Military intervention and humanitarian action: trends and issues.

A Arquitetura de Paz e Segurança Africana (APSA) foi instituída pela União Africana (UA) em 2002 para manter as regras, normas, objetivos e princípios da UA sobre paz, segurança e estabilidade na África. A APSA também foi estabelecida para assegurar que o comportamento dos Estados membros da UA se moldasse a esses princípios e normas. A APSA deveria ser a estrutura operacional para a implementação efetiva de decisões tomadas sobre prevenção de conflitos, operações de paz, operações de apoio à paz, construção da paz e reconstrução pós-conflito. Seu mandato refletia a mudança para a segurança humana, que é amplamente aceita no nível continental. A APSA lidou com questões relacionadas ao desenvolvimento humano; promoção de práticas democráticas, boa governança e respeito aos direitos humanos, ação humanitária e gestão de desastres naturais. No quadro da teoria Neoinstitucionalista da integração, e com o uso de dados secundários, a hipótese deste trabalho é de que a APSA, como resultado de não aplicar de forma uniforme as suas regras para todos os Estados membros, vem tendo dificuldades na atuação em promoção da paz e segurança na África. O artigo, portanto, avalia o desempenho da APSA desde o seu início e apresenta uma visão geral dos principais componentes da APSA, seu arcabouço legal, bem como seus sucessos, perspectivas e desafios. O principal objetivo do artigo é verificar se a APSA fez alguma diferença na área de paz, segurança e estabilidade na África desde a sua criação. O trabalho constatou que, apesar dos grandes avanços feitos pela APSA em cumprir seu mandato para promover a paz, segurança e estabilidade na África, sua incapacidade de aplicar as regras, princípios, valores e normas da UA de maneira uniforme, para assim moldar o comportamento dos Estados membros, vem resultando em prejuízos para sua atuação. Para que a APSA lide eficazmente com os conflitos na África, recomenda-se que a UA desenvolva e mantenha um grande interesse nos recursos técnicos, humanos e financeiros da APSA para permitir que funcione da melhor forma possível. A União Africana é encorajada a permitir que as regras funcionem e que sejam aplicadas uniformemente aos estados membros. A UA deve também continuar a construir e reforçar as suas parcerias com organizações internacionais preocupadas com a paz e a estabilidade em África.

Western armed forces have increasingly adopted “force protection” measures to avoid casualties during irregular warfare and peace-support operations. When similar protection measures were introduced in the humanitarian sector to safeguard aid workers, humanitarian action researchers criticised the broader implications of these security measures. Using their findings, it is possible to reflect critically on force protection in a military context. First, force protection may shift risks to vulnerable others, such as less-protected allies, or the local population. Second, force protection may directly upset power relations within the mission’s specific context. Third, force protection results in a deterioration of security intelligence. Fourth, force protection inhibits the development of empathy for allies, local populations, and victims. Fifth, force protection harms soldiers’ morale by exacerbating boredom. This paper concludes that armed forces would do well to assess the various adverse effects of force protection measures.

