Market Reform, Programmatic (De)alignment, and Party System Stability in Latin America

The topic of electoral volatility was not at the center of academic work in Latin America until Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully’s seminal 1995 work Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (cited in Electoral Volatility as an Expression of Party System Equilibrium). Preceding analyses primarily focused on explaining the breakdown of democratic politics in the region during the 1960s and 1970s. Conventional wisdom that departed from the classic work of Sartori in Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976), maintained that stable party systems are crucial for the durability of democracies, focusing his attention on aspects such as party system polarization and fragmentation. Mainwaring and Scully shift the discussion, arguing that previous literature on the region neglected and inadequately conceptualized an equally important property of party systems: their level of their institutionalization. According to Mainwaring and Scully, party system institutionalization (PSI) is formed by four different dimensions. The first is stability in the patterns of party competition. Thus, institutionalized party systems are those in which actors develop expectations, orientations, and behavior based on the premise that practices and organizations will prevail into the foreseeable future. Mainwaring’s 2018 work, Party Systems in Latin America (cited in Electoral Volatility as an Expression of Party System Equilibrium), argues that this is the only relevant dimension in PSI, while considering that the other three are just underpinnings that facilitate it. So according to this work, an institutionalized party system is the one in which a stable set of parties interacts regularly in stable ways. This stability of interparty competition is traditionally measured with the Pedersen volatility index, a comprehensive measure of the net systematic shift in levels of electoral support for parties across elections. As volatility is negatively correlated with this important dimension of party system institutionalization, conventional wisdom holds that political representation deteriorates when there is persistent high volatility. To this debate, the well-cited 2006 article by Mainwaring and Torcal, “Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization” (cited in Electoral Volatility as an Expression of Party System Equilibrium), adds the idea that this lack of stability in the patterns of competition in party systems, measured by electoral volatility, is a typical characteristic of new and developing democracies. According to that study, the most important defining characteristic of party systems in less developed countries is captured by their lack of institutionalization, in other words, the amount of electoral volatility in their party systems. Since the publication of these three contributions, the debate on party system dynamics in the region has focused on cross-national levels of electoral volatility, their relationship with other indicators of party system stability, and their consequences for democratic quality and performance, while also broadening the analysis to Europe.

One of the prime incentives for this dissertation was the renewed interest in the role of party agency for the emergence and structuring of party systems that came up in the course of the discussions about the third wave of democracy and the concomitant challenges to the theoretical fundamentals of common party system theory. In addition, scholarly discourse on the third wave brought up again the question as to how the party system as an independent variable impacts on processes of democratic consolidation, national integration and socio-economic development.Trying to examine the role of party agency in this regard and to assess the role of the party system as the independent variable, the dissertation deals with two regional and temporal contexts and a political phenomenon pertinent to these contexts that most often have ranked as unique or paradoxical in scholarly assessments. Academic accounts of post-colonial India are interspersed with references to a deviant case of, or an empirical anomaly to, party system and democratic theory, and the conventional vocabulary used to describe post-apartheid South African political development frequently resorts to such terms as political miracle or societal exceptionalism. A similar confusion and vagueness prevails with regard to the specific configuration of a democratic and competitive party system characterised by the towering and prolonged dominance of one party. The study is an attempt to shed light on these contexts and their party systems by departing from the conventional �paths� of party system theory as well as from the relativist assessments of post-independent India (1947-67) and post-apartheid South Africa (1994-). This is done by means of a diachronic comparison of the two countries� party systems with a distinct focus on the role of party agency in the shaping and maintenance of one-party-dominance and on the role of the two party systems as independent variables. Chapter 1 deals with the conceptual, theoretical and methodological problems, incentives and questions inherent in the kind of cross-national and diachronic comparison attempted in this study. Chapter 2 gives a brief outline of the regional settings at the time democratic party competition was beginning to take shape, outlines the institutional boundaries within which the two party systems were/are located, looks at the main characteristics of the electorate in post-independent India and post-apartheid South Africa and �takes stock� of the two party systems in terms of a broad outline of the dominant party and the relevant opposition parties. The next three chapters present the bulk of the empirical analysis and deal with the emergence, working and functions/effects of one-party-dominance in India and South Africa respectively. Each chapter refers to the basic outline of the analytical framework depicted above and combines theoretical arguments with empirical, as well as historical, givens of the two party systems under examination. Whereas chapter 3 examines how the two party systems were �shaped from above�, i.e. how party agency helped to achieve the dominant position of the INC and ANC respectively, chapter 4 examines the mechanisms of control employed to maintain dominance and the mechanisms of party competition prevailing in the two regional contexts. Both chapters deal with the party agentive factors identified in the analytical framework as responsible for the achievement and maintenance of one-party-dominance in the form of short analytical narratives. The last of these three chapters (chapter 5) sums up and discusses the effects and (redefined) functions of party systems in changing societies and gives an account of how both countries� party systems have fared with regard to these effects and in terms of fulfilling these functions. Chapter 6 takes up the differences and similarities of the two regional contexts as they have emerged out of the preceding three chapters, relates the �lessons� of the Indian experience to the prospects of one-party-dominance in South Africa by means of a comparison and reassesses the two key theses of the study, namely that a) party agency and strategy were among the most decisive factors in the formation and development of the two regional contexts� systems of one-party-dominance and are, in general, crucial for party system formation and development (they are especially relevant in the shaping of one-party-dominance in changing societies); and that b) systems of one-party-dominance have a potentially (but not necessarily) benign effect on processes of democratisation, national integration and democratic development in the crucial period of changing societies� transition to democracy and democratic consolidation.

