Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and The Soviet Union

This article surveys China's policy towards nuclear non-proliferation regime and contests view that China has now completed transition from a challenger to an upholder of global non-proliferation regime. It argues that the learning curve hypothesis and bureaucratic politics and profit motives arguments provide only a partial explanation of China's shifting but ambiguous and contradictory policy towards non-proliferation. China has cleverly played the proliferation card by exploiting loopholes in nonproliferation regime and contradictions in major power relationships so as to serve its national security interests. The article examines factors that have led Beijing to disregard non-proliferation regime in past and might make it continue to do so in future. It also analyses changing Asian security environment and its impact on China's nonproliferation commitments in future. Introduction The global nuclear non-proliferation (NNP) regime is an outgrowth of steps taken during second half of twentieth century to halt horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The NNP regime consists of several components. These are Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded in 1957; 1953 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) banning testing of nuclear weapons in atmosphere, outer space, or under water; 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which was extended indefinitely in 1995; London-based Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG), formed in 1974, which requires IAEA safeguards on all of its participants' nuclear exports; 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aimed at halting proliferation of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems; 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement (a successor to Cold War era's COCOM) covering conventional weapons and dual-use exports; and Zangger Committee which covers nuclear-related exports. T he 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has yet to come into force, further constrains all states from conducting nuclear tests. In addition, nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs) in Latin America, South Pacific, and Africa have further strengthened regime. In 1995, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) proposed establishment of a NWFZ in Southeast Asia, and in 1997 five Central Asian states issued Tashkent statement proposing a NWFZ for Central Asia. The overall record of NNP regime has been a mixture of success and failure. On positive side, five decades of international efforts at curbing spread of nuclear weapons have created a political and normative climate in which no state can easily declare its nuclear intentions. The unsuitability of nuclear weapons to most military situations also renders them useless. Moreover, a number of nuclearcapable states -- notably Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan -- have in recent years agreed to abandon strive for, or dismantle their nuclear weapons capabilities. In this sense, regime has been fairly successful. On negative side, campaign for nuclear disarmament appears to be failing just when success seemed at hand. Since mid1980s, regime has been undermined by emergence of new suppliers of nuclear technology and delivery systems, as well as by an increase in number of threshold or new nuclear weapons states (NWSs).. Apart from five declared NWSs (the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China), and two new self-declared NWSs (India and Pakistan), several other nations (Israel, Japan, North Korea, and Iran) are widely believed to have made significant progress towards acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. The changes in international system and global nuclear balance of power since end of Cold War have thrown up new challenges and opportunities for NNP regime. …

The article is an attempt to explain the IAEA’s critical role in ensuring global nuclear safety and on the global nuclear governance system. The objective of the Agency’s operation is promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including the use of energy to produce electricity, along with establishment of a system of safeguards to ensure that the countries do not use the peaceful assistance for military purposes.The aim of the article is to present the principles of the internationalsystem of nuclear safeguards and the role of the IAEA in maintaining nuclear peace and nuclear challenges of non-proliferation regime reform. The duality of nuclear technology (dual use) causes the need of strengthening the competence-control and institutional resources of the IAEA. It is necessary to oblige the Member States to cooperate with the Agency’s inspectors. The Agency should also develop a procedure to standardize the rules, structure, and legal restrictions. In addition the UN Security Council should react faster in the case of non-compliance detection. A separate issue is the internationalization of the fuel cycle.

Since 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has expanded its role in nuclear security. While it was only intended to focus on promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy in line with safeguards implementation to prevent nuclear proliferation, its mandate has, in time, evolved to address the emerging threats to nuclear technology, i.e., nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. In this historical perspective, the article analyses the development of the IAEA's nuclear security framework. Over time, there have been key points, such as the need for physical protection in the 1970s and the establishment of comprehensive security measures after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Currently, the IAEA's nuclear security program consists of guidance, training, and international cooperation efforts, which are only available upon the request of Member States. More recently, it has expanded its nuclear security efforts to provide technical assistance and monitor nuclear safety and security in conflict zones. However, this expansion has not been easy for the IAEA as it has challenges such as funding limitations and the tension between national sovereignty and international oversight. Ultimately, the IAEA's nuclear security role as the global platform shows its critical importance in enhancing international efforts to mitigate nuclear security threats. However, while the IAEA has made important progress in nuclear security, structural and political limitations constrain its effectiveness.