Reviewed by: Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa Terrence Lyons Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa. By John Prendergast. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1996. 164 pp. $12.95 paper. This volume by John Prendergast is part of a growing literature by activists in the humanitarian community who have been conducting a process of critical self-examination. Prendergast and others, including Larry Minear and Thomas Weiss, Ken Menkhaus, Alex de Waal, Mark Duffield, and the interagency review of the humanitarian response to the genocide in Rwanda have raised a series of important and difficult issues. Each is struggling with the set of issues presented by Prendergast in this volume as to how emergency aid can exacerbate conflict and how to both minimize these unintended consequences of humanitarianism and to use assistance to contribute to peace building. [End Page 234] These questions have come to prominence in the literature on humanitarianism as a result of the role famine assistance played in sustaining both the military government and insurgent forces in Ethiopia in the 1980s, the factional leaders in Somalia in the early 1990s, and most tragically the 1994 genocide and continuing conflict in Rwanda and its neighbors. These horrors have forced the humanitarian community to question the simple principle that a hungry child knows no politics. Instead, the relief community has come to recognize that it cannot ignore politics and that, in many cases, emergency assistance is the principal source of resources that may be used to either reinforce peace or strengthen the forces of destruction. Apolitical humanitarianism is impossible in the context of complex emergencies and state collapse, as the disasters in Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan in Africa along with Afghanistan, Bosnia, and other cases around the world have made clear. Prendergast focuses his attention on a region he knows extraordinarily well, the so-called “Greater Horn of Africa” that includes not only Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia but also Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire). One of the most important contributions of this book is the insights Prendergast makes on the basis of his long involvement in the region. Much of the data for this study comes from personal observations and interviews with humanitarian officials in the field rather than at headquarters. Despite a subtitle that suggests a continental focus, Prendergast barely mentions other cases where similar dynamics took place, most notably Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, and Angola. Prendergast justifies this focus by correctly pointing out that the Greater Horn has been a “laboratory for innovative crisis response,” although humanitarian agencies in Liberia also demonstrated a broad understanding of their relationships with political and military actors on the ground. The book is organized around a series of basic aphorisms, including the Seven Deadly Sins of humanitarianism in complex emergencies and the Ten Commandments for providing aid without sustaining conflict. Each seems thoroughly sensible, particularly when supported by Prendergast’s carefully selected examples from the field. What is lacking, however, is a set of specific judgments or criteria to guide decision makers within [End Page 235] humanitarian organizations and the donor community. The distinctiveness of each case and the author’s deep appreciation for context perhaps makes such generalizations difficult. In the end, Prendergast calls for a greater awareness of the political context humanitarian organizations work within when responding to complex emergencies and to experiment, consult widely and openly, and constantly evaluate one’s actions. The author’s most specific recommendations relate to the need to use humanitarian assistance to support local community structures and initiatives. Prendergast concludes by noting the centrality of humanitarian actors in complex emergencies: In most complex political emergencies, humanitarian aid is the most important avenue of contact among the international community, the conflicting parties, and civilians in the war zone. Ignoring the wider impacts and potential of humanitarian aid removes one of the most important policy instruments for preventing the escalation of conflict and promoting long-term peace building. Prendergast’s insights from the Horn of Africa should help humanitarian actors become more conscious of their roles and better able to use emergency relief to promote conflict management. Terrence Lyons Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program The...

In his 2012 report on the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, ᴜɴ Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon observed that: ‘As paragraph 139 of the World Summit Outcome highlighted, humanitarian action plays a critical role in protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. He continued, ‘Humanitarian agencies can help to protect populations and shield them from some of the worst effects of displacement. As such, humanitarian action is a critically important part of any “timely and decisive” response’. The contribution of humanitarian action to the protection of populations from genocide and other atrocity crimes was not, however, without its challenges and problems. The Secretary-General insisted that ‘humanitarian action must never be used as a substitute for political action’ and implored that ‘it must also be understood that humanitarian action depends upon humanitarian space. To defend humanitarian space, the United Nations and the international community must respect the humanitarian principles of neutrality, independence, humanity and impartiality’. This Special Issue of Global Responsibility to Protect takes these observations as its starting point – that humanitarian action contributes to the protection of populations from genocide and mass atrocities but that the nature of this relationship is complex and fraught with practical, ethical and strategic problems and challenges...

Maintaining peace in the Western Balkans and Kosovo has become a high aim for international organisations. Challenges in Kosovo such as the conflict in the 1990’s and afterwards, as well as the lack of politicalunity and institutions capable of both civilian and military intervention have led to long-term involvement of the EU. It should be noted that the engagement of the EU was also caused by ethnic nationalism, socio–economic problems and interethnic tensions, mainly between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, as well as unresolved issues in bilateral relations.This paper analyses the role of the EU in maintaining peace through its civilian mission and enlargement policy. The ongoing EULEX civilian mission was aimed at establishing a multi-ethnic justice system and police force, as well as introducing and promoting the rule of law, public orderand security. The enlargement policy is seen as an important process of interethnic and inter-state reconciliation.

