Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Free Will

The Commedia’s Metaphysics of Human Nature: Essays on Charity, Free Will and Ensoulment Humberto Ballesteros This dissertation aims to show that the Commedia develops an original and coherent philosophy of human nature. Deploying the methodologies of two separate disciplines, the history of philosophy and literary criticism, it places the poem’s ideas in the intellectual context in which they developed, and analyzes the learnedness, freshness and validity of its conclusions. The topic is divided in three themes, discussed in the same number of chapters: 1) Love and desire. After following Arendt in tracing a tension in Augustine’s works between the theological primordiality of dilectio Dei and the biblically endorsed importance of love for one’s neighbor, I argue that the Commedia develops a concept of social charity that seeks to reconcile that seminal Christian paradox. 2) Free will. Based on a study of the theory of free will advanced by Purgatorio and Paradiso, I advance the idea that Dante’s metaphysics and psychology of human freedom, particularly in regards to his description of the workings of absolute and relative will, contrast in a fundamental way with Aquinas’ in the Appendix of the Summa theologica; and based on that conclusion, and on an analysis of the example of Piccarda Donati, it is possible to conclude that the Commedia not only postulates a hierarchy of volitions as a necessary condition for human freedom, but also defines free will as the ability to formulate a self-forming action. 3) Body and soul. Based on the account of the creation of the universe found in Paradiso XXIX, I argue that the Commedia’s cosmos is strictly hylomorphic, and postulate that this theory also applies to the relationship between body and soul. Thus the transumanar depicted by the last canticle, far from a rejection of worldly existence, rather implies a reencounter with those inalienably human characteristics, but on a higher plane.

Peter van Inwagen, author of the classic book An Essay on Free Will (1983), has established himself over the last forty years as a leading figure in the philosophical debate about the problem of free will. This volume presents eleven influential essays from throughout his career, as well as two new and previously unpublished essays, 'The Problem of Fr** W*ll' and 'Ability'. The essays include discussions of determinism, moral responsibility, 'Frankfurt counterexamples', the meaning of 'the ability to do otherwise', and the very definition of free will, as well as critiques of writings on the topic by Daniel Dennett and David Lewis. An introduction by the author discusses the history of his thinking about free will. The volume will be a valuable resource for those looking to engage with van Inwagen's significant contributions to this perennially important topic.

Recently, psychologists and neurobiologists have conducted experiments taken to show that human beings do not have free will. Many, including a number of philosophers, assume that, even if science has not decided the free will question yet, it is just a matter of time. In The Experimental Approach to Free Will, Katherin A. Rogers accomplishes several tasks. First, canvasing the literature critical of these recent experiments (or of conclusions drawn from them) and adding new criticisms of her own, she shows why these experiments should not undermine belief in human freedom – even robust, libertarian freedom. Indeed, many of the experiments do not even connect with any philosophical understanding of free will. Through this discussion, she generates a long list of problems – ethical as well as practical – facing the attempt to study free will experimentally. With these problems highlighted, she shows that even in the distant future, supposing the brain sciences to have advanced far beyond where they are today, it will likely be impossible to settle the question of free will experimentally. She concludes that, since philosophy has not, and science cannot, settle the question of free will, it is more reasonable to suppose that humans do indeed have freedom. Brings together, and adds to, criticisms of recent experiments (or conclusions drawn from them) which supposedly show that human beings do not have free will Analyzes recent experiments supposedly related to human freedom through the lens of a philosophically informed portrait of a robust, libertarian free choice Develops a long list of problems – both practical and ethical – facing the experimental study of human freedom Proposes a thought experiment set in a distant future of advanced brain science to show that it is likely impossible for science ever to settle the question of free will.

Special Issue of Scientia et Fides Experimental psychology and the notion of personhood Editors: Scott Harrower (Ridley College, Australia), Ryan Peterson (Biola University, USA) Juan F. Franck (Universidad Austral, Argentina) Call for Papers The proposed Special Issue of Scientia et Fides aims at documenting and promoting high level integrative work that extends the insights of psychological science into the philosophical and theological discussions of what is a person. Psychological science is based upon empirical research and concepts that justifiably arise from data. It often requires the revision of previous models by asking new questions, thereby opening up new avenues for exploration in theological and philosophical debates that have gotten bogged down. Theology and philosophy would be thus greatly strengthened if these disciplines were able to warrant their claims and also nuance these based upon the findings of psychological science. There has been some remarkable mutual interdisciplinary enrichment in the study of free will, agency, moral attitudes, character building, and religious beliefs. This Special Issue capitalizes on the fruitfulness of such previous work, inviting cross-disciplinary studies on the relevance and import of psychological science for renovating philosophical and theological discussions on personhood. Philosophers, theologians and psychologists (especially those in the developmental and social fields), share a common interest in the notion of personhood. It is an anchor point that supports a rich phenomenological description of our human experience (embodiment, subjectivity, interiority, relationality, spirituality, morality and transcendence), it accounts for the metaphysical place of man in the great chain of being, and it also reflects the presence of the divine, thus illuminating the foundations of religion. The present call for papers welcomes a wide variety of views and subjects. It aims at overcoming the sterility of overly strict epistemological divides, at the same time as recognizing some necessary methodological distinctions. It therefore endeavors to contribute to an expanded exercise of reason, bringing together mutually illuminating research methodologies. Papers submitted for review will reflect the present state of the art of debates and studies at the intersection of these fields, and will typically consist in either of the following, or a combination thereof: (1) theoretical or conceptual discussions that show why a fruitful engagement between experimental psychology and philosophy and/or theology can specifically advance our understanding of personhood; (2) specific contributions of psychological science that illuminate, enrich, challenge or nuance a particular notion of personhood; (3) claims and arguments drawn from philosophical or theological knowledge, which could open up new paths for collaborative work with experimental psychology. Contributions in English, Spanish, Polish, German, French, Italian, or Portuguese, addressing abovementioned or related topics, may be submitted (after registration) on the journal’s website: http://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/SetF/about/submissions#onlineSubmissions For further information, please contact the editors of the Special Issue at: piotrroszak@umk.pl The submission deadline is 31 May 2021 .

