- Research Article
3
- 10.2139/ssrn.2009366
Optimal Stock Selling Based on the Global Maximum
- Feb 23, 2012
- SSRN Electronic Journal
- Min Dai + 2 more +2
Optimal Stock Selling Based on the Global Maximum
Optimal Stock Selling/Buying Strategy with Reference to the Ultimate Average
Optimal Stock Selling Based on the Global Maximum
Optimal Stock Selling Based on the Global Maximum
Spillover Effect of Consumer Awareness on Third Parties’ Selling Strategies and Retailers’ Platform Openness
Global e-commerce sales have experienced unprecedented growth for the past years and have reached over $2 trillion annually. One interesting phenomenon along with this remarkable growth is that giant online retailers, such as Amazon.com in the United States and JD.com in China, open their platforms and allow third-party sellers to offer products there, thus inviting competition. We explore why an online retailer would open its platform and why a third-party seller would join the platform. We highlight the role of a spillover effect that, when the third-party seller joins the retailer’s platform, more consumers become aware of the third-party seller’s existence and its products which are not even listed on the retailer’s platform. We characterize how the third-party seller’s optimal selling strategies should vary with and how the retailer’s openness decision should be determined by the extent of the spillover effect and the retailer’s initial awareness advantage. Compared with the case without a spillover effect, the spillover effect makes the retailer less likely to open its platform, but it makes the third-party seller more likely to sell identical products on an open retailer platform; the spillover effect always (weakly) benefits the third-party seller, but it does not necessarily hurt the retailer.
Read morePricing Models in the Presence of Informational and Social Externalities
This thesis studies three game theoretic models of pricing, in which a seller is interested in optimally pricing and allocating her product or service to a market of agents, in order to maximize her revenue. These markets feature a large number of self-interested agents, who are generally heterogeneous with respect to some payoff relevant feature, e.g., willingness to pay when agents are consumers or private cost when agents are firms. Agents strategically interact with one another, and their actions affect other agents' payoffs, either directly through social influence or competition, or indirectly through a review system. The seller has demand uncertainty and strives to optimize expected discounted revenues. I use either a mean-field approximation or a continuum of agents assumption to reduce the complexity of the problems and provide crisp characterizations of system aggregates and equilibrium policies. Chapter 2 considers the problem of an information provider who sells information products, such as demand forecasts, to a market of firms that compete with one another in a downstream market. We propose a general model that subsumes both price and quantity competition as special cases. We characterize the optimal selling strategy and find that it depends on both mode and intensity of competition. Several important extensions to heterogeneous production costs, information quality discrimination, and information leakage through aggregate actions are studied. Chapter 3 considers the problem of optimally extracting a stream of revenues from a sequence of consumers, who have heterogeneous willingness to pay and uncertainty about the quality of the product being sold. Using an intuitive maximum likelihood procedure, we characterize the solution of consumers' quality estimation problem. Then, we use a mean-field approximation to characterize the transient dynamics of quality estimates and demand. These allow us to simplify and solve the monopolist's problem, and ultimately provide a characterization of her optimal pricing policy. Chapter 4 considers the problem of a seller who is interested in dynamically pricing her product when consumers' utility is influenced by the mass of consumers that have purchased in the past. Two scenarios are studied, one in which the monopolist has commitment power and one in which she does not. We characterize the optimal selling strategy under both scenarios and derive comparisons on equilibrium prices and demands. Our main result is a characterization of the value of price commitment as a function of the social influence level in the market.
Read moreOptimal selling time in stock market over a finite time horizon
In this paper, we examine the best time to sell a stock at a price being as close as possible to its highest price over a finite time horizon [0, T], where the stock price is modelled by a geometric Brownian motion and the ‘closeness’ is measured by the relative error of the stock price to its highest price over [0, T]. More precisely, we want to optimize the expression: $$V^* = \mathop {\sup }\limits_{0 \leqslant \tau \leqslant T} \mathbb{E}[\tfrac{{V_\tau }} {{M_T }}] $$ where (Vt)t≥0 is a geometric Brownian motion with constant drift α and constant volatility σ > 0, \(M_t = \mathop {\max }\limits_{0 \leqslant s \leqslant t} V_s \) is the running maximum of the stock price, and the supremum is taken over all possible stopping times 0 ≤ τ ≤ T adapted to the natural filtration (Ft)t≥0 of the stock price. The above problem has been considered by Shiryaev, Xu and Zhou (2008) and Du Toit and Peskir (2009). In this paper we provide an independent proof that when \(\alpha = \tfrac{1} {2}\sigma ^2 \) , a selling strategy is optimal if and only if it sells the stock either at the terminal time T or at the moment when the stock price hits its maximum price so far. Besides, when \(\alpha > \tfrac{1} {2}\sigma ^2 \) , selling the stock at the terminal time T is the unique optimal selling strategy. Our approach to the problem is purely probabilistic and has been inspired by relating the notion of dominant stopping ρτ of a stopping time τ to the optimal stopping strategy arisen in the classical “Secretary Problem”.
