Process Safety - A Journey Towards Excellence

Process safety practices and process safety management (PSM) systems have been applied since the various incidents and accidents in the refining and petrochemical industries over many years. In the US, the Center for Chemical Process Safety created risk-based process safety as the framework for the next generation of PSM. In petroleum refining and petrochemical industries, companies are required by law to have occupational safety programs, with a focus on personal safety, as the focus of these programs is to prevent harm to personnel from workplace accidents such as fall, cuts, strains, and so on. Petroleum refineries are one of the major energy-consuming industries that contribute to a major proportion of the production cost. Energy in a typical refinery is 60% of variable costs and 1% improvement in energy equals to ~$650,000 year saving for a 100,000 bpsd refinery.

Many major accidents have taken place in the chemical and petrochemical industry over the past 40 years (e.g. Bhopal (India, 1984), Texas City (USA, 2005)), which have been key driving forces for issuing new regulations (governments), publishing standards (industry groups), developing policies (companies), and ultimately for improving Loss Prevention strategies and Process Safety Management (PSM). On this context, a key standard is the OSHA PSM (29 CFR 1910.119), a process-based program aiming at preventing or minimizing the consequences of catastrophic releases of toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive chemicals. The present paper focuses on the results from several PSM audits performed between 2010 and 2016, at several different Chemical Process Industry (CPI) facilities. On the one hand, we have evaluated how well these facilities complied with the requirements of the OSHA PSM Standard. On the other hand, the data from the audit findings has been compiled and statistically processed in order to compare the main common findings with the results of those analyzed by OSHA's Refinery and Chemical National Emphasis Programs (NEP) in 2012. Key audit findings from the CPI are a valued source of information for understanding current safety weaknesses. The lessons learned from this study help us to identify operational discipline and process safety leadership and culture benefits towards minimizing or avoiding audit findings, and therefore, to contributing to an optimized and sustainable Process Safety management system.

Presented on Wednesday 22 May: Session 22 The Process Safety Management discipline is still misunderstood and deemed complex despite the efforts and progress that have been made over the past decades in the energy industry. This is important as the energy industry turns towards the energy transition and needs to remember the fundamentals of managing process safety risks in emerging technologies. At Origin Energy, leadership, risk management and learning are tightly connected when it comes to ensuring good process safety. In this context, Origin Energy’s Integrated Gas Business Unit has implemented Process Safety Management initiatives over the last 5 years grouped under three Process Safety Management strategic pillars: empowered process safety leadership; open-minded learning culture and best practice process hazard management. The aim of these initiatives was to develop a heightened process safety culture across the business unit. The approach used was to demystify process safety concepts to generate engagement and ownership at all levels. This was supplemented with implementing a companywide Engineering and Technical Community of Practice to enable sharing of technical learning across boundaries and building strong process safety risk awareness foundations supported by a Process Hazard Analysis Revalidation program. To access the Oral Presentation click the link on the right. To read the full paper click here

Process safety challenges for SMEs in China

KOC commenced preparation of Integrity Management (IM) System Standard & Guidelines in 2003. The IM system implementation sits under HSE umbrella at present and compliments the existing HSE management system policy and procedures. KOC operations assets include North Kuwait (NK), WK, S&EK, Gas Operations/Management and E&PD (Exploration & Petroleum Development). Major Projects are also managed by TSD (Technical Service Directorate) & Controlling Teams including Inspection & Corrosion. Initially, a set of six critical areas for IM implementation was agreed with the operating assets and KPIs (key performance indicators) were defined accordingly. These comprised of chemical management system, safety critical equipment, emergency shutdown system testing, fire & gas detection system, replacement of pipelines temporary clamps with permanent ones and procedure for control & monitoring of safety overrides equipment. Previous integrity related incidents were analysed to identify the immediate and root causes and a basket of IM KPIs was prepared accordingly. The analysis also included the minor incidents, near misses, unsafe acts & conditions and lessons learned from inside and other Oil & Gas companies. Each asset selected a number of KPIs as applicable to the nature of their operations and prepared a 3 years rolling plan accordingly. Each asset monitors implementation of their selected KPIs and quarterly performance reports are compiled in an auditable manner. Achieved KPI targets are sustained for continuous improvement cycle & new KPIs are introduced into the IM basket as/when identified. IM system has now focused on PSM (process safety management) related aspects and incident prevention. Although the HSE management system has been focused on personal safety, IM/PSM system is aiming to enhance the process safety and prevent PSM related incidents. This provides a more holistic approach to enhance personnel responsibilities, competency development, safety critical equipment identification & respective PM (preventive maintenance) plans and incorporation of Inherently Safer Design (ISD) principles in project concepts to prevent loss of containment.

