Protester-shield model

During the past decade, Islamic terrorism is considered as a major political threat which had far-reaching consequences. Criminal law was enacted on both national and supranational levels in Europe. This fundamental change, however, was not prefigured by the terrorist attack in New York on September 11, 2001. It is rather an expression of an ongoing development. In the 1970’s, ethnic or national political terrorism (e.g., IRA, RAF) was on the table and prompted the adoption of security measures. The penal policy agenda was diverted to drug crimes in the 1980’s. In the 1990’s, as a consequence of the opening of the borders in Europe, organized transnational crime took the stage and was considered a critical threat. The adoption of covert investigative measures can especially be traced back to clandestine and partially transnational network structures. In contrast to organized crime, terrorist attacks pose a threat with potential lethal consequences for uninvolved civilians. While the terrorist attack requires publicity to spread anxiety and fear, its preparation necessitates clandestine operation. Hence, at the forefront of combating terrorism are cooperative efforts of the police and intelligence agencies on national and international levels as a vehicle for research on preventative measures against the dangers posed by terrorism. This “transcending of the boundaries” of security in the area of terrorism naturally poses fundamental problems in the realignment of national security architecture [1, 2]. The first question raised is the definition of terrorism. Moreover, early recognition and prevention of danger depend on prognoses that are supposed to illuminate an uncertain future by means of retrospective points of reference. The reliability of the predictions here needs to be approached with caution. In this context, so-called preincident indicators could help improve the reliability of the prognoses. The actions Crime Law Soc Change DOI 10.1007/s10611-013-9466-6

In the years following the attacks of 9/11, the Cold War discourse of totalitarianism has resurfaced in connection with Islamist terrorism. Scholars, journalists, and public intellectuals across the ideological spectrum routinely characterize the global jihad as the “new totalitarian threat” for the twenty-first century, as evidenced by such proclamations as the 2006 Euston Manifesto (“For a Renewal of Progressive Politics”). This discourse employs different names—“Islamofascism,” “Islamic totalitarianism”—but each signifies a tentacular threat to liberal democracy across the globe. It is in this context that this essay reads a recent novel, The German Mujahid, published (originally in French under the title Le village de l'Allemand, ou Le journal des frères Schiller) in 2008 by Algerian author Boualem Sansal. Banned in Algeria but winner of the 2011 German Book Trade Peace Prize, The German Mujahid, I argue, reproduces this new iteration of Islamist totalitarianism in novel form, triangulating memory of the 1994 civil war in Algeria and memory of the Holocaust along with contemporary representations of radical Islam in Europe. Yet for a novel so concerned with history and memory, and with the complex interplay between Europe and North Africa, what is striking in The German Mujahid is the absence of any engagement with the French-Algerian war or even French colonialism in Algeria. Certainly there is no shortage of creative and scholarly works on the Algerian War, but the suppression or erasure in the novel of this formative moment signals, in my view, a retreat from the anticolonial ethos that this conflict mobilized globally.

Why Europe Has to Offer a Better Deal Towards its Muslim Communities: A Quantitative Analysis of Open International Data

There is a heightened interest concerning the understanding of prejudice toward Muslims in Europe, steadily increasing since 2001. This study aimed at investigating whether the phenomenon of Islamophobia could have two different manifestations (i.e., Islamoprejudice and Secular Critique of Islam). In particular, we assessed whether two social attitudes, Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA, i.e., authoritarian aggression, and conservatism) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), could predict differently the two dimensions. Moreover, we wanted to investigate the different influence of the two dimensions in relation to the perceived threat from terrorism. A sample of 366 Italian adults participated in the study completing a self-report questionnaire. Data were analyzed by means of a structural equation model. Results showed that RWA and SDO were differently related to Islamoprejudice and Secular Critique of Islam, suggesting that certain forms of critique of Islam should not be associated with individual prejudice, because motivated only by secular, democratic, and universalistic convictions, denoting the traces of cultural biases. However, the nonprejudicial and apparently less problematic dimension of Islamophobia, that is, Secular Critique, does not preserve people from perceiving the threat from terrorism, in the same way as Islamoprejudice. Implications are discussed.

