Philosophy of the Brain: The Brain Problem

Hume Studies Volume XXII, Number 2, November 1996, pp. 255-271 Sympathy and Other Selves TONY PITSON Introduction Throughout Books II and III of the Treatise Hume makes considerable use of the notion of sympathy. For the most part this notion refers not to a feeling or passion as such, but rather to a kind of mechanism by which these and other mental states are communicated from one person to another. According to the way in which Hume describes this mechanism—for example, when it is first introduced in Treatise II i 11—it appears to operate as follows: we become aware of the sentiments or inclinations of someone else through their effects in that person's appearance and behaviour and in this way acquire an idea of the person's state of mind; and the idea which is thus acquired is then converted into an impression, so that we come to experience something comparable to the other person's own state of mind, as a result of the enlivening effect of the ever-present impression of self. Discussion of sympathy so understood tends to focus on the process in which our idea of the other person's state of mind is converted into the corresponding impression and the role played in this by the impression of self. As I intend to show, however, there are important questions about the way in which the idea itself is supposed to be acquired, and how this is to be reconciled with Hume's philosophical position both in the Treatise and elsewhere. In other words, the focus of the following discussion is the initial stage in the process which is supposed to result in our sharing the mental states of others. I believe we shall find that this—the epistemological—aspect of sympathy provides an important parallel to Hume's earlier treatment of the understanding. Tony Pitson is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotland. Email: aepl@forth.stirling.ac.uk 256 Antony E. Pitson Other Selves: The Epistemological Problem The topic of other selves is usually approached in philosophy from the perspective of both epistemology and the philosophy of mind. The epistemological issue is one concerning our knowledge of other selves. More precisely, what is at stake is the nature, extent and basis of such knowledge. Discussion of this issue often focuses on the question of whether we can, strictly speaking, be said to have knowledge of other selves at all. The reason why this question should have become the focus of discussion is one which deserves treatment in its own right. But it appears to arise from an underlying view of the nature of the self, viz., Descartes' dualism. The separation between mind and body involved in this doctrine leads naturally to the question as to whether the other beings by whom I am surrounded are anything more than just bodies. Is it not consistent with what I can observe that these other beings should be no more than machines?1 Do I therefore have any reason for supposing that I am not the sole worldly possessor of a mind? When we consider Hume's position in the light of this familiar way of regarding the issue of other selves, there is one striking fact which emerges immediately. This is that Hume appears to entertain no doubt whatsoever about our capacity for gaining awareness of the mental states of others—and, indeed, never directly addresses the issue of scepticism in this context. (Nor, we might note, does he hesitate to ascribe mental states to non-human animals—as, for example, in Treatise I iii 16). The existence of others as the subjects of mental states is presupposed both in Hume's discussion of the understanding in Book I of the Treatise, and also in his discussion of the passions—in particular, the indirect passions—in Book II. His account of sympathy, as we shall see, is one which in effect attempts to explain how it is possible for us to be aware of the contents of other people's minds. Since he nevertheless accepts some form of dualism (though not, as his discussion in Treatise I...

Our ethical obligations to another being depend at least in part on that being's capacity for a mental life. Our usual approach to inferring the mental state of another is to reason by analogy: If another being behaves as I do in a circumstance that engenders a certain mental state in me, I conclude that it has engendered the same mental state in him or her. Unfortunately, as philosophers have long noted, this analogy is fallible because behavior and mental states are only contingently related. If the other person is acting, for example, we could draw the wrong conclusion about his or her mental state. In this article I consider another type of analogy that can be drawn between oneself and another to infer the mental state of the other, substituting brain activity for behavior. According to most current views of the mind–body problem, mental states and brain states are non-contingently related, and hence inferences drawn with the new analogy are not susceptible to the alternative interpretations that plague the behavioral analogy. The implications of this approach are explored in two cases for which behavior is particularly unhelpful as a guide to mental status: severely brain–damaged patients who are incapable of intentional communicative behavior, and nonhuman animals whose behavioral repertoires are different from ours and who lack language.

