Prognostics and maintenance modeling for electronic components

Recent technological advancement has a profound effect on the ways that the war is being conducted and fought. The advanced communications, information, computing and sensor technologies enable the combat units to be integrated in the battlefield management network. By exchanging and sharing real-time battlefield information that is critical for the successful outcome of military engagement, the legacy forces are becoming much more effective and lethal than ever before, The bigger picture of such phenomena can be summarized as the concept of Network Centric Warfare(NCW). The main purpose of this study is to compare the outcome of regional combat engagement between the legacy forces and the future combat systems(FCS). The FCS capitalizes on the advanced technologies within the frame of NCW. This study uses the modeling and simulation methodology to assess the effectiveness of two different combat forces. The simulation results show that the FCS is more effective, hence vindicating the superiority of technologically advanced combat units.Key Words : Future Combat System(미래 전투 체계), Modeling and Simulation(모델링&시뮬레이션), NCW(네트워크 중심전), Combat Effectiveness(전투 효과)

: Crew size has become a critical issue in military vehicle design. Motivated by the needs of organizations such as the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity and the Future Combat System (FCS) lead system integrator, Boeing-Science Applications International Corporation, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) decided to take the initiative to investigate this issue. The focus of this trade study was to determine the viability of transitioning to a two-soldier crew for the line-of-sight (LOS) and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) platforms in the early FCS force designs for Increment I. The LOS-BLOS platform is now called the mounted combat system (MCS). The two- versus three-soldier crew analysis was conducted with task-network models built with the computer simulation tool, Improved Performance Research Integration Tool (IMPRINT). IMPRINT was developed by ARL to evaluate possible system performance by calculating the mental workload associated with each operator to complete a specified mission. Within this trade study, these missions were simulated with networks of functions and tasks representative of possible missions that would be performed by FCS MCS crew members. This study focused on the LOS engagement portion of the MCS mission. The initial IMPRINT models were developed from existing IMPRINT models of other combat platforms. While the MCS platform should have greater capabilities than its predecessor, the functions of driving, shooting, and communicating are fundamentally the same. FCS concepts seek to equip the MCS crew with technology to enhance their mission performance. These initial models were to be the baseline concept, and the desire was to add technology to the models as applicable.

A version of Telescoping Vaned Exhaust Nozzle (TEVEN) was developed by AADC/Rolls-Royce Corporation for the LiftFan exhaust system as a part of JSF Concept Demonstrator Aircraft (CDA) Program. The operational performance requirements for the vectoring nozzle were provided by Lockheed-Martin (LM) to meet the short take-off and landing capabilities of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) version X-35. The nozzle was designed to vector 15°-20° forward and up to 60° aft, from vertical, while maintaining relatively high performance levels at all operating conditions. This paper presents an in-depth discussion on the development of this CDA LiftFan™ vectoring nozzle, from the original TEVEN nozzle database, through the necessary design modifications to incorporate the requirements imposed by mechanical and control design, and performance changes as the JSF aircraft design progressed. Results from a 27% scale model test, conducted at NASA GRC are also discussed.

The JPEO-CBD, in conjunction with other members of the defense community, is actively assessing future system architectures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) such as the Future Combat Systems (FCS). Sensors, networks and information superiority are key elements of FCS, and the JPEO will provide the critical capability that enables complete situational awareness of CB hazards. After a brief overview of the JPEO-CBD program, this paper discusses early insight into how FCS operations and platforms affect CB sensors. Key challenges will be highlighted, such as sensor/platform integration, broad spectrum detection, and sensor performance.

The USA Army's future combat systems (FCS) will rely heavily on the use of remote, unattended sensors to detect, identify and track enemy targets in order to survive with less armor protection. Successful implementation of these critical sensor fields requires the realization of low cost transducers, processors and the communications infrastructure to report and disseminate sensor data to provide situational awareness to the FCS. The communications must support both static deployed and mobile ground and air robotic sensor arrays with robust, secure, stealthy, jam resistant links for sensor fusion and command and control. The applications and proliferation of such sensor arrays will ultimately depend on cost and performance. It is envisioned for broadest application that sensor networks can be deployed in a two tiered architecture that includes a lower sensor sub-layer consisting of acoustic, magnetic and/or seismic detectors and an upper sub-layer consisting of infrared or visual cameras. The upper sub-layer can be cued by the lower sub-layer and provides a gateway link to higher echelon tactical networks such as the tactical Internet. The sensor deployment geometries, networking constraints and distances to C2 nodes will be application specific. Application of the USA Army CECOM Networked Sensors for the Objective Force (NSOF) communications technologies is shown in a notional FCS environment.