An approximation problem in computing electoral volatility

This chapter examines how party system structures shaped capital market reforms in tandem with internal party organisations in Singapore from the late 1980s to the late 2000s. The central claim is that the highly concentrated party system and the centrally and coherently organised PAP combined to both generate strong incentives for political elites to pursue public-regarding reform policies and enable them to initiate and implement these policies decisively and resolutely. The first section briefly describes the development of policies and regulations concerning the capital market in Singapore prior to the late 1980s to provide a foundation for examining market changes and reforms over the ensuing two decades. The second section explores the process through which major market reforms were enacted from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, and the third section focuses on further and more significant reforms following the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. The fourth and final section concludes.KeywordsCorporate GovernanceMarket ReformVeto PlayerAsian CrisisSecurity SectorThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The Japanese political system of 1946-1996 has often been defined by the continuous rule for four decades of the conservative Liberal Democratic party (LDP), which had held a majority of seats in the Diet between its formation in 1955 until it lost its majority in the Upper House (House of Councilors) in 1989. Under the Japanese political milieus, the LDP has been in a position of semi-permanent governance since 1955 except for a few years in the mid-1990s. The first questionable issue, here, is how the LDP had maintained its dominant position during that period and how one-party dominance system had sustained? How had electoral volatility affected the party system change? Can we expect a dramatic change in Japanese politics in near future? In relation to these questions, how can we apply the theories of comparative parties and party systems to 1946-1996 history of Japanese party politics.

For decades, Latin America’s troubled experience with democracy has served as a testing ground for theories on democratization and political regimes. Today, most countries in the region have established democratic institutions, and a return to full-fledged authoritarianism is unlikely. However, these regimes are often at odds with the electoral, constitutional, liberal, and representative attributes that are associated with democratic regimes. Even though elections are the only means of access to public office in most of the region, they frequently involve high levels of clientelism, harassment of the opposition, and unfair advantages for incumbents. Although the separation of powers is central to the constitutional design in most countries, a generalized tendency exists toward the concentration of power in the national executive through formal or informal mechanisms. In some countries, party systems have collapsed (e.g., Peru and Venezuela); in other countries, parties have become increasingly detached from civil society (e.g., Chile and Mexico), and, in others, social movements have transformed the party system (e.g., Bolivia). The institutional ecology of many of these countries has also become one of the most diverse in the world, as representative institutions coexist with other forms of democratic decision making, such as plebiscites, participatory budgeting, citizen assemblies, national conferences, community councils, local and indigenous autonomies, town hall meetings, and constituent processes. These challenges to the liberal model of democratic governance have in many cases followed victories by left-wing parties and candidates, who have launched major efforts to overhaul their political systems. As a result, Latin America’s experience with democracy since the 1980s has thrown new light on old questions in political science, such as the relationship between institutional design and democratic stability, the performance of democratic institutions in contexts of low state capacity, or the interaction between political and economic inequalities. The region has also inspired new research agendas on the rise of ethnic-based social movements and democratic consolidation, on the electoral consequences of neoliberalism, and on the implications of direct and participatory democracy for effective governance. Most importantly, the particularities of Latin American democracies have problematized our definitions of democracy itself. This has generated new scholarly efforts to replace the democratic/authoritarian dichotomy with more fine-grained classifications of hybrid regimes, to identify multiple “varieties of democracy” or “democratic systems,” and to develop more precise measurement instruments to evaluate regime types around the world. This article offers an overview of current research on Latin American democracies. The first section presents general introductions to the topic, as well as efforts to produce normative assessments of changes in the quality of democracy in each country. The second section cites works that have drawn on the peculiarities of the Latin American experience to reconceptualize the notion of democracy itself. In the rest of the article, empirical research on specific aspects of democratic politics is organized in eight general categories: elections, separation of powers, popular participation, interest representation and political inequalities, state capacity and democratic responsiveness, new democratic institutions, local democracy, and the rise and fall of leftist governments.

