Nepal-China Security Issue in the Context of Belt and Road Program Implementation

Introduction Jessica Keough (bio) In 2013, China's president Xi Jinping announced an initiative that would set the course for much of China's foreign policy toward its Eurasian neighbors. Consisting of two parts—an overland "belt" connecting China with Central Asia, Russia, South Asia, and Europe and a maritime "road" linking Chinese ports with those in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe—the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) envisions a vast network of railways, highways, ports, pipelines, and communication infrastructure spanning the Eurasian continent and facilitating trade, investment, and people-to-people exchange (see Figure 1). In 2015, Beijing announced a plan to develop six economic corridors to advance this initiative (see Figure 2). China's leadership has rallied behind BRI, pledging substantial investment, creating new financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Silk Road Fund, and making diplomatic commitments to countries along the proposed routes. To many observers, BRI appears to be an outline of China's ambitious new grand strategy, 1 but what do states in the region think of this initiative? The seven contributors to this Asia Policy roundtable seek to answer this question by examining how Asian states along this new Silk Road view BRI and its potential implications. Michael Clarke begins the roundtable with an essay that analyzes China's motivations and objectives. He concludes that BRI is motivated by Beijing's desire to resolve long-term domestic, economic, and geopolitical challenges by strengthening states in China's frontier regions, exporting Chinese capital and labor, and establishing an alternative to the current international order. BRI integrates these objectives into a strategy that furthers China's goal of returning to great-power status without provoking strong counterreactions. Andrew Small seeks to understand Pakistan's role in BRI through an examination of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Despite Pakistan and China's long history of an "all-weather friendship," previous joint infrastructure and economic projects have generally failed to deliver [End Page 66] Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 1. China's Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Source: "West China Seeks Fortune on Modern Silk Road," Xinhua, May 15, 2016 ≈ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/15/c_135360904.htm. Originally published in Chinese in Xinhua, 2014. Reprinted with minor changes from Nadège Rolland, China's Eurasia Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017), 49. [End Page 67] Click for larger view View full resolution Figure 2. The Six Economic Corridors of the Belt and Road Initiative Source: Hong Kong Trade Development Council Head Office, "The Belt and Road Initiative," January 21, 2016 ≈ http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative/The-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-More-Information/obor/en/1/1X3CGF6L/1X0A36H1.htm. Reprinted from Rolland, China's Eurasia Century? 73. [End Page 68] on their rhetoric. Although both sides clearly stand to gain from CPEC and some progress has been made, long-standing challenges in Pakistan provide reason for skepticism that the project will in fact meet Beijing's goals. While not on board with BRI, India is closely watching the initiative, particularly CPEC. Harsh Pant and Ritika Passi argue in their essay that pressure is mounting on New Delhi to decide whether to remain on the sidelines. India is wary of the security implications of BRI, particularly for the contested area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and for Indian Ocean ports and sea lanes; however, China's infrastructure development projects could be a boon that increases the region's economic interdependence and gives India leverage to shape the initiative from within. India thus faces challenging decisions as BRI unfolds. Russia, by contrast, has moved from caution to an embrace of BRI, at least for now. The initiative will expand China's presence not only in Central Asia, Russia's traditional sphere of influence, but also further westward in Turkey, the Middle East, and Europe. While Moscow recognizes this dilution of its own influence, Sebastien Peyrouse argues that Russia's economic crisis and the effects of Western sanctions have left...

