Matching with Incomplete Information

Stable Matching with Incomplete Information

Route-cost-assignment with joint user and operator behavior as a many-to-one stable matching assignment game

We study a mechanism design problem under the assumption that renegotiation cannot be prevented. We investigate what kind of equilibria of which mechanisms are renegotiation-proof under a variety of renegotiation procedures, and which social choice functions can be implemented in a way that is renegotiation-proof. In complete information environments, we show that the set of ex post renegotiation-proof implementable social choice functions contains all ex post efficient allocations when there at least three agents, but only budget balanced Groves allocations when there are two agents. In incomplete information environments with correlated beliefs and at least three agents, every ex post efficient social choice function can be implemented in the presence of ex post renegotiation, but with independent private values only social choice functions that are given by budget balanced “Groves in expectations” mechanisms are implementable in such a way. We further show that the requirement of interim renegotiation-proofness does not impose additional restrictions on implementable social choice functions under complete information, but is likely to impose additional restrictions under incomplete information.

An integrated module-based reasoning and axiomatic design approach for new product design under incomplete information environment

A coordinated buyer-seller inventory model for fuzzy deteriorating items is developed under uncertain cost and demand information. The model is developed using quantity discount policy under incomplete information environment. It is observed that the solution is very close to that when one has complete information. Fuzzy set theory is used to handle the uncertainty in the input parameters. The model is analyzed using triangular membership function. The model is illustrated with a suitable numerical example.

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Exploitation vs. exploration: choosing a supplier in an environment of incomplete information

The aim of this paper is to show that strategic interaction provides a fruitful way to understand China’s decision-making behavior. States are actors in global politics and frequently have to make choices that are strategic. Credibility and uncertainty are central issues in this environment of incomplete information. This raises the question how China signals its motivations along this strategic chessboard. Strategic interaction assumes purposeful behavior from China in the African security environment. Signaling allows China to consider the problem of unknown motivations, making choices based in part, on what other actors are likely to do in the future. Knowing the choices of other African actors can help China judge what likely responses are.

Chapter 9 - Nanotechnology Risk Management: An Insurance Industry Perspective

This paper presents a systematic method for estimating the saturation point of interactive computer systems in an environment of incomplete information (in particular, where per interaction information is unavailable). This method is an improvement over the ad hoc, highly subjective, and time-consuming iterative approach commonly used. Following an operational analysis approach and using only commonly available data, a simple model was constructed to estimate the mean response time of a task characterized by its ci’u and I/O requests running in a given level of system load. The system work load is characterized by the CPU, disk, drum, and channel load factors. The system is periodically measured (or the system log examined) to obtain the parameter values needed to estimate the mean response time ofthe task as well as the corresponding work load level. With sufficient samples, a mean response time vs. system load curve can be plotted. The system saturation load is taken to be that corresponding to ...

There are no specific recommendations for the design and reporting of studies of children with fever and neutropenia (FN). As a result, there is marked heterogeneity in the variables and outcomes that are reported and new definitions continue to emerge. These inconsistencies hinder the ability of researchers and clinicians to compare, contrast and combine results. The objective was to achieve expert consensus on a core set of variables and outcomes that should be measured and reported, as a minimum, in pediatric FN studies. The Delphi method was used to achieve consensus among an international group of clinicians, pharmacists, researchers, and patient representatives. Four surveys focusing on (i) the identification of a core set of variables and outcomes; and (ii) definitions of these variables and outcomes, were administered electronically. Consensus was predefined as more than 80% agreement on any statement. There were forty-five survey participants and the response rate ranged between 84 and 96%. There was consensus on eight core variables and 10 core outcomes that should be collected and reported in all studies of children with FN. Consensus definitions were identified for all of the core outcomes. Using the Delphi method, expert consensus on a set of core variables and outcomes, and their corresponding definitions, was achieved. These core sets represent the minimum that should be collected and reported in all studies of children with FN. This will promote collaboration and ensure consistency and comparability between studies.

In this paper, an incomplete Multi-Granulation Rough Set (incomplete MGRS) is presented to recognize the intention of the air target. First, the model of the air target intention recognition based on the incomplete MGRS has be constructed, the dynamic change rate of the air target state has been added into the condition attribution of the decision to enhance the air target intention recognition capability under incomplete information and dynamic environment. And then some measures and a attribute reduction algorithm based on the importance of the decision attribute are presented. Finally, the simulation results showing that the decision algorithm based on the incomplete MGRS can recognize the intention of air target effectively under complex and uncertain combat environment.

A fuzzy set approach to the problem of sustainability

In this paper, we consider the following distributed bipartite matching problems: Let G=(L, R; E) be a bipartite graph in which boys are part L (left nodes), and girls are part R (right nodes.) There is an edge (li, rj) ∈ E iff boy li is interested in girl rj. Every boy li will propose to a girl rj among all those he is interested in, i.e., his adjacent right nodes in the bipartite graph G. If several boys propose to the same girl, only one of them will be accepted by the girl. We assume that none of the boys communicate with others. This matching problem is typical of distributed computing under incomplete information: Each boy only knows his own preference but none of the others. We first study the one-round matching problem: each boy proposes to at most one girl, so that the total number of girls receiving a proposal is maximized. If the maximum matching is M, then no deterministic algorithm can produce a matching of size not bounded by a constant, but a randomized algorithm achieves √M—and this is shown optimal by an adversary argument. If we allow many rounds in matching, with the senders learning from their failures, then the ratio is unbounded when the number of rounds is smaller than Δ, and becomes bounded (two) at the Δ-th round. In contrast, an extension of the one-round randomized algorithm establishes that there is no such discontinuity in the randomized case. This randomized result is also matched by an upper bound of asymptotically the same order.

Why do firms sometimes choose to undertake their R&D by financing start‐up companies, while other times they do it in their internal labs? We present a model where the choice of R&D is driven by information asymmetries on the quality of the project between the corporate venture capitalist and the idea owner. In an incomplete information environment, higher‐quality projects are more likely to be developed by start‐up firms, while low‐quality ones are exploited internally. Also, two types of risk are examined, intrinsic quality risk and external shock risk. Riskier project quality and more difficult project monitoring make a project more likely to be developed as a new venture. Finally, the model is able to show why corporate lab scientists get most of their compensation as a fixed salary, while idea owner entrepreneurs working for start‐up companies have a profit‐sharing agreement.