Quentin Skinner’s Attempt to Clarify Collingwood

Notes on Contributors

A large body of work in science education indicates that evolution is one of the least understood and accepted scientific theories. Although scholarship from the history and philosophy of science (HPS) has shed light on many conceptual and pedagogical issues in evolution education, HPS-informed studies of evolution education are also characterized by conceptual weaknesses. In this chapter, we critically review such studies and find that some work lacks historically accurate characterizations of student ideas (preconceptions and misconceptions). In addition, although several studies in the science education literature have drawn parallels between students’ conceptual change patterns and those from the history of science (HOS), we identify several issues that complicate the characterization of student ideas as “Lamarckian” or “Darwinian.” Finally, a review of the topic of explanation illustrates how the plurality of approaches employed in evolutionary biology is not reflected in evolution education scholarship or practice. This finding is particularly concerning given the recent shift in emphasis in science education standards to teaching content through practice-based tasks (e.g., explanation and argumentation). Overall, this chapter demonstrates that while HPS is of central importance to a deep understanding of evolution education, too often its contributions are poorly realized.

Notes on Contributors

The history and philosophy of science (HPS) plays a special role in education. An elective HPS course on the philosophy of scientific experimentation for young scientists and graduate students of natural science is presented. The course bears a pragmatic character, and its main aims include the development of critical thinking (CT), familiarization with philosophical problems in the relevant areas of knowledge, and the cultivation of a taste for reflective, critical analysis, both individual and group based, which contributes to a deeper understanding of the features of scientific practice in the context of modern complex group cooperation. Students are offered a classical HPS program that included debates on the relationship between empiricism and rationalism, the role of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, modern topics associated with the practical success of rationalism in the emergence of modern natural science, and the theory-ladenness of experimentation. Particular attention during the course is paid to the problems of megascience, the inclusion of which is justified by the specifics of the students’ engagement with science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). Emphasis is placed on the structure and typology of the collective subject in the modern educational process as well as in experimental practice. Lessons on the methodology of expert text analysis (META), which are aimed at the development of critical thinking skills and the creation of an interdisciplinary discussion space, are included in the course and relied on the example of the history and philosophy of high-energy physics to motivate professional reflection. META classes included in the course prepare graduate students for teamwork in big science, proto-megascience, and megascience. The course offers practical recommendations that could be applied to students’ own research and could be useful for practitioners.

In Canada, education is a provincial responsibility. Given a geographically expansive country, a diversity of cultures, and 13 provinces and territories, the role of history and philosophy of science (HPS) in science education varies considerably across the nation. In the last decade, some attempts have been made to provide some national consistency in science curricula across provincial boundaries (Pan-Canadian Frameworks for Science). While a focus for this work is on scientific literacy that incorporates in some ways teaching about the nature of science, implementation at the provincial level, often guided by textbooks, has not been widespread.

Mentoring graduate students and postdoctoral researchers shapes the development of future scientists and, by extension, the progress of science itself. Here we explain how scientific mentoring can be enhanced by incorporating history and philosophy of science (HPS). HPS can provide mentees with a vocabulary for interpreting scientific practice and help to foster creative and innovative biologists through attention to how and why science works. It can also encourage more conscious reflection among mentors on existing biological practices and spur the undertaking of new ones that ultimately contribute to the conceptual rigor and theoretical significance of life science inquiry. We provide concrete advice for experimenting with different strategies of incorporating HPS that range from slight modifications of widely used practices to more nonconventional ideas.

Modelling is ubiquitous in the humanities: while scholars do many things, the search for patterns and principles, and the links between them, is found in all humanistic disciplines and periods. Modelling in antiquity consisted mainly of explaining and constraining patterns by means of principles. In the early modern period, modelling also included the prediction and refutation of patterns by means of these principles. Since the late nineteenth century, the focus shifted to interpreting and criticizing patterns by means of principles. I will discuss some commonalities between modelling in the humanities and in the sciences. The exploration of different modelling strategies and practices in the (history of the) humanities has just begun and may lead to a new field coined History and Philosophy of the Humanities (HPH), analogous to History and Philosophy of Science (HPS).

This paper is an analysis of inserting history and philosophy of science (HPS) in a physics undergraduate program at a Brazilian university. It is an examination of the approaches and methodologies adopted by professors of a History and Epistemology course. The course aims to have an explicit approach to HPS. The results suggest a concern of the Physics Institute regarding inserting these questions into physics teacher training programs. The study also uncovered that the professors who taught the subject had different visions of HPS.

