Making Sanctions Smart Again: Why Maritime Sanctions Have Worked against North Korea

The core questions addressed by Noland (2019) are how, and whether, engagement could foster market-orientation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and reduce direct state control over the country's economy. Noland presumes that the DPRK regime's objective is to obtain revenue with minimum changes to its internal practices and associated risks to political stability, and argues that the nature of engagement is important in inducing desired changes in the country. Noland highlights the modality of economic exchange in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), and analyzes whether the KCI model could serve as a means of transformative engagement. Through his analysis, Noland demonstrates that the labor practices in the KIC appear to be both exploitative and limit the extent the DPRK workers are exposed to new ways of organizing work, and concludes that it is unlikely to generate the desired changes. In order to encourage real institutional change, Noland concludes that the DPRK's partners must emphasize “more transformative approaches,” especially by means of introducing international norms and voluntary codes into the country. Otherwise, Noland assesses that the economic growth would merely enable the DPRK to achieve its status of “a de facto nuclear state.” In order to promote “effective transformative engagement,” Noland focuses on the means to expose DPRK workers to “new ways of organizing work.” To advance this argument further, it is also necessary to address the broad question of how the empowerment of workers could lead to real institutional changes in the country. As Babson (2019) notes, for the DPRK's economic growth, the regime would need to reform the economic system by embracing the role of markets, stimulating private initiative, and transforming international relations. The reformative measures include (but are not limited to) building institutions for legal and financial systems, trade and macroeconomic management; state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform; and shaping the economic leadership and core agencies as well as the role of the international financial institutions. Additionally, it should be noted that “animal spirits” among the empowered workers and entrepreneurs are an essential ingredient for any market growth. What options are available for external partners to affect such a reformative process? How can these countries help the empowered DPRK workers challenge state control over the economy and promote a desired realignment of the incumbent domestic coalition? These broader questions may deserve scrutiny as well. In this regard, experts are debating the extent to which the SOE reform since 2014 and the increasing level of private business activities could affect the DPRK's future economic development and relations with its external partners. Sakai (2018) argues that the DPRK regime does not intend to pursue a Chinese-style of economic reform and continues to oblige all DPRK citizens and entities to obey absolutely the “leadership,” while emphasizing the importance of “self-development spirit,” as opposed to international cooperation. Sakai offers a cautious view with regard to the opportunities for external partners to affect the DPRK's reformative process. To the contrary, Mimura (2017) highlights a possible window of opportunity to affect the DPRK's thinking about foreign partnership by focusing on the internal debate surrounding the new economic strategy since January 2018. Mimura observes that SOE autonomy is a key subject in the debate and focuses on the increasing autonomy for SOE managers, as opposed to the state planners, in making decisions on issues related to human resource management and production and sales of excess commodities. Babson (2019) also points to an increasingly blurred boundary between SOE and private business activities, referring to the emergence of successful entrepreneurs in both SOEs and private ventures. Babson recommends to explore options for enterprise organization models that would best support the DPRK's future economic development and relations with its partners. Such endeavor would complement Noland's proposal on the empowerment of DPRK workers. The DPRK's new line of economic policy is surely intended to secure the survival of the regime which would reject any external pressure if it felt threatened. The transformative engagement approach could succeed so long as the DPRK leadership became confident of its merits, which would likely require a prolonged period of adjustment, at a minimum. The DPRK's future decision to abandon its nuclear weapons, if it ever happens, would be affected by the regime's confidence in the security environment in which the economy is a crucial, but not necessarily the sole, factor. Political rapprochement is also another essential element in undertaking effective transformative engagement.