The Army and Office of the Secretary of Defense agreed in May 2003 that the Future Combat Systems (FCS) Program had achieved sufficient maturity to pass what is referred to as "Milestone B." This milestone cleared the way for the Army and DARPA to award Boeing/SAIC FCS Lead System Integrator a 7 year System Design and Development Contract with options leading to production of systems and a Fielded Operational Capability in the year 2012. The breadth of the FCS Program is unique for DoD. It encompasses at least 7 variants of manned ground vehicles, 6 variants of unmanned ground vehicles, 4 unmanned aerial vehicles, unattended sensors, and the critical integration of these assets through a common Command/Control/Communications (C4ISR) backbone and protocol. As such, it has both internal program developments and strong linkages with existing programs in weapons, communications, sensors, command and control, and soldier integrated systems. An important new capability area for FCS is the integrated use of Unmanned Systems (both air and ground). This paper will deal with the LSI efforts associated with the UGV systems and additional detail will be available from the contractor teams working with us on each of these systems in later talks.

As a study in late 1999, and subsequently as an official program in early 2000, the Army and DARPA agreed to jointly fund a research effort which became known as Future Combat Systems (FCS) to fast track the introduction of new capability to our ground forces which were increasingly being asked to respond rapidly to hostile situations around the world. The Chief of Staff of the Army clearly articulated this crucial need in his thrust to make the light forces more lethal and the heavy forces more deployable. The DARPA/Army agreement consisted of two parts: a) program to have industry lead teams develop concepts for how the FCS would be composed and integrated and b) a series of technology development programs which were expected to generate potentially radical improvements in the overall effectiveness of the FCS concept. Two of these technology development programs were directly related to ground vehicle robotics, and evolved by the end of 2000 to be the Unmanned Ground Combat Vehicle (UGCV) and Perception for Off-road Robotics (PerceptOR) programs. These programs and the underlying assumptions are described in this paper.

: In October 2001, the Department of Defense (DoD) awarded a contract for System Development and Demonstration (SDD) of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) to the Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company. The JSF program, which is expected to run for more than two decades and cost $300 billion, will deliver 3,002 fighter/attack aircraft to the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, as well as to the UK Ministry of Defence. The JSF will replace U.S. Air Force F-16s and A-10s and complement the F-22; complement carrier-based U.S. Navy F/A-18E/Fs; replace U.S. Marine Corps AV-8Bs and F/A-18C/Ds; and replace UK Harrier aircraft. The primary reason for developing a single aircraft with three variants to fulfill the missions of the different services was to minimize cost. The result of having a single program will be considerable commonality among the three variants (conventional takeoff and landing CTOL, carrier variant CV, and short takeoff/vertical landing STOVL). This commonality will reduce both initial procurement and ongoing life-cycle costs, relative to having three unrelated aircraft. Many companies spread across the United States and the world will be building the various components and sub assemblies of the JSF. Lockheed Martin plans to assemble the major components of the JSF and test the aircraft at its Fort Worth, Texas, plant in a process called final assembly and checkout, or FACO.

The interconnected nature of the Army's Future Combat System provides an opportunity to use communication analysis as a viable evaluation method of both organizational efficiency and system design. In the current investigation, communications during teamin-the-loop experimentation were collected and analyzed for both content and flow patterns. Results suggest that players did not fully utilize the functionality of a common operating picture (COP) and new technology insertion did not achieve the desired effect within the organization. Requests for information and updates were frequently related to information that could have been found on the COP. The communication patterns suggested that the experimental organization was very much hierarchical, with little horizontal communications. That is, despite the influx of new systems, traditional operations were employed. In this study, communication data were successfully employed to assess operational effectiveness and the quality of system design.

: In Joint Force 2020, written in 2003, the chairman of the Joint Chief of staff warned that advances in technology and process may be moving so fast that it may challenge the Department of Defense's ability to assess, mature, and communicate the advantages and disadvantages of a networked force. This 2003 premonition may be eerily impacting the Army's efforts to mature the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program. While the Army has aggressively pursued General Shinseki's vision for the FCS force, the program continues to be challenged to successfully describe the bang- for-the-buck value that it will bring to the nation. While there are many potential reasons for the Army's less than optimal performance, I believe that there are six major areas that may be having the most significant impact: 1) the system focus of current acquisition processes, 2) the art and qualitative nature of information, 3) the challenge of separating intelligence from information, 4) current developmental tasking processes, 5) Department of Defense's (DoD) limited expertise with networked operations and 6) the use of inappropriate analytic tools.