Regimes to control weapons of mass destruction have been impressively effective, making nuclear acquisition less simple and significantly more expensive. Yet despite these mechanisms, a few states still find it to their self-defensive, prestigious, or strategic advantage to develop nuclear weapons, regardless of the dramatic international response to these proliferation decisions. India, in 1974 and then again in 1998, made such a decision, testing a nuclear device and announcing its intention to become a nuclear weapons state. Since this announcement, India has been an international nuclear pariah, a status compounded by its refusal to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the comprehensive test ban treaty, or the fissile material cut-off treaty.1 It is this breach ofthe international regime that has raised questions, frustration, and even anger about the 2005 announcement that India and the United States were negotiating a civilian nuclear transfer agreement, effectively transforming 35 years of American and international nuclear policy. Detractors from the agreement declared the end ofthe international nonproliferation regime, arguing that the deal rewards India's nuclear proliferation and signals to other aspiring nuclear states that legitimacy is gained by those that wait it out. Supporters ofthe deal argue that the regime has been so strict in implementing the principles of nonproliferation and disarmament that there has been no room for states like India, undermining the regime's ineffectiveness.Canada made the decision to pursue its own nuclear transfer agreement with India in August 2008, following negotiations at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, yet few analyses have examined the effects such a deal would have on Canada's own foreign policy. Not only has this decision determined Canada's own nuclear position, but it changes Canada's nuclear relationship with the United States and the larger international nuclear regime, and affects its broader South Asian foreign policy.While the bulk of debate has focused on the deal's nonproliferation and disarmament effects, this article argues that the Canadian decision to sign a deal has major positive outcomes. First, the article offers a brief nuclear history of Canada's bilateral relationship with India. It goes on to establish the context of US nuclear policy leading up to the deal, particularly in relation to the events of 11 September 2001. It then details the central objectives ofthe so-called 123 deal (after section 123 ofthe US Atomic Energy Act), particularly India's energy requirements and the US nonproliferation stipulations; examines the major arguments for and against the 123 agreement in the area of international nonproliferation, with a focus on how these perspectives relate to Canada's nuclear objectives; and, finally, discusses three major arguments supporting the Harper government's decision to sign a civilian nuclear deal with India.CANADA'S HISTORICAL NUCLEAR RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIAFor obvious reasons, Canada's nuclear policy developed in parallel to its bilateral relationship with India. At the time of India's independence, there was a friendly relationship between India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Canada's Louis St. Laurent and Lester B. Pearson. Nehru's commitment to peaceful civilian nuclear energy and global disarmament was assuring to Canadian leaders, who insisted that India begin its civilian nuclear program with investment in the CANDU reactor. While Canada was committed to the idea of peaceful nuclear energy, there was hesitation by some members ofthe government who recognized that India's nuclear interests might be less benign than once assumed. Canada's decision to move forward with a nuclear transfer relationship with India was based on three arguments. First, it was possible that other states would offer India nuclear technology, but at least Canada would be in a position to offer the adequate safeguards to stop proliferation. …

The issue of international responsibility arising from nuclear activities is one of the fundamental challenges in international law due to the wide-ranging impacts of nuclear incidents on humans and the environment. Despite advancements in the development of international treaties such as the Vienna and Paris Conventions, these frameworks still suffer from significant limitations and shortcomings, underscoring the need for substantial reforms. This article first examines ambiguities in legal definitions, including the lack of precise definitions for nuclear damage and hazardous activities, and then analyzes the deficiencies in international treaty systems, such as weak enforcement mechanisms and geographical and legal discrepancies between treaties. Furthermore, the conflict between customary rules and international treaties and the imbalance in the distribution of responsibilities between states and nuclear operators are assessed as barriers to the fair implementation of nuclear liability. Solutions such as designing a comprehensive liability system combining civil and criminal responsibility, establishing international compensation funds, strengthening oversight of nuclear activities through transparent and independent mechanisms, and imposing legal sanctions on violators are proposed. The necessity of enhancing international cooperation through strengthening the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and creating comprehensive conventions with robust enforcement mechanisms is also emphasized. The article concludes that reforming international treaties and designing an efficient and comprehensive legal framework not only improves the management of nuclear crises but also enhances global trust in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