China’s growing engagement in South Asia has significantly transformed the region’s political, economic, and strategic landscape. Central to this engagement is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a flagship global development strategy aimed at enhancing connectivity, trade, infrastructure development, and regional cooperation. Through large-scale investments in transportation networks, energy projects, ports, and digital infrastructure, China has positioned itself as a key driver of regional integration in South Asia. This study examines China’s role in shaping regional cooperation and integration in South Asia with a particular focus on the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative. It analyzes how BRI-related projects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), port development, and cross-border infrastructure have influenced economic interdependence, regional connectivity, and diplomatic relations among South Asian states. The study also explores challenges associated with BRI, including debt sustainability concerns, geopolitical rivalries, and regional security issues. Using a qualitative research approach based on secondary sources, this research highlights both the opportunities and limitations of China’s BRI in promoting sustainable regional integration in South Asia. The findings suggest that while BRI has enhanced regional connectivity and economic cooperation, its long-term success depends on inclusive development, political stability, and balanced regional diplomacy.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was initiated by China in 2013, BRI was designed to increase the connectivity of the global trade with the help of the large-scale infrastructure development projects in Asia, Europe, and Africa. Being one of the most ambitious international development strategies, the public perception of the BRI is essential in its success, and the perception of it is influenced by the media, and particularly the new media platforms. The paper examines the relationship between the BRI and how the same is framed by the new media in India and Pakistan and how these representations have influenced the opinion of the people in the Indo-Pakistani world. Although India and Pakistan are geographically close to each other, their media represents the BRI in strikingly different perspectives, depending on the historical, political and economic interests of each state. The study fills a knowledge gap in the literature by studying the influence of new media on the perception of the BRI in the two countries, in the differences between the security interests that India and Pakistan are placing in the new media. The research questions are aimed at identifying the way Indian and Pakistani media present the BRI issues, and whether the new media has anything to do with these impressions. The research design was a qualitative comparative study, and content analysis and framing analysis were utilized to analyse the contents of media by the digital news sources, blogs, and social media (e.g., Twitter, Facebook) between the years of 2023 and 2025. The results of the analysis showed that the BRI was mostly presented as a security threat by the Indian media and as the source of economic benefits by the Pakistani media, especially CPEC. These frames were stronger through the new media, and the Indian social media enhanced the security concerns, whereas the Pakistani social media advanced economic growth. These conclusions can be relevant to the policymakers, media professionals, as well as scholars of international relations by providing information on the way media framing can affect the popular opinion and bilateral relations in South Asia. These dynamics are important to understand to have more informed and balanced debate on global programs such as the BRI.

Parallax Visions of the Belt and Road Initiative Jonathan Fulton (bio) Daniel Markey's China's Western Horizon: Beijing and the New Geopolitics of Eurasia offers an important, original, and timely analysis of one of our time's most significant geopolitical transitions, as the People's Republic of China (PRC) evolves from an East Asian power to a global power. It is the type of comprehensive book that many would shy away from given its vast territorial coverage, and Markey should be commended for his ambitious undertaking. The result is an informed and engaging work that analyzes China's foreign policy as well as those of several states across South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. As China's interests and influence spreads, we need a clearer picture of the PRC's foreign policy objectives, and to understand the PRC in the Xi Jinping era, we have to start with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The second chapter, "Beijing's Global Aspirations," capably articulates the motivations of Chinese policymakers in developing BRI, putting it in the context of a foreign policy that has grown increasingly confident and ambitious. Perhaps the most important contribution of Markey's book is its emphasis on the agency of countries partnering with China in BRI projects—a part of the BRI story that is sometimes neglected. In nearly every bilateral relationship, excepting only the Sino-U.S. relationship, China's economic leverage creates asymmetry that contributes to a sense of the PRC marching toward dominance while taking advantage of weaker states' needs for development loans and FDI. China's emergence as a funding source represents a challenge to the liberal Western model, which has become increasingly irrelevant to many countries' infrastructure projects. David Dollar, formerly of the World Bank, has compared the Western model's limitations when measured against BRI: Only about 30 percent of World Bank lending is for infrastructure these days. Having run the largest infrastructure program in the World Bank, I can say that it's extraordinarily bureaucratic. Mostly, clients don't like to come the World Bank because it's just too time consuming. It takes many, many years to get things going. China is offering to finance infrastructure, not at highly concessional terms, at what we would generally call commercial terms, but frankly at interest rates that most of [End Page 146] these countries could not get from any other lender, unless they jumped through the hoops to go with the World Bank.1 The English-language narrative about BRI is often dangerously simplistic: China is using its economic might to overturn the liberal order through massive loans and infrastructure projects primarily designed to strengthen its own economy. Developed by Chinese state-owned enterprises, monitored by Chinese technology, and staffed with Chinese labor, the result is environmental degradation, the spread of an illiberal surveillance state model, unfair labor practices, and crippling debt. Partnering countries accept these adversities as the price of doing business with China. The implication is that with relatively little practical experience in dealing with the PRC, these smaller states do not know what they are getting themselves into. However, this perspective reflects a Western view of BRI in general, and a U.S. view in particular. China's Western Horizon illuminates how this process looks from the perspective of Eurasian countries working with China, explaining the motivations to forge closer ties and take on these loans and providing a more nuanced approach to BRI than we normally get from great-power competition analysis. An important theme throughout the book is that elites in partner countries adopt a logic reflecting pressures at the domestic or regional level. The chapter on South Asia offers the best illustration—not surprising given Markey's background in the region. The book begins with an interview with former Pakistani prime minister Pervez Musharraf discussing Gwadar port, the anchor of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC): "'Yes, Gwadar was entirely my idea, not a Chinese idea. I was concerned only about Pakistan's strategic interests'" (p. vii). This is an important but underreported aspect of BRI—local projects in need of funding are often folded into BRI cooperation. In Oman, for example...