Beach Energy Limited (referred as Beach Energy or Beach) is an ASX-listed exploration and production company headquartered in Adelaide, South Australia. Founded in 1961, Beach produces oil and gas from five onshore and offshore basins across Australia and New Zealand. During its most recent growth phase, Beach added a number of assets to its portfolio that were originally developed and operated by companies with different management systems, standards and reporting requirements. Over the past 5 years Beach has been – and continues to be – on a journey of learning, developing and refining its systems and standards for reporting process safety performance and integrating these within a ‘one Beach’ philosophy. This paper describes the current stage of this evolution in measuring, reporting and managing process safety performance at Beach, presents some of the key learnings to date, in addition to outlining the next steps Beach is taking on this journey. The paper covers the following: (1) experience with IOGP RP 456 Tier KPI model and current main KPIs in use; (2) application to projects, drilling campaigns and operating assets; (3) challenges in gathering data and event classification; (4) importance of getting safety critical equipment selection right; (5) communicating large and complex KPIs to a varied audience; (6) learning and improving process safety performance and systems based on KPIs; (7) new approaches to reporting health of process safety barriers aligned to IOGP RP544 categories using simplified bowtie Major Accident Event dashboards; and (8) integration of process safety management within the Beach Operations Excellence Management System. The key conclusions are that measuring process safety performance requires dedicated effort and consensus across all stakeholders on the most appropriate way to measure performance. Reporting needs a positive and collaborative culture to have the right impact. Managing performance must be based on objective evidence and careful analysis of the data. Achieving effective and efficient process safety measurement, reporting and management is a multi-year journey of continual improvement.

While modern process safety can be dated back to E.I. duPont in the early 1800s with the building of black powder plants including separation distances, and blast zones, the management of process safety has come a long way. Despite this, however, we have continued to see many catastrophic incidents occur, across a range of industries. There have been significant learning opportunities from the catastrophes, but are we actually applying the learnings? Exploring the past 40 years history shows a number of landmark process safety events. These events have not only changed our state of knowledge for managing process safety but have also resulted in standards and legislative change in multiple jurisdictions. This article explores the significant learnings that came out of the various landmark process safety events and the impact these changes have had on how process safety is managed today. Incidents considered as case studies in this article include the following:Flixborough UK (1974), Seveso Italy (1976), Bhopal India (1984), Piper Alpha UK (1988), Longford Australia (1998), Texas City Refinery USA (2005), Montara Australia (2009), Macondo USA (2010), and Pike River New Zealand (2010). © 2015 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 35: 165–170, 2016

A comparative analysis of process safety management (PSM) systems in the process industry

Application of Bayesian network and artificial intelligence to reduce accident/incident rates in oil & gas companies

With the popularization and application of chemical process safety management (PSM) systems in the chemical industry, the use of such systems in China has become the focus of a large volume of research. In this article, 12 elements included in the current Chinese PSM system are divided into four stages from a structural point of view. This division will be helpful in the follow‐up analysis. After a careful analysis of the evaluation results for one PSM pilot study in Nanjing, some correlations have been found between the results of the elemental evaluation. Small‐ and medium‐sized chemical plants make up a large proportion of Chinese chemical plants and many chemical accidents take place in these plants, so a simplified PSM system in practical operation need to be found. Based on a previous PSM structural analysis, the secondary elements of the PSM system can be removed. This allows researchers to avoid the traditional method of analyzing PSM elements individually. In the concrete analysis process, a theoretical analysis of the correlation degree between elements can be combined with the results of accident investigations. The simplified Chinese PSM system consists of four core elements: Process safety information, process hazard analysis, training, and emergency management. Based on the current applications of these four core elements in China, a consideration of correlations between these elements is used to make several suggestions for improving China's PSM systems. © 2017 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 378–381, 2017