Read moreOPTIMAL SELLING STRATEGY WITH A LARGE BLOCK OF STOCK
In this paper, we develop an optimal stock selling strategy with the stochastic upper bound of selling rate over an infinite time horizon. Moreover, the temporary and permanent price impact are considered. We treat the problem by using a fluid model. In the model that the number of shares is treated as fluid (continuous) and the overall liquidation is dictated by the rates of selling over time. The goal is to maximize the overall return under state constraints. The corresponding value function with the selling strategies is shown to be continuous and the unique viscosity solution to the associated HJB equation. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the result.
Read moreA Simulation Optimization Method for Coordination of Production, Transportation and Sales
This study considers a problem of coordinating production, transportation and sales in a multi-echelon supply chain network. A simulation model is built to generate the random customer demands at different locations, which are affected by a marketing strategy. Customer demands need to be satisfied by the supply chain through production, transportation and distribution. The optimization problem for coordination of production, transportation and distribution is first formulated as a linear programming with demands as input parameters in the constraint. Our objective is to maximize the expectation of the optimal profit of the supply chain given random demands by selecting an optimal marketing strategy. A simulation optimization technique is proposed to control the generation of random demands and solve the linear programming for efficiently learning the optimal marketing strategy. Numerical results show that our method can significantly improve the expected profit of the supply chain and reduce the computational burden of solving linear programming for achieving a given level of probability of correct selection of the optimal marketing strategy. Furthermore, we extend the optimization problem to a mixed integer programming and also demonstrate the computational efficiency of our proposed method.
Read morePeer-to-Peer Sharing of Subscription Services: A Non-Discriminatory Approach to Price Discrimination with Resale
Peer-to-Peer Sharing of Subscription Services: A Non-Discriminatory Approach to Price Discrimination with Resale
Price Discrimination with Demarketing
We study how demarketing interacts with pricing decisions to explain why and when it can be employed as the seller's optimal strategy. In our model, a monopolistic seller offers different price‐quality bundles of the product. A consumer's preference is private information. With demarketing, consumers must make a costly effort to purchase and/or utilize the product, whereas with marketing, the seller instead makes the effort so that the consumer's purchasing decision is independent of the cost of effort. Our result suggests that, for small or large effort costs, it is optimal for the seller to engage in marketing. For intermediate effort costs, however, demarketing can be optimal. With demarketing, the seller induces only the consumers with high valuation to make transaction effort. By doing so, the seller can price discriminate more effectively, thus extracting more surplus. We extend our analysis to the case where the seller can offer special deals through exclusive sales channels along with demarketing. Then, demarketing can be optimal even for large costs of effort.
Read moreAnalisis Game Theory pada Strategi Bersaing Alfamart dan Indomaret di Kebumen
Alfamart and Indomaret are the market rulers in Indonesia. According to research firm Nielsen, Alfamart and Indomaret take 87% market share (Gumiwang, 2019). Both retailers compete in opening their outlets which can influence marketing strategies and increase sales volume. This study aims to determine the optimal marketing strategy through game theory that is oriented towards the advantages of company facilities that are prioritized by customers and to find out what strategies are appropriate to be improved and maintained so that customers are more satisfied. Using the SPSS 24 Version tool to calculate the level of validity and reliability of each attribute given and also to determine a Cartesian chart to determine Importance Performance Analysis and use the POM-QM 4 software to determine what strategy is superior to Alfamart and Indomaret. The elements of the marketing mix used are Product , price, Promotion, Place, People, physical evidence and process. The purpose of this research is to get an optimal marketing strategy through game theory that is oriented to the advantages of company facilities that are prioritized by customers and to find out what strategies are appropriate to improve so that customers are more satisfied. The results showed that Alfamart was superior in implementing promotion strategies and Indomaret was superior in implementing product strategies.
Read moreIntegrasi ANP dan TOPSIS dalam Pemilihan Strategi Pemasaran yang Optimal
Creating a competitive advantage by providing value to customers has become a major focus in the formulation of marketing strategies. Making a good marketing strategy, companies can maximize the company's internal strengths and minimize existing weaknesses. CV ABC is a company engaged in the manufacture and supply of agricultural machinery, plantation machinery, fishery machinery, food processing tools and machinery and laboratory equipment. This research process uses the multi-criteria decision-making method Analytic Network Process (ANP) to determine the weight of the importance of the marketing resource evaluation criteria, as well as the TOPSIS method to obtain the best and ideal marketing strategy. The purpose of this research is to determine the optimal marketing strategy to be applied to the company. Therefore, this study uses the ANP method to obtain the relative weight of each criterion based on the respondents' subjective assessment of the company in CV ABC. To assess each marketing strategy, the TOPSIS method is used to rank the best and most ideal marketing strategies applied in the company. Based on the ANP results obtained, there are five criteria that are considered important in determining marketing strategies, these criteria are the ability to relate to customers (0,423), Reputation and Competition (0,208), Human Resource Assets (0,142), Market Innovation Ability (0,140), and Managerial Ability (0,088). The results of the ranking show that the differentiation strategy is the optimal marketing strategy for CV ABC.