The purpose of this article is to examine the phenomenon of Islamophobia, which expands from fear to hatred and then to violence, and to highlight its commonalities with the First Crusade. Thus, the aim is to analyze the phenomenon of Islamophobia from a broader perspective, along with its historical dimension. Western researchers have defined Islamophobia as a baseless fear to Muslims. However, today this concept has transformed into a complex phenomenon that expresses the marginalization Muslims face in European societies and the reasons for this marginalization, as well as possible solutions. After World War II, the Muslims who went to Europe as workers obtained citizenship in the countries they moved to. This led to them gaining more visibility in public spaces and wanting to benefit from social rights as much as an average European citizen. However, this situation has been met with an ethnocentric reaction from local citizens, who fear losing their privileges. Therefore Muslims, labeled as "others" who reject integration into social life, have been put back in the crosshairs in Europe through mass media. Moreover, the Islamophobic rhetoric used by far-right European politicians seeking to establish themselves in political life, along with terrorist attacks like September 11, has led to a rapid increase in violence against Muslims in Europe. It is understood that a negative propaganda campaign against Muslims was conducted during the First Crusade (1096-1099), which also contained similar elements of fear. In medieval European society, it is observed that religion, which played a decisive role in identity, was the source of conflict between Muslim and Western cultures. When we examine the echoes of Pope Urban II's call in the city of Clermont, France (1095), it is understood that there are very similar expressions to those used in contemporary Islamophobic elements. Clerics who fervently supported the Pope's call and political actors who considered their own interests incited the masses and initiated the First Crusade. At the end of the three-year campaign, the Crusaders, who took control of Jerusalem, executed almost all the Muslims living in the city and gathered the Jews in a synagogue, accusing them of spying for the Muslims, and burned them. As in the present day, it is a historical fact that while religious elements were the dominant factor in the emergence of the conflict between these two cultures, economic and political elements were also present. The fact that no academic study comparing Islamophobia and the First Crusade in terms of their commonalities has been conducted in our country constitutes the unique aspect of our article. While using qualitative research methods to answer the main question of the study, data sources were obtained through observation, document examination, literature review, and the examination of newspapers and brochures. These findings were analyzed using the descriptive analysis method. As a result of the research, similarities have been identified between the First Crusade and contemporary Islamophobia. It is understood that negative prejudices against Muslims and the Islamic religion existed in both periods. It is understood that while religious and cultural justifications were put forward by the ruling powers to create a negative perception of Muslims and the Islamic religion, political and economic reasons were manipulated.

When, why, and how do people living in a democracy become radicalized to the point of being willing to use or directly support the use of terrorist violence against fellow citizens? This question has been at the center of academic and public debate over the past years as terrorist attacks and foiled plots inspired by militant Islamism have grabbed European and American headlines. This article identifies and discusses empirical studies of radicalization and points to the strengths as well as the weaknesses characterizing these studies. The aim is to take stock of the current state of research within this field and to answer the question: From an empirical point of view, what is known and what is not known about radicalization connected to militant Islamism in Europe?

Religiosity and attitudes toward muslim immigrants in the context of a terrorist attack

The paper defines the Othering phenomenon in a sociological perspective. This phenomenon can be contextualised starting from the concept of Orientalism and addressed with reference to sociological theories and concepts. Aim of the article is to propose the concept of Othering and the analysis of the processes of Othering as a key to responding to the consequences of the jihadist terrorist strategy in the West. After September 11, 2001 and after the terrorist attacks in Europe, in fact, citizens of Middle Eastern and Arab origin have been victims of processes of Othering and social exclusion because of their ethnic origin. This paper considers some empirical research on the processes of Othering. The main referenced sociological theories and concepts are highlighted for each empirical research taken into consideration, with attention given to the role of visual perception in favoring the processes of Othering. Media, television and films as well as online platforms, thanks to visual tools and contents, use stereotypes when portraying people of Middle Eastern and Arab origin. The article examines how the processes of Othering originate from the sensory path of sight. Finally, it emerges that to date the theme of Othering has not yet been placed in a general field of theory in sociological literature. Each considered empirical research focuses on a particular concept or theory, thus reducing the complexity of the Othering phenomenon. The study of the processes of Othering to be set in a complex theory of otherness, takes shape as a sociological key to respond to important social challenges, such as terrorism.

