Nepal’s Political Trajectory and Challenges to Democratic Stability

Adolescence is a crucial formative period for developing persistent (dis)trust in political institutions, with long-term implications for democracy. This cross-national mixed-methods study investigates whether adolescents exhibit higher governmental trust than adults and which (un)trustworthiness criteria shaped their views during COVID-19. Quantitative data from multiple European countries (N = 3,714) show that younger adolescents reported significantly higher governmental trust than older adolescents and adults in all examined countries, with the largest difference observed in Serbia. A complementary qualitative meta-synthesis of seven primary studies (N = 251) uncovered 12 broad (un)trustworthiness criteria in COVID-19 decision-making, mostly centred on decision-making procedures. Key concerns included unpredictability, unexplained measures, and a lack of reciprocity and mutual responsibility between citizens and authorities. Younger adolescents sought closeness, emotional support, and predictability, while older adolescents and adults prioritised mutual responsibility, shared values, and clear explanations. These perspectives suggest that younger adolescents' institutional trust may diminish depending on the degree of (un)trustworthy decision-making, especially as their cognitive abilities, autonomy, societal roles, and political awareness evolve. Demonstrating or involving adolescents in trustworthy decision-making is crucial for establishing lasting institutional (dis)trust. The findings of this chapter can inform future crisis management strategies and bolster trust in democratic institutions among emerging generations.

This chapter discusses the level of political integration displayed by the Danish Muslims engaged in the 2005/2006 cartoons controversy. Conceptualising political integration as a multi-dimensional phenomenon distinguishing three aspects of political integration – a) political trust in democratic institutions, b) adherence to liberal-democratic values, and c) political participation in the polis – the article investigates the degree of political integration of Danish Muslims against a unique database on political claims-making during the Danish cartoons controversy. In contrast to the widespread public perception of the controversy, the article argues that the Danish Muslims involved in public claims-making displayed a considerable degree of political integration. The chapter argues that Danish Muslims actually demonstrated considerable trust in democratic institutions, relying mainly on procedural forms of claims-making and turning to transnationalisation of the issue only as a last resort. Furthermore, it is argued that the claims-making of the involved Danish Muslims revealed alternative interpretations of fundamental liberal-democratic values, but significant adherence to the basic principles. Finally, the chapter argues that the level of political participation of Danish Muslims was particularly high during the cartoons controversy and that this high level of political claims-making and mobilisation should be understood as active citizenship rather than ‘cultural backlash’.

Media corruption and issues of journalistic and institutional integrity in post-communist countries: The case of Bulgaria

Deep-seated challenges concerning service delivery, mis-governance, corruption and state capture were uncovered by the Zondo Commission of inquiry. While the triple challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment continued to persist as well, at the same time, disillusionment with democracy has led to citizens questioning its status as the preferred government form. In this study, the connection between corruption perceptions and the evaluation of democracy in South Africa’s third decade is explored. A quantitative methodology utilising descriptive statistics and an analysis drawing from public opinion data accessed through the South African Social Attitudes Survey is adopted for this study. Key findings that emanate from the study indicate that the South African public is now more likely to recognise corruption as one of the top three problems that face South Africa. The results also indicate a growing preference for non-democratic, authoritarian governments. This has been characterised by low voter turnout in the local government elections of 2016 and 2021, and the national and provincial elections of 2019 and 2024. Erosion of public trust in democratic institutions—the government, courts and parliament—has fuelled the delegitimisation of democracy, with citizens showing growing wariness. Democracy has suffered from a decade of perceived unchecked corruption, a trend set to continue unless the state intervenes with anti-corruption measures, accountability initiatives and successful prosecutions of those accused of state capture and grand corruption.

This special issue presents different perspectives of how knowledge making is being governed in ways that produce epistemic injustice. Contemporary conditions of ‘post-truth’ and ‘crisis in trust in democratic institutions’ are characterized by misinformation and challenges to established forms of expertise while ‘living with Covid’, politics and economics have taken precedence over science (Jayasuriya, 2021; McCarthy & Jayasuraya, 2022). This raises significant concern as to whether knowledge-state-society relations can address what are key issues for a sustainable and just global society.

Political Culture and the Rule of Law: Comparing the United States and New Zealand

In the current context, characterized by the rapid spread of information and the influence of social media, populist discourse has become an increasingly widespread phenomenon. Manipulation through populist rhetoric poses a major threat to democracy, especially in the post-truth era, where objective truth is replaced by subjective and emotional narratives. Populism in this era capitalizes on the fears and insecurities of citizens, appealing to emotions and resentments, and constructing a "common enemy" identified as the political elites or other groups perceived as being against the people's interests. Thus, populist discourse promotes the idea of a struggle between "us" and "them", where "us" represents the popular masses or the majority, and "them" are those held responsible for corruption, inequality, and various failures. In the post-truth era, in which false or distorted information is quickly spread and accepted, manipulation through populist discourse can undermine trust in democratic institutions and weaken the democratic process as a whole. Therefore, the danger lies not only in the ideological manipulation of the public but also in the risk of eroding the fundamental values of democracy.