This article suggests eight lessons regarding democratic governance during the third wave of democratization in Latin America. First, creating effective democratic governance has proven far more difficult than analysts anticipated in the early 1990s. Second, the outcomes in democratic governance in contemporary Latin America have varied widely. Third, effective states are important for successful democratic governance. Fourth, institutionalized party systems facilitate effective democratic governance. Fifth, no set of formal institutions is clearly superior to others for promoting successful democratic governance. Sixth, although historical legacies shape the prospects for the subsequent success of democratic governance, countries have opportunities to break from the past and to establish new regime dynamics. Seventh, in the post-1990 period in Latin America, positive and negative outcomes have tended to go together. Finally, effective democratic governance does not always satisfy popular aspirations.

Democratic Culture and Governance is a collection of essays by prominent Latin American social scientists who were brought together by UNESCO to discuss issues of democracy at a conference held in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1990. The organization of this conference in Latin America was a recognition of the significance of the region for the debate about the theory and practice of democratization and democratic governance. The contributors include Manuel A. Garretón, Francois Bourricaud, Torcuato Di Tella, Norbert Lechner, Michel Maffesoli, Helio Jaguaribe, Mario Dos Santos, Osvaldo Sunkel, Ariel Davrieux, Enrique Leff, Dante Caputo, Jorge Sabato, Raúl Bernal-Meza, and Luis Albala-Bertrand. The articles by these prominent Latin Americanists address three main topics: issues of transition processes, economic conditions and the dilemmas of democratic governance, and democratization in the context of international restructuring. The collection provides a sense of some of the most troubling issues affecting democracy in Latin America, especially how prominent social scientists view these problems. The articles, however, lack depth. They are short pieces that look like conference commentaries rather than carefully-thought-out scholarly articles. In this sense, the book is useful as a documentation of the relevant issues discussed at the Montevideo conference, but it cannot be viewed as a significant contribution to the academic literature on democratization processes in Latin America.Social Democracy in Latin America should be welcomed by students of comparative politics and social democracy. Outstanding social scientists from Latin America and Europe provide informative and insightful analyses of the relationship between European and Latin American social democracy. The essays can be divided into two categories. One set of articles focuses on the analysis of the social democratic experience in Europe and its relevance for Latin America; the second set examines the experiences, possibilities, and limitations of social democracy in Latin America. Contributors to the book are Tilman Evers, Kenneth Hermele, Paul Cammack, Manuel Alcántara Sáez, Pablo González Casanova, Marcelo Cavarozzi, Alex Fernández Jilberto, Luis Gómez Calcaño, Julio Cotler, Augustin Cueva, Jaime Tamayo, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Alain Touraine.The articles by Evers, Hermele, Cammack, and Alcántara Sáez address two main topics: the social democratic experience in Germany, Sweden, England, and Spain and the nature of the relationship between the European social democratic governments and parties and their Latin American counterparts. A major theme examined in these chapters is whether economic or political motivations accounted for the increasing interest of European social democrats in Latin America. The chapters concentrating on Latin America address more general themes, as in the chapter on the Left in South America by Cavarozzi, or concentrate on country or regional studies, including those of Chile, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Central America, and Mexico.The last two chapters address questions about the challenges of social democracy in Latin America. Cardoso examines the tension between the role of the market and that of the state in the allocation of resources and the redistribution of income. In Latin America, under the present conditions of external debt and inflation, the trend has been to privatize. But while privatization in great proportion is, according to Cardoso, unacceptable, social democrats must carefully evaluate how Latin American economies can open up. The final essay, by Touraine, discusses social democracy as a political project, the various meanings of social democracy, and possible ways out of the present situation at a time when the room for positive solutions is narrow. Overall, the essays are rich in information and provide a critical outlook on the social democratic experiences in Europe and Latin America.

