Process hazard analyses of control and instrument systems

While developing responses to help a client respond to occupational safety and health administration (OSHA) citations, we discovered that little or nothing has changed in 14 years at many facilities. OSHA is still finding the same gaps today. Chemical plants generally know how to complete a process hazard analysis (PHA), management of change (MOC), an incident investigation, etc. What is incomplete are the work processes to ensure continuity and completion.It is imperative that you have a functional process safety management (PSM) program. For example, OSHA states that the best defense against a National Emphasis Program (NEP) inspection is a strong PSM program. Failures can result in citations and incidents, which can lead to repeat or egregious citations, financial losses, public disgrace, and fatalities. Once your company has been cited for minor offenses, it becomes a target for repeat inspections.The teachings of this article will reduce failures by designing, implementing, and using complete work processes for PSM‐related activities. Many failures can be addressed by (1) improving the documentation of what you already do, (2) promptly resolving PSM‐related recommendations of all types, and (3) dealing with the challenge of keeping track of the ever‐changing recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) that apply to many aspects of your PSM program. In addition, management support/involvement and systems that follow‐up to ensure all work activities are complete and adequately documented are essential. Instituting complete work processes will improve your PSM program, improve your efficiency, and reduce the chance of citations. © 2011 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2011

In 2020, a fire and explosion accident occurred in Taiwan because of the reverse flow of high‐pressure recycle gas. This accident resulted in three minor injuries and caused the Taiwanese government to instruct the top three chemical groups in Taiwan to conduct procedural hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies in addition to normal HAZOP studies. The cause analysis based on the accident timeline and cause factor chart indicated that improper control of the protection logic bypass and the lack of four process safety management (PSM) elements, namely mechanical integrity, process safety information (PSI), operating procedures, and process hazard analysis (PHA), were the root causes of the aforementioned accident. The deficiencies leading to accidents are related to planning problems in PSM promotion but unrelated to the implementation of PSM programs. Maintenance processes should be evaluated and developed according to PHA results or equipment structure to guarantee equipment integrity. The incompatibility of process chemicals with pipeline materials should be considered; then, the construction materials mentioned in PSI should be extended to those of pipelines, not just equipment. In addition to the hazards of normal operations, those of non‐routine operations should be identified to ensure the completeness of the PSM program. Protection logic bypass should be appropriately controlled, and a complete safety evaluation must be conducted before resetting the initiated protection logic. A majority of the deficiencies identified in this study exist in most Taiwanese chemical companies, including the leading ones performing PSM. The lessons learned from the aforementioned accident provide advance information that can be used to develop an improved PSM system.

This article presents a brief analysis of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Petroleum Refinery Process Safety Management National Emphasis Program (NEP) citation results as of early 2009. It includes trends distilled from the OSHA inspections performed to date. Recommendations for preparing for PSM NEP level inspections are provided.A proven approach to designing and implementing an upgrade project for OSHA process safety management systems and EPA risk management program is described. The model presented can be targeted to a facility's NEP specific citations or used for a general PSM system effectiveness upgrade.This article includes recommendations for improving PSM as a result of an NEP inspection. The recommendations are for the PSM elements that routinely have major OSHA citations; that is: Operating Procedures, Mechanical Integrity, Process Hazards Analysis, Process Safety Information, Management of Change, and Incident Investigations. © 2009 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 2009

Many facilities have now implemented and maintained process safety management (PSM) programs for 20 years or more, but these facilities continue to have sometimes serious incidents and injuries suggesting a continuing need to improve their PSM performance. Of course, new requirements are often added to upgrade PSM programs, due to near‐miss learnings, audit findings, and new recommended and generally accepted good engineering practices, for example, but often overall performance improvements have not occurred or have not achieved the desired level of performance. How can significant performance improvements be obtained? Although performance issues at different facilities will certainly vary, this article provides several key approaches for improving overall PSM performance and for helping prevent injuries and incidents. © 2012 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2012

Chapter 3 - Objective and Description of PHA, What-If, and HAZOP Reviews

7 - Process technology safety and hazard analysis

This paper provides guidance to key techniques and methods used in the EDM process industry for identifying and documenting environment, safety, and health (ESH) hazards and theircontrols.This is first time that the brainstorming method “what-if” analysis,one of the well-known process hazard analysis (PHA) techniques, is used to predict hazards in electrical discharge machining (EDM) processes. This technique analyzes potential causes and consequences of fires, explosions, releases of toxic or flammable chemicals and major spills of hazardous chemicals, and focuses on fluid system, machining system, electrical & instrumentation system, utilities, human actions and external factors that might impact the process. This analysis helped to identify conditions that can lead to an accident situation and recommendations are givento overcome the risks of these situations. An exhaustive analysis in the EDM process to identify and analyze hazards is presented in this paper and control recommendations are provided to overcome the risks of these hazards.