The central question of this article is why Russian military aggression in Ukraine has failed to strengthen support for democracy and cooperation with partners in some Central European countries. In addition, the article examines the link between military conflict in the immediate neighbourhood and the crisis of democracy. Based on a review of the extensive literature on the crisis of democracy, the article integrates findings from several opinion polls conducted in Central European countries. Looking primarily at the Visegrad countries, clear patterns emerge in responses and attitudes towards Russia. We can see the influence of the political discourse in these countries, the narratives used by political elites and, more recently, war fatigue and economic consequences. The article argues that a military conflict in the vicinity of democratic countries exacerbates the crisis of democracy. The information warfare that is part of this conflict and the susceptibility of the political elite to the dissemination of enemy propaganda undermines trust in democratic institutions and democracy.

This article offers a normative analysis of some of the most controversial incidents involving police—what I call police-generated killings. In these cases, bad police tactics create a situation where deadly force becomes necessary, becomes perceived as necessary, or occurs unintentionally. Police deserve blame for such killings because they choose tactics that unnecessarily raise the risk of deadly force, thus violating their obligation to prioritize the protection of life. Since current law in the United States fails to ban many bad tactics, police-generated killings often are treated as “lawful but awful.” To address these killings, some call on changes to departmental policies or voluntary reparations by local governments, yet such measures leave in place a troubling gap between ethics and law. I argue that police-generated killings merit legal sanctions by appealing to a relevant analogy: self-generated self-defense, where the person who engages in self-defense started the trouble. The persistent lack of accountability for police-generated killings threatens life, police legitimacy, and trust in democratic institutions. The article closes by identifying tools in law and policy to address this challenge.

Twenty years after German reunification, surveys have persistently uncovered differences in political trust between the eastern and western parts of the country. Studies have offered disintegrated and inconclusive assessments of the cross‐regional variation. This variation is traced to a tenacious, retrospective sympathy for socialism steeped in political socialisation and experiential learning. Empirical analyses confirm the presence of two key effects. First, retrospective evaluations of socialism not only fuel popular distrust of political institutions, but are more strongly correlated with trust in the east. Second, East–West evaluations of socialism are sufficiently different to contribute towards explaining the contrasting levels of trust between the two regions. That socialist values constitute a core axis upon which East German attitudes pivot presents a challenge for nurturing trust in democratic institutions and renews attention to processes through which supportive attitudes to democracy are acquired in transitional countries.

This study examines money politics as a representation of patron-client culture in elections, focusing on its implications for democratic integrity in Indonesia and other developing countries. The primary issue addressed is how money politics, through financial incentives, reinforces dependency between political elites and voters, undermining fair electoral processes. The research aims to analyze the socio-political dynamics of money politics and its impact on democratic governance. Using a qualitative approach, the study relies on literature review and secondary data analysis, including academic journals, election reports, and media articles. The findings reveal that money politics perpetuates systemic corruption, exacerbates social and political inequalities, and weakens public trust in democratic institutions. The study concludes that addressing money politics requires comprehensive reforms, including stricter campaign finance regulations, enhanced political literacy, and stronger democratic institutions. This research highlights the importance of understanding money politics within the framework of patron-client relationships to develop effective strategies for promoting fair and inclusive democratic practices.Keywords: Money Politics; Patron-Client; Election; Political-Sociology

In an ever-evolving technological landscape, digital disinformation is on the rise, as are its political consequences. In this paper, we explore the creation and distribution of synthetic media by malign actors, specifically a form of artificial intelligence-machine learning (AI/ML) known as the deepfake. Individuals looking to incite political violence are increasingly turning to deepfakes–specifically deepfake video content–in order to create unrest, undermine trust in democratic institutions and authority figures, and elevate polarised political agendas. We present a new subset of individuals who may look to leverage deepfake technologies to pursue such goals: far-right extremist (FRE) groups. Despite their diverse ideologies and worldviews, we expect FREs to similarly leverage deepfake technologies to undermine trust in the American government, its leaders, and various ideological ‘out-groups.' We also expect FREs to deploy deepfakes for the purpose of creating compelling radicalising content that serves to recruit new members to their causes. Political leaders should remain wary of the FRE deepfake threat and look to codify federal legislation banning and prosecuting the use of harmful synthetic media. On the local level, we encourage the implementation of “deepfake literacy” programs as part of a wider countering violent extremism (CVE) strategy geared towards at-risk communities. Finally, and more controversially, we explore the prospect of using deepfakes themselves in order to “call off the dogs” and undermine the conditions allowing extremist groups to thrive.