Maintaining peace and peaceful co-existence is one of the major goals of integration. It is rightly believed that a peaceful international society can emerge by working together in workshops and market places rather than by signing pacts in chancelleries. The United States of America and its Western allies earnestly desire to empower conflict-ridden Afghanistan so that the country can achieve economic sustainability and lasting peace. Regional integration theorists believe that this is possible through economic integration with both Central and South Asia so as to gain wider access to regional trade and transportation. Accordingly, in 2011, the US announced a trade and transportation project, the New Silk Road Initiative (NSRI), intended to integrate South and Central Asia with war-torn Afghanistan. This constitute an act of intra-state and trans-border trade agreement among Eurasian countries including Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Central Asia, and Europe. It seeks to renew the Ancient Silk Route so as to open up new markets and economic opportunities for the land locked counties of Central Asia and Afghanistan, thereby boosting their economic growth, creating new jobs, attracting foreign investment, reducing poverty and ensuring regional stability. However, in 2013 China announced a most ambitious foreign policy and economic initiative known as the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative-referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) - intended to ensure - a strong economic and political lead in South and Central Asia. China aims to connect its underdeveloped hinterland to Europe through Central Asia. China’s BRI became a big challenge to the United States’ NSRI and is emerging as more productive, beneficial and successful.

Conclusions * South Asia, with a quarter of the world's population, a demonstrated weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability, great economic potential, and chronic instability, can no longer be regarded as peripheral to U.S. global interests. * Achieving peace and stability, particularly in and between India and Pakistan, is the overarching U.S. interest in South Asia, and we need a well-considered, long-term strategy to pursue it. * The United States needs to avoid the episodic, single-issue pattern of its past interaction with South Asia. * Sustained, broad-based engagement, based on a thorough review of U.S. interests and regional realities, will preserve and enhance U.S. interests. * A presidential visit to all the major countries of the region could signal our commitment to long-term engagement focusing on Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, good governance, economic advancement, and sane management of the region's nuclear capabilities. With President Clinton's visit to South Asia, the forthcoming transition in the White House, and Indo-Pakistani relations in near crisis, a review of U.S. policy toward that region and options for the future is warranted. We need to reevaluate what our fundamental interests in South Asia are, because they have changed significantly from what they were when these countries gained independence at mid-century and especially since the end of the Cold War. South Asia is hardly a vital U.S. interest, but it has become much more important. The unchecked Indo-Pakistani arms race poses risks of nuclear conflict and undermines nonproliferation regimes in other regions; Afghanistan and Pakistan are grappling with forms of militant Islam that have global reach; and the stability and development of the region have an important impact on U.S. interests in China, the Persian Gulf, and Central Asia. We have to honestly assess where we have been right and wrong--know the history but not be its prisoner. The days are gone when we can afford to view the subcontinent as a backwater in our global strategy. U.S. Interests in South Asia The bedrock U.S. interest in South Asia has been and will continue to be peace and stability within and between the nations of the region (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Maldives). If peace and stability prevail, the United States can make progress not only on nonproliferation, economic reform and development, trade liberalization, democracy/ governance, human rights, narcotics, terrorism, and World Trade Organization issues--indeed, on all of these issues, with enormous benefit for our vision of a prosperous, democratic South Asia integrated with the global economy. Without peace and stability, little can be accomplished on any front. South Asia Realities By focusing serially upon the Cold War, the green revolution, the quest for global and regional nonproliferation, and the importance of human rights over the last fifty years, we have had a distorted perception of the realities on the ground. The absence of an across-the-board approach has hampered the development and implementation of a coherent, successful policy in pursuit of U.S. interests. In any reconsideration of U.S.-South Asia policy--it is important that we begin with a reality check. * Tensions between the region's two largest countries, India and Pakistan, are high. Hostility over Kashmir--three wars in 52 years--holds the region hostage. Resolving Indo-Pakistani tensions is the sine qua non of long-term peace and stability. Both nations have nuclear weapons and delivery systems; neither will give them up. A confrontational approach by the rest of the world demanding renunciation of nuclear capability only aggravates the problem of achieving restraint, as demonstrated by our unsuccessful nonproliferation efforts set against the realities of internal and regional politics. …