Recent qualitative studies of the relationship between public opinion and U.S. foreign policy put decisions into the following two categories: the President tends to lead or to follow public opinion; public opinion influences decision-making, constrains the decision, or has no impact. These studies typically research the initial decision to intervene, but fail to examine the subsequent decisions to sustain and win a war: financial and human means, conduct, objectives, duration, and communication. I argue that these elements of a winning strategy are impacted by concerns with public support at home. The impact of public opinion on the decision whether to use force is better understood when analyzing the compromise between the perception of anticipated public opinion and the necessities of a military campaign. Public opinion impacts the strategy, the timing, and length of an intervention, and inversely, those elements impact the anticipated public opinion and ultimately the decision to use force or choose a different course of action. The president can expect to influence public opinion and raise the acceptability of an intervention through various means: he can assess the possibility to alleviate the potential damage of a war by relying on the legitimacy of a UN mandate, using airstrikes to prevent casualties, or framing the debate to emphasize the link of the intervention with national security for example. Only if these options are not expected to be sufficient, will they consider comprising their desired goals for a more popular policy and strategy. As a consequence, there is a back-and-forth process between anticipated public support for a given intervention and the consideration of the use of force: the strategy envisioned for a potential intervention affects the anticipated support, which in turn affects the preferred strategy and in the end the final decision to intervene. Contrary to the current literature, which tends to conclude that the president enjoys a substantial margin for maneuver, an analysis of post Cold War cases of interventions, limited interventions, and military escalations shows that anticipated public opinion limited the president's margin for maneuver and influenced not only the decision to intervene but also the military strategy and in the end, the result of the intervention. These findings contradict the realist paradigm for which only the structure of the international system matters and domestic politics are irrelevant in the study of international relations. This research is primarily based on extensive interviews with high-ranking staffers from the National Security Council (NSC), the State Department, and the Department of Defense involved in the decision-making process as well as the White House pollster and high-ranking officials on the ground. These interviews are completed with open sources. Decisions are also scrutinized in light of their political context. Indicators include the President's approval ratings and their current trend, the electoral cycle, the support of Congress and the elite opinion, polls on the issue and the salience of the conflict at the time.

The Muslim World League is an organization of a religious and cultural character and one of the most active international organizations in the Islamic world, and does not interfere in the political affairs in which it is active. Since its establishment in 1962, this organization has established many institutions and branches, and has opened dozens of offices in all continents as it also carried out thousands of religious, cultural, relief and humanitarian activities in many countries of the world. Due to the organization's large number of activities, it is considered as the university of the peoples of the Islamic world and the pioneer in religious and cultural work in the Islamic world, and it has become confused with the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which is a political organization that brings together the governments of the countries of the Islamic world under its flag. This introductory page attempts to define the organization, its history, objectives, branches, and specializations of each branch, and to introduce the historical transformations that the work of this international organization has witnessed.

The report addresses the micro-level as a key dimension of post-conflict peacebuilding interventions, with a particular focus on the relationships and interactions of international and local actors. What changes do occur with regard to their perceptions, expectations, attitudes and activities in the course of interactions? Can we identify experiences and mechanisms that lead to a re-articulation of relationships and interactions and, consequently, a recalibration of the overall peacebuilding exercise, e.g. with regard to more (or less) cooperation, more (or less) mutual trust, more (or less) animosities and misunderstandings, and more (or less) legitimacy? These questions are addressed through an in-depth case study, at the core of which are narrative, problem-centred interviews with international and local actors who were and/or are engaged in the peacebuilding process on Bougainville. Bougainville is regarded as a kind of ‘laboratory’ in which international/local relations and interactions are rather direct, because national institutions play a relatively small role, and external actors are present upon invitation not only by national, but also local actors. The exploration of the Bougainville case is complemented by a plausibility probe in a case with contrasting conditions, Sierra Leone.

This study aimed at providing a broader understanding of the impact of war, governance and leadership on social economic development of South Sudan with particular reference to Jonglei County. The objectives of the study were to assess the relationship between war and socio-economic development of Jonglei State , examine the relationship between governance and socio-economic development in Jonglei State, leadership and socio-economic development of Jonglei State and to study the factor structure of war, governance and leadership on social economic development in Jonglei State. The study employed a survey and content analysis and descriptive design while using qualitative and quantitative approaches. The study population was 348, selected using purposive and simple random sampling technique. The sample size determination was made using Krejcie and Morgan Table (1970) formula. The sample size was 213. The data analysis was made using Statistical package for social scientists (SPSS 18). The major findings of the study were that there was a positive relationship between; war and social-economic development (r = 0.856, P-value < 0.01), Education and Social-economic development (r = 0.826, P-value < 0.01), leadership traits and social-economic development (r = 0.816, P-value < 0.01) and lastly variables explained (R= 0.644) a combination of war, governance and leadership traits in assessing the level to which they can predict the level of social-economic development in the State like Jonglei in South Sudan, such that a unit change in a possibility of a war governance and leadership traits will contribute to a change in the possibility of social-economic development of any state like Jonglei and South Sudan as a whole. The study recommends that there should be peace building measures that directly focus on how to combat armed conflict especially the fighters, a proper recommendable approach would be fostering Amnesty programs for fighters to ensure peace building, should try to embrace a democratic governance, the government should try to provide security, justice, economic, and social functions and to channeling the will, energies, and resources of both the indigenous population and the international community and should endeavor to support peace building through encouraging institutional participation in peace building and democratic process of their countries.