Academic studies have consistently demonstrated that citizens have lost trust in democratic institutions, grown sceptical of elected leaders, and become dissatisfied with how democracy works. These studies, however, neglect the analysis of some of the most important objects of the democracies they analyse. A case in point is the German constitution (Basic Law), which prescribes the values of German democracy and the institutions through which they are realized. By analysing 28 years of individual-level data from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS), this article makes two important discoveries about attitudes towards the constitution. First, support for it is widespread, enduring and increasing amongst citizens in the east and west of the country. Second, generalized linear models demonstrate that this form of support is grounded in phenomena which provide it with durability. Postmaterialist values, centrist ideology, and age all nurture attachments to the constitution. These effects are confirmed by post-estimation analyses of average marginal effects. By demonstrating that German democracy is underpinned by a fund of enduring support, the research challenges suggestions of a crisis of democracy and concludes that Germans are not cynically rejecting of democracy, but critically democratic: they desire a fuller expression of the constitutional ideals.

Twenty Years of PostcommunismDeepening Dissatisfaction Ivan Krastev (bio) It was "the best of years." Reflecting on the historical significance of Central Europe's revolutions, Robert Cooper wrote that "the year 1989 divides the past from the future almost as clearly as the Berlin Wall divided the East from the West."1 The revolutions of '89 turned the will of the people as expressed in free and fair elections into the only source of legitimate government that modern societies were ready to accept. Centuries-old arguments critical of the desirability or feasibility of democratic regimes virtually disappeared. Democracy may not have run out of enemies, but it ran out of critics. The revolutionary crowds on the streets of Prague and East Berlin—peaceful, triumphant, and insisting on their right to live in a "normal society"—provided the ultimate validation for the superiority of liberal democracy as a form of government. The contradictions that had been afflicting Europe's democratic experience over the last two centuries seemed finally to have reached a resolution. Inspired by the spread of democratic regimes following the demise of communism, political theorists became more interested in the process of democratization than in the transformations taking place within existing democracies. In the years immediately following 1989, little attention was paid to the impact of that year's epochal events on the way that democracy was beginning to be perceived by its own citizens. No longer was democracy only the least undesirable form of government—the best of a bad bunch, if you will. Instead, it was coming to seem like the best form of government, period. People were starting to look to democratic regimes not merely to save them from something worse, but to deliver freedom, prosperity, and honest and effective governance all in one big package. Today, twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there is a growing [End Page 113] ambiguity about the historical significance of 1989 and about the state of democracy in Europe (particularly Central Europe). Trust in democratic institutions (including elections) is steadily declining. The political class is viewed as corrupt and self-interested. Disenchantment with democracy appears to be growing. According to one 2008 survey, only 21 percent of Lithuanians, 24 percent of Bulgarians, 24 percent of Romanians, 30 percent of Hungarians, and 38 percent of Poles believe that they have benefited from the fall of the Berlin Wall.2 The revisionists' hour has arrived. In his new book Uncivil Society, the U.S. historian and political scientist Stephen Kotkin powerfully argues that, the Polish case aside, the communist collapse across Central and Eastern Europe is best understood as the implosion of an ineffective and demoralized communist establishment (the "uncivil society" of his title) than by a revolt of civil society.3 The people on the streets of Prague and Sofia were not so much revolutionary citizens as dissatisfied consumers. The idea of civil society has long been a magical construct, one that has somehow succeeded in simultaneously satisfying modernization theorists' belief in the historical mission of the middle class, the New Left's fascination with spontaneous activism, neoliberals' affection for antistatism, and Western donors' fondness for English-speaking NGOs. But today that construct is losing its appeal. 1989 and All That The new wave of revisionism does not limit itself to reappraisals of what really happened in 1989 and who did it. Instead, the revisionists seek in the first place to alter our understanding of who were the overall winners (and who were the net losers) from the change. There are many today who believe that it was not the people but the elites who broke free and collected the jackpot of 1989. The end of communism, this account goes, set in motion a process that has liberated ex-communist elites from fear (of purges), from guilt (for being rich), from ideology, from the chains of community, from national loyalties, and even from the necessity to govern. Was George Orwell right, one wants to ask, when he wrote that "all revolutions are failures, but they are not all the same failure"?4 My argument here, however, is not that the revolutions of 1989 were a failure. What I...

In the era of declined public trust in democratic institutions, the emergence of social media renewed hopes for citizens' firmer inclusion and engagement in politics. This study explores young adults' online political engagement in a new European Union member state - Croatia. This case is particularly important as it deals with a 'newly' democratic country that faces low levels of trust in politicians. Starting with their levels of offline participation, I examined levels of online political participation and the connection and interaction between them. An online survey was supplemented with a limited number of in-depth interviews to further examine the underlying reasons for certain opinions and attitudes. The results show that social media are a good tool for boosting political participation among young Croatian citizens and influencing voters' opinions, despite the fact that one of the main characteristics of this type of communication remains clicktivism.