This volume assesses China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as it approaches its tenth year in operation. The programme has gone through a difficult transition since its inception in 2013, with an environment developing in a way utterly unanticipated by Chinese decision-makers. Despite pragmatic adjustments to the BRI, the lack of a firm empirical base has impeded the BRI and led to its demise in many countries. With the accumulation of nearly ten years of project and economic data, it is possible to make an in-depth assessment of the BRI. For this purpose, the study examines the infrastructure component of the BRI in 39 countries, stretching from the Americas to Oceania and, finally, South Asia. The study finds a strong relationship between a country’s progress in improved governance and the quality of its infrastructure. Countries that have benefited from the BRI have simultaneously achieved progress in governance areas, such as the rule of law and control of corruption. By not emphasizing improved governance structures, China condemns many of its partners to failure. Researchers, students, and economic development specialists from Latin America to South Asia and Oceania will find this study a useful departure from the volumes of anecdotal BRI assessments.

Pakistan’s geographical location is ideal for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Project, and it formally recognizes as an iconic model of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) plan. This corridor is laid at the cross intersection of three regions of economic growth include: China, Central Asian Republics and South Asia. It plays a vital role of inter-connectivity between these three regions, where three billions of inhabitants live, which is roughly half of the world population. The central argument of the paper is sternly conceptual and based on the subsequent arguments: foremost, the foundation of CPEC project is a green signal for the regional connectivity, mutual cooperation, economic growth and stability of the entire region of South and Central Asia. Secondly, the topographical position of Pakistan has an incredible potential for corridor development and manipulation process. Thirdly, due to the iconic model of belt and road initiative plan, the CPEC corridor has broad potential for regional economic growth because of shared boundaries and cross intersection position with China, CARs and South Asia. Finally, with the copious fruitful opportunities, this project facades somber challenges internally and outwardly. Hence, this study uses a positive-sum logic to analyze central argument and also discusses the policy inputs that may be prolific for regional growth and reforms of the project.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an ambitious project aiming to transform the economic landscape along its route in the areas of trade, investment, and energy supplies. It makes as its focal point the connectivity between China and Eurasia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. South Asia’s location presents China with significant strategic opportunities as Beijing seeks to expand its economic presence in the subcontinent by providing resources in infrastructural development, particularly the construction of seaports. With growing Chinese trade and investment in the region, Beijing is also extending its diplomatic influence into what has long been considered as India’s sphere of influence. With longstanding strategic distrust and unresolved territorial disputes, New Delhi is suspicious of Beijing’s intentions and concerned over the latter’s growing influence into a region it has long considered its sphere of influence. In this context, the BRI has the potential to intensify Sino–Indian rivalry, and the Modi government has indeed explored and launched initiatives to counter Chinese diplomatic activities. It remains a challenge whether and how Asia’s rising powers can reduce their trust deficits and explore areas of cooperation made possible by the BRI, working toward a cooperative, mutually beneficial future for Sino–Indian relations and the region as a whole.

Launched in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was originally devised to link East Asia and Europe through a network of physical and digital infrastructure. This article analyses the BRI’s development in the European context by offering a comparative analysis of 727 BRI and BRI-like projects within 46 European countries from 2005 to 2021. The analysis considers projects’ location, typology, status, and the main enterprises involved in each project. According to our results, there is a “two-speed Europe”. Indeed, while the vast majority of projects are included in the Digital Silk Road (e.g., telecommunication, transfer technology, data centre, 5G, fintech) and are located in North-Western Europe, traditional investments in infrastructure (e.g., ports, roads, railways, SEZ) are concentrated in South-Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries. While North-Western Europe is particularly concerned about cyber security and data protection issues, various South-Eastern European countries look favorably upon the development opportunities offered by the BRI. The BRI is clearly different from the Western approach to development (based on competition and economic liberalism) and integration (based on treaties). The BRI approach—including its platform, leveraging political flexibility, economic pragmatism, ability to mobilize resources, and ability to create synergies between state and business—could take advantage of the flaws of the European integration process. The BRI, with its strengths as well as weaknesses, represents an opportunity for the EU to understand the need for greater economic and political foresight, social cohesion, and economic flexibility to meet the development needs of its member countries. China, too, can draw inspiration from cooperating with EU countries on how to improve the reception of its investment initiatives by focusing on reciprocity, security guarantees, and protection of rights and the environment.