North Korea's Objectives and Activities in Cyberspace Daniel A. Pinkston (bio) The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) is a centralized, authoritarian, personalistic dictatorship under the third generation of the Kim dynasty. Despite having suffered a terrible famine and long-term economic deprivation, North Korea has developed its cyber capabilities into a significant and persistent threat and gained notoriety for its past hacking activities, most remarkably the attacks against Sony Pictures Entertainment, cryptocurrency and bank heists, and ransomware attacks. Pyongyang has seriously cultivated its cyber capabilities since the mid-1990s and now possesses the full range of capabilities to conduct computer network operations, including computer network attack, computer network exploitation, computer network defense, influence operations (military information support operations, information operations, and propaganda), cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and probably physical cyberweapons.1 Kim Jong-il recognized the value of cyber capabilities in the 1990s, which gave North Korea ample time to recruit and train human resources and invest in institutions to develop and sustain the country's assets in cyberspace.2 North Korea's priorities in the realm of information and communications technology (ICT) are embedded in the leadership's national strategy, which is composed of two main parts: national security and economic development. This is no different from any other state, except that the type of regime, division of the two Koreas, and external environment present a number of threats, challenges, and opportunities that affect North Korea's cyber posture and activities. This essay seeks to put North Korea's cyber activities in the context of the leadership's political goals and the country's science and technology policy. [End Page 76] After explaining Pyongyang's national strategy and the role of cyber, this essay will turn to the regime's demand for hard currency and the persistent attraction of cybercrime. While North Korean hackers successfully have demonstrated their skills, they also present a dilemma for the leadership. Who is to monitor these expert technicians? To help mitigate this problem, the regime has replicated its "coup-proofing" institutional design found in the security apparatus and the military. Finally, the essay speculates that in the future North Korea might try to employ its cyber capabilities more extensively in the realm of influence operations. Cyber Capabilities in North Korean Strategy When North Korea's cyber infrastructure took off in the mid-1990s, the country's survival was at stake. The economic shock and famine in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse and the death of founding leader Kim Il-sung led Kim Jong-il to adopt military-first politics that served as a type of public administration and crisis management system for regime survival.3 Kim Jong-il emphasized national security and military affairs with the aim of achieving a strong and prosperous country.4 To accomplish this goal, Kim Jong-il envisioned North Korea being strong in three dimensions: ideology and politics, military power, and the economy. He stated that "science and technology is a strong impetus for building a strong and prosperous country," while emphasizing "science as an important part of his strategic line to build a powerful socialist state."5 Kim Jong-un has continued his father's emphasis on science and technology. Under his rule, North Korea has been following the pyongjin line, which seeks the simultaneous development of nuclear technology (both military and civilian) and the economy. After Kim declared in his 2018 New Year's address that North Korea had "perfected the national nuclear forces," Pyongyang—at least nominally—shifted its emphasis to the economic portion of pyongjin.6 Science and technology, including ICT, are considered critical foundations in the leadership's effort to boost economic [End Page 77] output and efficiency.7 In his report to the 7th Party Congress in May 2016, Kim called for breakthroughs in advanced technologies such as information technology, nanotechnology, biotechnology, new materials technology, new energy technology, and space technology.8 North Korea's current five-year economic plan (2016–20) calls on science and information technology as instruments to normalize production in strategic industries.9 To foster the development of human resources in ICT, North Korean schools now introduce ICT into the curriculum...

The Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) is arguably the world's most chronic abuser of human rights. In an unprecedented move, a Commission of Inquiry established by the UN's Human Rights Council accused the DPRK government of systematic violations of human rights amounting to crimes against humanity. In so doing, the Commission succeeded in putting human rights in the DPRK on the global agenda. Within months the UN's General Assembly and Security Council had joined the human rights body in examining the issue. This article explains the emergence of this new engagement with human rights in the DPRK, showing its relation to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ principle. It charts the growing sense of frustration felt at the lack of progress on human rights in DPRK and shows how this was manifested in the General Assembly's decision to pursue the Commission's recommendations and call on the Security Council to take concrete steps. Despite this, however, the article shows that there are powerful obstacles in the way of a more robust international approach to human rights in the DPRK and counsels a less confrontational approach focused on engaging China and building trust within the Security Council.