This chapter clarifies the content and operation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which works to ensure the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It examines the content and status of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, including the concomitant situation in Iran. It also outlines the role of the United Nations (UN) Security Council with respect to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). The chapter talks about the operation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR), which was initiated by like-minded countries in order to address the increasing proliferation of nuclear weapons. It covers the development and use of nuclear weapons and mentions new technologies under development for their delivery.

The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) provides advanced capabilities to simulate the uranium enrichment process to support international negotiations on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Uranium isotope separation centrifuges connected in a cascade configuration can produce the low-enriched uranium needed for nuclear power. However, those same centrifuges connected in a different configuration can also produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Having the capability to assess cascade operations and identify nefarious activities promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while restricting nuclear weapons proliferation. DNN R&D's Nonproliferation Stewardship Program Adaptive Computing Environment and Simulations (ACES) project is creating a modern, sustainable ecosystem of physics-based models and data-analytics tools that enables analysts to model uranium enrichment systems, simulate operational scenarios, and apply various policy options to explore potential outcomes.

South Africa was one of the first states to conclude an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2002, allowing the IAEA greater right of access to safeguard nuclear activities and material. In light of this, some observers in the arms control community find it odd that South Africa’s representatives at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) would be the main objectors to making the conclusion of an Additional Protocol a precondition for states wishing to import uranium enrichment and reprocessing technology (classified as sensitive nuclear technology and material). The South African objection should be viewed as only the most recent in a series of objections to measures that may seem obviously in line with nuclear non-proliferation. This emerging pattern in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy and, more specifically, the objection to the Additional Protocol condition are related to its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and can be investigated through the lens of a politics of denial. Denial is the act of saying “no”, but it is also in psychological parlance the unconscious thought process manifesting a refusal to acknowledge the existence of certain unpleasant aspects of external reality. It will be argued that South Africa’s opposition to the Additional Protocol condition can be explained in the context of two instances of denial: (i) a perceived denial by the nuclear haves of what the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty codifies as an inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology – something that South Africa is cautious to be complicit in; and (ii) the nuclear weapon states’ denial (the psychological meaning) of the unpleasant reality of a hypocritical nuclear order – something that South Africa wants to expose or at least something with which to engage to limit the effects for itself and other NAM members. The politics of denial does not yield to a pragmatist/utopian dichotomy in the nuclear realm, but instead reveals the dialectic nature of realism and idealism in nuclear politics, especially as reflected in South Africa’s nuclear diplomacy.

For the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the peaceful uses of nuclear energy include not only electrical power generation, but also its application for medical, agricultural, and industrial purposes. This chapter focuses on the narrow use of nuclear energy for power generation. The share of nuclear power generation as a percentage of world power generation has been slowly declining after it peaked at close to 20 percent around 1996. The fast-growing economies of China and India have resulted in greater electricity generation more by burning coal and other fossil fuels than rapidly introducing nuclear power. Nuclear power generation produces spent nuclear fuel, but only very few countries, such as Finland and Sweden, have found places to dispose of their spent nuclear fuel. Other countries—the United States, Japan, France, Switzerland, South Korea, and Taiwan among them—are struggling to find places for the permanent disposition of spent nuclear materials.

