Motivational Internalism and The Second-Order Desire Explanation

Motivational internalism is the thesis that captures the commonplace thought that moral judgements are necessarily motivationally efficacious. But this thesis appears to be in tension with another aspect of our ordinary moral experience. Proponents of the contrast thesis, motivational externalism, cite everyday examples of amoralism to demonstrate that it is conceptually possible to be completely unmoved by what seem to be sincere first‐person moral judgements. This paper argues that the challenge of amoralism gives us no reason to reject or modify motivational internalism. Instead of attempting to diagnose the motivational failure of the amoral agent or restrict the internalist thesis in the face of these examples, I argue that we should critically examine the assumptions that underlie the challenge. Such an examination reveals that the examples smuggle in substantive assumptions that the internalist has no reason to accept. This argument has two important implications for the debate in moral motivation: first, it reveals that the motivational externalist needs a new argumentative strategy; and second, it shows that there is nothing especially problematic about a formulation of the thesis that captures the core internalist intuition that first‐person moral judgements are necessarily accompanied by motivation.

Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral disagreement, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as a large majority of subjects were willing to attribute moral understanding to an agent lacking moral motivation. However, our attempts to replicate this study yielded quite different results, and we identified a number of problems with Nichols' experimental paradigm. The results from a series of surveys designed to rule out these problems (a) show that people are more willing to attribute moral understanding than moral belief to agents lacking moral motivation, (b) suggest that a majority of subjects operate with some internalist conceptions of moral belief, and (c) are compatible with the hypothesis that an overwhelming majority of subjects do this. The results also seem to suggest that if metaethicists' intuitions are theoretically biased, this bias is more prominent among externalists.

Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I introduce a theory of moral motivation that supplements the intuitive responses to different amoralist cases. According to moral judgment purposivism (MJP), in rough approximation, a purpose of moral judgments is to motivate corresponding behaviors such that a mental state without this purpose is not a moral judgment. MJP is consistent with conceptual desiderata, provides an illuminating analysis of amoralist cases, and offers a step forward in the internalist-externalist debates.

The real‐life complexity of moral motivation can be examined and explained by reintegrating time and development into moral inquiry. This article is one of the possible integrative steps in this direction. A dynamic developmental conception of moral motivation can be a useful bridge toward such integration. A comprehensive view of moral motivation is presented. Moral motivation is reconceptualized as a developmental process of self‐organization and self‐regulation out of which moral judgment and action emerge through the interplay of dynamically intertwined cognitive and emotional components. Moral identity is proposed to emerge from long‐term self‐organization of moral motivation. In turn, as a higher‐order construct, moral identity has a top‐down influence on real‐time self‐organization. The article includes an account of short‐term changes in moral motivation, and an account that connects real‐time moral functioning with long‐term changes. Moral motivation is qualified as a dynamic developmental process on the basis of self‐organization, multicausality, nonlinearity, interconnectedness of time scales and substantial intrapersonal variability through motivational pluralism.

Kohlberg's theory of moral development explores the roles of cognition and emotion but focuses primarily on cognition. Contemporary post‐formal theories lead to the conclusion that skills resulting from cognitive‐affective integration facilitate consistency between moral judgement and moral behaviour. Rest's four‐component model of moral development delineates these skills specifically. The components, moral motivation, moral sensitivity, moral reasoning and moral character, operate as multidimensional processes that facilitate moral development and subsequently promote moral behaviour. The relationships between these components have been relatively unexplored, thereby missing the opportunity to unpack the processes underlying moral growth and development. In this study, moral motivation (spirituality), moral sensitivity (post‐formal skills) and moral reasoning are operationalized to examine the mediational effects of moral sensitivity of medical students. In the complex moral environment of medical students opportunities arise to question values and develop cognitive‐affective skills, among them spirituality and post‐formal thinking which are linked to increases in post‐conventional moral reasoning. The models tested indicate that moral sensitivity mediates the relationship between moral motivation and moral reasoning.

In preparation for the challenges of the real world and life after school, moral judgement stands as a pivotal skill among Malaysian secondary school students. Understanding the moral motivating factors contributing to the development of moral judgement maturity is imperative. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the relationships between moral motivation components—specifically, moral emotion (guilt and shame) and moral identity—and moral judgement among Malaysian secondary school students. A sample of 393 students (170 males, 223 females; M age = 16 years) from Selangor state participated in the study. Structural equation modelling (SEM) was utilised to analyse the predictive associations between these constructs. The findings revealed positive correlations among moral emotion, moral identity, and moral judgement. Notably, both guilt and shame, as well as moral identity, were found to be significantly related to students' moral judgement maturity. These results suggest that the tendency for experiencing guilt and shame, along with a heightened moral identity, play pivotal roles in shaping the moral judgement maturity of secondary school students, potentially fostering their moral development. This study contributes valuable insights into the mechanisms linking emotions and identity to moral judgement maturity, offering significant implications for the field of moral psychology.

