Nuclear Security for Newcomer Countries

On 7 November 1996, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) initiated a series of international nuclear emergency exercises (INEX-2) involving specific Member country nuclear facilities. The first of these exercises is to be conducted in conjunction with a regional exercise (FORTUNA) in Switzerland and south-western Germany. The sponsorship of such exercises by the OECD/NEA started in 1993 with INEX-1.

In the view of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the decision-making of safety supervision of civil nuclear facilities needs independence. In order to deeply evaluate and review a series of issues related to the safety of civil nuclear facilities, national regulatory authorities usually need to consult independent institutions or external committees with professional capabilities. Such organizations providing technical services are called Technical Support Organizations (TSO), which can be national laboratories, research institutions or consulting units. In some cases, support from professional organizations in other countries may also be required. Most of the world’s major nuclear power countries adopt an independent nuclear safety supervision model. All along, China has continuously strengthened the construction of nuclear safety supervision capacity, and the safety supervision capacity has been gradually improved. China has established a nuclear and radiation safety supervision system, including National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) as the decision-making department for nuclear and radiation safety supervision, six regional nuclear and radiation safety supervision stations, Nuclear and Radiation Safety Center (NSC) and other units. China has established a nuclear safety expert committee, and mainly relies on the National Nuclear and Radiation Safety Supervision Technology R & D Base (R & D Base) as the central level test, verification and R & D platform to provide consultation and technical support. The R & D base has completed the construction of some test, verification and R & D functions. China has built a series of important laboratories in the R & D base, it still has not formed R & D system. In the future, China need to improve the technical support capacity of nuclear safety supervision. In short, the independence of nuclear safety regulatory decision-making requires to enhance from institutional independence to capability independence. The independence of China’s nuclear safety regulatory authority has been basically established. In the future, it is more important to improve the regulatory capacity. Only by establishing a perfect technology R & D system can nuclear safety decision-making be based on sufficient scientific basis.

Since 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has expanded its role in nuclear security. While it was only intended to focus on promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy in line with safeguards implementation to prevent nuclear proliferation, its mandate has, in time, evolved to address the emerging threats to nuclear technology, i.e., nuclear terrorism and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. In this historical perspective, the article analyses the development of the IAEA's nuclear security framework. Over time, there have been key points, such as the need for physical protection in the 1970s and the establishment of comprehensive security measures after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Currently, the IAEA's nuclear security program consists of guidance, training, and international cooperation efforts, which are only available upon the request of Member States. More recently, it has expanded its nuclear security efforts to provide technical assistance and monitor nuclear safety and security in conflict zones. However, this expansion has not been easy for the IAEA as it has challenges such as funding limitations and the tension between national sovereignty and international oversight. Ultimately, the IAEA's nuclear security role as the global platform shows its critical importance in enhancing international efforts to mitigate nuclear security threats. However, while the IAEA has made important progress in nuclear security, structural and political limitations constrain its effectiveness.

14 - Nuclear power plant systems

Various Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) around the globe have begun to recognise the strategic importance of Knowledge Management (KM) initiatives in achieving sustained high levels of operational performance. Although these organisations have been involved in KM-related activities for some time, they typically have not viewed and managed these activities from a KM perspective. Several NPPs have been early adopters of KM practices in the nuclear industry and have been proactive in implementing company-wide KM programmes. However, at most NPPs, the concepts and benefits of KM are only beginning to be understood and have yet to be applied. Effective KM enhances a firm's capability to assimilate, create and exploit knowledge. KM is widely recognised in both the management literature and in practice as an important enabler of long-term organisational performance. Its role is particularly important in technology-intensive industries such as the nuclear power industry. This paper summarises the preliminary findings of research being done at Atomic Energy Canada Ltd. (AECL) to explore the link between KM practices and NPP organisational performance. These initial findings are based on a review of the literature and meetings with NPP managers during several nuclear power station visits. The research is being conducted in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The United Kingdom has signed a new international convention on the safety of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste. The agreement, signed in Vienna on the 40th Anniversary of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), sets tough international obligations for the management of these materials to ensure the protection of both the public and the environment.

Concerned about the sustainability of its oil and gas reserves, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been taking steps to diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on natural resource exports. The most eye-catching of these changes has been the rapid development of Dubai as a finance, services and travel hub in the last decade. A further plank in this strategy has recently been revealed: UAE plans to embark upon a nuclear power programme. Emphasising transparency and close cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it hopes to have the first of its reactors on line by 2017.

