No-fault accident compensation systems

This pioneering Handbook contains specially-commissioned chapters on tort law from leading experts in the field. This volume evaluates issues of vital importance to those seeking to understand and reform the tort law and the litigation process, taking a multi-disciplinary approach, including theoretical economic analysis, empirical analysis, socio-economic analysis, and behavioral analysis. Topics discussed include products liability, medical malpractice, causation, proximate cause, joint and several liability, class actions, mass torts, vicarious liability, settlement, damage rules, juries, tort reform, and potential alternatives to the tort system. Scholars, students, legal practitioners, regulators, and judges with an interest in tort law, litigation, damages, and reform will find this seminal Handbook an invaluable addition to their libraries.

This pioneering Handbook contains specially-commissioned chapters on tort law from leading experts in the field. This volume evaluates issues of vital importance to those seeking to understand and reform the tort law and the litigation process, taking a multi-disciplinary approach, including theoretical economic analysis, empirical analysis, socio-economic analysis, and behavioral analysis. Topics discussed include products liability, medical malpractice, causation, proximate cause, joint and several liability, class actions, mass torts, vicarious liability, settlement, damage rules, juries, tort reform, and potential alternatives to the tort system. Scholars, students, legal practitioners, regulators, and judges with an interest in tort law, litigation, damages, and reform will find this seminal Handbook an invaluable addition to their libraries.

This pioneering Handbook contains specially-commissioned chapters on tort law from leading experts in the field. This volume evaluates issues of vital importance to those seeking to understand and reform the tort law and the litigation process, taking a multi-disciplinary approach, including theoretical economic analysis, empirical analysis, socio-economic analysis, and behavioral analysis. Topics discussed include products liability, medical malpractice, causation, proximate cause, joint and several liability, class actions, mass torts, vicarious liability, settlement, damage rules, juries, tort reform, and potential alternatives to the tort system. Scholars, students, legal practitioners, regulators, and judges with an interest in tort law, litigation, damages, and reform will find this seminal Handbook an invaluable addition to their libraries.

Management or Avoidance of Medical Malpractice Crises?: Time to Choose

A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical Malpractice

THE main purpose of this paper is to present empirical estimates of a model of the disposition of claims through the courts. Landes, Gould, Posner, and others have developed a theoretical model of the disposition process, in which the decision to settle and the size of settlement depend on the defendant's maximum offer (expected award at verdict plus litigation costs) relative to the plaintiff's minimum ask (expected award at verdict minus litigation costs).' Variants of this model have been applied in several contexts, but so far it has not been tested empirically with data on individual claims.2 The obstacles to estimation by standard econometric techniques are twofold. First, the hypothesized determinants of the outcome-the potential verdict, ask, offer, and litigation costs-are all unobserved in the data available. Second, if the theory is correct, claims closed at each stage of disposition are not random samples but are "selfselected" on the basis of those case characteristics whose effect we wish to measure. Therefore, analysis of the observed outcome-size and probability of payment to the plaintiff, at verdict and in out-of-court settlement-cannot be generalized to the universe of claims as a whole. Param-

This article evaluates the impact of changes in tort laws on state medical licensing board actions in the United States, an area of study that has largely been overlooked in the tort reform debate. We employ negative binomial models with random effects to ascertain the impact of the passage of individual tort reforms, additional explanatory variables, and period effects on board licensing actions. Our results suggest that alterations to states' joint and several liability rules, the enactment of penalties for frivolous lawsuits, and the establishment of the National Practitioner Data Bank may have increased the use of serious sanctions by medical licensing boards, while implementation of arbitration and attorney fee regulation may have decreased their use. We call for greater attention to be paid to the impact of tort reforms on licensing actions.

Why Civil Recourse Theory is Incomplete

Medical Malpractice in American Urology: 22-Year National Review of the Impact of Caps and Implications for Contemporary Practice

Deceit is one branch of the offense under tort law. Deceit can be said to be a fraud act committed by someone who caused the other party to suffer loss or injury. The party suffering a loss or an injury can bring a claim in court on the basis of the tort law. Besides, the claimant must proof several important things before the court can decide the liability. This proof or evidence requires scientific verification by forensic experts. The testimony of the forensic expert can be used to convict deception and also can be used to dismiss the case in court. However, some forensic evidence is wrongly given in the trial. This has a significant effect on both the claimant and the defendant. As a result, the question arises as to what is the liability for tort of deceit in forensic according to tort and Islamic law. The purpose of this study is to define the meaning of deceit in tort and Islamic law as well as the liability for tort of deceit in forensic. This is a case study which gathered materials based on literature reviews, including cases published in Malaysian legal journals as well as cases addressed by fuqaha. The study was analyzed using thematic and descriptive methods. The study found that deceit is an offense according to tort and Islamic law. The liability for tort of deceit by a forensic expert must be determined on the grounds of which the deceit was knowingly committed while testifying to the evidence before the court. This study has implications to the judiciary; legal practitioners in Malaysia and to the forensic experts who were called to adduce evidence in court.