A interpretação padrão da teoria da motivação humeana considera que a mesma subscreveria um modelo conativista baseado em desejos (paixões), enquanto intrinsecamente motivadores, que nos comprometeriam com uma concepção de internalismo motivacional e, por conseguinte, com uma posição não-cognitivista. Basicamente, esta interpretação padrão de Hume, sustenta que os juízos morais são de natureza puramente conativa, fornecendo, assim, ao agente uma razão ou motivo intrínseco para agir (internalismo motivacional), não exprimindo, no entanto, nenhum conteúdo racional cognitivo (não-cognitivismo). Dada a aproximação entre verdade e conhecimento, os cognitivistas afirmam também a tese de que há autêntico conhecimento moral. Os juízos morais possuem conteúdo cognitivo e não apenas, como querem os não-cognitivistas, expressões de atitudes, de preferências, de desejos ou de prescrições. Desta forma, o contraste entre cognitivismo e não-cognitivismo gira primariamente em torno da questão sobre a natureza do juízo moral. E, na interpretação clássica de Hume, a natureza do juízo moral seria não-cognitiva. Com este trabalho exploro uma linha de argumentação alternativa, em defesa de uma posição que privilegia a possibilidade de um conhecimento moral, segundo a filosofia moral de Hume. Os fundamentos da moral em Hume examinam a exigência motivacional tendo como alvo, a ser criticado, não o conhecimento moral (cognitivismo) e sim o racionalismo moral. No entanto, essa linha alternativa, não representa uma adesão pura ao cognitivismo. A estratégia seguida por essa argumentação, consiste em apontar o aspecto “prático” dos juízos morais, ou seja, o seu papel na orientação e na motivação das ações morais, e, em seguida, argumentar que, dada essa função primordial dos juízos morais, repetindo, o seu caráter prático, orientador de ações, não exclui, também, um conhecimento moral. De certa forma, o argumento é que, segundo a teoria da motivação de Hume, a natureza do juízo moral teria uma dimensão objetiva e prática (aquilo que realmente nos move para a ação).

This systematic review aimed to update and explore the extant literature (2011-2020) regarding ethics knowledge in audiology and to compare the findings to an earlier study (2001-2010). This systematic review employed the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses. MEDLINE, CINAHL, ERIC, MasterFILE Premier, E-Journals, Africa-Wide information and Academic Search Premier electronic databases, and non-peer-reviewed papers in Seminars in Hearing yielded a total of 63 papers. Following systematic screening using inclusion and exclusion criteria, a total of 12 full-text papers were included in this review. Pertinent data and findings from the review were tabulated and analyzed using a qualitative, deductive approach. Results showed that the 12 papers were published in nine peer-reviewed journals with a predominantly social scientific approach. This differs from the earlier review that reported only five papers with a predominantly philosophical approach. However, both the current and earlier studies focused on the rehabilitation/management role of the audiologist. In the earlier study, the focus was on moral judgment (as one of the components of moral behavior), whereas this was the focus of only half of the papers identified in this study, with the remaining papers focusing on moral sensitivity and moral motivation. The focus of papers had evolved and continued to include more elements related to the multiple perspectives used to analyze and describe ethics research. The body of knowledge of ethics in audiology specifically expanded in the area of social scientific research, focusing on beneficence and nonmaleficence, including moral motivation and basing research on moral judgment with the emphasis on the rehabilitation/management and education/research/administration role of audiologists.

Internalism about normative reasons is the view that an agent’s normative reasons depend on her motivational constitution. On the assumption that there are reasons for emotion I argue that (a) externalism about reasons for emotion entails that all rational agents have reasons to be morally motivated and (b) internalism about reasons for emotion is implausible. If the arguments are sound we can conclude that all rational agents have reasons to be morally motivated. Resisting this conclusion requires either justifying internalism about reasons for emotion in a way hitherto unarticulated or giving up on reasons for emotion altogether.