This article presents an analysis of international documents on the justification of monitoring systems in areas where nuclear facilities are located. The main international organization that regulates radiation safety, including requirements for the organization of radiation control and monitoring of radioactive contamination of the environment, is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA Statute authorizes the Agency to establish safety standards to protect health and minimize the consequences to life and property of activities involving the use of radiation technologies. The IAEA safety standards must be used in its own work, and IAEA member states can apply them by incorporating them into their nuclear and radiation safety regulations. Regularly reviewed IAEA safety standards are a key element of the global regime for the protection of people and the environment.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the key multilateral global nuclear governance body, describes itself as the ‘global platform’ for nuclear security efforts, with a ‘central role’ in facilitating international cooperation in the field. After initial contestation among member states about whether the IAEA’s mandate encompassed it, nuclear security has now been universally accepted as a valuable mainstream IAEA activity. Although states still insist that nuclear security is primarily their responsibility, the Agency’s programme continues to evolve and grow and can barely meet demand for its services. It has been particularly effective in promulgating recommendations for enhancing nuclear security at the national level and in advising and assisting states in striving for higher standards. Since the end of the Nuclear Security Summit process in 2016, the IAEA has taken on the role of principal conference convenor, involving a ministerial meeting and increasingly creative technical presentations and side events. The Agency faces the usual dilemmas of international organizations in being constrained by what its member states will allow and by financial and technical limitations. This can result in modest advances after painstaking negotiations and lowest-common-denominator approaches. With a more expansive mandate, sharper prioritization and evaluation of its activities, and guaranteed funding through the regular budget, the IAEA could make a significantly greater contribution to preventing nuclear terrorism.

A lack of knowledge acquisition (LOKA), among engineering staff members in supply firms (e.g., vendors), owner/operator utilities (e.g., licensees), and in regulatory agencies (e.g., the NRC), can impair nuclear power plant (NPP) safety in ways that can persist throughout the operating lifetime of an NPP. A LOKA occurs when experienced technical reviewers fail to pass enough information, or technology, to less-experienced technical reviewers. The existence of a LOKA, among technical reviewers, can lead to errors and omissions that can result in misleading or incomplete licensing bases. Eight examples of errors and omissions are presented, each of which is evaluated in the context of physical phenomena, logic, licensing strategy, and effects upon regulation. These errors and omissions could be attributed to several causes, one of which could be a LOKA. Reliable attribution to a LOKA or its causes is not directly addressed, since attention is focused principally upon the safety implications of errors and omissions that may possibly, but not exclusively, be due to a LOKA. The epistemology of a LOKA, which may consider training or human relations, is generally addressed in other studies, which apply to issues that affect more than the nuclear power industry. If those who design, analyze, license, operate, and regulate NPPs do not adequately understand and apply proven engineering principles, standards, and established regulations, critical thinking, and sound logical reasoning, then it could be said that a LOKA exists. A LOKA could hamper the development of defensible conclusions in safety analyses, viable licensing strategies, and fair regulatory judgments. Eight examples of errors and omissions are presented, each of which leads to a conclusion that seems to conflict with an industry standard, a federal regulation, an engineering principle or physical phenomenon, or just plain logic. The examples are generally evaluated in accordance with the requirements of a well-known, oft-cited nuclear industry standard, which is now almost half a century old. This standard was published in 1973 by the American Nuclear Society (ANS) (1973, Nuclear Safety Criteria for the Design of Stationary Pressurized Water Reactor Plants, La Grange Park, IL, ANS-N18.2-1973). It expresses the fundamental principle of nuclear safety and licensing, which is applied by vendors, licensees, and regulators alike. This Standard defines nuclear safety criteria and plant design requirements for plant operating situations or events according to their expected frequencies of occurrence. Those events that have high frequencies of occurrence must not pose a danger to the public. Events that could pose the greatest danger to the public must be limited, by design, to extremely low expected frequencies of occurrence. This concept is implemented by grouping postulated plant situations (or events) into categories that are defined according to their expected frequencies of occurrence. Licensees are required to present analyses and evaluations of the events, in each category, to demonstrate that the events’ consequences do not exceed the category’s specified acceptance limits. Furthermore, licensees are required to demonstrate that certain events would not develop into more serious events (e.g., events that would be grouped into more serious, higher-consequence categories), without the concurrent occurrence of independent faults. That is, the Standard (American Nuclear Society, 1973, Nuclear Safety Criteria for the Design of Stationary Pressurized Water Reactor Plants, La Grange Park, IL, ANS-N18.2-1973) requires that NPPs must be designed in a way that does not allow high-frequency, low-consequence events to degrade into high-frequency, high-consequence events. The errors and omissions that are considered in the example evaluations could be due to a LOKA, among other possible causes. In each example, a LOKA is sufficient; but not necessary, to produce the noted errors and omissions. Attention is focused upon the safety implications of a LOKA, not its epistemology. The LOKA in the nuclear power industry, including its regulators, is ongoing, since it is not recognized and remedied.