Party system institutionalization has been analyzed as a key variable supporting democratic consolidation and governability in Latin America. In this article the concept is applied to the case of Mexico, which completed its democratic transition following the elections of July 2000. The framework developed by Scott Mainwaring and Tim Scully in particular is assessed against evidence from the developing Mexican party system. The article addresses the question of whether the institutionalized single party regime has been supplanted by an institutionalized democratic regime. Although on some comparative measures the Mexican system does not appear to be securely institutionalized, this has much to do with the flux associated with deinstitutionalizing a hegemonic system. By examining the issues of volatility, party 'rootedness' and legitimacy, there are good grounds for believing that the Mexican system evinces substantive stability in the patterns of interaction between parties.

Under what conditions can populist leaders achieve success in different democratic systems? What opportunities do other political players have against autocratic intrigues? Are the formal institutions of the United States strong enough to resist President Trump’s violation of norms? These are the main questions of this volume, which collects various approaches to examine the impact of populism on liberal democracy. Since November 2016, one camp of scholars has interpreted Trump’s political rise and doings as a series of attempts to destroy liberal democracy, while another other camp is relatively sanguine thanks to its solid faith in the political institutions of the United States. As an important example of the former, Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2018) book How Democracies Die focuses on the ongoing erosion of democratic norms, like “mutual toleration” between political competitors and “forbearance”, as a minimum level of cooperation. They argue that if unwritten rules are violated, the system of democracy will be undermined. The authors of this volume also express their concerns about political processes, but most of them belong to the latter, more optimistic group. According to Kurt Weyland and Raúl Madrid, President Trump can do serious damage in some policy areas (such as environmental and foreign policy). But he cannot achieve major institutional transformations and undermine American democracy. Despite the great virtue of the moderate and systematic approach of the book, there is a feeling that scientists in the two camps are still speaking past each other. Weyland and Madrid’s analysis propounds a cross-national framework for studying populists in government, which emphasizes the role of the political institutions and the parties but slightly underestimates the softer aspects of politics, such as democratic norms. As experts of democratic processes and populism in various regions, the authors aim to offer comparative lessons from Europe and Latin America, where populism was able to achieve significant political success. Unlike these regions, the United States’ political and social context does not favor populist actors. In the introduction, Weyland and Madrid determine four types of obstacles that prevent further expansion of populism. First, the separation of powers is linked to the federal and presidential system of government. Sovereign institutions and almost equal power relations between the two parties in Congress make it difficult to concentrate power. The next impediment to autocratic maneuvers is the stable and cohesive two-party system, which means for Trump not only a strong opposition but a decentralized Republican party, on which he has no direct influence. The massive polarization of American politics has helped the president seize power, but at the same time, it precludes him from further strengthening. Third, prevailing political and social cleavages, the percentage of ethnic groups and classes of the electorate are not favorable to a populist shift because there is no way for Trump to build a broad coalition. Finally, the absence of a crisis does not allow Trump to appear as a savior of the nation. Based on these barriers, Weyland and Madrid predict a democratic backlash “in which the leaders of both parties agree to enact reforms designed to prevent future violations of democratic norms” (p. 33). However, not all authors share this optimistic view, some of them more explicitly warn the dangers of the American populist phenomenon. Including the introduction and conclusion, the book consists of seven chapters. The individual studies highlight different aspects of the analytical framework presented above (e.g. party systems and strategies, social cleavages). The first three chapters provide comprehensive insights on populist cases from Latin America, East-Central and Western Europe and draw illuminating assumptions concerning Trump’s presidency. In the following, the focus is on the United States and the likely impacts on the public sphere of Trump's politics. We begin the examination of the book with the political context in which populist leaders gain power. The story of a populist ascension usually starts within a state of emergency: countries of Latin America and East-Central Europe were suffering a prolonged crisis when a political leader emerged and took power. As Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser examines, after the takeover, a personalistic “strongman” implemented economic reforms and at the same time promoted broad institutional transformations, and even introduced new constitutions (Chapter 1). As the cases of Fujimori and Chávez show, effective crisis management or increasing welfare expenditures can legitimize the efforts of populist presidents to govern