Reasoning on Constrained Epistemic Action Modal Logic

nnn The primary objective of this thesis is to contribute to the development of a theory of how computerized decision aids affect decision behavior. nnn This objective is attained by developing a cost-benefit-based model of how decision makers select from available cognitive information processing operators. The cost-benefit model assumes that decision makers establish qcognitive repertoiresq comprised of all the cognitive operators they are capable of executing. When making a decision, decision makers choose from this repertoire based on maximizing net benefit (execution benefits less execution costs). Decision aids are one of the task environment factors that influence expected execution costs. nnnn It is important to develop a theory of decision-aid effect so that decision aids can be matched more purposefully to the characteristics of the decision maker, the task, and the environment. This objective contrasts to the current situation, which is characterized by ad hoc implementation of decision aids on the assumption that aided decision making will improve the quality of decisions. More generally, expositions of decision process theories that help explain contingent decision behavior in different task environments are needed to improve decision performance. nnn Since the decision making model developed in this research was based on cognitive decision processes, a process tracing methodology (collection of verbal protocols) was used to gather data to test the model. This methodology relies on participants verbalizing their thought processes as they make a decision. Coded verbal protocol transcripts form the basis of the experimental data used for statistical testing purposes. nnn This research used one combination of experimental task (a financial analysis task), participant (intermediate-level professional accountants), and decision aid (a computer spreadsheet program). Participants were asked to assess the relative risk of seven competing loan applicants. Nine participants were provided with only paper-based task materials. Eight participants were also provided with access to a computer spreadsheet containing loan applicant financial information. nnn The central research proposition that decision-aid effect would be limited to increased execution frequencies of cognitive operators specifically supported by the decision aid was ratified. Apart from this expected effect, few differences were found in the decision behaviors of unaided and aided decision makers. However, post hoc tests of variance in decision behavior showed aided decision makers operate more consistently. This result cannot be explained easily within the cost-benefit theory used in the research. nnn By applying cost-benefit theories of decision behavior to individual cognitive operators, some tentative decision-aid design guidelines have emerged. When decision making is regarded as a sequence of cognitive operator executions, improved decision making performance results from improved cognitive operator execution performance. To achieve improved cognitive operator execution performance by using a decision aid implies that the affected operators positively contribute toward problem solution. Unless decision-aid designers analyze task requirements in terms of required (or desired) cognitive operators, the results achieved by providing decision aids will be unpredictable. Accordingly, maximum decision-aid leverage will be obtained only by knowing which cognitive operators result in information processing bottlenecks and by providing decision aids specifically designed to overcome these bottlenecks. nnn Because verbal-protocol-based research is expensive and time consuming, not all research propositions could be tested. In particular, research propositions relating to expected changes in decision behavior arising from the amount of task information embedded in the decision aid were not tested. Testing these propositions would add another factor to the empirical work, thus doubling required samples sizes and resultant data analyses. Appropriate experimental designs for future research are identified. nnn In summary, the research has contributed to the development of a cost-benefit theory of decision behavior that is useful in understanding the cognitive consequences of changes in the task environment. Because decision aids reduce expected costs of cognitive operator execution, they increase expected operator net benefit. Where operator net benefit is increased, increased execution frequencies follow. By analyzing other changes in the task environment in a similar fashion (that is, by determining the effects on expected operator execution costs and expected operator execution benefits), more accurate predictions of contingent behavior can be made.

When giving an analysis of knowledge in multiagent systems, one needs a framework in which higher-order information and its dynamics can both be represented. A recent tradition starting in original work by Plaza treats all of knowledge, higher-order knowledge, and its dynamics on the same foot. Our work is in that tradition. It also fits in approaches that not only dynamize the epistemics, but also epistemize the dynamics: the actions that (groups of) agents perform are epistemic actions. Different agents may have different information about which action is taking place, including higher-order information. We demonstrate that such information changes require subtle descriptions. Our contribution is to provide a complete axiomatization for an action language of van Ditmarsch, where an action is interpreted as a relation between epistemic states (pointed models) and sets of epistemic states. The applicability of the framework is found in every context where multiagent strategic decision making is at stake, and already demonstrated in game-like scenarios such as Cluedo and card games.

Dynamic epistemic logic (\(\mathbf {DEL}\)) is known as a large family of logics that extend standard epistemic logic with dynamic operators. Such dynamic operators can be regarded as epistemic actions over Kripke semantics (or its variant). Therefore, \(\mathbf {DEL}\) is often used to model changes of agents’ knowledge, belief or preference over Kripke semantics in terms of dynamic operators in many literatures. As a variant of \(\mathbf {DEL}\), (van Benthem and Liu, J Appl Non-Classical Logics 17(2):157–18 2007; Liu, Reasoning about preference dynamics, Springer Science & Business Media, Berlin 2011) proposed dynamic logic of relation changers (\(\mathbf {DLRC}\)). They provided a general framework to capture many dynamic operators in terms of relation changing operation written in programs of propositional dynamic logic, and they also provided a sound and complete Hilbert-style axiomatization for \(\mathbf {DLRC}\). While \(\mathbf {DLRC}\) can cover many dynamic operators in a uniform manner, proof theory for \(\mathbf {DLRC}\) is not well-studied except the Hilbert-style axiomatization. Therefore, we propose a cut-free labelled sequent calculus for \(\mathbf {DLRC}\). We show that our sequent calculus is equipollent with the Hilbert-style axiomatization.

