- Front Matter
6
- 10.1289/ehp.112-a788
Editorial: Embracing Scrutiny
- Oct 01, 2004
- Environmental Health Perspectives
- Thomas J Goehl
Editorial: Embracing Scrutiny
Abstract We study the optimal disclosure policy in a sender–receiver communication game where the receiver's morale, defined as his expected state of the world, affects his performance. The sender observes the state and chooses whether to disclose it to the receiver, who then decides whether to participate in a task. The receiver wins if his performance in the task meets a target. No disclosure is optimal if the receiver wins with average morale in each state. Otherwise, in the threshold disclosure equilibrium that Pareto‐dominates full disclosure, the receiver quits as the sender discloses the worst states and wins as the sender withholds the rest. The receiver wins in more states in the Pareto‐optimal equilibrium as the sender chooses a non‐monotonic disclosure policy. Our theory reveals a trade‐off between transparency and efficiency when morale affects performance. It has applications in a broad range of areas including military, family, education and business.
Editorial: Embracing Scrutiny
Editorial: Embracing Scrutiny
Strategic Information Disclosure and Encroachment in a Co‐Opetitive Supply Chain: Bayesian Persuasion Perspective
We investigate the optimal information disclosure policy in an environment where an online platform, possessing private market demand information, interacts with an original brand manufacturer (OBM) and a contract manufacturer (CM) with asymmetric brand power. The OBM enjoys a brand advantage, while the CM may encroach on the market if the profitability justifies the encroachment cost. The platform, leveraging data advantages, influences the manufacturers' decisions through strategically designed disclosure policies. The optimal disclosure policy depends on the CM's encroachment cost and the OBM's brand advantage. First, full disclosure is optimal when the encroachment cost is sufficiently high or low. Second, partial disclosure is optimal for distorting the posterior expectation about market demand downward when encroachment costs are moderately high, or upward when they are moderately low. Third, partial disclosure can induce encroachment if the brand advantage is small or deter it if the brand advantage is large. The platform profits from the optimal policy, which may come at the expense of the OBM and CM. We demonstrate that the optimal policy can enhance profits for the entire supply chain under intense competition and a large brand advantage. This study provides a critical framework and practical insights for understanding strategic decisions and channel management.
Read moreSustaining Implicit Contracts when Agents have Career Concerns: The Role of Information Disclosure
Sustaining Implicit Contracts when Agents have Career Concerns: The Role of Information Disclosure
Efficiency of Vulnerability Disclosure Mechanisms to Disseminate Vulnerability Knowledge
Security vulnerabilities in software are one of the primary reasons for security breaches, and an important challenge from knowledge management perspective is to determine how to manage the disclosure of knowledge about those vulnerabilities. The security community has proposed several disclosure mechanisms, such as full vendor, immediate public, and hybrid, and has debated about the merits and demerits of these alternatives. In this paper, we study how vulnerabilities should be disclosed to minimize the social loss. We find that the characteristics of the vulnerability (vulnerability risk before and after disclosure), cost structure of the software user population, and vendor's incentives to develop a patch determine the optimal (responsible) vulnerability disclosure. We show that, unlike some existing vulnerability disclosure mechanisms that fail to motivate the vendor to release its patch, responsible vulnerability disclosure policy always ensures the release of a patch. However, we find that this is not because of the threat of public disclosure, as argued by some security practitioners. In fact, not restricting the vendor with a time constraint can ensure the patch release. This result runs counter to the argument of some that setting a grace period always pushes the vendor to develop a patch. When the vulnerability affects multiple vendors, we show that the responsible disclosure policy cannot ensure that every vendor will release a patch. However, when the optimal policy does elicit a patch from each vendor, we show that the coordinator's grace period in the multiple vendor case falls between the grace periods that it would set individually for the vendors in the single vendor case. This implies that the coordinator does not necessarily increase the grace period to accommodate more vendors. We then extend our base model to analyze the impact of 1) early discovery and 2) an early warning system that provides privileged vulnerability knowledge to selected users before the release of a patch for the vulnerability on responsible vulnerability disclosure. We show that while early discovery always improves the social welfare, an early warning system does not necessarily improve the social welfare
Read morePhysician Error and Disclosure
Traditional patient and physician attitudes toward disclosure are discussed. Studies show that full disclosure does not lead to more litigation, but has decreased the number of claims filed and the average settlement value. There is a current movement toward full disclosure by healthcare institutions. As full disclosure policies are adopted by more institutions and legislation that protects expressions of apology and sympathy accompanying those disclosures is enacted, the result will be improved patient care and a decrease in future errors.
Read moreTruthful Disclosure of Information
This article is about disclosure of quality. The question that it seeks to answer is: Does the free market offer enough incentive for business to disclose? The article concludes that whether information is of purely private value or not, more than the socially-optimal amount of disclosure takes place. The optimal policy is for the government to subsidize sale without disclosure. The article offers no support for the policy of mandatory disclosure. The results should be viewed with care, however, as they seem to depend on special features of the model, in particular the assumed impossibility of misrepresentation.
