces and marine resources. However, U.S. laws that govern the uses of ocean spaces present a challenging tangle of authorities and mandates that do not easily facilitate ecosystem-based policies. For over 30 years, U.S. marine fisheries management has been guided by eight Regional Fishery Management Councils. Working under the many laws that guide setting stewardship priorities for ocean ecosystems, councils provide the Federal Government with advice on fisheries harvest levels, fish habitat protections, and fishing community needs. Implementing EBM for any ocean ecosystem requires a careful examination of the laws and policy processes that affect human interaction with that ecosystem. This article explores the U.S. perspective on federal ecosystem-based fisheries management, its part in U.S. national ocean policy, and how fishery management councils might position themselves as both EBM policymakers and policy takers for ocean resource management.

This article tests capture theory by analyzing voting behavior on U.S. Regional Fishery Management Councils. Some seats on the councils are reserved for state and federal agency representatives; others, for political appointees. The political appointees primarily represent special interests (specifically, commercial and recreational fishing interests); a smaller number of appointees represent public interests. We use logistic regression to model the vote of state and federal agency representatives on the councils as a function of the votes of commercial interests, recreational interests, and public interests. We find evidence that some state agencies are captured by special interests from their states, but not systematic evidence across all states. We find that state agency representatives voted with commercial interests from their own state in five of the sixteen states in our sample; with recreational interests in three states; and with both special interests in two states. These ten states support the capture hypothesis; the other six states do not. We find no evidence that federal agencies were captured on the councils. We conclude that the gubernatorial-driven appointment process leads to capture at the state level by promoting voting blocs among state agency representatives and special interests from those states. Federal agency representatives, by contrast, are better able to maintain their distance from state-level politics on the councils, and thereby enhance their ability to vote independently on fishery management measures.