This article explores the international dynamics of the Gaza war, focusing on how global powers align, intervene, and utilize international aid as a strategic instrument. It examines the positions of key countries that support either Israel or Palestine, analyzing their actions through the lens of Realism, with supplementary insights from Anarchism. The study argues that while states publicly justify their involvement through humanitarian or legal principles, their actions are largely influenced by geopolitical interests, historical narratives, domestic pressures, and strategic alliances. Countries such as the United States, and the United Kingdom provide military and diplomatic backing to Israel to maintain regional dominance and economic leverage. The research further discusses how international organizations, including the UN and ICC, play both active and symbolic roles in shaping the discourse, often constrained by great power politics. By mapping the political gains pursued through aid, diplomacy, and international alignments, the thesis provides a comprehensive understanding of how the Gaza conflict has become a global arena of competing interests, identity-driven agendas, and contested norms of international order. Through a Realist lens (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979), this article analyzes the Gaza War (2023–present) as a global power contest where states prioritize strategic interests over humanitarian or legal principles. Evidence—including U.S. military aid ($3.8B/year + Elbit contracts; International institutions (UN, ICC) are neutered by vetoes or selective enforcement, while neutral states (e.g., India) prioritize arms deals over ethics. The article concludes that coercive measures (arms embargoes, grassroots governance) must raise occupation costs to force compromise.

The article examines the conflict between the Republic of Panama and the United States of America in the context of the global confrontation between the United States and China that has intensified since the coming to power of D.Trump in January 2025. The main factor in the escalation of the situation was the growth of tension between the two countries around the Panama Canal, which is of strategic importance to the United States. Trump’s campaign of harsh pressure on Panama, in addition to seeking to strengthen the U.S. strategic position in the Panama Canal zone, increase its control over global trade flows and generate additional revenue, reflects long-standing concerns about China’s growing influence in Central America and the Caribbean. Deterring China is part of Trump’s broader strategy to increase political, economic and military presence in the region, which is seen as an area of special interests of the United States. The article presents an analysis of the Trump administration’s policy towards the Panama Canal and of its economic importance for the United States. It also examines China’s role in the development of the canal and assesses the real presence of Chinese (Hong Kong) companies in its management. The reaction of Panama’s authorities to the demands to reduce dependence on China as well as the consequences of the measures taken for China are shown. The problems and prospects of the development of the transport artery connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are analyzed. The unprecedented pressure on Panama, which included threats of military intervention, resulted in a renegotiation of the terms of cooperation with the Chinese companies, the sale of shares in the port infrastructure of the Panama Canal to a consortium of investors led by an American fund, the cooling of Sino–Panamanian relations and Panama’s withdrawal from the Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative”. It is concluded that in the near future, such pressure tactics will determine Washington’s political, trade, and economic relations with countries geographically located in the immediate environment of the United States, where its influence and economic leverage are significant.

: In the Post-Cold War era, the US military has frequently conducted peace operations. Such operations have practically become the norm, particularly in failed states. Most failed states are typically unable to provide basic social, economic, legal, and political services and safeguards to their citizens. Consequently, when the US military enters a failed state as a peace operations force, the conditions supporting peace more often than not are fragile or even non-existent. This study examines an appropriate peace operations model for a failed state where the likelihood for continued conflict and violence persist. This paper describes failed states, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace maintenance and peace building. The examples of two historical states (Somalia and East Timor) indicate the utility and feasibility of this model. This study examines the reasons for military intervention and also why it's essential for the US military to have the right force employed. This study examines why the appropriate model to employ in a failed state should be peace enforcement, peace maintenance and peace building.

Surveys conducted in 1979-80 revealed that courses incorporating major arboricultural content and curricula emphasizing arboricultural subjects were offered at 27 North American universities. Nineteen courses and 1 2 curricula were provided at the undergraduate level and 4 courses and 2 curricula were available to graduate students. Several new courses are planned for both levels. Current and proposed university arboricultural opportunities should meet the educational and continuing training needs of the North American shade-tree industry. University research and development activities, however, should be strengthened to support arboricultural science programs, especially at the graduate level.