Read moreShareholder litigation, management forecasts, and productive decisions during the initial public offerings
Shareholder litigation, management forecasts, and productive decisions during the initial public offerings
Information disclosure and vaccination externalities
This paper examines the information disclosure problem when both positive and negative externalities can arise for vaccination. During an epidemic outbreak, public disclosure on the level of infectiousness may potentially trigger a sudden increase in the demand for vaccination, which imposes external costs. The government has to choose an information disclosure policy to induce a level of vaccination that balances the benefits and costs of revealing information. I establish conditions under which a full disclosure is optimal in some circumstances and a non-disclosure or partial disclosure is optimal in other circumstances. I show that the feature of partial convexity restricts the scenarios in which pooling is desirable. Indeed, I find that it is never optimal to pool a sufficiently low infectiousness state with other states.
Read moreOptimal Allocation via Waitlists: Simplicity Through Information Design
We study non-monetary markets where objects that arrive over time are allocated to unit-demand agents with private types, such as in the allocation of public housing or deceased-donor organs. An agent’s value for an object is supermodular in her type and the object quality, and her payoff is her value minus her waiting cost. The social planner’s objective is a weighted sum of allocative efficiency (i.e. the sum of values) and welfare (i.e. the sum of payoffs). We identify optimal mechanisms in the class of direct-revelation mechanisms. When the social planner can design the information disclosed to the agents about the objects, the optimal mechanism has a simple implementation: a first-come first-served waitlist with deferrals. In this implementation, the object qualities are partitioned into intervals; only the interval containing the object quality is disclosed to agents. When the planner places a higher weight on welfare, optimal disclosure policies become coarser.
Read moreValue creation with Dye’s disclosure option: optimal risk-shielding with an upper tailed disclosure strategy
Dye [J Account Res 23 (1985) 123] showed that the optimal disclosure policy, when a manager is randomly endowed with perfect private information, is upper tailed, i.e., the manager only discloses firm value above an appropriate cutoff level. We interpret this strategically as an optimal exercise by management of the embedded formal option to report value. Given any disclosure cutoff level, we value the corresponding option using contingent claims analysis. It is shown that the Dye disclosure cutoff value maximizes the formal option value. We find it to be the minimum possible conditional valuation (conditioned by non-disclosure) which is thus consistent with the intuition that investors should value conservatively. We show how the Dye cutoff can be interpreted as a strike price in a ‘protective put’ which offers a shield against risk of disclosure of low value. The strategic analysis is further extended by allowing the probability level that the manager is informed to be a choice variable. We show that the manager will never choose to be perfectly endowed with information, and is likely to be more endowed than unendowed. We also present a simple worked example which shows how the total value of the firm changes once the Dye option is formally incorporated.
Read moreImplementing the “Wisdom of the Crowd”
We study a novel mechanism design model in which agents each arrive sequentially and choose one action from a set of actions with unknown rewards. The information revealed by the principal affects the incentives of the agents to explore and generate new information. We characterize the optimal disclosure policy of a planner whose goal is to maximize social welfare. One interpretation of our result is the implementation of what is known as the “wisdom of the crowd.” This topic has become increasingly relevant with the rapid spread of the Internet over the past decade.
Read moreStress tests and model monoculture
Stress tests and model monoculture
Information Quality and Correlated Signals
This paper assumes that there are two methods of estimating the value of a firm's assets, called the historical cost (HC) and market value (MV) methods, respectively. It assumes that the true value of the assets and the two estimates are all random variables, jointly distributed as a multivariate normal. These methods are distinguished by their relevance (measured by the covariance of the estimate with the true asset value) their reliability (as measured by the estimates variance) and the direct costs of estimation and disclosure. Then, assuming there are a group of investors with negative exponential utilities, price equations are derived when a manager reports using a policy of reporting only HC, only MV, or both HC and MV (called full disclosure or FD). The choices among these disclosure policies are compared on both an ex-ante basis (before the realizations are observed) and an ex-post basis. Next a price equation is derived for the policy of reporting the lower of HC or MV (called LCOM). It is shown that this price equation equals the price equation for reporting HC or MV alone (whichever is announced) adjusted up by an imputed benefit for the undisclosed good news. Finally a price equation is derived for the policy of reporting the greater of HC or MV (called GCOM). This price equation is similar to the LCOM price equation except the addition of an imputed benefit is replaced by the subtraction of an imputed cost. This price equation is used to analyze questions concerning the imposition of market value accounting for financial assets owned by financial institutions.
Read moreInvestment Behavior under Uncertainty in Number of Competitors
Investment Behavior under Uncertainty in Number of Competitors
Information disclosure in optimal auctions
Information disclosure in optimal auctions