Mental models theory and relevance theory in quantificational reasoning

This chapter gives an overview of our ongoing experimental research in the MeMoSpace project, concerning the cognitive processes underlying human spatial reasoning. Our theoretical background is mental model theory, which conceives reasoning as a process in which mental models of the given information are constructed and inspected to solve a reasoning task. We first report some findings of our previous work and then two new experiments on spatial relational inference, which were conducted to investigate well-known effects from relational and syllogistic reasoning. (1) Continuity effect: n-term-series problems with continuous (W r1 X, X r2 Y, Y r3 Z) and semi-continuous (X r2 Y, Y r3 Z, W r1 X) premise order are easier than tasks with discontinuous order (Y r3 Z, W r1 X, X r2 Y). (2) Figural the order of terms in the premises (X r Y, Y r Z or Y r X, Z r Y) effects the order of terms in the conclusion (X r Z or Z r X). In the first experiment subjects made more errors and took more time to process the premises when in discontinuous order. In the second experiment subjects showed the general preference for the term order Z r X in the generated conclusions, modulated by a figural bias: subjects used X r Z more often if the premise term order was X r Y, Y r Z, whereas Z r X was used most often for the premise term order Y r X, Z r Y. Results are discussed in the framework of mental model theory with special reference to computational models of spatial reasoning.

Age differences in syllogistic reasoning in relation to crystallized and fluid ability were studied in 278 adults from 19 to 96 years of age. Two reasoning tasks, the evaluation and the construction of conclusions for syllogisms of varying complexity and believability, a vocabulary test, and 3 tasks of working memory were administered. The magnitude of age-related variance on selected reasoning tasks was only partially reduced by statistically controlling measures of both working memory and vocabulary. Additional age-related effects on reasoning were found to be significantly associated with number of mental models and bias produced by conflict between belief and logic. A significant bias was also found toward acceptance of invalid syllogisms as valid, even when contents were abstract. These sources of error in logic are discussed in relation to Johnson-Laird's (1983) theory of mental models and Evan's (1989) account of bias in human reasoning.

Mental model theory as a model for analysing visual and multimodal discourse

This chapter discusses how a substantial number of studies have shown that working memory capacity (WMC) is the best single predictor identified so far of reasoning ability as measured by intelligence tests. This finding is an important step toward understanding psychometric intelligence in terms of theories from cognitive psychology. The factor-analytic approach to individual differences provides a tool to identify associations and dissociations between indicators of cognitive functions. The approach is to model the correlational structure of a large set of indicators by theoretically specified structural equation models. WMC is found to be related to measures of processing speed. One explanation is that many working memory tasks are complex span tasks that involve a processing component, and the speed of performing this component is one source of variance in complex span tasks. Currently the most successful theory of deductive reasoning is the theory of mental models.

When solving a simple probabilistic problem, people tend to build an incomplete mental representation. We observe this pattern in responses to probabilistic problems over a set of premises using the conjunction, disjunction, and conditional propositional connectives. The mental model theory of extensional reasoning explains this bias towards underestimating the number of possibilities: In reckoning with different interpretations of the premises (logical rules, mental model theoretical, and, specific to conditional premises, conjunction and biconditional interpretation) the mental model theory accounts for the majority of observations. Different interpretations of a premise result in a build-up of mental models that are often incomplete. These mental models are processed using either an extensional strategy relying on proportions amongst models, or a conflict monitoring strategy. The consequence of considering too few possibilities is an erroneous probability estimate akin to that faced by decision makers who fail to generate and consider all alternatives, a characteristic of bounded rationality. We compare our results to the results published by Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, and Caverni [Johnson-Laird, P., Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V., Legrenzi, M., & Caverni, J. (1999). Naive probability: A mental model theory of extensional reasoning. Psychological Review, 106, 62-88. doi: 10. 1037/0033-295X.106.1.62], and we observe lower performance levels than those in the original article.

This study is situated within the scope of critical analysis. It examines Moroccan citizens’ cognitive reception of political discourse through a linguistic and socio-cognitive perspective. Focusing on three major political parties representing the country’s principal ideological poles—the CU, PJD, and SUPF—the research investigates how citizens interpret political messages and the cognitive mechanisms underlying their perceptions. Guided by Van Dijk’s (2008) mental model theory, the study explores how participants construct understanding based on personal experiences, cultural knowledge, and socially shared representations. The Data collected via a cognitively structured questionnaire reveal that participants frequently rely on pre-existing mental models shaped by negative episodic memories, social images, and culturally ingrained perceptions. These cognitive patterns result in a persistent misalignment between politicians’ intended discourse and the public’s interpretations. The findings also indicate that participants judge political discourse more by the parties’ perceived social roles than by their actual ideologies, which contributes to fixed perceptions and widespread political disengagement among the Moroccan public. Accordingly, the study highlights the importance of political literacy as a mechanism to align citizens’ mental models with parties’ cognitive frameworks, thereby fostering a more coherent social understanding of Moroccan political messaging.