This is a comprehensive examination of the ideas of the early modern philosophers on the nature of mind. Taking Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in turn, Janice Thomas presents an authoritative and critical assessment of each of these canonical thinkers' views of the notion of mind. The book examines each philosopher's position on five key topics: the metaphysical character of minds and mental states; the nature and scope of introspection and self-knowledge; the nature of consciousness; the problem of mental causation and the nature of representation and intentionality. The exposition and examination of their positions is informed by present-day debates in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of psychology so that students get a clear sense of the importance of these philosophers' ideas, many of which continue to define our current notions of the mental.Again and again, philosophers and students alike come back to the great early modern rationalist and empiricist philosophers for instruction and inspiration. Their views on the philosophy of mind are no exception and as Janice Thomas shows they have much to offer contemporary debates. The book is suitable for undergraduate courses in the philosophy of mind and the many new courses in philosophy of psychology.

This chapter concerns a distinction within philosophy of mind and cognitive science between conceptual and nonconceptual ways in which a person may mentally represent the world. The thought that perception is nonconceptual—that its character is concept independent—is also motivated by an empirically plausible expectation of a certain ontogenetic and the phylogenetic continuity in nature. Nonconceptualism about perception is, thus, motivated by the thought that perception is, and must be, a more primitive capacity than, and therefore also independent of, the concepts employed by our more intellectually demanding cognitive capacities. Fodor presents an assortment of the arguments in support of the informational encapsulation, or cognitive impenetrability, of perception. Mental states are widely considered to have representational content: they represent the world, one's body, or one's other mental states as being some way or another. As such, mental states are semantically evaluable.

Key issues in epistemology for the most part have to do with epistemic values such as justification, truth, and knowledge—that is, values related to the epistemic status of our propositional attitudes, mental events, and states. However, another important issue that is worth examining is the extent to which a subject is in a position to evaluate the strength of her epistemic position. In this paper, I wish to emphasize two properties of our mental states that play a decisive part in that respect: their opacity and transparency. In the following, I will assume that a mental state is opaque whenever it presents itself with no underlying reason, whereas states that are supported by apparent reasons are transparent.One main argument that I will defend is that even when the opacity and transparency of our mental states are not reliable cues, still they remain highly informative. Notably, I draw some implications relative to the externalist/internalist debate in epistemology. I examine the claim that only mental states that are justified are well grounded or justification conferring and the idea that often stands behind, that is, that only states whose reasons are accessible are justified—namely, the Accessibility Requirement. I also examine the source of a recent debate in epistemology: the epistemic status of our intuitive states, as these are perfect instances of opaque mental states. I conclude that intuitive states in some respect are less misleading than states that are supported by apparent reasons.

Incidencia y factores predictivos del delírium en pacientes neurológicos hospitalizados

Philosophy of mind has made substantial progress on biologically-rooted approaches to understanding the mind and subjectivity through the enactivist perspective, but research on subjectivity within neuroscience has not kept apace. Indeed, we possess no principled means of relating experiential phenomena to neurophysiological processes. Here, we present the Nested States Model as a framework to guide empirical investigation into the relationship between subjectivity and neurobiology. Building on recent work in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, we develop an account of experiential states as layered, or nested. We argue that this nested structure is also apparent in brain activity. The recognition of this structural homology - that both experiential and brain states can be characterized as systems of nested states - brings our views of subjective mental states into broad alignment with our understanding of general principles and properties of brain activity. This alignment enables a more systematic approach to formulating specific hypotheses and predictions about how the two domains relate to one another.