Korea has been achieving the world best safety and economic performance of nuclear power plants through continuous technology development and asset management optimization since its first nuclear power reactor was introduced in the late 1970s. While most countries have stopped building new nuclear power plants since the severe accident in TMI nuclear plant in 1979, Korea has been steadily developing its own reactor models and constructing new nuclear plants. In addition, Korea won recent new nuclear plant project of United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a result of these efforts. A nuclear power plant consists of a great variety of complex equipment having state-of-the-art technologies, and the highest nuclear safety and equipment reliability are required. Therefore, the most sophisticated systematic engineering asset management is essential to the nuclear power plant. As a responsible company of operating and constructing all nuclear power plants in Korea, Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co. (KHNP) has developed its own asset management model for the nuclear power plants in operation and expanded the model into the new plants under construction. Since the asset management model was developed for the various equipment types in the nuclear power plant, it can be easily utilized in other industries as a highly effective asset management model. This paper presents new and innovative methods to refine and improve existing asset management practices in general plants by diagnosing KHNP’s physical asset management model. It contributes to the development and improvement of an advanced asset management model for general plant industries and utilities to meet the objectives of securing a clean environment, improved public health and safety, and general community well being.

Verification of Correctness and Completeness in the Implementation of IAEA Safeguards: The Law and Practice

The subject of this paper is scientific description of the terms nuclear security and nuclear safety, with reference to international legal aspects and necessary holistic approach to these concepts. Taking into account that there are overlapping and inconsistent use of the abovementioned terms in both domestic and foreign literature, the aim of this paper is to describe them precisely, point to the main differences and similarities in terminology, in order to enable their understanding, adequate use in scientific and professional literature, as well as holistic approach in practice. The connection between the terms stems from their common goal - protection of people and the environment from harmful influence of radioactivity, whereas the terms diverge in areas where the requirements for achieving nuclear security and nuclear safety are in complete contradiction. Nuclear security refers to the protection of nuclear materials and facilities from unauthorized access, theft and abuse, with primary focus being on preventing criminal activities. Nuclear safety, on the other hand, has an aim to prevent accidents in nuclear facilities, as well as to protect people and the environment from potentially harmful influence of radioactivity. Holistic approach requires integration of nuclear security and safety measures, in order to achieve synergy between the two concepts, and, at the same time, make sure that their implementation does not jeopardize one another. This way, societies and states can reduce risks to nuclear materials and facilities, both from unauthorized access and potential hazards arising from nuclear processes and facilities.