We provide algebraic semantics together with a sound and complete sequent calculus for information update due to epistemic actions. This semantics is flexible enough to accommodate incomplete as well as wrong information e.g. due to secrecy and deceit, as well as nested knowledge. We give a purely algebraic treatment of the muddy children puzzle, which moreover extends to situations where the children are allowed to lie and cheat. Epistemic actions, that is, information exchanges between agents A,B, . . . ∈ A, are modeled as elements of a quantale. The quantale (Q, ∨ , •) acts on an underlyingQ-right module (M, ∨ ) of epistemic propositions and facts. The epistemic content is encoded by appearance maps, one pair f A : M → M and f Q A : Q → Q of (lax) morphisms for each agent A ∈ A, which preserve the module and quantale structure respectively. By adjunction, they give rise to epistemic modalities [12], capturing the agents’ knowledge on propositions and actions. The module action is epistemic update and gives rise to dynamic modalities [21]— cf.weakest precondition. This model subsumes the crucial fragment of Baltag, Moss and Solecki’s [6] dynamic epistemic logic, abstracting it in a constructive fashion while introducing resource-sensitive structure on the epistemic actions.

Epistemic Logic studies statements containing verbs such as 'know' and 'wish'. It is one of the most exciting areas in medieval philosophy. Neglected almost entirely after the end of the Middle Ages, it has been rediscovered by philosophers of the present century. This is the first comprehensive study of the subject. Ivan Boh explores the rules for entailment between epistemic statements, the search for the conditions of knowing contingent propositions, the problems of substitutivity in intentional contexts, the relationship between epistemic and modal logic, and the problems of composite and divided senses in authors ranging from Abelard to Frachantian.

Metaphor scholars have widely explored metaphor use in political discourse. Nevertheless, the current research does not account for the ‘gradable metaphoricity’ in political discourse analysis. This dissertation fills this gap by addressing this specific issue in two frameworks: (1) viewing political metaphor from a static and gradient perspective (Source-Target mapping; Conventional vs. Novel vs. Dead), and (2) viewing political metaphor from a gradable and dynamic perspective (a matter of salience and awareness of metaphoricity). A systematic literature review in chapter 2 points out that the static and dynamic perspectives differ significantly in underlying assumptions and organizing principles, although both are indistinctly referred to by metaphor scholars as constituting a ‘gradable’ view. The former takes metaphor as a static conceptual unit or lexical unit, but the latter tends to accord a central role of activation of metaphoricity to metaphorical expressions. To launch a theoretical advancement about the dynamic view in political discourse, chapter 3 offers a usage-based model of gradable and dynamic metaphors—the YinYang Dynamics of Metaphoricity (YYDM). In addition, this thesis investigates political metaphors from an interdisciplinary angle, incorporating theory from the field of International Relations. An empirical evaluation of political (discourse) studies in chapter 4 shows the large absence of transdisciplinary perspectives. Addressing the abovementioned gaps, this dissertation reports on two empirical analyses of trade metaphors in a big corpus that represents the official trade positions of the United States and China during the presidencies of Bill Clinton and Jiang Zemin (1993-1997) as well as Donald Trump and Xi Jinping (2017-2021). Based on a codebook of a cross-linguistic metaphor identification procedure in chapter 5, the first empirical part contributes to the static and gradient perspective and includes two corpus-based studies of metaphorical framing about trade (chapters 6-7). The diachronic and cross-linguistic use of source domains from a socio-cognitive approach in chapter 6 reveals that source domains are semantic fields that vary with trade discourse contexts (interests, power, and power relations). Chapter 7 shows that the use of trade metaphors (source domains of Conventional and Novel metaphors) to construct and legitimize political ideologies correlates with differences between political genres. The second part contributes to the gradable and dynamic view by applying the transdisciplinary model of YinYang Dynamics of Metaphoricity in chapters 8-10. In chapter 8, an evaluation of the new model in the Clinton-Jiang trade discourse shows that the dynamic cognitive process (transformation of metaphoricity) and rhetorical process (argumentation and persuasion) mutually develop with the evolution of the socio-political process (trade perspectives and trade events). Chapter 9 investigates the transformation of metaphoricity in the Trump-Xi trade discourse and finds that cognitive processes (patterns of metaphoricity activation) and affective processes (emotions or sentiments) mutually develop with the evolution of socio-political processes (trade perspectives and trade events). Based on the findings in chapters 8-9, chapter 10 further shows several phenomena in the Clinton-Jiang and Trump-Xi trade discourses: the movement of metaphors on the metaphoricity spectrum, the bodily motivation of gradable and dynamic metaphoricity, and the interconnected political discourse systems. Drawing on all the theoretical and empirical insights revealed in the dissertation, the final section of the thesis outlines a future direction, i.e., moving towards a transdisciplinary and dynamic approach to metaphor in political discourse analysis.