Summary form only given. The importance of mental models in complex control tasks is discussed, and the lattice theory of mental models is described. Plans for a series of experiments using a simulation developed with the Lab View programming language to validate the lattice theory of mental models are reported. >

With the swift entry of artificial intelligence (AI) into everyday life, human-product interactions are becoming increasingly complex. We suggest an ecosystem-minded, humanity-centered design approach to better understand this complexity. Simultaneously with the development of interaction types, discussions and developments on theories of mental models are crucial to understanding and improving the nature of these interactions. In this paper, we address the gap in mental model theories and extend Norman's conceptual model at three dialogue levels: dialogue in language, mind, and use.

Our knowledge of Thales of Miletus is fragmentary. We only have very short passages attributed to him by ancient sources, and those passages are not always clearly consistent with each other. In this paper, I analyze some of the most representative ancient fragments with theses assigned to Thales of Miletus by means of a methodology based on the general framework of the unified theory of mental models. My intention in doing that is to try to clarify what he truly thought about water, the soul, and gods, and my conclusions refer to the fact that it is very possible that Thales’ philosophy was much closer to myth than sometimes assumed.

Towards explaining the cognitive efficacy of Euler diagrams in syllogistic reasoning: A relational perspective

According to the mental models theory, humans reason by constructing, inspecting, and validating mental models of the state of affairs described in the premises. We present a formal framework describing all three phases and testing new predictions about the construction principle humans normally use and about the deduction process itself - the model variation phase. Finally, empirical findings in support of these principles are reported.

How can mental models theory account for content effects in conditional reasoning? A developmental perspective

Quantified modal inferences interest logicians, linguists, and computer scientists, but no previous psychological study of them appears to be in the literature. Here is an example of one: All those artists are businessmen. Paulo is possibly one of the artists. What follows? People tend to conclude: Paulo is possibly a businessman (Experiment 1). It seems plausible, and it follows from an intuitive mental model in which Paulo is one of a set of artists who are businessmen. Further deliberation can yield a model of an alternative possibility in which Paulo is not one of the artists, which confirms that the conclusion is only a possibility. The snag is that standard modal logics, which deal with possibilities, cannot yield a particular conclusion to any premises: Infinitely many follow validly (from any premises) but they do not include the present conclusion. Yet, further experiments corroborated a new mental model theory's predictions for various inferences (Experiment 2), for the occurrence of factual conclusions drawn from premises about possibilities (Experiment 3) and for inferences from premises of modal syllogisms (Experiment 4). The theory is therefore plausible, but we explore the feasibility of a cognitive theory based on modifications to modal logic.

The theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM; G. Gigerenzer, U. Hoffrage, & H. Kleinbölting, 1991) has had a major influence on the field of judgment and decision making, with the most recent important modifications to PMM theory being the identification of several fast and frugal heuristics (G. Gigerenzer & D. G. Goldstein, 1996). These heuristics were purported to provide psychologically plausible cognitive process models that describe a variety of judgment behavior. In this article, the authors evaluate the psychological plausibility of the assumptions upon which PMM were built and, consequently, the psychological plausibility of several of the fast and frugal heuristics. The authors argue that many of PMM theory's assumptions are questionable, given available data, and that fast and frugal heuristics are, in fact, psychologically implausible.

Rudolf Carnap proposed three reduction rules to improve scientific language. Those rules indicate when it is correct to add a property in situations in which other properties are already had. Assuming the theory of mental models, it has been shown that the rules are not hard to use from the cognitive point of view. The key to argue that is to accept that the human mind works as dual-process theories claim. According to these theories, people can use two different systems. One of them implies effort but the other one does not. Thus, the idea is that Carnap’s reduction rules can be applied resorting just to the system not implying cognitive effort. This paper goes one step further and poses that even from a Popperian perspective the reduction rules keep not being difficult. One might think that falsifiability requires cognitive effort because it needs to address situations in which the sentences are false. However, this paper tries to explain that, following the theory of mental models, that is not hard if the sentences are conditionals, and the sentences in the reduction rules have conditional structures.