Subject Terrorism trends across Europe. Significance While there have been numerous attacks organised or inspired by Islamist terrorism in Europe, Spain and Italy have been spared significant violence in recent years. This goes against what might be expected from previous events: Spain saw the deaths of 192 people in 2004 from coordinated bombings by an al-Qaida cell and Italy has been receiving heavy flows of migrants, among which there are fears of smuggled Islamic State (IS) operatives. Impacts The wave of migrants using the Mediterranean route into Italy does not appear to pose a significant radicalisation threat at the moment. However, it may lead to long-lasting social divisions if public services designed to assist integration are overwhelmed. Migration and security policy will be key issues in upcoming elections across Europe.

This article investigates the effects of the Iraq war on terrorism in the West. Arguments from academics and from war-opponents and adherents are distilled into three hypotheses which are tested. To do this, a measure is created of terrorist activities in the West based on terrorist attacks and failed and foiled plots. The causal logic of the hypotheses is examined by piecing together data from various sources. Effects of the Iraq war are surprisingly hard to identify on terrorism in the West: It is difficult to corroborate that the Iraq war has drawn Islamist militant resources from the West, that Jihadist returnees should pose a significant threat, or that Muslims in greater numbers have been mobilized to terrorism. This does not disqualify transnational dynamics! Rather, it exemplifies how transnational dynamics in terrorism connects some parts of the globe, but not all, and not necessarily those most globalized. Immaterial factors, such as tactics from Iraq, have not been relevant in the West, but have had an effect in Afghanistan. Material factors like the return of Jihadists have not permeated to the West, but have had an effect in neighbouring countries.

China is a relative newcomer to the Middle East region. Indeed, as it is not in China’s immediate neighbourhood, for a long time its importance to Beijing remained low. This began to change in the early 2000s. Due to its impressive economic expansion, marked by joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, China’s energy consumption growth rate accelerated, making the energy-rich region increasingly crucial to China’s energy security. Thus, the destabilization that came to the Middle East with the Global War on Terror declared by the United States as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attack, endangered its interests. At the same time, however, having significant Muslim minorities of its own, China was keen to maintain the security of its Muslim-majority provinces and used the GWOT as justification for curbing the threat of its internal, separatist “Islamic terrorism”. Eventually, then, to accommodate its growing interest in the region, China expanded its “greater neighbourhood” to include the Middle East as well. Presently, while still not a key partner for Beijing, the region is one of the main suppliers of China’s gas and oil, an increasingly important export destination, a territory of continuous construction activity of Chinese companies under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and an object of a large-scale Chinese charm offensive. Slowly, it is becoming an object of Beijing’s security interests as well.

