Noninterference with Dynamic Security Domains and Policies

Information flow policies are confidentiality policies that control information leakage through program execution. A common way to enforce secure information flow is through information flow type systems. Although type systems are compositional and usually enjoy decidable type checking or inference, their extensibility is very poor: type systems need to be redefined and proved sound for each new variation of security policy and programming language for which secure information flow verification is desired.In contrast, program logics offer a general mechanism for enforcing a variety of safety policies, and for this reason are favoured in Proof Carrying Code, which is a promising security architecture for mobile code. However, the encoding of information flow policies in program logics is not straightforward because they refer to a relation between two program executions.The purpose of this paper is to investigate logical formulations of secure information flow based on the idea of self-composition, which reduces the problem of secure information flow of a program P to a safety property for a program derived from P by composing P with a renaming of itself. Self-composition enables the use of standard techniques for information flow policy verification, such as program logics and model checking, that are suitable in Proof Carrying Code infrastructures.We illustrate the applicability of self-composition in several settings, including different security policies such as non-interference and controlled forms of declassification, and programming languages including an imperative language with parallel composition, a non-deterministic language and, finally, a language with shared mutable data structures.

Formal verification of information flow security with dynamic policies of security-critical systems is a grand challenge. This paper presents the first effort to formally specify and verify a capability-based system model with dynamic information flow policies. We build a generic security model with dynamic security policies. In the security model, we define a set of information flow security properties and provide an inference framework for them. Based on the security model, we propose a system model for capability-based secure systems. The system model specifies critical events including system initialization, inter-domain communication, and capability management. We prove information flow security of the capability-based model by an unwinding theorem. Formal specification and security proof are carried out in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover and could be applied to formally develop and verify the security of capability-based secure systems, such as separation kernels and secure hypervisors. To our knowledge, this is the first machine-checked proof of capability-based information security with dynamic policies.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for enhancing security policy management in the Grid.Design/methodology/approachThe Grid security policy reconciliation problem is presented. A generic view on the security policy notion is adopted and the security policy ontology notion is introduced and used.FindingsIn the course of this work it was found that, in order to enhance security policy management in the Grid, Grid entities should have the ability to negotiate their security policies. It was also found that, in order to achieve security policy negotiation, effective security policy semantics manipulation towards security policy reconciliation is needed. Finally, it was established, through the use of an example, that if appropriate means are used for security policy reconciliation then incompatible security policy representations can be transformed into compatible ones.Research limitations/implicationsResearch limitations stem from the adoption of a generic view on the security policy notion and the selection of identification and authentication security policies as the focal point of the proposed framework. Research implications include the possibility of examining how existing security policy reconciliation models can be incorporated in this generic framework. The possibility of investigating how such a framework can lead to a security policy knowledge management tool for Grid administrators is also demonstrated.Practical implicationsPractical implications of this work include the establishment of a common framework for security information exchange between Grid entities.Originality/valueThis paper proposes a framework for enhancing security policy management in the Grid. The proposed framework can be used by researchers as a reference and by security experts in order to reduce ambiguity concerning the interpretation of security policies expressed in different forms, by negotiating Grid entities.

Chapter 18 - Creating Effective Corporate Security Policies

The study focuses on collective norms concerning the use of force to inform the analysis of national and European security and defence policy. In particular, it aims to shed some light on the question of why members of the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’ in Iraq subsequently supported further steps towards an autonomous and effective European Security and Defence Policy. We analyse collective defence norms in Britain and Poland by means of a qualitative analysis of press debates before, during and after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Our findings indicate that the salience and vigour of the debates varied strongly and so did the areas of normative contention. In the British press, debates centred on normative conflicts surrounding the relationship with the US, international authorisation, and the legitimacy of regime change as a goal for the use of force. In Poland, debates were far less intense and centred on the need to show solidarity with a trusted ally in need. We conclude that strategic norms, in particular revolving around the attachment to the US as a security partner, have become less of a problem for the evolution of ESDP but for different reasons in each case.