without constraint. Among the countries studied the Netherlands and the United States are notable exceptions. Populists got power in developed democracies in the absence of a social crisis by bringing deeply divisive issues to the forefront such as immigration, Islam, and national identity. It is important to note that their impact on the political systems is more limited than the impact of populist counterparts in weaker democracies. How could populist leaders concentrate so much power in their hands? Kevin Deegan-Krause presents East-Central European ethno-nationalistic versions of populism where the concentration of power in parliamentary systems allowed for populist leaders to hijack democratic institutions (Chapter 2). Filling public institutions with functionaries, making uneven political conditions by legislation, state capture, eliminating independent media, intimidation of critics and opponents—are only a few devices from the toolbox to dismantle democratic pluralism. Weak institutions of Latin American and East-Central European democracies were unable to resist these radical transformations. The political structure of the United States is different because the system of checks and balances disperses power among political actors. This arrangement of horizontal accountability normally precludes that the President circumvents either the legislature or the jurisdiction. Trump has serious power of appointment, and he can violate democratic norms. But his position is weaker than the position of populist leaders in European parliamentary systems. Nevertheless, as Deegan-Krause and Bonikowski argue in their chapters, Trump’s transgressive style and the unpredictable consequences of his actions can erode formal institutions. Institutional weakness cannot be understood without the assessment of political power relations. As Orbán’s supermajority illustrates, a hegemonic populist actor can shape institutions in his image, thereby making them dysfunctional. Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove show a different constellation, where the governing party is not in the dominant position (Chapter 3). The “parliamentary system of government forces the chief executive to forge a majority support coalition, which is not easy to do in Italy’s multi-party system” (p. 97) or in the Netherlands. Most European and Latin American populist leaders have risen in a fragmented party system with low legitimacy. Many can rely on a loyal, highly personalized party (e.g. Berlusconi, Mečiar, Orbán) which works as an effective machinery for obtaining political resources. In contrast, Trump came to power in a well-established two-party system with limited influence on the Republican Party. Moreover, there is an apparent cleavage inside the GOP between the old party elite, who lost its gatekeeping role, and the movement-based membership (Tea Party), who puts controversial cultural issues at the forefront. According to Kenneth Roberts, the high level of ideological and party polarization not only demoralizes, but it tends to politicize public institutions, and ultimately, it will erode the legitimacy of the system (Chapter 5). Escalating polarization and “movementization” led to radical changes in the electoral arena, because “they sorted voters into rival and increasingly hostile partisan camps, strengthening partisan identities” (p. 137). The social and ethnic structure of the United States prevents the formation of a broad social coalition for Trump. As Bart Bonikowski presents, the American president’s rhetorical style combines an exclusionary view of nationalism with anti-elite and authoritarian components which undoubtedly distorts political discourse and increases polarization (Chapter 4). This type of populism can be attractive for less-educated voters who make up a smaller part of the electorate, while in turn, the educated electorate and ethnic minorities stigmatized by Trump may also be mobilized to support Democrats. In this sharply divided political field, moralistic political views and antagonistic partisan identities reinforce social and political cleavages. According to Verbeek and Zaslove, one of the most important positive effects of populism on liberal democracy is to integrate those voices of those felt excluded. New issues and movements could reach out to disenchanted political orphans to rise above an outsider-leader who looks like “one of us”, but on the negative side, moralistic and militant rhetoric deepen further existing divisions and produce new ones. Polarization is one of the main motifs of the book that turns up chapter by chapter. As Madrid and Weyland state in the conclusion, “the high levels of political polarization in the United States pose a significant obstacle to efforts by Trump to obtain the electoral dominance that other populists have used to consolidate power and transform their countries’ political institutions” (p. 169). This antagonism in the US suitably explains why we should not be afraid of a rapid autocratic turn, but it is not reassuring when we think of the destruction of democratic norms. Formal institutions can function as fortresses (for a while), but as Roberts finds, the extent of democratic deterioration largely depends on the strategy of Republicans. Most likely the party leadership will stand by Trump, not only supporting him in legislation and appointments but also defending his anti-democratic behavior. So, is the glass of water half-full or half-empty? The answer depends on whether the emphasis is on the institutions or the action. The great value of this volume is that it presents different views and aspects of populism that the readers can compare with each other. It is highly recommended to scholars interested in the theories of populism and democracy.