It is usually thought, following Hume, that considerations to do with motivation favour non-cognitivism over cognitivism about moral judgements. Hume’s motivation argument was that non-cognitivism does better than cognitivism at respecting the common observation that there is an immediate or internal connection between moral judgements and motivation. Hume’s famously asked (roughly): how can cognitivism account for the fact that moral judgements are intrinsically motivating?KeywordsMoral JudgementMoral MotivationVariable MotivationMoral AttitudeInternal ConnectionThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Transcendental arguments against skepticism claim that the skeptical argument depends on the falsehood or the unbelievability of the skeptical hypothesis. This chapter argues that the skeptic needs to presuppose the moral or practical rationality of the subject, requiring the existence of an external world with certain features (strongest arguments), the falsehood of the skeptical hypothesis (strong arguments), or the subject’s belief in such a world (weak arguments). The argument starts with rational agency and investigates the sense of moral obligation, moral motives, and virtues that would exist in “vat morality,” arguing that although the skeptic needs to presuppose the rational and moral agency of the subject, the skeptical hypothesis denies or undermines the subject’s agency. The chapter ends by considering whether the skeptic can retreat to Pyrrhonian skepticism to save the skeptical project, concluding that he cannot.

Morals for the sake of movement: Locomotion and sensitivity to norms in moral dilemmas

Morally-relevant theory of mind mediates the relationship between group membership and moral judgments

Part 1 Overview: Hume, human nature and the foundations of morality, David Fate Norton. Part 2 Practical reason: was Hume a Humean?, Elijah Millgram Kantian tunes on a Humean instrument - why Hume is not really a sceptic about practical reasoning, Elizabeth Radcliffe. Part 3 Moral anti-rationalism, is and ought, and the status of moral judgments: Hume on moral judgement, Philippa Foot Hume on is and ought, W.D. Falk variants of sentimentalism, J.L. Mackie gilding or staining the world with sentiments and phantasms, Barry Stroud is Hume a non-cognitivist in the motivation argument?, Rachel Cohon. Part 4 The origin and refinement of the moral sentiments: another look at Hume's account of moral evaluation, Pall S. Ardal the common point of view in Hume's ethics, Rachel Cohon justice and the foundations of social morality in Hume's Treatise, Jacqueline Taylor constructing character - Hume on moral approval, love and the general point of view, Christine Korsgaard. Part 5 The artificial virtues and society: Hume's noble lie - an account of his artificial virtues, Marcia Baron Hume's account of social artifice - its origin and originality, Annette Baier artificial virtues and the sensible knave, David Gauthier. Part 6 Moral motivation and obligation: is Hume an internalist?, Charlotte Brown how does the Humean sense of duty motivate?, Elizabeth Radcliffe motive and obligation in Hume's ethics, Stephen Darwall natural obligation and normative motivation in Hume's treatise, Tito Magri. Part 7 Character and utility: character - a Humean account, Jane McIntyre Hume on the characters of virtue, Richard Dees Hume and the Bauhaus theory of ethics, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord Hume and the invention of utilitarianism, Stephen Darwall.

The Development of Ethics is a selective historical and critical study of moral philosophy in the Socratic tradition, with special attention to Aristotelian naturalism. It discusses the main topics of moral philosophy as they have developed historically, including: the human good, human nature, justice, friendship, and morality; the methods of moral inquiry; the virtues and their connexions; will, freedom, and responsibility; reason and emotion; relativism, subjectivism, and realism; the theological aspect of morality. This volume examines early modern moral philosophy from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Volume 3 will continue the story up to Rawls’s Theory of Justice. The present volume begins with Suarez’s interpretation of Scholastic moral philosophy, and examines seventeenth- and eighteenth-century responses to the Scholastic outlook, to see how far they constitute a distinctively different conception of moral philosophy. The treatments of natural law by Grotius, Hobbes, Cumberland, and Pufendorf are treated in some detail. Disputes about moral facts, moral judgments, and moral motivation, are traced through Cudworth, Clarke, Balguy, Hutcheson, Hume, Price, and Reid. Butler’s defence of a naturalist account of morality is examined and compared with the Aristotelian and Scholastic views discussed in Volume 1. The volume ends with a survey of the persistence of voluntarism in English moral philosophy, and a brief discussion of the contrasts and connexions between Rousseau and earlier views on natural law. The emphasis of the book is not purely descriptive, narrative, or exegetical, but also philosophical. Irwin discusses the comparative merits of different views, the difficulties that they raise, and how some of the difficulties might be resolved. The book tries to present the leading moral philosophers of the past as participants in a rational discussion that is still being carried on, and tries to help the reader to participate in this discussion.