: Program managers would like to minimize the risk associated with the acquisition of their system in order to better control costs, schedule, and performance. It is especially important to do so in cutting-edge programs with a history of complexity, difficulty or controversy. Deservedly or not, the lead system integrator (LSI) approach used in the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program has been criticized for relying too heavily on private industry to manage this innovative, large scale acquisition program. The objections from Congress center on government's surrender of too much of its responsibility, authority, and budget to private industry. As a result of the concern over the use of LSIs, program managers are understandably interested in minimizing risk to better control costs, schedule, and performance. In order to minimize risk, it is essential that contracts are written well, with appropriate specificity, and include not only the desired goods or services, but also essential information that enables the program manager to track the progress of contract performance and to quickly detect potential problems. This research takes a high-level/macro approach to identifying issues and suggesting items that should be considered when developing the Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract for Spin Out 1 of the FCS program.

The US Army Future Combat System (FCS) will implement Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV) in numbers not previously seen before in military operations. Many of these vehicles will also be larger and faster than the small robots typically used today for explosive ordnance disposal and general improvised explosive device handling. More importantly, FCS will implement these UGV's in scenarios were they will be in much closer proximity to soldiers and other non-combatant personnel. This paper describes the plan for developing an appropriate match of technology for autonomous UGV maneuver with the emerging need for safety release verification for these systems prior to fielding. The plan is followed by descriptions of initial data collections with a UGV, that will form the starting point in this safety release process, and stimulate further use and refinement of this process for large UGV's in applications beyond FCS.

: The FCS is a radical departure from the previous Army concept of operations. It is described primarily as a system of systems and is a new way to fight. The new concept of operations is network centric, with information from a large number of different types of sensors passing through the network to the C2 vehicle. This diverse information must be understood, situational awareness achieved, and, tactical decisions based on it must be made. Thus, the new soldier manning the FCS C2 platform is given much more information, more diverse in nature; and therefore has a much more cognitively challenging job. training (ET) seeks to provide effective training anytime, anywhere. Embedded training must allow individual and collective training on a digital terrain representation of the mission area and permit mission planning and rehearsal in both stand-alone and networked modes while enroute.FCS Mission Needs Statement (MNS) 2001 Instructors are required to perform several instructional tasks, including instructing the student on relevant information, presenting appropriate examples, debriefing the student, and assigning remedial instruction. However, an instructor will not usually be available in the field, anytime, anywhere.

The Future Combat System (FCS) initiative is at the center of the Army's Future Force Vision. To predict how proposed systems and displays will impact situational understanding and, thereby, decision making, the U.S. Army Research Laboratory Human Research and Engineering Directorate (ARL HRED) used the tool, Command, Control, and Communication: Techniques for Reliable Assessment of Concept Execution (C3TRACE). C3TRACE is a modeling environment in which one can develop multiple concept configurations quickly and efficiently, minimizing the need for multiple human-in-the-loop experiments. Among the performance measures tracked are operator utilization, completed versus dropped messages, and the probability of making a “good” decision, that is, a decision supported by the required information. C3TRACE was used to develop a model of a Future Combat System (FCS) platoon equipment concept—–wrist-mounted displays for the dismounted positions and laptop-type displays for the mounted positions. This paper discusses the effects of display device communication processing on Soldier performance in mounted vs. dismounted positions.

The public debate on the government's decision to purchase the F-35 joint strike fighter (JSF) has been dominated by process and cost considerations. Secondary in this debate has been the utility of the F-35 for Canadian sovereignty missions and the F-35's capabilities relative to a range of alternatives, which include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Explicitly missing is any analysis of the strategic-political considerations that underpin the decision to maintain a multi-role fighter capability. Such considerations, in turn, are driven by assessments of the relationship between airpower and future warfare, and Canadian strategic interests on the world stage, which combined to lead to the F-35 decision. Beneath the surface of the public debate are fundamentally different views about the roles Canada should undertake internationally and in cooperation with its allies. In effect, critics of the F-35 decision are seeking to limit Canadian capabilities in order to limit Canadian options overseas.