Abstract: As data regarding the U.S. tort liability system become more refined and dependable, evidence of the importance of mass torts is emerging. Much of the impetus for and debate surrounding tort reform, however, has focused on individual tort claims. The purpose of this research is to consider the unique characteristics of mass torts, particularly those that generate from latent injuries, with regard to the likely effect of currently popular tort reforms. The various tobacco litigation efforts are employed as mechanisms within which to undertake this consideration. The results indicate that care in designing tort reforms is necessary if modifications are to be effective in reducing the litigation costs associated with mass torts. Furthermore, research into the social benefit of various system structures currently being debated is warranted. The risk management and insurance community is interested in the debate and related reforms, both for purposes of reducing costs and for the purpose of increasing certainty of liability outcomes.

If British lawmakers look to other jurisdictions for ideas as to how to reform tort law, it is not unlikely that they will turn their attention to Australia. Tort reform legislation swept across Australia at the start of the 21st Century. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to reflect upon what might be learned by British legislators from the Australian tort reform experience. It is hoped that this analysis might, in particular, assist legislators to understand, if they conclude that British tort law requires wider-scale statutory reforms than has occurred to date, which provisions in the Australian legislation might usefully be replicated or which at least deserve to be given serious consideration as a model for reform in Britain. It is also hoped that the analysis will help British legislators to appreciate which of the Australian provisions stand as nothing but warnings. Due to the small amount of space available only a handful of the Australian changes can be addressed. The analysis centres, therefore, on the most significant or interesting changes or those that seem to have the greatest prospect of being copied in Britain.

Medical Malpractice: Trends in Litigation

From his vantage point as president of a large multispecialty group practice. Dr Montgomery has observed the direct effects that medical malpractice liability has had on healthcare costs. Here he offers a counterpoint to the Clinton plan's malpractice provisions and enumerates his own recommendations for meaningful tort reform.

1 See Richland, Municipal Law: Local Government Liability Insurance and Tort Reform, N.Y.L.J., May 22, 1986, at 1 (over 163 towns in New York State reported a premium increase of up to 100%; over 41 towns reported an increase of up to 400%); N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1986, at A26, col. 1 (editorial) (California's Orange County experienced six-fold increase in premiums); Sawyer, How a Good Town Became a Bad Risk, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1986, at A6, col. 6 (insurance premium for Schaghticoke, N.Y., increased 400% in course of one year). 2. Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1986, at 41, col. 2 (reporting on indications that 'quite a few' New Jersey municipalities can't get insurance); Sullivan, U.S., States Seeking Ways to End Liability Insurance Crisis, Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 7, 1986, at 4, col. 3 (Blue Lake, Cal., lost its liability insurance policy and flew flag upside down as signal of distress); Wolinsky, Insurance Crisis Forecast for Most California Cities, L.A. Times, Feb. 28, 1986, at 3, col. 3 (estimating that two-thirds of California cities will be forced to go without liability coverage, while 43 cities already lack coverage); see also N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1986, at A26, col. 1 (editorial) (discussing need for proposals to smooth out effects of insurance business cycles); telephone interview with Mark Wasser, General Counsel to California Local Agency Self-Insurance Authority (Jan. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Wasser Interview] (stating that joint insurance pools were formed in response to cyclical nature of commercial insurance rates). 3. See Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities, A.B.A. J., July, 1986, at 48, 51 (1986) (reform of state tort systems expected in reaction to liability crisis); Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1587-89 (1987) (discussing tort reform); Wash. Post, Nov. 20, 1987, at C4, col. 1 (Virginia facing problems regarding liability insurance despite prior legislative action); Weintraub, 9 Bills Limiting Governmental Liability Pass Key State Panels, L.A. Times, Aug. 25, 1987, at 3, col. 2 (legislation passed to limit state and local government liability); Pasztor, White House Switches Focus to States in Bid for Liability-Insurance Revisions, Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1987, at 48, col. 2 (in 1986, 30 states adopted laws that in some way limit liability claims); Richland, supra note 1, at 2, col. 3 (discussing New York state proposal to amend rule of joint and several liability, and abolish collateral-source rule in reaction to insurance crisis); Sullivan, supra note 2, at 4, col. 1 (as of March 1986, 44 states with legislatures in session had tort reform bills pending); N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1986, at A26, col. 1 (editorial) (insurers call for tort reform to limit local government liability). In California, a bill calling for a state insurance pool was recently passed by the state assembly. CAL. GOV'T CODE ?? 6599.01-.41 (West Supp. 1988). Under the California law, a state-instituted liability fund, administered through the Local Agency Self-Insurance Authority (LASIA), provides municipalities with insurance coverage for all tort liability over $1,000,000 and under $25,000,000 not met by private insurers. The fund is supported by premiums paid by municipalities, membership fees, and interest earned on money in the fund. The fund and its administration are separate from the state government, and the state is not directly responsible for the fund or for torts committed by any municipality covered under the plan. The program's sponsor stressed that [plublic entities are among those most severely affected by the unavailability of liability insurance. Cities and counties are particularly affected because of their high contact with people who use public facilities, especially streets, highways, parks and beaches. D. Hauser, Liability: Local Agency Self-Insurance Authority 1 (Aug. 26,