The article examines the key challenges of the European security system and the threats Ukraine and the EU face with. The author notes the onset of an era of global conflict and instability. The text analyzes Ukraine's path to integration with the EU, its main stages, achievements, and unresolved problems. Attention is paid to the study of the dangers that have arisen because of Russia's aggressive retro-imperial policy, and the importance of consolidation of the EU member states to counter Russian encroachments is shown. It’s also emphasized that Ukraine's contribution to European security is growing considerably, but the country needs more comprehensive support and assistance from European and other democratic states in the world. The author points out the problems in the EU itself in developing and ensuring an effective foreign and security policy, especially in view of the subversive activities of the so-called Putin's circle of friends. The vital importance of granting Ukraine and Moldova the status of candidates for EU membership is underlined as well as a fundamental decision to start accession negotiations with both countries. Attention is also drawn to the need to reform the EU itself, primarily to ensure its greater ability to respond to emerging challenges and threats.

The configuration of security mechanisms in automotive on-board networks makes it necessary to define and deploy adapted security policies. This paper discusses how to design policy engines that implement an effective enforcement in such architectures despite the complexity of the protocol stacks of on-board electronic control units. It also evaluates how policies expressed in XACML can be adapted to the automotive environment efficiency requirements despite the limited computational power of those units and network bandwidth limitations.

The security policies of an application can change at runtime due to several reasons, as for example the changes on the user preferences, the lack of enough resources in mobile environments or the negotiation of security levels between the interacting parties. As these security policies change, the application code that copes with the security functionalities should be adapted in order to enforce at runtime the changing security policies. In this paper we present the design, implementation and evaluation of a runtime security adaptation service. This service is based on the combination of autonomic computing and aspect-oriented programming, where the security functionalities are implemented as aspects that are dynamically configured, deployed or un-deployed by generating and executing a security adaptation plan. This service is part of the INTER-TRUST framework, a complete solution for the definition, negotiation and run-time enforcement of security policies.KeywordsSecurity enforcementSecurity policyAspect-Oriented ProgrammingDynamicity

The replacement of European Political Cooperation (EPC) by a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the terms of the 1993 Treaty on European Union (TEU) promised to create a much more effective European foreign policy within the context of a new commitment to external policy as a whole, including for the first time security and defence policy. Under TEU, it will be recalled that the EC was transformed into an EU constructed upon three ‘pillars’, the second of which contained CFSP. Thus CFSP immediately became one of the new Union activities and may appropriately be labelled Union foreign policy. An intergovernmental approach to foreign policy was reinforced by the pillar structure, but it was envisaged that CFSP would be integrated into other Union activities in ways that appeared to resolve continuing debates between integrationists and intergovernmentalists.

In the globalized business world, financial information security management (FISM) and corporate risk management (CRM) have become critical elements for ensuring business sustainability and gaining a competitive advantage. The security of financial information not only protects the financial integrity of businesses but also supports long-term success by enhancing reputation management, regulatory compliance, and stakeholder trust. However, the necessity of addressing the relationship between financial information security and corporate risk management within a holistic framework has not been sufficiently emphasized in the literature, especially with the increasing threats in cybersecurity. This gap creates uncertainties regarding how businesses should integrate financial information security into their risk management strategies. The purpose of this study is to analyze the interaction between financial information security management and corporate risk management and to provide a practical and applicable framework for integrating financial information security into business risk management strategies. The study examines how financial information security management is integrated into corporate risk management processes (risk identification, assessment, response, and monitoring) and its impact on organizational performance (cost reduction, efficiency improvement, and competitive advantage). Considering major financial crises and cyberattacks, the global impact of financial information security threats on businesses, national economies, and the global financial system is increasingly being discussed. In this context, the study highlights the critical importance of FISM and CRM for businesses and presents concrete examples of the risks that may arise if these two concepts are not considered together (data breaches, financial losses, reputational damage, legal sanctions). The study systematically reviews existing approaches in the literature (such as ISO 27001 and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework) to contribute to the development of effective financial security and risk management policies for businesses.This study employs qualitative research methods, including a literature review and expert opinions. By analyzing current studies and industry reports, the relationship between financial information security and corporate risk management is examined in depth.In conclusion, integrating financial information security management with effective corporate risk management policies plays a crucial role in enhancing business sustainability, gaining a competitive advantage, and reducing costs. Businesses must adopt a holistic management approach that incorporates cybersecurity measures, financial risks, and regulatory requirements. This comprehensive approach is essential for ensuring long-term success and maintaining a competitive edge in today's dynamic business environment.