Problem setting. The pace of in Ukraine affects all state institutions through systemic changes in state regulation mechanisms. In terms of scope and content, the mechanisms of state regulation lead to profound social transformations, which allow us to assert that Ukraine is undergoing a new stage of qualitative changes that can produce other social practices, including in the field of nuclear energy. The responsibility for the successful implementation of these is exacerbated by the fact that they occur against the background of the obvious crisis of the world order, systemic internal and external challenges - the need to counter hybrid terrorist threats to territorial integrity and sovereignty, economic and man-made society. which leads to a focus on profitable economic activity and disrupts the natural course of social development. Under the outlined conditions, the development of the nuclear industry is impossible without the effective application of methods of state regulation that fully take into account its features and specifics, which will comprehensively and timely ensure nuclear and radiation safety. In this regard, the existing regulatory framework, which is a hierarchical system of legal norms, becomes a priority for Ukraine in the development of the legal mechanism of state regulation of the safe use of nuclear energy. Therefore, the scientific search for existing ways to improve, as well as conceptualize and implement new for Ukraine mechanisms of state regulation in the field of nuclear energy, consistent with the approaches of the European Union (EU) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), become especially relevant and important. A special place in this process is occupied by the legal mechanism of state regulation in the field of nuclear energy use in Ukraine. Recent research and publications analysis. It should be noted that issues related to the study of management mechanisms in recent decades are in the field of scientific interests of many scientists, such as V. Averyanov, G. Atamanchuk, V. Afanasyev, V. Bakumenko, E. Grigonis, L. Grigoryan. , N. Yesypchuk, V. Knyazev, M. Koretsky, O. Korotych, M. Kruglov, P. Nadolishny, N. Nyzhnyk, O. Obolensky, G. Odintsova, Y. Tikhomirov, L. Yuzkov and a number of other scientists. However, despite the applicability of this definition, approaches, content and structure are interpreted differently: there is both identification with the mechanism of the state, economic or economic mechanism, and the opposition of the essence of the concept. A significant contribution to the development of certain legal aspects of the problem under study was made by legal scholars, in particular: H. Balyuk researched the formation and formation of nuclear law in Ukraine and conceptual and legal reforms in the field of ecology in Ukraine and modern challenges; S. Yershova researched legal regulation of economic relations (relations) of nuclear power plants of Ukraine; S. Plachkova studied the state regulation of nuclear and radiation safety in Ukraine. Analysis of recent research and publications shows that government regulation in the field of nuclear energy has been studied in part, from different scientific points of view. The paper objective – to carry out analysis of the theoretical and methodological foundations of the legal mechanism of state regulation of safe use of nuclear energy and identify factors that contribute to improving the efficiency of the process of targeted state influence in this area. Main material. State regulation in the field of nuclear energy can be defined as supporting and regulatory activities of the state, implemented on the basis of theoretical and methodological principles (doctrines, concepts, values, principles, guidelines, goals, objectives) through a system of organized, targeted, comprehensive actions (measures) and mechanisms for achieving them (means, methods, levers and tools of influence) and aimed at creating favorable conditions and environment for nuclear and radiation safety, human protection from radiation, through the priority of banning certain activities and state supervision in the field of use nuclear energy. Development and legal consolidation of norms and rules of relations of subjects of state regulation in the field of nuclear energy use, establishment of requirements to forms of legal regulation, gives to state regulation internal coherence which is provided by timeliness of their acceptance and application, completeness and stability. Direct influence is exercised through instruments of administrative and legal nature, which regulate the activities of the executive body. the functional sphere of state regulation in the field of nuclear energy use is manifested through the process of purposeful influence on facilities that are not necessarily subordinated to the relevant executive body. Accordingly, state regulation in the field of nuclear energy use is a dynamic process of state influence on facilities operating in the field of nuclear energy use and providing technical support to the executive branch. Conclusions of the research. The study found that government regulation in the field of nuclear energy is aimed at protecting life, health, property, length protection, as well as establishing ways to organize the organization of activities, licensing rules, location of activities and provision of services. In other words, state regulation in the use of nuclear energy involves organized systemic actions to ensure sustainable and balanced functioning of the economic, environmental, social subsystem, aimed at ensuring nuclear and radiation safety of the population and the environment. Approaches to understanding the essence of state regulation determine the ways of organizing relations between the state and the subjects of activity, the choice of which is based on the specifics of the sphere and the goals of the state that are implemented.

Historically in the United Arab Emirates, security personnel stationed at nuclear sites were typically men with military or policing backgrounds. Although these groups bring important, transferrable skills and experience to the nuclear security mission, some Emirati stakeholders recognize the increased benefit of a greater diversity of voices and backgrounds within the nuclear security team hierarchy. By recruiting from a wider range of disciplines and encouraging gender diversity, the security team could develop broader insight into security challenges, and a greater variety of perspectives could bring forth more innovative solutions. When aligning a diverse, multinational workforce with a common mission, all members of a security organization must fundamentally change their individual approaches to the work; the entire staff must be on the same page. This can be particularly challenging for some people who find it difficult to transition from a framework of beliefs because of past experiences based on prescriptive, exclusionary, hierarchical thought. Also, national cultural values are learned early, held deeply, and change slowly over the course of generations, and inherent biases rooted in these values can create barriers to the collective progress of a team. Creating a more open, diverse, and transparent culture for the team by accepting a unique, egalitarian, professional nuclear security culture that all members adhere to can be a challenging task for some. In this article, I share my experiences related to professional roadblocks, personal challenges, and lessons learned, particularly those regarding the empowerment of women in science and engineering, while developing and establishing the United Arab Emirates nuclear security program. I also discuss the support (and underrepresentation) of women, including those currently in critical leadership positions, and their careers in nuclear security.