In 2020, a fire and explosion accident occurred in Taiwan because of the reverse flow of high‐pressure recycle gas. This accident resulted in three minor injuries and caused the Taiwanese government to instruct the top three chemical groups in Taiwan to conduct procedural hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies in addition to normal HAZOP studies. The cause analysis based on the accident timeline and cause factor chart indicated that improper control of the protection logic bypass and the lack of four process safety management (PSM) elements, namely mechanical integrity, process safety information (PSI), operating procedures, and process hazard analysis (PHA), were the root causes of the aforementioned accident. The deficiencies leading to accidents are related to planning problems in PSM promotion but unrelated to the implementation of PSM programs. Maintenance processes should be evaluated and developed according to PHA results or equipment structure to guarantee equipment integrity. The incompatibility of process chemicals with pipeline materials should be considered; then, the construction materials mentioned in PSI should be extended to those of pipelines, not just equipment. In addition to the hazards of normal operations, those of non‐routine operations should be identified to ensure the completeness of the PSM program. Protection logic bypass should be appropriately controlled, and a complete safety evaluation must be conducted before resetting the initiated protection logic. A majority of the deficiencies identified in this study exist in most Taiwanese chemical companies, including the leading ones performing PSM. The lessons learned from the aforementioned accident provide advance information that can be used to develop an improved PSM system.

It takes usually 3 to 4 years on an average to build a complex oil and gas facility from concept to commissioning. All critical features of the facility are decided during the early stages of the project. In fact the concept stage can be called as the stage when the DNA of the facility is cast. During rest of the project all that is being done is to develop and translate this DNA to reality. Very little can be done in later stages to correct safety problems buried in concept itself. Are we paying enough attention to process safety during this stage? Projects are implemented under several constraints and process safety sometimes takes a backseat. While there are several methods of Process Hazard Analysis by which process hazards are checked during design, how far are they effective? As the project accelerates towards completion all focus will be usually on the schedule. Are project teams able to see the compromises made on process safety during the fast track implementation? This paper will review the current practices for ensuring process safety during project implementation. Further it will present case histories of projects where hazards where buried deep inside design in spite of safety reviews that were carried out. The paper will argue the case for deeper understanding of process safety and the need for better management of the same during project implementation. Summary of latest research on the subject from diverse fields of Technical Safety, Behavioral Science and Systems theory will be included in the paper. In conclusion, the paper will provide better ways of understanding the complex issues and demonstrate several important factors that will help in ensuring process safety during project implementation.

Many industrial sites struggle to achieve consistently strong business performance in Process Safety Management (PSM). For these work sites, leading indicators may show that there is good participation in process safety activities, but unfortunately, the process safety incident rate remains above targets. Oftentimes, these sites must be very reactive as incident follow‐up consumes much of their available resources and incident avoidance continues to be elusive. This paper discusses new approaches used to break free from lackluster PSM performance. These new approaches are designed to maximize worker engagement which in turn will boost the culture and lead to a step‐change improvement in PSM performance. The new approaches incorporate the Swiss cheese model at the center of a framework that is easily understood by all workers. Workers' knowledge of PSM and how it pertains to their specific role is then strengthened through routine sharing of external events. Workers are then encouraged to apply learnings to their work and they are rewarded for breakthroughs in hazard identification or mitigation. These approaches have not only received applause from regulators but have also been successfully used to break out of mediocrity and attain “best‐in‐class” PSM performance, as measured by API RP 754 criteria.

Guidance to improve the effectiveness of process safety management systems in operating facilities

Safety culture has been identified as a critical element in high consequence incidents in the oil and gas industry over the past few decades. Traditionally, safety culture, which is the collection of beliefs, perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors of the stakeholders within an organization regarding safety, has been viewed in terms of occupational safety: i.e., perception of components and norms that affect personal safety. It is clear that lapses in occupational safety can lead to injuries or fatalities to individual workers. However, lapses in process safety can cause injuries or fatalities to groups of workers or the public, or extensive damage to the facility and environment. The visible nature of hazards to individual workers often leads companies to focus more on occupational safety culture as opposed to process safety culture since occupational safety performance is easier to recognize. Process safety hazards are related to the process, conditions which are not necessarily obvious but are hidden within the complex systems comprising the chemical, mechanical, and controls of the process unit. Thus, process safety requires engineering discipline to systematically identify and manage the potential hazards posed by a process system throughout its life. Process safety culture is the collective group of values (i.e., beliefs, perceptions, attitudes) and behaviors that affect the safety management of processes in an organization. In the traditional safety culture assessment approach, the focus is on individual behavior, attitudes, and perception of process safety concerns such as management of change, process hazard analyses, near-miss reporting, etc. has been missing. Due to such gaps, the application of traditional safety culture assessment tools and methods in the process industry does not provide a comprehensive status of the state of process safety culture in such organizations. The objective of this paper is to discuss the differences between the occupational safety culture and process safety culture assessment techniques and present methods and guidelines to develop a process safety culture assessment tool.