Software-defined networking offers new opportunities for protecting end users by designing dynamic security policies. In particular, security chains can be built by combining security functions, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and services for preventing data leakage. The configuration of these security functions and their associated policies is based on behavioural models of end-user applications when accessing the network. In this demo, we present our tool Synaptic, a SDN-based framework intended for the formal verification of security policies as well as for automatically generating such policies based on automata learning methods applied on NetFlow records of end-user applications collected at the device level.

: Commanders have operated in multiple security domains since the advent of national security classification structures and command and control systems. Planning, execution, and control in JIIM environments demands the movement of information between the security domains of all participants. Cross-domain solutions facilitate the necessary transfers, but only for systems designed to operate at multiple security levels or with multilevel security. Cross-domain solutions are also constrained by cost and security policies. Interoperability certification processes in the DOD components must require explicit identification of cross-domain requirements so the necessary resource flows are incorporated into system design. Multiple security level systems should expand their functions to provide cross-domain capability to commanders until multilevel security solutions become more prevalent and less costly. Capability developers should incorporate enterprise cross-domain services into objective architectures, in anticipation of DISA and DODIIS provisioning. Research and development efforts beyond the 2013 Future Years Defense Program should focus on domain convergence.

Over the years, computer systems have evolved from centralized monolithic computing devices supporting static applications, into client-server environments that allow complex forms of distributed computing. Throughout this evolution, limited forms of code mobility have existed. The explosion in the use of the World Wide Web, coupled with the rapid evolution of the platform-independent programming languages, has promoted the use of mobile code and, at the same time, raised some important security issues. This chapter introduces mobile code technology and discusses the related security issues. The first part of the chapter deals with the need for mobile codes and the various methods of categorising them. One method of categorising the mobile code is based on code mobility. Different forms of code mobility, like code on demand, remote evaluation, and mobile agents, are explained in detail. The other method is based on the type of code distributed. Various types of codes, like source code, intermediate code, platform-dependent binary code, and just-in-time compilation, are explained. Mobile agents, as autonomously migrating software entities, present great challenges to the design and implementation of security mechanisms. The second part of this chapter deals with the security issues. These issues are broadly divided into code-related issues and host-related issues. Techniques, like sandboxing, code signing, and proof-carrying code, are widely applied to protect the hosts. Execution tracing, mobile cryptography, obfuscated code, and cooperating agents are used to protect the code from harmful agents. The security mechanisms, like language support for safety, OS level security, and safety policies, are discussed in the last section. In order to make the mobile code approach practical, it is essential to understand mobile code technology. Advanced and innovative solutions are to be developed to restrict the operations that mobile code can perform, but without unduly restricting its functionality. It is also necessary to develop formal, extremely easy-to-use safety measures.

We present Relational Hoare Type Theory (RHTT), a novel language and verification system capable of expressing and verifying rich information flow and access control policies via dependent types. We show that a number of security policies which have been formalized separately in the literature can all be expressed in RHTT using only standard type-theoretic constructions such as monads, higher-order functions, abstract types, abstract predicates, and modules. Example security policies include conditional declassification, information erasure, and state-dependent information flow and access control. RHTT can reason about such policies in the presence of dynamic memory allocation, deallocation, pointer aliasing and arithmetic. The system, theorems and examples have all been formalized in Coq.

We present PIDGIN, a program analysis and understanding tool that enables the specification and enforcement of precise application-specific information security guarantees. PIDGIN also allows developers to interactively explore the information flows in their applications to develop policies and investigate counter-examples. PIDGIN combines program dependence graphs (PDGs), which precisely capture the information flows in a whole application, with a custom PDG query language. Queries express properties about the paths in the PDG; because paths in the PDG correspond to information flows in the application, queries can be used to specify global security policies. PIDGIN is scalable. Generating a PDG for a 330k line Java application takes 90 seconds, and checking a policy on that PDG takes under 14 seconds. The query language is expressive, supporting a large class of precise, application-specific security guarantees. Policies are separate from the code and do not interfere with testing or development, and can be used for security regression testing. We describe the design and implementation of PIDGIN and report on using it: (1) to explore information security guarantees in legacy programs; (2) to develop and modify security policies concurrently with application development; and (3) to develop policies based on known vulnerabilities.