Decoding an individual's hidden brain states in responses to musical stimuli under various cognitive loads can unleash the potential of developing a non-invasive closed-loop brain-machine interface (CLBMI). To perform a pilot study and investigate the brain response in the context of CLBMI, we collect multimodal physiological signals and behavioral data within the working memory experiment in the presence of personalized musical stimuli. Participants perform a working memory experiment called the n-back task in the presence of calming music and exciting music. Utilizing the skin conductance signal and behavioral data, we decode the brain's cognitive arousal and performance states, respectively. We determine the association of oxygenated hemoglobin (HbO) data with performance state. Furthermore, we evaluate the total hemoglobin (HbT) signal energy over each music session. A relatively low arousal variation was observed with respect to task difficulty, while the arousal baseline changes considerably with respect to the type of music. Overall, the performance index is enhanced within the exciting session. The highest positive correlation between the HbO concentration and performance was observed within the higher cognitive loads (3-back task) for all of the participants. Also, the HbT signal energy peak occurs within the exciting session. Findings may underline the potential of using music as an intervention to regulate the brain cognitive states. Additionally, the experiment provides a diverse array of data encompassing multiple physiological signals that can be used in the brain state decoder paradigm to shed light on the human-in-the-loop experiments and understand the network-level mechanisms of auditory stimulation.

Neurophilosophy includes all philosophical discussion about aims, methods, empirical findings, and the possible consequences of neuroscience. Also, it denominates all attempts to clarify the relationship between brain states on the one hand and mental states on the other. Major topics of neurophilosophy are: (1) The “mind-brain”-problem, i. e., the nature of mental states and their relationship to brain states, particularly with respect to consciousness and mental causation, (2) the relationship between the “outer” or “objective” and “the inner” or “phenomenal” world including the epistemological quest for certainty of perception and cognition, (3) the problem of free will and culpability, (4) the question of unique human as opposed to animal traits including the presence of mind and consciousness in animals, (5) the origin and function of the “self”, (6) the origin of social and moral behavior, and (7) ethical questions of neuroscience. As to the mind-brain problem, only versions of nonreductionist monism or physicalism appear worth discussing. Empirical evidence underlines that mental states obey physical laws and can be predicted on the basis of knowledge about brain states. It has to be left to the future as to whether already existing physical concepts will suffice to explain the “nature of mind”, or whether new laws, while being compatible with the existing ones, have to be discovered.KeywordsConscious StateBrain StateBinocular RivalryMental CausationInferior Temporal CortexThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The End of the Law? Law, Theology, and Neuroscience

The combination of Brain-Computer Interface (BCI) technology, allowing online monitoring and decoding of brain activity, with virtual and mixed reality (MR) systems may help to shape and guide implicit and explicit learning using ecological scenarios. Real-time information of ongoing brain states acquired through BCI might be exploited for controlling data presentation in virtual environments. Brain states discrimination during mixed reality experience is thus critical for adapting specific data features to contingent brain activity. In this study we recorded electroencephalographic (EEG) data while participants experienced MR scenarios implemented through the eXperience Induction Machine (XIM). The XIM is a novel framework modeling the integration of a sensing system that evaluates and measures physiological and psychological states with a number of actuators and effectors that coherently reacts to the user's actions. We then assessed continuous EEG-based discrimination of spatial navigation, reading and calculation performed in MR, using linear discriminant analysis (LDA) and support vector machine (SVM) classifiers. Dynamic single trial classification showed high accuracy of LDA and SVM classifiers in detecting multiple brain states as well as in differentiating between high and low mental workload, using a 5 s time-window shifting every 200 ms. Our results indicate overall better performance of LDA with respect to SVM and suggest applicability of our approach in a BCI-controlled MR scenario. Ultimately, successful prediction of brain states might be used to drive adaptation of data representation in order to boost information processing in MR.

Depending on brain's current levels of relaxation, focus, and other mental states, brain will produced variable proportions of brain wave types. Each category of EEG(electroencephalography). Generally people's brain waves will respond to lights and sounds thuding at brain wave frequencies, and it will impact the change in state of brain — this activity called “entrainment.” We can schedule our brain to observe any brain wave experience as we like, by toggling number of pulses into eyes and ears. So here we are going to program various frequencies which are correlated to brain modes like Alfa, Beta, Gamma, Theta, & Delta by implementing Brain wave generator (BWG) using dsPIC DSC. This will be very useful in medical field for psychiatrist and many more.