Learning motivated by electrical stimulation of the brain.

Against the background of Gestalt psychology, the author argues that the phenomenological method is not a generic plea for philosophical innocence or the appeal to a conscious dismantling of every kind of unconscious prejudices, but rather the uncovering of a set of well-determined opinions, with precise theoretical consequences, mostly inspired by psychological associationism. The theoretical core of phenomenology as a philosophical method (distinguished from preliminary stages of psychological research) and Husserl’s attempt to use it for responding to the appeals and tensions of his historical moment have therefore to be sharply distinguished. For Husserl, the problem of method became entangled with ethical tasks, while phenomenology took more and more the shape of a philosophy of subjectivity, until the idea of phenomenology was presented as the only answer to the concept of crisis. While the rhetoric of the crisis gets poorer the more it is iterated outside of its historical horizon, the theoretical core of phenomenology as a method can be grasped in its validity only beyond it as the analytic task driven by a theory of the intentionality of conscious acts. In the line of this analytic interpretation of phenomenology, the first goal of philosophy is bringing order into thinking: phenomenology is a – rather complex and sophisticated – intuitionistic method. In this respect, intuition consists in a method to trace modes of being by describing structural modes of manifestation. The goal is not to describe phenomenological givens, but phenomenological rules or structures: it is to sketch a phenomenologically grounded ontology. Accordingly, philosophical analysis deals with the process of “concept formation” from the inner structures of experience up to more independent idealities, from general regularities that are directly graspable in the configuration of what is given to more abstract concepts.

The debates about human free will are traditionally the concern of metaphysics but neuroscientists have recently entered the field arguing that acts of the will are determined by brain events themselves causal products of other events. We examine that claim through the example of free or voluntary switch of perception in relation to the Necker cube. When I am asked to see the cube in one way, I decide whether I will follow the command (or do as I am asked) using skills that reason and language give to me and change my brain states accordingly. The voluntary shift of perspective in seeing the Necker cube this way or that exemplifies the top-down control exercised by a human being on the basis of the role of language and meaning in their activity. It also indicates the lived story that is at the centre of each human consciousness. In the third part of this essay, three arguments are used to undermine metaphysical objections to the very idea of top-down self control.

Objective To discuss the effects of the classification of psychological guidance on the emotion and prognosis of patients with cerebrovascular stenosis disease undergoing intravascular interventional therapy and to investigate effective interventions. Methods A total of 101 patients with cerebrovascular stenosis disease who underwent intravascular interventional treatment from June 2014 to September 2016 were selected and divided into experimental group (n=52) and control group (n=49) using random number method. Patients in the control group accepted conventional preoperative education instruction, while patients in the experimental group received additional postoperative classified psychological guidance. The Hamilton Anxiety Scale (HAMA) , pain scores, postoperative blood pressure changes and adverse reactions were compared between the two groups before and after surgery. Results The number of preoperative patients who were not anxiety, possible anxiety and anxiety were 5, 20, and 27 respectively in the experimental group, and were 3, 19, and 27 in the control group. There was no statistic difference between two groups (Z=0.444, P=0.657) . The number of postoperative patients who were not anxiety, possible anxiety and anxiety were 29, 17, and 6 respectively in the experimental group, and were 14, 24, and 11 in the control group. There was a statistically significant difference between two groups (Z=2.710, P=0.007) . There were significant differences in pain score, blood pressure, dysuria and insomnia between the two groups after operation (P<0.05). Conclusions The classification of psychological guidance can effectively stabilize the patients' psychology and emotion who underwent the cerebral vascular interventional operation, relieve the pain, help to control the blood pressure, reduce complications and adverse reactions, and improve the prognosis of patients. Key words: Interventional operation; Classification of psychological guidance; Cerebral vascular stenosis

The article will focus on revising based on recent studies regarding the synergies which lie in between educational psychology and cognitive neurosciences; furthermore in the following paper a significant emphasis will be attributed to the discovery of the mirror neurons as the basis of empathy and to the relative implications concerning the educational, social and clinical fields.