A survey is presented of the transport of nuclear and other radioactive material in Germany. The amount of transport of spent fuel shipments for more than 25 years is gi ven. For example, at present, more shipments are carried out within Germany to the licensed interim storage facilities since the possibility of a direct final storage was introduced into legislation in 1994. Since the transport is the part of the nuclear fuel cycle which brings the fuel into the closest contact with the public, the general protests against the peaceful use of nuclear energy often culminate in activities during the transport of radioactive material, and the paper reports some particular events in this field. The influence of the development of the nuclear industry in Germany on the shipments of radioactive material is also given. One of the provisions in the shipment approval concerning the German atomic energy law for the licence holder is the ‘48-hours-notification’: this means that at least 48 h in advance, special authorities and also the Federal Office for Radiation Protection have to be informed about the transport (e.g. date and time of the shipment, consignor, consignee, type and mass of the material). Thus, much data exists in the Federal Office for Radiation Protection, especially for the transport of nuclear material and also for the transport of other radioactive material with a high amount of radioactivity (large sources). The choice of the mode of transport plays an important role in various aspects with respect to radiation exposure, physical protection, the use of the packagings, and others, The influence of these issues on the mode of transport is investigated.

Peaceful use of nuclear energy and the problem of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

The German Nuclear Society (KTG) is a non-profit scientific technical association with more than 2500 members. KTG strives for the development and dissemination of the stateof-the-art in nuclear science and technology to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and related disciplines. In 2009 the KTG has celebrated its 40 anniversary. The technical work of the KTG members is performed in the framework of currently 9 topical sections, which for instance jointly organize the KTG Annual Meetings, topical meetings devoted to selected subjects and several other activities. In recent years, the topical sections Reactor Safety, Thermal and Fluid Dynamics, as well as Reactor Physics and Computational Methods, have successfully established a series of meetings on “Topical Issues of Reactor Safety Research in Germany”. These meetings represent a forum for authorities, operators, technical support organizations, and vendors. A Technical Programm Committee (TPC) consisting from members of the participating topical sections, is responsible for selecting the issues to be addressed at the meeting. The acceptance and success of this series of meetings is mainly due to the current subjects dealt with. Also this forum offers the chance for a free exchange of opinions outside licensing and supervisory procedures. A balance is presented between survey papers on the background and the state of the art in the related field, specific technical presentations, and outlook papers. The participants are provided with a general overview on the area addressed and with new ideas and impetus for their future work. In order to further promote these kind of meetings the TPC has initiated co-operation with the Independent Journal for Nuclear Engineering, Energy Systems, Radiation and Radiological Protection KERNTECHNIK. For enhanced dissemination of the state-of-the-art, the key papers of the meetings are published in special issues of the journal. The 2010 meeting on “Topical Issues of Reactor Safety Research in Germany” was held at the Forschungszentrum Dresden-Rossendorf (FZD) on October 7–8 2010. It was hosted by the Institute of Safety Research (IfS) of FZD. The second day of the 2010 meeting was devoted to the ensurance of emergency core cooling (ECC) at PWRs and BWRs during loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCA) involving the release of thermal insulation material, which may lead to the clogging of the sump or the wet well strainers. The presentations were assigned to three sessions: “Overview and International Situation”, “Experiments and Model Development” and “Ensuring the Emergency Core Cooling for PWRs and BWRs”. A selection of these presentations is published in this special issue of KERNTECHNIK. In 1977, the first precursor of such a strainer clogging event occurred in BWR Gundremmingen (KRB-A), Germany. During an overfeeding transient a safety valve was damaged leading to a LOCA and almost complete release of the thermal insulation material around the break area. Some portions of the released material were collected in front of the strainers. Since KRB-A had an emergency condenser the ECC system was not started. Therefore, no coolant loaded with mineral fibers was sucked in and the fibrous material did neither clog the strainers nor enter the core. Nevertheless, the analysis of the event identified the potential of fiber entry and deposit into the core and its influence on core cooling. Because of the decommissioning of KRB-A the safety case of this event was inadequately assessed and the conclusions drawn were insufficiently distributed nationally, as well as internationally. Further events with release of insulation material and/or the clogging of strainers by mineral wool or other types of material later on occurred, for instance the Swedish NPP Bareback-2 (1992), and the US NPPs Susquehanna-2 (1988), Perry (1993), and Limerick-1 (1995). In German PWRs and BWRs several strainer modifications and backfittings were implemented over the last 10 years. These measures take into account the recommendations of the German Reactor-Safety Commission (RSK) on the robust demonstration of the effectiveness of the ECC during loss-of-coolant accidents involving the release of insulation material or other substances and on the removal of deposits from the PWR strainers by back flushing as required for PWRs in the RSK statements of July 2004 and March 2008. The RSK requirements are based on the following fundamental acceptance criteria:

The success of any new build project is reliant upon all stakeholders — applicants, vendors, contractors and regulatory agencies — being ready to do their part. Over the past several years, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) has been working to ensure that it has the appropriate regulatory framework and internal processes in place for the timely and efficient licensing of all types of reactor, regardless of size. This effort has resulted in several new regulatory documents and internal processes including pre-project vendor design reviews. The CNSC’s general nuclear safety objective requires that nuclear facilities be designed and operated in a manner that will protect the health, safety and security of persons and the environment from unreasonable risk, and to implement Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. To achieve this objective, the regulatory approach strikes a balance between pure performance-based regulation and prescriptive-based regulation. By utilizing this approach, CNSC seeks to ensure a regulatory environment exists that encourages innovation within the nuclear industry without compromising the high standards necessary for safety. The CNSC is applying a technology neutral approach as part of its continuing work to update its regulatory framework and achieve clarity of its requirements. A reactor power threshold of approximately 200 MW(th) has been chosen to distinguish between large and small reactors. It is recognized that some Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) will be larger than 200 MW(th), so a graded approach to achieving safety is still possible even though Nuclear Power Plant design and safety requirements will apply. Design requirements for large reactors are established through two main regulatory documents. These are RD-337 Design for New Nuclear Power Plants, and RD-310 Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants. For reactors below 200 MW(th), the CNSC allows additional flexibility in the use of a graded approach to achieving safety in two new regulatory documents: RD-367 Design of Small Reactors and RD-308 Deterministic Safety Analysis for Small Reactors. The CNSC offers a pre-licensing vendor design review as an optional service for reactor facility designs. This review process is intended to provide early identification and resolution of potential regulatory or technical issues in the design process, particularly those that could result in significant changes to the design or analysis. The process aims to increase regulatory certainty and ultimately contribute to public safety. This paper outlines the CNSC’s expectations for applicant and vendor readiness and discusses the process for pre-licensing reviews which allows vendors and applicants to understand their readiness for licensing.

The Hungarian Parliament’s Decision 25/2009 (IV.2.) gave the approval to start preparatory activities for establishing new reactors on-site at Paks Nuclear Power Plant. Furthermore, Hungary ratified a treaty with the Russian Federation, signed in Moscow on January 14, 2014, for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Through these activities, Hungary has made its commitment to nuclear energy clear. In this article, we attempt to prove that neither the law of the European Union, nor the current national legislation can present obstacles to this decision. At the same time, we will draw upon the circumstances that accompanied the decision-making process. In doing so, we will reveal that by violating the access to information, public participation and integration and precautionary principles, the legitimacy of this decision was needlessly damaged.

The history of the WMD control regime began in the early years of the United Nations with the most ambitious plan, the Baruch Plan, to create an international authority responsible for the development and peaceful use of nuclear energy. It would take custody of all fissionable material and technological information essential for producing nuclear weapons. It would also verify the freeze on weapons production and the destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Although the plan was not accepted, it launched a process that broadened the arms control objective to include chemical and biological weapons and classified them all together as weapons of mass destruction, a concept used to distinguish them from conventional weapons. All the proposals that evolved during the first decade were then pulled together to form a comprehensive model for General and Complete Disarmament (GCD). The model was then considered to be unrealistic as a basis for negotiating a convention for phased across-the-board disarmament to be implemented by a single international disarmament and verification organization. However, it established a firm conceptual foundation and an outline of partial or collateral measures that would be separately negotiated as building blocks towards verified disarmament in all areas.