Introduction The literature on party systems is composed of two related strands. Studies of emerging democracies typically ask whether the party system is institutionalized : are parties the primary legislative and electoral actors, with deep social roots and routinized patterns of interaction? Those of established democracies, on the other hand, are more concerned with whether the party system is in equilibrium : given status quo socioeconomic and political institutions, are the number of parties and ideological cleavages stable? As this volume’s editors propose, these two approaches are based on distinct conceptions about the role of parties in democracy. In a celebrated quote, Schattschneider (1942: 1) writes, “Political parties created modern democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties.” In new democracies, parties are seen as organizations whose existence – before, during, and after democratization – is crucial but fragile. Scholars of established democracies, by contrast, assume that parties are here to stay and focus instead on more granular distinctions in the character of the party system. My goal in this chapter is to integrate these two literatures through the lens of party system institutionalization in Japan. Japan has had the longest history of party politics in Asia, but its functions and salience have varied over time. Parties emerged during the autocratic Meiji period, and they played a valuable role in political liberalization. Despite being derailed by military governments during World War II, parties quickly became a focal point of legislative politics during and after the U.S. occupation. They took on many of the organizational characteristics of their prewar predecessors, and the primary partisan cleavage in Japan, interregional fiscal redistribution, retained its salience throughout. In this sense, the Japanese party system has been institutionalized for a long period of time: legislative politics – both in the autocratic and democratic periods – was the province of political parties that represented urban versus rural socioeconomic divisions in society.

This article is an overview of the types and level of institutionalization of party systems in seven young democracies in East and Southeast Asia. By applying Alan Siaroff’s typology of party systems, the analysis demonstrates that the party systems in Asia do not converge on a single format. The party systems under consideration also differ in the level of institutionalization. Party systems in Thailand, the Philippines and especially South Korea are stuck in an inchoate state. Even though there is considerable variation among the cases, the party systems in Indonesia, Mongolia and Taiwan can be considered as well institutionalized relative to the rest of Asia and moderately institutionalized when compared to Latin America. Furthermore, weak institutionalization correlates with volatile structures of party competition and cooperation in Thailand, whereas in South Korea and the Philippines party systems seem to be paradoxically stabilizing in a situation of protracted under-institutionalization, as both cases combine more or less stable party system patterns with weak institutionalization.

The present set of Research Notes, which were first presented at a forum on Latin America's market reforms held at the 2003 Latin American Studies Association Congress, investigates the economic and social repercussions of the neoliberal wave that swept across the region during the 1990s. Have market reforms brought greater economic stability and stimulated growth ? How have they affected crucial social issues, such as unemployment, poverty, and inequality? After Weyland's introductory explication of these questions, the Research Notes by Evelyne Huber and Fred Solt and by Michael Walton advance divergent assessments of neoliberalism's successes and failures. Huber and Solt argue that overall, Latin America's market reforms have yielded disappointing results in terms of economic stability and growth, social equity, and the quality of democracy. In particular, countries that enacted more radical reforms or that took especially drastic steps towards change performed less well than nations that proceeded more cautiously and gradually. By contrast, Walton argues that market reforms have increased growth while not significantly exacerbating economic instability and social inequality. And to the extent that neoliberalism fell short of expectations, the problem did not emerge from market reforms as such, but from deficiencies in the institutional context in which these reforms were enacted.

In this article, I explore the nature of party systems that have emerged in Africa in the wake of the adoption of democratic political systems after 1990. Although political parties help shape core democratic processes and institutions, parties and party systems have received relatively scant attention in the scholarly literature on democratization in Africa. I argue that party systems in most African countries are built on quite a different foundation from the one that undergirds both advanced industrial democracies and the theories about party systems generated by their experiences. I assess the strengths and limitations of the comparative literature on party system development in the light of African experiences, and argue for a more critical examination of concepts from that literature that have been widely used to assess the prospects and progress of party system institutionalization, including pluralism, system fragmentation and volatility.

Electoral democracy has shown remarkable resilience in Latin America, but the quality and depth of democracy in the region remain at risk. The real threat to democratic government in Latin America is not a reverse wave that would return the region to military rule, but rather the gradual erosion of democratic institutions. The myopic focus on elections is partly to blame for the fragility of Latin America’s democratic scaffolding. Competitive elections have masked the fact that other essential components of democracy have not taken root. Like the narrow focus on elections, the perception of Latin America as a monolithic entity has impeded a careful review of democracy in the region. The quality of democracy varies greatly across Latin America. The variation in the position of Latin American democracies along the democratic spectrum reflects the fact that the countries of the region face different challenges. The range of obstacles to democratic consolidation includes a weak rule of law, discredited political party systems, persistent inequality and poverty, social exclusion, and mounting violence and crime. To ensure that citizen dissatisfaction does not undermine the legitimacy of democratic government, policymakers must address these challenges.