Read moreModeling and application of we-energy in energy Internet
This study aims to propose we-energy (WE), which is a novel energy autonomous region. WE provides an energy management strategy for the local consumption of renewable energy, the plug-and-play of distributed generators, and the multi-energy complementation of production-consumption-storage integration. A quaternary model based on the information, physics, energy, and economic subsystems (Information-Equipment-Energy-Economical System, IEEES) was established to address the problems of multi-energy coordination and WE optimization under different operating conditions. Four operating modes of the WE were presented. Using the coupling characteristics of the abovementioned four subsystems, modal transformation was performed in accordance with the operational situation of the energy internet, and the corresponding state equations of the WE were established. The operation of the WE under several typical application scenarios, such as distributed optimization and coordinated control, was analyzed. An optimal marketing strategy between multiple WEs was established through economic optimization, which realized the appropriate allocation of energy sources inside the WE. Moreover, the coordinated control of inner devices of WE ensured the stability of both the parameters and energy exchange at grid-connected spots under fluctuating conditions.
Read moreA game theory approach to selecting marketing-mix strategies
PurposeAdopting efficient marketing strategies is a challenging task in a competitive market place involving complex marketing planning, techniques and mechanisms to identify the best course of action under these circumstances and finding optimal solutions or stable outcomes. Decisions and strategies of competitors in the market influence the selection of the appropriate marketing strategy. The main purpose of this paper is to develop a mathematical methodology based on the game theory approach for planning optimal marketing-mix strategies in dynamic competitive markets, taking into account strategic foresight and interaction effects.Design/methodology/approachThe game theory approach, as a decision-making tool in conflict situations, is suggested for planning and adopting optimal marketing strategy. The main intellectual attraction of the game theory is essentially a question of how to act in gaming situations against highly rational opponents A kind of static, finite and non-cooperative game analytics approach has been developed for this issue, and the proposed model has been implemented to design optimal marketing strategies for two top brands of the automotive parts market in Iran.FindingsThe findings of this study show that the optimal marketing-mix strategy for brand A is pricing and for brand B is the product strategy.Practical implicationsGame theory and the Nash equilibrium model can provide a practical approach to find and adopt the right strategy, know competitors' movements and strategies and get more profit.Originality/valueThe integration of the game theory approach into the marketing mix framework has been adopted as a generalized model for marketing strategy planning and analysis as well as to resolve some shortcomings of the marketing mix framework. The Nash equilibrium model has been used to analyze the results. The incorporation of game theory into marketing models has the potential to enrich the scope of marketing modeling.
Read moreThe Sound of Silence: Observational Learning in the U.S. Kidney Market
Mere observation of others' choices can be informative about product quality. This paper develops an individual-level dynamic model of observational learning and applies it to a novel data set from the U.S. kidney market, where transplant candidates on a waiting list sequentially decide whether to accept a kidney offer. We find strong evidence of observational learning: patients draw negative quality inferences from earlier refusals in the queue, thus becoming more inclined towards refusal themselves. This self-reinforcing chain of inferences leads to poor kidney utilization despite the continual shortage in kidney supply. Counterfactual policy simulations show that patients would have made more efficient use of kidneys had the concerns behind earlier refusals been shared. This study yields a set of marketing implications. In particular, we show that observational learning and information sharing shape consumer choices in markedly different ways. Optimal marketing strategies should take into account how consumers learn from others.
Read moreOptimal stopping time problem in a general framework
We study the optimal stopping time problem $v(S)={\\rm ess}\\sup_{\\theta \\geq S} E[\\phi(\\theta)|\\mathcal{F}_S]$, for any stopping time $S$, where the reward is given by a family $(\\phi(\\theta),\\theta\\in\\mathcal{T}_0)$ of non negative random variables indexed by stopping times. We solve the problem under weak assumptions in terms of integrability and regularity of the reward family. More precisely, we only suppose $v(0) < + \\infty$ and $(\\phi(\\theta),\\theta\\in \\mathcal{T}_0)$ upper semicontinuous along stopping times in expectation. We show the existence of an optimal stopping time and obtain a characterization of the minimal and the maximal optimal stopping times. We also provide some local properties of the value function family. All the results are written in terms of families of random variables and are proven by only using classical results of the Probability Theory
Read moreBiological application of optimal stopping time problem
In this paper, we develop some extensions of results proposed by Dayanik and Karatzas (2003) on optimal stopping time problem, and apply them to the Wright-Fisher diffusion process. In this respect, we study in details the important problem of boundary behaviour of the diffusion that approximates the Markov chain. As application, we find the perfect time to turn off the monitor genetic diseases. Precisely, we find the optimal stopping time at which, is maximised the probability that a sample of size n, taken from large infected population, consists only of uninfected individuals. We show that this maximal probability is nothing other than the probability of fixation of the infected allele in case of bounded scale function.
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