Ever since the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Europe has experienced a huge influx of refugees, which has led to demographic and social changes and created fears about the erosion of the European civilisation and Christian values. The Continent has also experienced several Islamic terrorist attacks- like those in Paris, London, Brussels and Berlin. This, coupled with the rise of the right-wing in Europe, has led to increasing xeno-racism, particularly of an Islamophobic variety that has resulted in the creation of an environment of intolerance and exclusion. At times this has manifested itself as outright hostility towards the Muslim community through hate crimes which take the form of physical and verbal attacks on visibly identifiable and more tangible symbols of Islam like hijabs, headscarves, burkhas and mosques. Yet, most of these hate crimes remain unreported and unaddressed. The European Union (EU) is a one of a kind post-modern entity professing values of equality, democracy and human rights. Given this commitment, this paper attempts to take stock of the EU’s response to rising xeno-racism with particular attention to Islamophobia and the Member States’ attempts to grapple with the same.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the militant Islamist threat within the United States, to determine whether the current United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure can prevent the next significant terror attack in the homeland, and recommend improvements to the National Counter-Terrorism Structure organization and practices. The first two chapters define militant Islam and explore the likelihood that it remains a persistent threat within the United States. The paper focuses on militant Islamists rather than all ideological threats in the United States and on the most damaging of potential terror attacks. A selection of six terrorist events illustrates the history of militant Islamist actions in the United States from 1993 to 2007, defines the threat, and aids in the analysis and evaluation of the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure later in the paper. Support for a persistent and plausible militant Islamist threat inside the United States and the six-year absence of a significant terror attack in the homeland is shown to be a result of slow, patient militant Islamist planning for an attack more powerful than that of 9/11. Using the defined threat as a foundation, the third chapter describes the existing National Counter-Terrorism Structure comprised of federal, state, and local law enforcement and homeland security organizations. The chapter focuses upon the Structure's policy, procedure, and resource implementation; communications and information sharing; and contingency plans and rehearsals. The fourth chapter analyzes whether the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure can defend the homeland against the next militant Islamist terror attack in the homeland. The analysis uses selected Principles of War from the US Army's Field Manual 3-0 and focuses upon the extent to which national, state, and local law enforcement and homeland security organizations coordinate and share information about known and potential terrorist threats and learn through their examining and rehearsing threat plans and scenarios. This chapter also makes recommendations to improve any problems in the organization and practices of the National Counter-Terrorism Structure discovered during the analysis. The importance of identifying seams in the Structure is seen when looking at the context of the 9/11 terror attacks. Prior to September 2001, a significant seam in the Counter-Terrorism Structure existed because the CIA and FBI did not conduct synchronized information sharing and coordination. That seam aided al-Qaeda on 9/11. Proposed recommendations concerning the National Counter-Terrorism Structure are evaluated with the same Principles of War as was used during the evaluation of the existing structure. The United States is at war in the homeland with militant Islamists- the enemy threat that already exists within our borders. They enter through the porous US borders with Canada and Mexico or are homegrown from citizens and long-term residents of the United States within those same borders. The forces fighting on behalf of the United States are the law enforcement and homeland security organizations who make up the United States National Counter-Terrorism Structure. That Structure is comprised of the Department of Homeland Security, Northern Command, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the federal level, similar organizations at the state level, and city and county law enforcement and security personnel at the local level. The addition of new counter-terrorism organizations as well as new and better information sharing and collaboration centers in the United States allows the US National Counter-Terrorism Structure to provide better security than before September 11, 2001. Is it good enough to prevent the next militant Islamist terror attack on the scale of 9/11 within the homeland?

Legal Response to Global Terrorism: The European Union Perspective

Results from previous research suggest that terrorist attacks lead to relatively short‐term increases in trust in institutions. The explanation for this increase is known as the ‘rally effect’, whereby individuals respond to crises and threats with more positive support for political leaders and institutions. Even though the number of related natural experiments with survey data is increasing, these studies merely represent case studies of single incidents with limited external validity. To advance quasi‐experimental research on the effects of terrorist attacks on institutional trust, we propose a new methodological approach by assessing all jihadist terrorist attacks resulting in at least one civilian death in a European country that take place during the fieldwork of the European Social Survey and combining the results of eight unique natural experiments in five different countries using meta‐analytic and meta‐regression techniques. The results of this ‘multi‐site natural experiment’ indicate that support for the rally‐hypothesis is mixed at best. While some attacks appear to significantly increase at least some measures of institutional trust (e.g., The Netherlands 2004, France 2015, Israel 2012), others seem to have no effect at all (e.g., Germany 2015, France 2018), or even substantially decrease trust in domestic political institutions (Russia 2012). Summary effects from multilevel meta‐analyses are non‐significant for any institutional trust outcome. These results are robust to a large number of robustness tests and alternative specifications. In comparison with previous research, it appears that a lot of the European evidence for the rally‐hypothesis was based on ‘outlier’ case studies like the Charlie Hebdo attack in France, 2015. Accordingly, our results cast doubt on the unrestricted generalisability of rally effects after terrorist attacks to different geographic, political, social or historical contexts.