There are debates on whether the implementation of the Belt and Road (BR) initiative could significantly increase CO2 emissions in participating countries. Nevertheless, the policy effect of the BR initiative on both consumption- and production-based CO2 emissions has not been fully explored. In this study, we quantified the consumption- and production-based CO2 emissions in BR countries with a multiregional input–output model. Then, a difference-in-differences (DID) model was used to identify the CO2 emissions caused by the BR initiative. Results showed that the production-based CO2 emissions (20.77 Gt) were 11 percent higher than the consumption-based CO2 emissions (18.71 Gt) in BR countries. The BR initiative had a significant, positive effect on per-capita consumption-based CO2 emissions (p value < 0.1), with an average increase of 0.51 t/cap/year, but had no significant effect on per-capita production-based CO2 emissions (p value > 0.1). These results imply that the BR initiative promoted regional consumption to achieve common prosperity and boosted green transformation of regional economy. Moreover, non-BR countries that have consumed CO2-embedded products should take responsibility for the CO2 emitted in BR countries. Participants should give priority to strengthening the cooperation based on their country’s infrastructure conditions rather than the proximity to China. These findings clarify the policy effect of the BR initiative and distinguish the CO2 emission responsibility from both consumption- and production-based perspectives.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is, by far, the largest intercontinental mega project of the twenty-first century. Given its historical and cultural aspects, both the overland and the maritime silk routes of BRI have underlying connections with South Asia. The active participation of Bangladesh and Pakistan in BRI from this region clasps a greater strategic importance for China. It has unlocked a new set of opportunities to strengthen China’s long-standing bilateral security engagements with these two countries. Given this context, this chapter aims to analyze China’s security cooperation with Bangladesh and Pakistan in the context of BRI and its implications to the individual interests and achievements of these three countries in the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean. Based on the analytical frameworks of structural realism and security strategies of the small powers, this study explains the linkages between China–Bangladesh and China–Pakistan security cooperation and shows how these security arrangements go alongside each other to ensure an effective balance of power in the Indian Ocean.

In June 2015, China and Hungary concluded an agreement for Hungary to become a partner in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also referred to as “One Belt, One Road”. The BRI was launched by the Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013 presenting Beijing’s ambitious strategy of connecting China to Eurasia and beyond through a network over land and maritime routes and rail lines. The BRI partnership ties in with Hungary adding a new foreign policy dimension to its integration into Western politico-economic structures. Hungary’s new foreign policy orientation, referred to as “Eastern Opening”, is accommodating to upcoming geopolitical and financial-economic powers in Asia. In this chapter, Chinese and Hungarian financial-economic relations are studied within the theory of critical geopolitics. A three-layered toolkit provides a framework for in-depth analysis of developing financial-economic relations. It is demonstrated that bilateral financial-economic cooperation and mutual domestic investments are modest, although China has benefited most from expanding trade relations and investments in Hungary. The biggest advancement in Chinese-Hungarian cooperation has been made on the regional/global level. Between China and the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), a so-called “17+1 cooperation” has been established which assigns Hungary a strategic position to facilitate infrastructural and transport connectivity within the BRI. The plan to construct the Budapest-Belgrade high-speed rail line connecting Central Europe and the Balkans has been heavily criticized by the EU, however. The chapter concludes that such hard connections lay a solid foundation for long-term cooperation between China and Hungary in the framework of the BRI.

Global economic structure transition boosts PM2.5-related human health impact in Belt and Road Initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or the One Belt One Road (OBOR), was announced to the world by President Xi Jinping of China during his visits to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013. The BRI comprises a trans-continental passage that links China with Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, Russia and Europe by land. It includes a sea route connecting China's coastal regions via Southeast and South Asia, South Pacific, Middle East and Eastern Africa, all the way to Europe. It is by any standards in political vision or economic aspiration in the history of mankind, the grandest that has been conceived, covering 70 countries, involving nearly 65% of the world's population and a combined GDP of 40% of the world. Notwithstanding these distractive developments concerning China, world attention is constantly focused on the BRI. This chapter attempts to look at BRI in an off-beat South Asian historical perspective, leaving the much-trodden String of Pearls theory, China–Pakistan friendship, China–Myanmar relations etc. aside. In doing so, it aims to generate discussions for newer policy avenues to South Asian neighbours and international lending agencies in dealing with the compelling attractions of BRI.