Logical, philosophical, biological and psychological lines of development of the attitude concept in psychology are analyzed. The status of this concept at modern psychology is considered. Its opportunities for disclosure of an entity of some psychological phenomena are shown. Key words: attitude, subject, personality, mentality elements, installation, emotional relation.

This chapter develops and defends the public health-quarantine model, a non-retributive and non-punitive alternative for addressing criminal behavior that draws on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. It begins by arguing that there are several powerful reasons for rejecting retributivism, not the least of which is that it’s unclear that agents possess the kind of free will and moral responsibility needed to justify it. Section 1 briefly summarizes the arguments against free will and basic desert moral responsibility and explains their implications for the retributive justification of legal punishment. Section 2 then introduces and defends the public health-quarantine model and argues that it’s not only consistent with free will skepticism but that it also provides a more humane, holistic, and effective approach to dealing with criminal behavior than either retributivism or other leading non-retributive alternatives. The chapter concludes in sections 3 and 4 by addressing a number of potential concerns about proportionality, human dignity, and victims’ rights. It is argued that each of these concerns can be met and that in the end the public health-quarantine model offers a superior alternative to retributive punishment and other non-retributive accounts.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Psychology Volume 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility

: Free will is usually defined by three conditions: (1) the ability to do otherwise; (2) control of one’s own choices; (3) responsiveness to reasons. The compatibility of free will with determinism lies at the heart of the philosophical debate at the metaphysical level. This debate, while being increasingly refined, has not yet reached a conclusion. Recently, neuroscience and empirical psychology have tried to settle the problem of free will with a series of experiments that go in the direction of so-called illusionism: free will as the conscious control of our behavior cannot exist, being a mere illusion. But even in this case, the experimental results are challenged at various levels. Considering that in most moral and legal systems, the subject’s liability derives from their freedom, the usefulness of preserving the concept of freedom – which incidentally responds to a very strong commonsensical intuition – suggests the need for an operational solution. This could be done by resorting to the concepts of capacity and cognitive control, which are measured by a set of well-established neuropsychological tests. Our preliminary proposal is to create an index, the first step towards a specific quantification and measurement of free will, to be used especially in ethical and legal contexts. Theoretical premises, practical difficulties and objections to this approach are also discussed and addressed. Keywords : Free Will; Responsibility; Self-control; Cognitive Functions; Determinism/Compatibilism. Operazionalizzare e misurare (un tipo di) libero arbitrio (e di responsabilita). Un nuovo quadro di riferimento per la psicologia, l'etica e il diritto Riassunto : Il libero arbitrio e solitamente definito da tre condizioni: (1) la possibilita di fare altrimenti; (2) il controllo delle proprie scelte; (3) la sensibilita alle ragioni. L’esistenza del libero arbitrio rispetto alla verita del determinismo e il cuore del dibattito filosofico a livello metafisico. E tale dibattito, pur sempre piu raffinato, non ha ancora raggiunto un punto di approdo. Recentemente, le neuroscienze e la psicologia empirica hanno cercato di dirimere il problema del libero arbitrio con una serie di esperimenti che vanno nella direzione del cosiddetto illusionismo. In altre parole, il libero arbitrio come controllo cosciente del nostro comportamento non esisterebbe. Ma anche in questo caso i risultati sperimentali sono sfidati a vari livelli. Considerato che dalla liberta discende, in gran parte dei sistemi morali e legali, la responsabilita degli individui, l’utilita di conservare il concetto di liberta, verso la cui esistenza c’e anche una forte intuizione tra i non esperti, suggerisce di circoscrivere e operazionalizzare il libero arbitrio. Cio potrebbe essere fatto ricorrendo alle nozioni di capacita e controllo cognitivo, che sono misurati da una serie di test neuropsicologici ben consolidati. La proposta preliminare e quella di creare un indice sintetico, primo passo verso una specifica quantificazione e misurazione del libero arbitrio di cui siamo dotati, da utilizzare soprattutto in ambito etico e giuridico. Premesse teoriche, difficolta pratiche e obiezioni a questo approccio sono discusse e affrontate. Parole chiave : Libero arbitrio; Responsabilita; Autocontrollo; Funzioni cognitive; Determinismo/Compatibilismo.

There have been serious doubts about mainstream psychological concepts and theoretical models in terms of their applicability to non-western cultures. It has been suggested that mainstream psychology is a byproduct of western tradition and fashioned by particular cultural and historical conditions. In that sense, defining presenting problems, structuring the counseling process and therapeutic alliances are directly affected by cultural factors. Thus, the goal of this study is to discuss the relations between culture and theoretical bases and applications of the counseling psychology regarding definitions of psychological health, reflecting psychological symptoms, coping, defining presenting problems, and therapeutic alliances.

The paper focuses on the effects of recent psychological findings on the theory of adjudication – putting emphasis on the role played by emotions in the decision-making process. Two different philosophical claims will be analysed, starting from the very famous topos of digestive justice: the idea that the decision-making process is completely predictable (determinism) versus the irrationality of the decision claimed by the realists. In the conclusion a non-naturalistic perspective will be sketched, aiming at including the novel knowledge arising from psychology – i.e. emotions are part of physiological process of decision-making.