With the popularization and application of chemical process safety management (PSM) systems in the chemical industry, the use of such systems in China has become the focus of a large volume of research. In this article, 12 elements included in the current Chinese PSM system are divided into four stages from a structural point of view. This division will be helpful in the follow‐up analysis. After a careful analysis of the evaluation results for one PSM pilot study in Nanjing, some correlations have been found between the results of the elemental evaluation. Small‐ and medium‐sized chemical plants make up a large proportion of Chinese chemical plants and many chemical accidents take place in these plants, so a simplified PSM system in practical operation need to be found. Based on a previous PSM structural analysis, the secondary elements of the PSM system can be removed. This allows researchers to avoid the traditional method of analyzing PSM elements individually. In the concrete analysis process, a theoretical analysis of the correlation degree between elements can be combined with the results of accident investigations. The simplified Chinese PSM system consists of four core elements: Process safety information, process hazard analysis, training, and emergency management. Based on the current applications of these four core elements in China, a consideration of correlations between these elements is used to make several suggestions for improving China's PSM systems. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 378–381, 2017

The Brazoria County Petrochemical Council, 13 companies that are working together to enhance relations between industry and the community, united in a joint effort at complying with the EPA's Risk Management Program. One of the significant issues the group had to address was the need to develop meaningful hazard assessment for presentation to the public. The EPA's “Table Look‐Up Approach” found in the Offsite Consequence Analysis Guidance document is certainly a good tool; however, the built‐in conservatism results in over‐estimates of potential hazard areas. Much more meaningful results are shown to be obtained using one of the hazard release models.The value of using a credible scenario with realistic meteorological data is demonstrated through the consistently smaller areas predicted by the PHAST Model for planning purposes. Realistic scenarios/failure modes and realistic model parameters are important so that the risk to the public is not overstated. Proprietary models such as PHAST are invaluable in providing more meaningful consequences for planning purposes.

Guidance to improve the effectiveness of process safety management systems in operating facilities

Chapter IV - Guided Word Hazard Analysis

Chapter 8 - Review Applications for Typical Facilities

Summary Acrolein (2-propenal) is a highly effective microbiocide and sulfide scavenger that has been commercially available since 1960 and has been used widely in the oil- and gas-production industry. Acrolein is a liquid product supplied in and applied from specialized containers, eliminating potential releases from transfers between tanks. The acrolein containers are built to comply with international transportation regulations. This paper will cover the development of a safety-management program and standardization of application equipment that allow the usage of acrolein for applications with a risk comparable to, or in some cases lower than, that for conventional chemical products. Standardized operating procedures, closed-system application equipment [verified by industrial hygiene (IH) monitoring], and redundant safety devices are built into the system to prevent chemical exposures or misapplications. Applications are performed by trained and certified personnel who have completed a specific competency evaluation under field conditions. A detailed and customized safety-management program is completed and implemented for each application with extensive client participation. This paper will cover the core of the safety-management program, which focuses on developing site-specific elements, including process safety information, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, employee and contractor training, applicator competency and field evaluation, prestartup safety reviews, management of change, and emergency planning and response procedures. A safety audit program is also implemented to ensure that the completed safety management program complies with each element. Audits are conducted at the actual location during the course of the chemical application. A strong safety-management program and standardized application system have been shown to reduce personnel and environmental risks by lowering the potential for misapplications or equipment failures. These systems have allowed successful treatment programs on numerous global production assets. To validate this, a series of case histories will be presented that highlight the best practices that enable the safe application of acrolein.

A general guideline to improve operational discipline is required. Operational discipline can be improved with simple things such as floor level meeting (FLM), job cycle check (JCC), risk assessment (RA), daily safety audit (DSA), consequence analysis (CA), mechanical integrity (MI), incident investigation (II), management of change (MOC), behavior observation (BO), pre‐start up safety reviews (PSSR), process hazard analysis (PHA), job risk assessment (JRA), quantitative risk assessment (QRA), and process safety management (PSM) implementation. This article presents risks identified from floor level meetings, steps for job cycle check and risk sensitivity and procedure for daily safety audit and behavior observation audit. Consequence analysis, pre‐start up safety review and why tree analysis are discussed for improving operational discipline. Inclusion of consequence analysis in work instructions is discussed. Procedure for accident investigation is elaborated by investigating trainee unit shift engineer (USE) burning injury accident and why tree diagram is constructed and findings and recommendations are provided. PHA techniques (HAZOP, Failure Mode and Effect Analysis) methodology is presented to enhance operational discipline. This article is especially for those industries which are located in countries where PSM implementation is not mandatory and they are lacking in operational discipline.

Chapter 1 - Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis