Man made machine: global animation and the modern body

This book describes the remarkable life of Paul Rusch, a Kentuckian who went to Japan after the Great Kanto Earthquake. Rusch embarked on an unlikely journey from a YMCA worker to college instructor, missionary, prisoner of war, and military intelligence officer, ultimately founding Seisen-Ryo lodge and the Kiyosato Educational Experiment Project (KEEP) in Kiyosato, Japan. Through KEEP, Rusch introduced new agricultural methods and technology to highland Japan, endeavoring to help feed an impoverished region in the postwar era. Credited with introducing American-style football to Japan, Rusch was also instrumental in recruiting Japanese Americans (Nisei) for military service during World War II. As an army intelligence officer during the Allied Occupation of Japan, Rusch gathered evidence employed to absolve Emperor Hirohito of responsibility for the Pacific War. Rusch used his vast social network in Japan to acquire evidence of a Communist espionage ring in Japan led by the spymaster Richard Sorge, a development that affected the anti-Communist policies of Occupied Japan and McCarthy-era politics in the United States. Rusch’s dreams of evangelizing Japan did not come to fruition, but, despite some failures, Paul Rusch’s memory has endured into the twenty-first century, inspiring Japanese and Americans to foster cultural exchange, environmental sustainability, and international peace.

Reviewed by: Bokujinkai: Japanese Calligraphy and the Postwar Avant-Garde by Eugenia Bogdanova-Kummer Maki Kaneko (bio) Bokujinkai: Japanese Calligraphy and the Postwar Avant-Garde. By Eugenia Bogdanova-Kummer. Brill, 2020. xii, 181 pages. €104.00, cloth; €104.00, E-book. The last two decades have witnessed the significant growth of English-language scholarship on 1950s and 1960s Japanese avant-garde art. Spearheaded by Alexandra Monroe's 1994 landmark exhibition/publication Japanese Art After 1945: Scream Against the Sky, in the early twenty-first century many scholars published must-read books, catalogues, and articles on post-1945 Japanese avant-garde art, including Reiko Tomii, Bert Winther-Tamaki, Midori Yoshimoto, Ming Tiampo, and Miriam Sas. Particularly foregrounding Japanese avant-gardists' active interactions and negotiations with their Euro-American counterparts, their studies have effectively illuminated the central roles played by those "non-Western" artists in the post-1945 contemporary art scene and thereby posed a significant challenge to the Euro-American-centric notion of modernism and avant-gardism. This collection of scholarship thereby sets firm ground for the study of post-1945 Japanese art vis-à-vis the so-called global art history, whose most recent outcome can be found in the 2019 traveling exhibition Changing and Unchanging Things: Noguchi and Hasegawa in Postwar Japan, while inspiring young and mid-career scholars to further complicate and diversify the narrative of the postsurrender art of Japan.1 [End Page 426] Eugenia Bogdanova-Kummer's first book, Bokujinkai: Japanese Calligraphy and the Postwar Avant-Garde, is the most recent member of this league of scholarship and fully demonstrates that the study of 1950s and 1960s Japanese art is far from exhausted. The book focuses on the avantgarde calligraphers' collective Bokujinkai, or People of the Ink, which was founded by five young Japanese calligraphers in 1952 and attained significant recognition in Western Europe and the United States through to the 1960s. While the Bokujinkai is not at all an unknown group, previous studies focused almost exclusively on its de facto leader Morita Shiryū (1912–98) and on Inoue Yūichi (1916–85), arguably the most radical member of the group. Bogdanova-Kummer's book is the first study in English to holistically investigate this avant-garde calligraphy group through its membership, network, formal experimentations, and guiding philosophies from its formation to its "conservative turn" in the 1960s. By centrally focusing on the Bokujinkai's strategies, efforts, and struggles for the internationalization of calligraphy with the notion of the "transcultural" advocated by the German philosopher Wolfgang Welsche as its key framework, moreover, Bogdanova-Kummer sets the goal for her book to "change the perception of transcultural constellations in postwar abstract art" and further challenges the Eurocentric account of avant-garde art "not only in regard to geographies, but also in terms of the art forms and communities involved" (p. 3). The uniqueness of this study lies in the author's attempt to position calligraphy, "an often overlooked and culturally specific art form" (p. 9), at the center of the early postwar transnational interactions of Japanese and Euro-American avant-garde artists. Oscillating between art and letter, rooted in the Sino-Japanese cultural tradition, and deemed to be conservative, calligraphy was significantly disadvantaged in proving its relevance to Euro-American art at that time. However, the author insists, precisely because of this disadvantageous position or marginalization, the Bokujinkai's "success" in the international art arena invites our scrutiny; its bold strategies toward the challenge of bridging calligraphy and abstractions, and the limitations encountered in doing so, reveal "the complex mechanisms that drive the art world's politics of inclusion and rejection, as well as the conflicting historiographies of the postwar avant-gardes as perceived in Japan, Europe, and the United States" (p. 146). Based on this fascinating proposal, Bogdanova-Kummer details the Bokujinkai's trajectory through six main chapters. Chapters 1 and 2 present, in the author's words, the "macro-level sociopolitical contextualization" (p. 23) and "micro-level study of the community of avant-garde calligraphers" (p. 37), respectively. Together with the [End Page 427] introduction, which includes an extremely important survey of pre-1945 modern Japanese calligraphy, the first two chapters provide the reader with key...

Since it was first published more than forty years ago, Sources of Japanese Tradition, Volume 2, has been considered the authoritative sourcebook for readers and scholars interested in Japan from the eighteenth century to the post-World War II period. Now greatly expanded to include the entire twentieth century, and beginning in 1600, Sources of Japanese Tradition presents writings by modern Japan's most important philosophers, religious figures, writers and political leaders. The volume also offers extensive introductory essays and commentary to assist in understanding the documents' historical settings and significance. Wonderfully varied in its selections, this eagerly anticipated expanded edition has revised many of the texts from the original edition and added a great many not included or translated before. New additions include documents on the postwar era, the importance of education in the process of modernization, and women's issues. Beginning with documents from the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate, the collection's essays, manifestos, religious tracts, political documents, and memoirs reflect major Japanese religious, philosophical, social and political movements. Subjects covered include the spread of neo-Confucian and Buddhist teachings, Japanese poetry and aesthetics, and the Meiji Restoration. Other documents reflect the major political trends and events of the period: the abolition of feudalism, agrarian reform, the emergence of poltical parties and liberalism, and the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars. The collection also includes Western and Japanese impressions of each other through Western religious missions and commercial and cultural exchanges. These selections underscore Japanese and Western apprehension of and fascination with each other. As Japan entered the twentieth century, new political and social movements -- Marxism, anarchism, socialism, nationalism, and feminism -- entered the national consciousness. Later readings in the collection look at the buildup to war with the United States, military defeat and American occupation. Documents from the postwar period echo Japan's struggle with its own history and its development as a capitalist democracy.

At somewhat different times during the postwar era, both China and Japan have been referred to as "miracle economies," with a good deal of justification in both cases. Japan had by far the highest rate of growth in the industrialized world from the 1960s through the 1980s, and by 1990 it had arguably caught up with, if not passed, the United States as the world's leading economy. For most of the last 15 years, in stark contrast, Japan's economy has stagnated. China's economic surge has, if anything, been more spectacular than Japan's in numerical growth rate, as it has had the highest growth rate in the world over the last 25 years, a truly remarkable accomplishment. Yet because it started from such a low base in development, China is still at the level of a developing nation in terms of GDP per capita (it has 1.3 billion population), although its industrial centers, particularly Shanghai, are certainly first-world cities (United Nations, 2005).KeywordsEconomic ReformTotal Quality ManagementEvolve GlobalTrade SurplusEconomic MiracleThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Reviewed by: Health Security for All: Dreams of Universal Health Care in America Jill Quadagno Alan Derickson . Health Security for All: Dreams of Universal Health Care in America. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005. xii + 240 pp. $30.00 (0-8018-8081-5). In the past decade there has appeared a virtual cottage industry of books on the many failed attempts to enact national health insurance across the twentieth century. Yet anyone who wonders whether there is anything new that can be said about this issue must read Alan Derickson's marvelous book, Health Security for All. Unlike his predecessors who have focused on the politics of health policymaking, Derickson traces the evolution of a societal ideal—universal coverage—and the ways in which reformers have sought to translate that ideal into a plan of action. Interestingly, the concept of universal health care has not necessarily meant an entitlement to care, nor has it meant government financing of health-care services. During the Progressive Era, the first proposals for state health insurance promoted by the American Association for Labor Legislation were far from universal. Excluded from the AALL plan were the elderly, the permanently disabled, the self-employed, agricultural laborers, domestic workers, and all irregularly employed [End Page 206] 206 workers (a provision that effectively ruled out most women). Not until the 1920s did universalism become an ideal. In that period, elite reformers based in medical and public health schools led the drive to make medical care accessible to everyone. One of the main proponents of universal care was the American Medical Association, which nonetheless rejected the idea that this care would be provided through the government. All efforts to increase the public provision of care, whether through county health centers, health services for mothers and infants, or even visiting nurses, were vehemently opposed by the AMA. In the 1930s the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care voiced support for the concept of universalism but disagreed on a course of action that would make health care accessible to everyone. Yet it was in this period that the first notion of health care as a social right began to take hold, with organized labor at the forefront of the debate. By the 1940s the concept had coalesced into a proposal that truly would have provided universal health-care access. The goal of universal entitlement faded from view with the collapse of the health-care rights campaign in the postwar period. Instead, voluntary health plans spread rapidly in the 1940s and 1950s, making it appear that private insurance would eventually cover the entire population. As Derickson aptly points out, the success of the voluntarist approach demobilized the core constituency for a universal public insurance program. Universalism was revived in the early 1970s, and then again in the 1990s when President Clinton proposed his own plan for universal access. By then, however, the political will had dissipated. The result of a century-long debate over universalism has been a residual social-policy model in which the government serves as the last resort for the marginal segments of society. I laud Derickson's fresh approach to health-policy history with its focus on the diverse visions of how best to provide health protection and the amazing array of plans designed by reformers to reach this goal. Yet his discussion of the varying interpretations of universality would have been strengthened if he had provided more historical context. How did the ideological, political, and economic forces in each period influence the salience of universality and the way it was interpreted by the public? Is it likely that the United States will ever achieve universal coverage or guarantee universal access to health care? Derickson suggests that universality can be achieved if reformers work to build a mass movement among the uninsured, minority-rights advocates, progressive faith-based organizations, children's advocates, and feminist groups. Such a strategy can succeed only if these various constituencies can agree on specific goals—a task that has proved elusive in the past. Health Security for All provides both a way for reformers to understand these past failed efforts and a blueprint for crafting a message for the future. Jill Quadagno...

I HAVE FELT longer than some people would be willing to admit that there are many questions about the Progressive Era which want explication. What does Progressivism mean to anybody-what does it suggest? Different eras have different popular significance, under changing historical conditions. I venture to say that the Progressive Era has not, in recent decades, appeared to require urgent study of any sort. What do people think about, when they think of the American past? In recent years, we have had student parties based on the Roaring Twenties themes-F. Scott Fitzgerald and his Flappers and Philosophers. Here, by the way, is one of the real pieces of evidence that we have again been passing through, in our own ways, a kind of latter-day Nineteen Twenties: a post-War era with characteristics of the last great post-War era. Students do not have parties of the Nineteen Thirties. If they decided to have a pre-World War I party, it would be based, not on Progressivism, but on barber-shop quartets, handle-bar moustaches, floor-length skirts, beer-parlor dancing, and other decor of the period. The philosophy of Progressivism is not reflected in its popular tunes in the sense that Come to Me, My Melancholy Baby, says something obvious about post-World War I disillusionment. There is not so direct a relationship between the fight for Pure Food Laws and the battle against Frenzied Finance, on the one hand, and East Side, West Side and After the Ball, on the other. Some years back, there was a vogue which magnified Andrew Jackson and his era. It was an obvious effort to link the New Deal with the policies and deeds of the old Tennessee Indian-killer. We have had no comparable effort to link the events of Progressivism with those of our own times. I will go further. In my recollection, Progressivism has seemed, in point of interest, less near to us than perhaps any other era in American history. I recall an odd problem I had with a book of my own which dealt with Progressivism. It was handled by a variety of the publishing firm's editors: clever men with wide interests, very contemporaneous in their outlook, but willing to take anything into account which might make them money. Here was my book, largely centered on Pro-

Japanese Buddhism was introduced to the United States at the Parliament of World Religions in Chicago in 1893, but the development of Japanese American Buddhism, also known as Nikkei Buddhism, really began when Japanese migrants brought Buddhism with them to Hawaii and the continental United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It has been influenced by, and has reflected, America’s sociopolitical and religious climate and the US relationship to Japan, to which generations of Japanese Americans, such as Issei (literally, first generation, referring to Japanese immigrants), Nisei (second-generation American-born offspring of the Issei), and Sansei (third generation), responded differently. While adapting to American society, Japanese American Buddhists maintained their cultural practices and ethnoreligious identity. The history of Japanese American Buddhism discussed in this article spans from the late-19th Century to the 1970s and is divided into three major periods: the pre-World War II, World War II, and the postwar eras. Japanese American Buddhism is derived from the various Buddhist organizations in Japan. The Nishi Hongwanji denomination of Jōdo Shinshū, a form of Pure Land Buddhism known as Shin Buddhism in the West, is the oldest and largest form of ethnic Japanese Buddhism in the United States. In Hawaii, Nishi Hongwanji founded the Hompa Hongwanji Mission of Hawaii (HHMH) in Honolulu in 1897. On the continental United States, it established the Buddhist Mission of North America (BMNA) in San Francisco in 1898, currently known as the Buddhist Churches of America (BCA). Other Japanese Buddhist organizations also developed in the United States at the beginning of the 20th century. They include the Jōdo-shū, another sect of Pure Land Buddhism; Higashi Hongwanji, another major denomination of Jōdoshin-shū; Sōtō-shū, a Zen Buddhist school; Shingon-shū, known as Kōyasan Buddhism; and Nichiren-shū. The characteristics of Japanese American Buddhism changed significantly during World War II, when approximately 120,000 persons of Japanese descent living in the West Coast states were incarcerated because of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066. The postwar period witnessed a rapid transformation in the status and visibility of Japanese Buddhism in the United States. This transformation was driven by the promotion of ethnonational Buddhism by Nisei and by the growth of interest in Zen Buddhism among the general American public. The positive reception of Japanese Buddhism in the United States reflected and reinforced the transformed relationship between the United States and Japan from wartime enemies to Cold War partners. While they experienced greater receptivity and interest in Buddhism from nonethnics, they could no longer practice or espouse Jōdo Shinshū teachings or adapted practices without clarification. Debates concerning the authenticity of Jōdo Shinshū Buddhism and Japanese American Buddhist practices were interwoven within a longer history of American Orientalism. By the 1960s, Japanese American Buddhist communities were transformed by the addition of a small but vocal nonethnic membership and a new generation of Sansei Buddhists. Demands for English-speaking ministers resulted in the creation, in 1967, of the Institute of Buddhist Studies, the first graduate-level training program in the United States endorsed by Nishi Hongwanji. This article is an overview of Japanese American Buddhism with a focus on the development of the Nishi Hongwanji Shin Buddhist organizations in the United States. English scholarship on the development of other Japanese Buddhist organizations in the United States is still limited. Throughout the history of Japanese American Buddhism, Nikkei Buddhists negotiated with America’s political institutions and Christian churches, as well as with Euro-American Buddhists, over Buddhist and cultural practices to maintain and redefine their ethnoreligious tradition. Buddhist temples provided the space for them to gather and build a community of shared faith and cultural heritage, discuss their place and the role of Buddhism in American society, and express their concerns to America’s general public.