A nationwide nutrition survey began when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) requested assistance from international relief organizations in 1997 due to flooding in 1995-1996, followed by the worsening food shortage peak in 1997. According to reported data for the 15 years since the active intervention and assistance from international societies, the malnutrition and mortality rates of children in the DPRK have improved. However, the prevalence of the stunting reported in the latest 2012 report is 27.9%, which is still a moderate-severe level, and worrisome in terms of international standards. In particular, the prevalence in Ryangangdo, which is regarded as the worst region in the DPRK, is 39.6%, which is a very high level of stunting. To alleviate such regional deviation will be a major task for future assistance. In addition, one cannot emphasize too highly the importance of early nutritional assistance for pregnant women and infants, considering that the recovery from stunted growth is low after two years of age, and the aftereffects would continue for the rest of their lives.

The article assesses the efforts of the DPRK—a country which has experienced significant industrial development under central planning—to develop a more open economy, having probably reached the limits of inward‐looking growth ('Juche') and having recently experienced a dramatic change in its traditional trading partnerships. It describes the nature of the DPRK state management system and the growing dissatisfaction with its performance in recent years. From its relatively isolated position, the DPRK is taking advantage of UNDP technical assistance to implement its change strategy in three areas: diversification of international trade, foreign investment promotion through joint ventures with state enterprises and modernization of industrial management. Implementation of the UNDP programme has thrown into relief some of the institutional obstacles to the internationalization of the economy inherent in the central planning system. Against a background of relative lack of foreign investor interest—recent legislation notwithstanding—the article describes remedial efforts being undertaken. On the trade front, the government has made modest successes in diversification, but these will need to be reinforced by multilateral assistance with trade information, marketing and other skills needs of trade officials. The article concludes with a review of the DPRK's prospects in the context of the Korean unification issue, other regional cooperation such as the Tumen River Project and international debates over regime survival in the DPRK. Prospects for spreading management change through technical assistance in the DPRK are conditioned by a number of factors, including the extent to which a new management culture can be disseminated from pilot enterprises to the economy as a whole and whether the enclave approach to investment promotion in enterprise zones is also helpful in this regard. Though the DPRK political economy is robust and resourceful, the question that remains is whether the cautious or reluctant government strategy for change can bring results in time.

Any evaluation of life in the Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea can be only tentative because of the great difficulty in obtaining reliable information. Almost all information coming out of North Korea is strictly official and tailored for foreign readers, including reports submitted to UN agencies such as FAO and UNESCO. The land has been described as a terra incognita in the western consciousness. 1 The difficulties are especially daunting to an enquiry into the fate of religion under the cult of Kim Il-song, North Korea's leader since 1946. This is somewhat surprising for Koreans historically have been (and in the South still are) extremely religious people, while up to 1945 the northern provinces had been vibrant centres of, in particular, Protestant Christianity. The silence regarding Christianity since 1953 is at least deeply disturbing and, in human terms, may enshroud a tragedy. But before attempting to peer beneath this shroud, I would like to provide a brief view of the religious and socialist/communist developments and relationships preceding Korea's partition at the 38th parallel in August 1945.

