Oppenheimer and public support for arms control negotiations

It has been 50 years since the adoption of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which established the obligation upon all States Parties to work towards nuclear disarmament under Article VI. Yet, despite extensive reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles since the Cold War peaks, nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts are currently in disarray. After the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was terminated in 2019, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty remains as the only bilateral limitation on United States (US) and Russian nuclear forces in operation and is due to expire in February 2021. The US has justified its limited nuclear disarmament progress on the premise that the current international security environment is not conducive to further nuclear disarmament. Instead, the US has recently promoted a new initiative called Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND). The initiative aims to provide a platform for all States to engage in constructive dialogue to identify ways to improve the international security environment, which make nuclear deterrence necessary while addressing the hurdles that currently impede progress towards nuclear disarmament. Significantly, the US regards CEND as an ‘effective measure’ and an illustration of its commitment towards disarmament under Article VI. This article seeks to address the US claim that CEND represents a good faith, effective measure towards nuclear disarmament pursuant to Article VI. This will revisit existing doctrinal interpretative debates concerning the obligation under Article VI, particularly the requirements that negotiations and measures be adopted in good faith, and what constitutes an effective measure towards nuclear disarmament. The discussion will then determine whether the CEND initiative itself can be considered a good faith, effective measure towards nuclear disarmament, by considering its purpose, origins and implementation, and actions of the US.

SummaryShifts in U.S. nuclear policies under the Trump Administration may affect Japan in significant ways. The demands of formulating a coherent set of policies and implementing them, and dealing with pushback from other states and domestic opposition make it hard to anticipate exactly what U.S. nuclear policies may look like under Donald Trump. President Trump, however, has been outspoken on nuclear policy issues, and even though the statements are often contradictory, they offer some insight. These statements form the basis of this analysis.This essay looks at how United States nuclear arms control and disarmament policies may change over the next few years. It begins by looking at Trump's views on nuclear arms control issues, including the New START agreement and U.S. plans for modernization, the possibility of new nuclear weapons and a resumption of nuclear testing. It then looks at Trump's views on U.S. nuclear posture, including the question of the first use of nuclear weapons. The essay also examines how the President has viewed the challenge of nuclear proliferation, especially the case of North Korea and U.S. policy toward Japan. Finally, with talks to begin in March 2017 on a UN mandated treaty to ban nuclear weapons, the essay looks at the abolition of nuclear weapons.

Journal Article Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries and The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Get access Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries. Onkar Marwah and Ann Schulz (Eds.). Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. 1976. (Distributed in UK by John Wiley, Chichester.) 348 pp. £9.80.The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control. By William Epstein. New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan. 1976. 341 pp. £10.50. Lawrence Freedman Lawrence Freedman 1Chatham House Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 53, Issue 4, October 1977, Pages 642–643, https://doi.org/10.2307/2616240 Published: 01 October 1977

The slogans of the "walkers for peace " in the Uniled Slates of America anti in Western Europe (and also in South Africa) against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology as well as the growing probability of a nuclear war in the light of president Reagan's rearmament plan, arc born of the numerous failures of nuclear disarmament and arms control. The ever- increasing danger that goes along with nuclear proliferation in the sense of weapon production and the handling of radioactive waste urges us to look more seriously than ever at nuclear technology. The article deals with some of the efforts to control the proliferation process as well as efforts to limit or reduce nuclear arms. Some essential factors that negatively influence the discussions are pointed out and finally it is concluded that because of the sin-induced brokenness of man’s heart, control over nuclear arms proliferation has just partial success. The abolition of weapon production and total disarm­ ament are ideals that will, in this era that precedes the second coming of Christ, not be fulfilled. Thus, the nuclear arms race will inevitably continue.

Traditionally, the term nuclear arms control is strongly associated with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or Russian-American bilateral agreements. Besides the US-Russia regime, there is at least one more interesting case in the world, which certainly deserves attention — a specific case of India-Pakistan relations in this field. These two countries had to interact in a very peculiar regional and bilateral context, and thus they have formulated their specific understanding of basic concepts of nuclear arms control. The world’s current situation is developing towards revising nuclear arms control mechanisms and possible expansion of multilateral formats of arms control negotiations. Although these states possess nuclear weapons, they are outside the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. Yet, Pakistan and India could be potentially involved in the extended format of the debate. So, the understanding of their bilateral practices addressing nuclear arms control mechanisms is necessary for the initiation of a constructive discussion with them. The measures taken by the two Governments are not regarded as arms control in the classical Western approach to research in this field. Still, the authors suppose reviewing the Pakistani attempts to establish the peculiar South Asian bilateral nuclear arms control between India and Pakistan.