Notes on Contributors

This survey of major developments in North American philosophy of science begins with the mid-1960s consolidation of the disciplinary synthesis of internalist history and philosophy of science (HPS) as a response to criticisms of logical empiricism. These developments are grouped for discussion under the following headings: historical metamethodologies, scientific realisms, philosophies of the special sciences, revivals of empiricism, cognitivist naturalisms, social epistemologies, feminist theories of science, studies of experiment and the disunity of science, and studies of science as practice and culture. A unifying theme of the survey is the relation between historical metamethodologists and scientific realists, which dominated philosophical work in the late 1970s. I argue that many of the alternative cognitive naturalisms, social epistemologies, and feminist theories that have been proposed can be understood as analogues to the differences between metamethodological theories of scientific rationality and realist accounts of successful reference to real causal processes. Recent work on experiment, scientific practice, and the culture of science may, however, challenge the underlying conception of the field according to which realism and historical rationalism (or their descendants) are the important alternatives available, and thus may take philosophy of science in new directions.

Programs for the reform of K-12 science teaching today usually insist that science teachers must introduce their students to the nature of science, as well as to scientific content. The academic field of science studies, however, evinces no consensus about what the nature of science really is. This article examines how science educators and educational researchers have drawn on the fragmented teachings of science studies about the nature of science, and how they have used those teachings as a resource in their own projects. It identifies three competing movements for the reform of science teaching that owe a particular debt to science studies: history and philosophy of science (HPS), science, technology, and society (STS), and constructivist pedagogy. The article analyzes some of the deep assumptions about the relationships between research science, school science, and children’s learning that pervade the educational literature.

Este trabalho insere-se no contexto das discussões acerca da inserção da chamada “Natureza da Ciência” (NDC) no ensino de ciências por meio do uso da História e da Filosofia da Ciência (HFC). A partir da análise de aspectos dos debates sobre a natureza da luz no início do século XIX, propomos a discussão de diversos temas da NDC, com ênfase nos diferentes fatores envolvidos no processo de avaliação entre teorias concorrentes. Em particular, trazemos as contribuições de Thomas Young e Augustin Fresnel no âmbito da disputa entre a teoria ondulatória e corpuscular da luz, destacando, ainda, aspectos dos contextos francês e britânico desse período. Surgem, da apresentação desse episódio histórico, certos temas concernentes ao saber sobre ciência, tanto relacionados mais diretamente a questões históricas e sociológicas quanto relativos a questões epistemológicas, e que podem ser problematizados e explorados no ensino de física.

There is no debate regarding the importance of including NOS in the science curriculum, but some suggest that it would be best to call this domain Nature of Science Studies, History and Philosophy of Science (HPS), Ideas-about-Science, Nature of Sciences, Nature of Scientific Knowledge, or Views on the Nature of Science.

Notes on Contributors

Literally speaking, "Philosophy of biology" is a rather old expression. William Whewell coined it in 1840, at the very time he introduced the expression "philosophy of science". Whewell was fond of creating neologisms, like Auguste Comte, his French counterpart in the field of the philosophical reflection about science. Historians of science know that a few years earlier, in 1834, Whewell had generated a small scandal when he proposed the word "scientist" as a general term by which "the students of the knowledge of the material world" could describe themselves, and distinguish themselves from artists. The term "philosopher", Whewell argued, was too wide. A new generic term, more or less equivalent to the French term "savant", was needed in order to prevent the disintegration of science that seemed to flow from its specialization in modern times.1 When Whewell first introduced the terms "philosophy of science" and "philosophy of biology" in his 1840 Philosophy of the inductive sciences, the latter term was merely a special branch of "philosophy of science". The expression "philosophy of science" itself had two justifications: firstly, this phrase expressed the idea that "science" remained cognitively coherent enough to justify a critical enquiry into its methodological unity and its foundation; secondly, the phrase "philosophy of science" was required in order to distinguish a properly "philosophical" enquiry from a "historical" approach to science. Although Whewell's 1840 Philosophy of the inductive sciences 2 had approximately the same chapter structure as his 1837 History of the Inductive Sciences 3 (that is, a series of chapters successively devoted to the concept of science in general, and although there was considerable overlap between the contents of the two books, then to particular sciences), its theoretical purpose was different. Clearly, Whewell was not willing to confuse the genres of history and philosophy as Auguste Comte had done in his 1830 Cours de philosophie positive.4 Note also that the word "biology" was still extremely rare in English when Whewell used it in 1840. In fact, Whewell's 1837 History of the Inductive Sciences does not make use of the word "biology": Whewell successively examines "botany", "zoology", "physiology" and "comparative antomy" as special branches of "analytico-classificatory science", then discusses palaeontology as a special case of the "palaeo-etiological sciences". Three years later, in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Whewell does use "biology" as a generic term for all the sciences dealing with life. The various sciences which were separately examined in the previous book are now collectively considered. Furthermore, the main philosophical problem raised by biology is its dual nature: biology is both nomological and a historical science. Modern philosophers of biology are generally unaware of the story of the origins of the expression "philosophy of biology", but Whewell's dual theoretical nature of biology is still a major concern for modern "philosophy of biology".