How North Korea Wages Political Warfare at Home and Abroad…and How to Respond

In the nine years after the inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in February 2008, the consensus regarding the alliance between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States was that it couldn't be better. Yet with the inauguration of new administrations in both capitals, despite the reaffirmation of each side's commitment to the alliance, there are some concerns and anxieties over North Korea policy, the implications of China's rise for the regional security architecture, and alliance management. In general, the United States is concerned about the possibility that Moon Jae-in will revive Roh Moo-hyun's Sunshine Policy of engagement with North Korea as well as adopt a pro-Chinese orientation and encourage anti-American sentiment. On the other hand, the ROK has concerns about the Trump administration's protectionism, hostile policy toward North Korea that eschews dialogue, unilateralism in the military sphere, and demand for greater burden-sharing.To maintain, strengthen, and upgrade the U.S.-ROK alliance, both Seoul and Washington should work very closely to increase trust and mutual respect and to iron out possible differences over the aforementioned issues. The following discussion will examine the two allies' areas of convergence and divergence on North Korea policy, China's rise, and alliance management. It will then conclude by assessing the prospects for the U.S.-ROK alliance in the aftermath of political transitions in both countries.Consultation and Coordination on North Korea PolicyFor both Washington and Seoul, North Korea's nuclear weapons program remains the most urgent and important challenge. The overall situation in and around the Korean Peninsula is very unstable and intense, as North Korea seeks acceptance as a nuclear state and relevant parties try to force the Kim Jong-un regime to give up its nuclear weapons.At the moment, Washington and Seoul appear to be on the same page in their commitment to a strategy of pressure and engagement. However, each side seems to have some suspicion about the other. The United States is concerned about the possibility that the new ROK government will revive Roh's Sunshine Policy, which strongly emphasized engagement and positive incentives. On the other hand, the Moon administration might have anxieties that the Trump administration's policies will be too militant and aggressive, potentially inducing a series of crises and confrontations without the possibility of dialogue and negotiation.1 Nonetheless, given North Korea's ongoing missile tests and threats to stage another nuclear test, both the United States and ROK are in a common stance of mounting more pressure on North Korea until it shows meaningful signs of denuclearization.At the moment, despite its desire to have some degree of autonomy in dealing with North Korea, South Korea does not have much room to maneuver. It would be difficult for the Moon government to go against the Trump administration's strategy of maximum pressure and engagement and pursue a completely new policy. From the South Korean perspective, the threat posed by North Korea goes beyond nuclear weapons and missiles. Human rights violations, as well as economic and social instability, are among the conventional security issues that must be resolved. Therefore, the United States must not restrict its North Korea policy to the nuclear and missile threats but should adjust its policy to address all of these issues. To gain the support and cooperation of the United States, and to reduce suspicion between the two allies, South Korea should also clarify its vision, strategy, and action plans to handle and solve the North Korea problem.At the same time, the United States and South Korea should discuss and come to an agreement on the level and scope of pressure to be applied and on the conditions, procedures, and agenda for dialogue. The United States is concerned that the Moon administration will rush into a dialogue with Pyongyang and has reservations about reopening the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tours regardless of the progress toward denuclearization. …

IntroductionTo let all people eat rice with meat soup, as a common propaganda slogan has it, has been an objective of the leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea.1 Yet contrary to official proclamation, nutritional stress has lingered in North Korea ever since its foundation in 1948, which was brought about by the emerging Cold War (1945-1991). As a manifestation of food calamities, mean final height of North Korean men, taken as a proxy for nutritional and epidemiological stress in early life,2 merely stagnated for all decades of the Cold War.3,4 In stark contrast, contemporary South Korean men are by now the tallest in all of East Asia because of healthy and wealthy living conditions in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula.5Worst of all, by the 1990s, North Korea experienced a great famine.6,7 Massive starvation of North Koreans occurred with the downfall of socialism and the geopolitical disintegration of the Eastern Bloc. Food, fertilizers, and energy could no longer be afforded on the basis of world market prices. Lacking these necessary inputs, North Korea's economy collapsed in the 1990s.8 More important, in the previous Cold War era, the socialist government inefficiently focused on heavy industrialization and symbolic mammoth projects of marginal economic use in addition to overspending up to one-third of its budget on the military.9 This leftNorth Korea without comparative advantages in exports in the post-Cold War era to raise the levels of living and revive its economy.Though macroeconomic shocks and long-term strategic malinvestments are the underlying causes for North Korea's decline after the Cold War, the food crisis of the 1990s itself was triggered by two consecutive floods in 1995 and 1996 that devastated large parts of the country and evolved into a major famine.10 The floods in turn were a result of the El Nino weather anomaly at that time, although deforestation accelerated the crisis. However, by the early 2000s, North Korean living standards improved thanks to international assistance. In the early 1990s, North Korea joined the United Nations, and after the first floods in 1995, it officially appealed for aid. Ever since then, international food aid has been pouring into the DPRK, with peaks from 1997 to 2005 (Figure 1). Another important factor for North Korea's revitalization in the post-Cold War era was liberalization reforms. These were officially introduced in 2002 (July First Reforms) and led to a paradigmatic shift, including marketization and decentralization.11,12,13 Table 1 demonstrates that probably 78 percent of North Koreans were participating in the informal economy by the time they were interviewed from 2004 to 2005.This article investigates the trends in underweight of children in North Korea from 1987 to 2012 to explore how the nutritional status of the North Korean people developed in the critical decade of the 1990s and beyond. First and foremost, the starting point of this study is the year 1987, which is a prefamine period when North Korea was still integrated into the Eastern Bloc. The last year of observation is the post-famine year 2012, which is over a decade after the great famine of the 1990s. Hence, this study offers very rare evidence on the long-term development of North Korean biosocial living standards. Previous statistical analysis on North Korean child malnutrition focused on cross-sectional evidence during the peak of famine14,15 or after the famine16,17 as well as on the regional effects of the food crisis.18,19 What is more, this paper compares underweight rates of children in North Korea to that of their peers in South Korea by drawing on recently released statistics based on a nationally representative anthropometric survey carried out from 2003 to 2004. This is another intriguing comparison because both Koreas share the same genetic and cultural ancestry and were also not affected much by migration over the last centuries. …