This thesis deals with the role of the body in the first chapter of Matter and Memory: Essay on the relation of the body and spirit, by Henri Bergson. This study of the relation between bodily and mental aspects has acquired capital importance in Metaphysics and in Theory of Knowledge, or by its relevance in the main doctrines of Modern Philosophy, or by the actual belief that it has been spreading out in the cognitive sciences that would have a strict parallelism or an ontological reduction between brain and mental states. Bergson agreed that there was a relation between the body and the mind, but did not grant that relation implies a strict correspondence between physical and mental aspectsbefore, the mental states would exceed the brain states. For rethinking the relation between mind and body, Bergson adopted a new theory of perception whereby the living body is assumed as a center of action instead a representation. It is intended here to investigate the onto-epistemological implications of this peculiar theory of perception for the relation between mind and body in contrast the position with which this theory directly polemicizes: the Psychophysiology the nineteenth century. To demonstrate that, we will discuss the agreements and disagreements between Bergson and Psychophysiology about the main features of the human body which allow us a contact with the material world, namely, the structure of the nervous system, perception and sensation. For examining the nervous system, we will see the main features that constitute itself and how is the relation between an external stimulus and its effect to the human body, from the biological point of view. In the case of perception, we will approach its main characteristics, emphasizing its role to dispose the body to act in the world. Finally, with regard the sensation, we will see wherein sensation differs from perception and what would be its place in the human body. Our hermeneutical strategy is based on a conceptual and bibliographical study of the first chapter of Matter and Memory and other complementary Bergsonian texts to this work in question. Our hypothesis, in short, is that a reconstruction of the Bergson's Philosophy of Perception allows reorienting our conception on the acquisition and scope of our real knowledge.

Electroencephalograph (EEG) data provide insight into the interconnections and relationships between various cognitive states and their corresponding brain dynamics, by demonstrating dynamic connections between brain regions at different frequency bands. While sensory input tends to stimulate neural activity in different frequency bands, peaceful states of being and self-induced meditation tend to produce activity in the mid-range (Alpha). These studies were conducted with the aim of: (a) testing different equipment in order to assess two (2) different EEG technologies together with their benefits and limitations and (b) having an initial impression of different brain states associated with different experimental modalities and tasks, by analyzing the spatial and temporal power spectrum and applying our movie making methodology to engage in qualitative exploration via the art of encephalography. This study complements our previous study of measuring multichannel EEG brain dynamics using MINDO48 equipment associated with three experimental modalities measured both in the laboratory and the natural environment. Together with Hilbert analysis, we conjecture, the results will provide us with the tools to engage in more complex brain dynamics and mental states, such as Meditation, Mathematical Audio Lectures, Music Induced Meditation, and Mental Arithmetic Exercises. This paper focuses on open eye and closed eye conditions, as well as meditation states in laboratory conditions. We assess similarities and differences between experimental modalities and their associated brain states as well as differences between the different tools for analysis and equipment.

Normative guidance is a way of influencing others' behaviour which operates through the mind (through mental states and processes such as norm understanding, normative reasoning, belief in norm's validity, choice to follow it, etc.). Knowledge of the relevant aspects of the mind has therefore a clear importance in order to improve normative guidance (increase its efficacy, rationalize it, moralize it, etc.). But the study of the relationship between mind and normativity is a too wide field, impossible to explore in its entirety: selection criteria are needed. In this article I propose some contributions to their elaboration. First, I point out the «phenomenon of normativity» (meant as the conscious experience of norms) as the general scope of the theories of mind relevant for normative guidance, offering a rough sketch of it. Second, I show how, inside this general scope, the theories of mind preferable for the purposes of normative guidance are not necessarily the best one from a scientific point of view. Thirdly, I explore in this light the possible relevance of Elimitavism, i.e. the thesis, discussed in the philosophy of mind, that folk psychology concepts, such as propositional attitudes, misrepresent the mind, and that theories of mind built on the folk psychology framework are therefore bad scientific theories to be given up in favour of theories framed with totally different concepts, which could be provided by the neurosciences.