This chapter discusses the nuclear arms race in terms of its technological aspects and its political implications. It explains biological and chemical weapons, theory of conflict and some regional case studies. Weapons and strategy interact because it is the quality of nuclear weapons that determines their strategic uses, while at the same time strategic thinking may be an important factor in weapon developments. There is ample evidence that at present the nuclear arms race is strongly technologically determined. The general problems of nuclear armament and arms control were introduced from different perspectives of academic disciplines and diplomatic practice. But most participants were agreed that nuclear weapons have had a deep impact on the practice and theory of international politics. An issue that come up in most discussions on conventional, biological, chemical, and nuclear disarmament is the problem of verification. International politics being basically anarchic, planned general and complete disarmament is impossible.

Nuclear disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation

Nuclear disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and security

Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future by Henry D. Sokolski is a compact book of just three chapters and running 135 pages, but it is likely to unnerve any reader who knows about the growing stockpiles of separated plutonium and stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium. Discussions revolve around the need for a well-protected second-strike capability, the call for a new generation of nuclear weapons that would be easier to use, and the growing interest in the early use of tactical nuclear weapons to quickly de-escalate a conflict. The book commences with the current popular views on nuclear proliferation and proceeds to analyze the consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Three currently-held views – arms control, hawkish, and academic neorealist – are analyzed in-depth. The first of these schools – arms control – postulates that nuclear weapons are ineffective at deterring aggression, their use is extremely remote, and proliferation is of no vital consequence. To buttress this argument, they cite examples of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Korean and Vietnam wars, and the terror attacks of 9/11 in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008. Hence, John Mueller concluded that “nuclear weapons do a poor job of deterring small or major wars” (9). The Obama administration went on to make reducing nuclear arms a prerequisite for preventing their future spread (6). However, hawkish supporters of nuclear weapons hold the view that reducing American and Russian nuclear arms has a negligible impact on the nuclear ambitions of other countries; North Korea and Iran are cited as apposite examples. Therefore, they believe that nuclear weapons in the U.S. and allied hands help maintain peace.

A SUSTAINED DEBATE continues over the moral issues of nuclear deterrence, defense, and arms control. Much attention has been given to the draft pastoral letters on this subject prepared by the NCCB Ad Hoc Committee on War and Peace. A final version of this letter is to be issued by the American Catholic bishops this spring. The extensive publicity surrounding the drafts of the pastoral letter and the concomitant debates over the nuclear freeze and related antinuclear initiatives have resulted in a widespread familiarity with the principal assumptions and judgments, as well as the methodology, of the American bishops' committee. Official indications are that the final version of the letter will be essentially the same as the second draft. However, the committee chairman, Cardinal Joseph Bernardin, has stated that further clarification of the committee's views on the communist threat and nuclear deterrence will be forthcoming. In any event, the pastoral letter to be issued should be viewed more as a starting point for continued study and discussion than as a definitive moral analysis of the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence, defense, and arms control in a world of conflict. Accordingly, this analysis proceeds independently of the work of the bishops' committee. Cognizance is taken of the pastoral letter as an important source of Catholic teaching. However, as the committee itself has acknowledged, many of the normative judgments in the letter turn on factual assumptions and projections about which reasonable people disagree. Moreover, the committee's application of just-war doctrine to nuclear issues is subject to criticism. This article anticipates the promulgation of the spring pastoral by submitting an alternative view. This view is based on a different reading of the material facts and just-war doctrine pertinent to nuclear deterrence, defense, and arms control than that evidenced in the second draft pastoral letter and to be anticipated in the final version. This alternative view is offered as a contribution to the further study and debate that will surely follow the bishops' letter. The analysis will proceed in the following order: (1) The meaning of just-war doctrine will be explored in the light of the injunction of Vatican

The idea of arms control has hardly taken root in South Asia. The existing nuclear arms control measures between India and Pakistan are patently inadequate for addressing the pressing nuclear concerns of the region. Although there are compelling reasons for nuclear arms control, India and Pakistan are reluctant to undertake worthwhile arms control initiatives. There are three key reasons for this: India and Pakistan are currently at the formative phase of their nuclear force-building and at this stage they are unlikely to undertake arms control measures fearing that it may affect their future force-building plans; their intense political rivalry is unfavorable for successful arms control; the extra-regional links—the China factor—of South Asia's security dilemma hinders prospects for arms control in the region. Owing to these factors, the prospects for successful arms control between India and Pakistan are not great in the foreseeable future, although the question remains as to how long they can ignore the issue.

Nuclear arms control and disarmament processes have stalled in recent years, and there is concern, especially among non-nuclear states, that the nuclear risk-reduction measures previously called for are not being met. One of the most important of these is the need for no first use (NFU) commitments to be given by all the nuclear weapon states (China and India have already done so.) The idea has been given recent impetus in the United States, especially as President Biden prepares the next US Nuclear Posture Review. Some states under the US nuclear umbrella, however, have expressed resistance to this idea, even as NFU would be highly-useful in reducing nuclear dangers. This paper argues that Australia, even though it is not formally under a US nuclear umbrella, has an important role to play in furthering prospects for NFU. The paper suggests ways in which this might be done.