Russia has had a consistent policy of promoting a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, opposing resolution of the nuclear issue through pressure or sanction, supporting a multilateral process and solution, promoting adherence to Non-Proliferation Treaty rules, and expanding mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Moscow suggested initiating a six-party process regarding a solution to the divided Korean peninsula in 1994. North Korea is generally positive about Russia's suggestions. The United States has belatedly and reluctantly recognized Russia's positive role in the process. Russia hopes the Six Party Talks (6PT) will gradually evolve into a multiparty security and cooperation system including a peaceful DPRK. This will be facilitated by international economic assistance to the DPRK and institutionalization of the 6PT. Successful Russia-U.S. cooperation may have much wider implications. Key words: Russian foreign policy in Korea, North Korea, multilateral security - East Asia, nuclear weapons Early Russian Efforts to Promote Collective Security in Korea On March 24, 1994 the Russian foreign ministry made public a suggestion for a six-party involving the two Koreas, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan. The United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) were also supposed to join the discussion on Korea for finding a compromise solution to the first North Korean nuclear crisis. That crisis began in March 1993 when the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), suspected of nuclear-weapon development, left the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).1 The proposed comprehensive solution in Korea was meant to include: * promoting nuclear nonproliferation in Korea; * guarantees of noninterference in the internal affairs of the two Korean states; * military confidence-building measures; * replacement of the 1953 Korean armistice agreement with a new peace treaty; and * normalization of bilateral relations between certain members of the talks (U.S.-DPRK, DPRK-Japan).2 The idea itself was not new. After the end of the Korean War the armistice agreement of 1953 recommended that the governments of the countries concerned hold a to solve the problem of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and reach a peace agreement. The idea of a six-party consultative conference raised during the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly was proposed by South Korea and was supported by Japan.3 Russia's support for the process was based on the presumption that the Korean security issue (including the nuclear problem) was rooted in the long history of relations between the four powers (Japan, USSR, United States, and China) on the Korean issue. Historically, imperial Japan was the colonial master of Korea and only its defeat in World War II by the United States and the USSR brought about Korean independence. The United States and the USSR agreed on the division of Korea at Yalta in 1945. Soon after, however, they became adversaries in the course of the Korean War, which also involved China. The cold-war confrontation was the product of the global competition between two systems: the USSR and China, both of which, although at odds with each other, had alliance treaties with the DPRK and supported Pyongyang, versus the U.S.-Japan-South Korea bloc. This system provided the security balance on the peninsula. Thus, the 1994 Russian suggestion was not spontaneous and was prompted by Russia's attempt to protect its national interests. However, at that time it was ignored. As Samuel Kim puts it: Being left out of the Chinese bilateral approach and marginalized by US hegemonic sanctions, Russia was attempting to get back into the game. . . . Washington dismissed the Russian proposal as a harmful distraction while Beijing scuttled it as deviating from its declared party line.4 Instead, a 2+2 formula (the two Koreas, the United States, and China) formula was implemented, in 1996, rebuffing Russian attempts to be involved. …

The press in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) is closely tied to its communist sociopolitical structures. The North Korean press finds its modus operandi in the ‘Soviet Communist’ theory for its relationship with its government. This study examines the press laws and regulations in North Korea, pursuing three questions: (1) What is the status of the press as a sociopolitical institution in North Korea?; (2) What is the constitutional and statutory scheme relating to press freedom in North Korea?; and (3) What is the impact of the statutory mechanisms on the press in North Korea? The press and other mass media in North Korea are totally controlled by the Korean Worker's Party. No dissenting voice is permitted in the news media. North Korea recognizes freedom of the press as a Constitutional right of their citizens. Nevertheless, there is a considerable disparity between the constitutional guarantee of press freedom and its practical application. In the name of ‘collective good’ as de...