Problem setting. Ensuring constant access to humanitarian aid during military conflicts and complex emergencies has always been an important issue for politicians. Its solution is to guarantee the protection of civilians in times of danger and political instability. The practice of humanitarian negotiations led to the emergence of the concept of humanitarian diplomacy in the early 2000s. It was to persuade community leaders and high-ranking decision-makers to act in the interests of vulnerable populations in accordance with humanitarian principles. Humanitarian diplomacy is carried out by humanitarian actors and includes the organization of a safe presence of humanitarian organizations, access to negotiations with the civilian population, monitoring assistance programs, and respect for international law. The development of humanitarian aspects of diplomacy is linked to the protection of the most vulnerable groups – ethnic and religious minorities, women, children, refugees, victims of armed conflict, terrorism and environmental disasters. An important task facing scholars is to study the nature of diplomacy, the history of its development, as well as modern models and tools. Scholars draw attention to the need to return in international relations to the philosophy of morality and values. In our opinion, it is expedient to define the concept of humanitarian diplomacy, to show the formation and development of humanitarian diplomacy and the institute of humanitarian law, to consider the problems of humanitarian activity in the modern world. Analysis of recent researches and publications. K. Schmitt, H. Arendt, M. Foucault, D. Agamben, D. Butler, ES Gromoglasova, TV Zonova, OF Rusakova studied the strategic dimension of humanitarian diplomacy and humanitarian law in their works. In addition, the famous works of domestic scientists such as VF Antipenko, M. Gnatovsky, V. Gutnik, T. Korotky, A. Talalaev, O. Tiunov, I. Lukashuk, J. Zhukorska and others. Target of research is to define the concept of “humanitarian diplomacy”, analyze the historical development of the concept of humanitarian law and diplomacy, describe the current problems of functioning. Article’s main body. The article examines the prerequisites and features of the formation of humanitarian diplomacy and humanitarian law. The authors try to give a modern definition of “humanitarian diplomacy, analyze the historical development of the concept of international humanitarian law and diplomacy.” The role of international organizations in the implementation of humanitarian aid to vulnerable groups during armed conflicts is highlighted, the current problems of humanitarian diplomacy are described. Conclusions and prospects for the development. Given the above, the authors can conclude that the ways of formation and development of humanitarian diplomacy were quite difficult. Only in the middle of the XIX century were the norms and principles on the basis of which vulnerable groups are protected; the first international legal acts of humanitarian law were adopted; international organizations have sprung up to provide humanitarian assistance to all those in need. In modern conditions, in our opinion, humanitarian diplomacy is becoming a key element in providing assistance to all vulnerable groups, which is provided by many actors, such as states, international organizations, ordinary people and their initiatives.

One of the four core humanitarian principles, impartiality's substantive ethical and deeply operational nature directs aid agencies to seek and deliver aid on the basis of non-discrimination and in proportion to the needs of crisis-affected people. Designed to operationalize the principle of humanity, impartiality is challenged by a plethora of external factors, such as the instrumentalization of aid, bureaucratic restriction, obstruction by States or non-State armed groups, and insecurity. Less visible and less examined are factors internal to aid agencies or the sector as a whole. Based on a desk review of the literature and the authors’ experience working with Médecins Sans Frontières, this article explores shortcomings in how the humanitarian sector understands and operationalizes impartiality, placing the focus on these internal factors.Beginning with the definition of impartiality, the article focuses on inadequacies in the practice of impartiality's twin pillars: non-discrimination and proportionality in the delivery of aid. Key conclusions include the necessity of an active rather than passive approach to non-discrimination, and the need for greater commitment to proportionality. In extending this analysis, the article looks more deeply at how aid organizations approach the humanitarian principles, identifying shortcomings in the way that the sector operationalizes, engages with and evaluates those principles. Given the sector's limited inclusion of or accountability towards people in crisis, its exercise of impartiality seems particularly problematic in relation to its power to decide the who and what of aid delivery, and to define the needs which it will consider humanitarian.The objective of this article is to reset humanitarians’ conceptual and operational understanding of impartiality in order to better reflect and protect humanity in humanitarian praxis, and to help humanitarians navigate the emergent challenges and critical discussions on humanitarian action's position in respect to climate change, triple-nexus programming, or simply a future where staggering levels of urgent needs vastly outstrip humanitarian resources.