Probability-Based Contraction

The postulate of recovery is commonly regarded to be the intuitively least compelling of the six basic Gardenfors postulates for belief contraction. We replace recovery by the seemingly much weaker postulate of core-retainment, which ensures that if x is excluded from K when p is contracted, then x plays some role for the fact that K implies p. Surprisingly enough, core-retainment together with four of the other Gardenfors postulates implies recovery for logically closed belief sets. Reasonable contraction operators without recovery do not seem to be possible for such sets. Instead, however, they can be obtained for non-closed belief bases. Some results on partial meet contractions on belief bases are given, including an axiomatic characterization and a non-vacuous extension of the AGM closure condition.

The standard ``serial'' (aka ``singleton'') model of belief contraction models the manner in which an agent's corpus of beliefs responds to the removal of a single item of information. One salient extension of this model introduces the idea of ``parallel'' (aka ``package'' or ``multiple'') change, in which an entire set of items of information are simultaneously removed. Existing research on the latter has largely focussed on single-step parallel contraction: understanding the behaviour of beliefs after a single parallel contraction. It has also focussed on generalisations to the parallel case of serial contraction operations whose characteristic properties are extremely weak. Here we consider how to extend serial contraction operations that obey stronger properties. Potentially more importantly, we also consider the iterated case: the behaviour of beliefs after a sequence of parallel contractions. We propose a general method for extending serial iterated belief change operators to handle parallel change based on an n-ary generalisation of Booth & Chandler's TeamQueue binary order aggregators.

Three seemingly weak and plausible conditions on an operation of contraction on belief sets are shown to be logically incompatible: (1) there is at least one sentence that can be successfully removed by the operation, (2) both the original belief set and the outcome of the operation have finite representations, and (3) a non-tautologous sentence can be removed without loss of all its non-tautologous logical consequences.

Discussions of the issue of iterated belief revision are commonly accompanied by the presentation of three “concrete” operators: natural, restrained and lexicographic. This raises a natural question: What is so distinctive about these three particular methods? Indeed, the common axiomatic ground for work on iterated revision, the AGM and Darwiche-Pearl postulates, leaves open a whole range of alternative proposals. In this paper, we show that it is satisfaction of an additional principle of “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives”, inspired by the literature on Social Choice, that unites and sets apart our three “elementary” revision operators. A parallel treatment of iterated belief contraction is also given, yielding a family of elementary contraction operators that includes, besides the well-known “conservative” and “moderate” operators, a new contraction operator that is related to restrained revision.