The long standing appropriation of Native American culture for promotional purposes has received ample criticism from tribal members, Indigenous advocates, professional organizations, and scholars. Mounting disapproval has pressured private companies and public institutions to curtail these practices in the United States. This article expands historical understanding of these contested representation by analyzing the advertising of three major firearms manufacturers – Savage, Remington, and Winchester – and a few other gun sellers who have periodically exploited American Indian images and language from the late nineteenth century until the present day. These depictions, their historical context, and their macromarketing implications are critically examined. Also discussed are intersections with U.S. gun culture, study limitations, and opportunities for further research on Native American appropriation globally.

Drawing on oral histories and archival data, we demonstrate how both childrearing and housing practices were directly and indirectly organized around a standardized and codified textual discourse early in the twentieth century in the United States. Using institutional ethnography (IE), we begin with selected experiences of our research participants when they were girls and mothers and explicate these experiences by discovering the social relations that regulate them translocally. We show how the concerted ideological practices of the Children’s Bureau, the Own Your Own Home campaign, and the Better Homes in America movement linked proper childrearing practices with a suitable home environment and connected parents with the marketplace for obtaining housing, household goods, and services. We also examine the textual discourse that established the “Standard American Home (SAH)” as the appropriate form of dwelling for infants and children. Keywords: childrearing, housing, institutional ethnography, textually-mediated discourse, Progressive Era. “Normal family life can not exist apart from a normal home,” the noted housing reformer Edith Elmer Wood proclaimed (1931:7). Later she added, “American authorities agree with the British and a majority of Continentals that a single-family detached house with a garden all around it forms the ideal setting for the life of growing children, . . . [T]he only excuse for apartments is for celibates, childless couples, and elderly people whose children have grown up and scattered. Newly married couples, especially where the husband and wife are both working, will naturally turn to them. And herein lies the danger, if they stay on after children are born” (1931:41). At the time of her writing, these ideas were becoming commonplace and formed the basis for much criticism of housing in the United States. In this paper we demonstrate that the standard of the proper home environment for raising children, alluded to above, was articulated by the concerted efforts of three state-affiliated organizations: the Children’s Bureau, the Own Your Home campaign, and the Better Homes in America movement. The work processes of these organizations—research projects, the production and distribution of pamphlets, articles, and newspaper advertisements, demonstration projects, and other discursive practices— connected anxious parents to the newly professionalized child welfare experts (Levine and Levine 1970), an emerging market of consumer goods and services for the home (Bronner 1989), and to the depressed consumer market for housing (Luken and Vaughan 2005). In doing so they authorized these agents to be the holders of child welfare solutions. A number of sociologists and historians have examined the “child saving campaigns” during the Progressive Era in the United States, particularly with regard to the discovery of child neglect and abuse (Nelson 1984; Pfohl 1977), the creation of juvenile justice systems This research was partially supported by grants from the Scholarly Research and Creative Activities Program, Arizona State University West. The authors would like to thank the women who graciously participated in this study. They also thank James Holstein and the many anonymous reviewers for their comments on prior versions of this paper. Authors’ names are listed in alphabetical order. The contents of this article represent a cooperative effort. Direct correspondence to:

Comparative study of factors affecting public acceptance of mining projects: Evidence from USA, China and Turkey

Charlie Chaplin 1889–1977

Many scholars researched social informatization from different perspectives, including profession, economy and technology. In this thesis, the author will studied on social informatization from the perspective of basic characteristics of information. Firstly, the author will describe other scholars’ social informationization theories. Secondly, the definition of information and basic characteristics of information will be given. Then, the production mode informatization and life-style informatization from the perspective of basic characteristics of information will be studied on in this paper. Lastly, the conclusion will be drawn.