This chapter presents first theories on legitimation and delegitimation, and then briefly reviews the history of the legitimacy struggles between the Koreas since they were established in 1948. It deals with the issue of the Koguryŏ tombs and the current historical debate - the borders and origin of the monarchy and the policy with which South Korea has decided to tackle the Koguryŏ issue. The chapter examines the background of the change in Republic of Korea (ROK) policy on this issue and its implications for the essence of relations between the Koreas today. In June 2004, United Nations educational, Scientific and cultural Organization (UNESCO) held a conference in china and approved the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s application for recognition of the Koguryŏ tombs on its territory as World heritage Sites. Keywords: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK); Koguryŏ tombs; Korea; legitimacy struggles; UNESCO

Plutella xylostella and Pieris rapae are the key components of a pest complex that attacks Brassica crops in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). We examined the spatial distributions of these insects within crops both as individual species and when combined as a standard insect that was derived from their relative feeding rates. The influence of standard co‐operative management practice and an integrated pest management (IPM) strategy on the dispersion of the standard insect was tested. Iwao's m* − m relation was then used to describe the distribution of standard insects by management categories and of Pieris rapae using all data. Pest management practices only affected the distribution of the species when they were combined into standard insects. Enumerative sampling plans were therefore designed for standard insects based on population data derived from IPM‐managed fields and for Pieris rapae from population data from all experimental fields. The presented plans have the potential to make a significant contribution to managing lepidopteran pests in the DPRK. The approach will be useful in the design of sequential sampling plans for other geographical regions where these pests co‐occur and can also contribute to the development of sequential sampling plans for other pest complexes for which standard insects can be derived.

North Korea enacted a Countermeasure Act that could respond by considering the international community’s accountability activities and human rights sanctions as defamation against North Korea and that established a crime of defamation on DPRK in the criminal law. In response to COVID-19, North Korea revised the Law on Prevention of Infectious Disease and enacted the Emergency Quarantine Law. By enforcing these laws, North Korea excessively regulated and punished North Koreans. Also North Korea strengthened controls and rules by tightening discipline within the WPK through punishment and reshuffles of officials. Especially North Korea strengthened ideological, information and culture control through enacting Public Report Act, Reactionary Ideology and Culture Rejection Act, Youth Education Security Act, Pyongyang Standard Language Protection Act and Law on the Administration of Revolutionary Relics. And control and punishment of drugs was strengthened through the revision of the Criminal Law and enactment of the Drug Crime Prevention Act. Meanwhile, North Korean authorities have continuously issued an order to ban human rights violations since COI establishment and then enacted Act on Prevention of Batteries. This indicates that international community’s consistent human rights policy toward North Korea can draw reality change and legislative change. Also in order to drawing North Korea’s change, international community continue information and culture dissemination activities.

This study summarized the achievements and issues of humanitarian assistance to North Korea and looked at the direction and Tasks in terms of ‘Responsibility to Protection(R2P)’ that has been actively raised in the international community. If we expand the concept of R2P, it includes the meaning of ‘prevention’ and ‘support’ to prevent systematic human rights violations from occurring. In other words, it can be seen that the suppression of human rights against North Koreans, the threat of survival due to food shortages, and the level of serious health care all provide the basis for the international community’s intervention in North Korea. And intervention in North Korea from an R2P perspective is actually a means of preventing North Korea’s provocations in the current situation in North Korea. Considering the past experience of humanitarian assistance to North Korea and the nature of the North Korean regime, a long-term and gradual strategy is needed to maintain both humanitarian assistance and international pressure for intervention in North Korea from the R2P’s perspective in order to bring about the ultimate change in North Korea.