In January 2023, the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved the hands of the Doomsday Clock forward to 90 s before midnight, reflecting the growing risk of nuclear war [1]. In August 2022, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that the world is now in ‘a time of nuclear danger not seen since the height of the Cold War’ [2]. The danger has been underlined by growing tensions between many nuclear-armed states [1, 3]. As editors of health and medical journals worldwide, we call on health professionals to alert the public and our leaders to this major danger to public health and the essential life support systems of the planet, and we urge action to prevent it. Current nuclear arms control and non-proliferation efforts are inadequate to protect the world's population against the threat of nuclear war by design, error or miscalculation. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) commits each of the 190 participating nations to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control [4]. Progress has been disappointingly slow, and the most recent NPT review conference in 2022 ended without an agreed statement [5]. Many examples of near disasters have exposed the risks of depending on nuclear deterrence for the indefinite future [6]. Modernisation of nuclear arsenals could increase risks: for example, hypersonic missiles decrease the time available to distinguish between an attack and a false alarm, increasing the likelihood of rapid escalation. Any use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic for humanity. Even a ‘limited’ nuclear war involving only 250 of the 13,000 nuclear weapons in the world could kill 120 million people outright and cause global climate disruption leading to a nuclear famine, putting two billion people at risk [7, 8]. A large-scale nuclear war between the USA and Russia could kill 200 million people or more in the near term and potentially cause a global ‘nuclear winter’ that could kill five to six billion people, threatening the survival of humanity [7, 8]. Once a nuclear weapon is detonated, escalation to all-out nuclear war could occur rapidly. The prevention of any use of nuclear weapons is therefore an urgent public health priority, and fundamental steps must also be taken to address the root cause of the problem – by abolishing nuclear weapons. The health community has played a crucial role in efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war and must continue to do so in the future [9]. In the 1980s, the efforts of health professionals, led by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), helped to end the Cold War arms race by educating policy makers and the public on both sides of the Iron Curtain about the medical consequences of nuclear war. This was recognised when the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to IPPNW [10] (http://www.ippnw.org). In 2007, IPPNW launched the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which grew into a global civil society campaign with hundreds of partner organisations. A pathway to nuclear abolition was created with the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017, for which the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons was awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize. International medical organisations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, IPPNW, the World Medical Association, the World Federation of Public Health Associations, and the International Council of Nurses, played key roles in the process leading up to the negotiations and in the negotiations themselves, presenting the scientific evidence on the catastrophic health and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons and nuclear war. They continued this important collaboration during the First Meeting of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which currently has 92 signatories, including 68 member states [11]. We now call on health professional associations to inform their members worldwide about the threat to human survival and to join with IPPNW to support efforts to reduce the near-term risks of nuclear war, including three immediate steps on the part of nuclear-armed states and their allies: first, adopt a no first-use policy [12]; second, take their nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert; and, third, urge all states involved in current conflicts to pledge publicly and unequivocally that they will not use nuclear weapons in these conflicts. We further ask them to work towards a definitive end to the nuclear threat by supporting the urgent commencement of negotiations among the nuclear-armed states for a verifiable, time-bound agreement to eliminate their nuclear weapons in accordance with commitments in the NPT, opening the way for all nations to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The danger is great and growing. The nuclear-armed states must eliminate their nuclear arsenals before they eliminate us. The health community played a decisive part during the Cold War and more recently in the development of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We must take up this challenge again as an urgent priority, working with renewed energy to reduce the risks of nuclear war and to eliminate nuclear weapons. The respective authors were paid by their employers. CZ's time was funded by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. IH and AH developed the idea of the editorial and led drafting, along with CZ. All other coauthors contributed significantly to the editorial content.

For the last ten years the Disarmament NGO Canadians for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (CNWC) has conferred a “Distinguished Achievement” award on an individual who has contributed to advancing nuclear disarmament. Paul Meyer, an Adjunct Professor of International Studies at Simon Fraser University, a Director of the Canadian Pugwash Group and a former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament was the recipient of the 2022 award. In connection with the award, Meyer delivered on 28 November 2022 a public lecture at the University of Ottawa’s Centre for International Policy Studies. The lecture addressed contemporary nuclear threats, described current efforts at nuclear arms control and disarmament and proposed five actions that the Canadian Government could take to advance its disarmament goals.

Toward Nuclear Abolition presents the inspiring, dramatic story of how citizen activists helped curb the arms race and prevent nuclear war. Examining events from 1971 to the present, the author continues the account he began in two earlier volumes, One World or None and Resisting the Bomb. The book shows how pressure from the Nuclear Freeze campaign in the United States, the European Nuclear Disarmament campaign, and comparable movements around the world foiled the nuclear ambitions of hawkish government officials and forced them toward nuclear arms control and disarmament. A leading historian and peace researcher, the author combines extensive scholarly research with a pathbreaking account of how the largest mass movement of modern times saved the world from nuclear annihilation.