This brief survey of aspects of the history of Irish Studies in the US argues that the prevailing modes of academic knowledge production and the social and financial support of the Irish American community have fixed the conditions of possibility under which the field developed. When immigration was high, language and cultural revival underway, and philology of high status in the Euro-American world, the twin fields of Celtic Studies and then Irish Studies were broadly adopted in private and public universities. The mid-twentieth century saw the emergence in literary studies of a text-based model of criticism and pedagogy in which select Irish writers were studied within an English literary canon and in isolation from Irish cultural and historical contexts. This began to change with the growing confidence of Irish America, and of Ireland, in the 1960s, when the ACIS was founded. In the 1980s and 1990s, feminist and postcolonial scholarship gave new relevance to Irish historical and cultural topics, and new wealth and a new cultureof philanthropy in Irish America allowed the formal establishment of programs and centers of study.

Three years ago, the United States and Thailand seemed headed for u more strained and distant relationship. U.S. policy-makers viewed Bangkok us increasingly insignificant while Thailand sought to move out of its traditional U.S. orbit and increasingly balance the influence of Washington China, Europe, and the Muslim world. Yet, since 2001, the United States and Thailand have become extremely close. This article examines the U.S.-Thai relationship from the 1980s to the present day, particularly focusing on the post-9/ 11 era in light of the Bush administration's war on terrorism and growing linkages between Thailand and the United States. Ultimately, the article analyses what has accounted for warmer ties, why some strains still remain, and whether U.S.-Thai relations hove in fact returned to their previous 1980s intimacy. Introduction When George W. Bush and Thaksin Shinawatra took office in 2001, U.S.-Thai relations were cordial though jittery. In the post-Cold War world, U.S. policymakers had relegated Thailand to a lesser level of importance. Meanwhile. Thailand had increasingly sought to transform its traditionally pro-U.S. tilt towards a foreign policy more evenly balanced to include China, Europe, and the Muslim world. Yet, since 2001, the United States and Thailand have embarked on an increasingly intimate partnership unseen since the 1980s. This article examines the changing priorities of U.S.-Thai relations from the 1980s, 1990s, through the events of 9/11, to the present day. It particularly focuses on the post-9/11 era in light of the Bush administration's international war on terrorism, and growing security and economic ties between Thailand and the United States. Ultimately, the paper emphasizes how common interests have led to warmer ties while certain strains remain. Until Thailand's brief 1975 to 1976 experiment democracy, U.S.-Thai relations were quite close and might even be described as patron--client. (1) The relationship was built on shared anti-communist security concerns and paralleled the military elites' dominance of Thai society. The U.S. began supplying Thailand military aid in 1950 and both states signed the 1954 Manila Pact of the former Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). Despite SEATO's demise in 1977, the Pact remains in force. Meanwhile, the Thanat-Rusk communique of 1962 committed each nation to defend the other if one was attacked. The 1975 to '76 period saw a policy of equidistance whereby Thai policymakers sought alliance not only the United States but also with new friends and former enemies. (2) Thailand in the 1980s followed a policy of omnidirectionality which recognized the importance of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), China, Vietnam, the USSR, as well as the United States. The success of omnidirectionality showcased the evolution of Thailand from being a simple client of the United States to becoming a key regional player in its own right. (3) But omnidirectionality did not distance the close U.S.-Thai security relationship. Indeed, the U.S.-Thai Cobra Gold annual air, land, and sea operations (begun in 1982), took on added importance during the 1980s, given the occupation by Vietnam of Cambodia. By the late 1980s, economic growth, the winding down of Vietnam's Cambodia venture, and the Cold War's end led to a reassessment by the U.S. and Thailand over their alliance's very nature. The civilian administration of Chatchai Chunhaven (1988-91) stressed greater disengagement from the United States. Chatchai's government sought to turn Indochina from a battlefield into a marketplace, and separate economic agreements Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Thailand's post-1988 foreign policy toward Myanmar was guided by constructive engagement. This friendly approach toward Myanmar's military sought profits for Thai investors in Myanmar and security for the Thai-Myanmar border. …

The Canadian federal government, shut out of meaningful post-World War Two diplomacy by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, found few avenues to assert its separate Canadian identity in the immediate postwar era. The Canadian psychological warfare program for German POWs--influenced by pent-up official frustration (1)--was an attempt by the government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King to register its mark on thousands of German prisoners of war who lived in Canadian-operated POW camps during and after the war. Astounding is the fact that some POWs, intentionally cut off from the outside world, asked on 8 May 1945 which side had won the war. (2) The United States and the United Kingdom sought to influence the thinking of the Germans following World War Two, especially because of German confusion about the causes of their defeat in World War One. In fact, Adolph Hitler promoted the deceptive stab-in-the-back theory that blamed Germany's democratic leaders for betraying a supposedly undefeated German army by surrendering in 1918. Since German militarism quickly reasserted itself after World War One, Allied postwar treatment of Germany's World War Two POWs brought home the message that the German nation had been defeated on 8 May 1945. Canada added its own dimension by implementing a psychological warfare program based on a similar American initiative. Colonel Henry Faulk, head of the British reeducation program, held that Canada undertook a limited re-educational effort that was far too intellectual to affect the rank and file of the POWs. (3) His harsh estimate of Canadian curriculum grew out of the POWs' strong expressions of Nazi loyalism when the Canadian-held POWs arrived in Britain in 1946-47 to begin an indefinite period of reparation labor. Faulk, who was quick to fault the Canadian reeducation program, did not consider that the Canadian-held POWs, just as those held by the U.S., resented their indefinite delay in Britain to such an extent that they briefly reasserted their adherence to Nazism in defiance. (4) This study explores the psychological factors affecting the POWs' postwar ideology by asking fundamental pedagogical questions about Canada's reeducation program: How did the military educators attempt to achieve the desired de-programming outcomes, and what factors impeded the prisoners' process? Was the entire program a useful exercise? Why did the Western Allies undertake a reeducation program that involved the indoctrination of POWs? The Mackenzie King government expended a significant military investment on the psychological warfare through an intense bombardment of accurate and uncensored Allied information. Canadian officials, looking at reeducation efforts in the United States, embraced John Dewey's pedagogy of learning by doing to liberate of the POWs' minds from Nazi control. Final interrogations of POWs in 1946 revealed that most prisoners abandoned aggressive Nazi tenets but refused to abandon Nazism in its entirety. Their bunker mentality and their lingering insecurities probably made them cautious students of an Allied world view. Psychological surveys in 1947 verified that POWs leaving Canada failed to embrace democratic principles. 8 May 1945 stood as a great divide in Allied reeducation efforts. Indeed, the historical context of the two periods plays a key role because only in the aftermath of the war did the Allied powers establish a victors' role over the vanquished POW enemy. Allied foreign policy goals also came into play, because the Allies sought to discredit Nazi ideology and German militarism. Canada, too, imposed strict military measures that involved withdrawing wartime POW privileges. Canadian influence on German POW matters grew out of Canadian acceptance of thousands of British-held prisoners of war. In May of 1940, just as Germany prepared to attack Britain, and Nazi U-boats menaced Canadian shipping in the Gulf of St. …