The situated approach to situation awareness (SA) claims that system operators often offload information instead of constructing detailed, stable and internal representations of dynamic situations. Offloading, which can be more or less deliberate, is the attenuation of internal processes in favor of augmenting external ones. Operators do this to minimise costly internal processing and storage. This paper uses empirical evidence and phenomenological analysis to argue that situated SA presupposes a motor intentional core. This core refers to embodied skills whose function is to present states of the system as being a certain way. They include, for example, the skillful eye scan patterns of experts and various epistemic actions that involve manipulating objects in the physical world to make information available to other cognitive processes. Through these motor intentional skills, offloaded information can be accessed on an as-needed basis. We discuss metrics for assessing the motor intentional core, as well as implications for interface design and the training of system operators, arguing that many motor intentional skills can be taught directly.

Perceptual decision-making is a dynamic cognitive process and is shaped by many factors, including behavioral state, reward contingency, and sensory environment. To understand the extent to which adaptive behavior in decision-making is dependent on pupil-linked arousal, we trained head-fixed rats to perform perceptual decision-making tasks and systematically manipulated the probability of Go and No-go stimuli while simultaneously measuring their pupil size in the tasks. Our data demonstrated that the animals adaptively modified their behavior in response to the changes in the sensory environment. The response probability to both Go and No-go stimuli decreased as the probability of the Go stimulus being presented decreased. Analyses within the signal detection theory framework showed that while the animals' perceptual sensitivity was invariant, their decision criterion increased as the probability of the Go stimulus decreased. Simulation results indicated that the adaptive increase in the decision criterion will increase possible water rewards during the task. Moreover, the adaptive decision-making is dependent on pupil-linked arousal as the increase in the decision criterion was the largest during low pupil-linked arousal periods. Taken together, our results demonstrated that the rats were able to adjust their decision-making to maximize rewards in the tasks, and that adaptive behavior in perceptual decision-making is dependent on pupil-linked arousal.NEW & NOTEWORTHY Perceptual decision-making is a dynamic cognitive process and is shaped by many factors. However, the extent to which changes in sensory environment result in adaptive decision-making remains poorly understood. Our data provided new experimental evidence demonstrating that the rats were able to adaptively modify their decision criterion to maximize water reward in response to changes in the statistics of the sensory environment. Furthermore, the adaptive decision-making is dependent on pupil-linked arousal.

There were mainly six types of formalization models found in the study for 95 city and county names in China’s Hunan province, namely, the environment in a place for the place, the wish of the nomenclator for the place, the relative position of a place for the place, the resident for the place, the legend for the place, and the function of a place for the place. In the six formalization models, the environment in a place for the place was the most in number, forging 47 names. Besides, the wish of the nomenclator for the place and the relative position of a place for the place came the second, taking 20 names respectively. The cognitive operation participating in the formalization was primarily single metonymy with only a few complex metonymies. Metaphtonymy could be only noted in the model of the wish of the nomenclator for the place. It was notable that single metaphor was missing in the cognitive operations.

Working memory refers to the short-term retention of information that is no longer accessible in the environment, and the manipulation of this information, for subsequent use in guiding behavior. In this review, we will present data from a series of event-related functional magnetic-resonance-imaging (fMRI) studies of delayed-response tasks that were designed to investigate the role of different regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) during different working-memory component processes. From these data, we conclude that: (1) lateral PFC is anatomically organized according to the types of cognitive operations that one performs when attempting to temporarily maintain and manipulate information; and (2) consistent with the picture that has emerged from the monkey electrophysiological literature, human lateral PFC is involved in several encoding- and response-related processes as well as mnemonic and nonmnemonic processes that are engaged during the temporary maintenance of information. Thus, lateral PFC activity cannot be ascribed to the function of a single, unitary cognitive operation.

Ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), and temporal cortex (TE) all contribute to visual decision-making. Accumulating evidence suggests that vlPFC may play a central role in multiple cognitive operations, perhaps resembling domain-general regions of the human frontal lobe. We trained monkeys in a task calling for learning, retrieval, and spatial selection of rewarded target objects. Recordings of neural activity covered large areas of vlPFC, dlPFC, and TE. Results suggested a central role for vlPFC in each cognitive operation with strong coding of each task feature, while only location was strongly coded in dlPFC and current object identity in TE. During target selection, target location was communicated first from vlPFC to dlPFC, followed by extensive mutual support. In vlPFC, stimulus identities were independently coded in different task operations. The results suggest a central role for the inferior frontal convexity in controlling successive operations of a complex, multi-step task.

Issues about information spring up wherever one scratches the surface of logic. Here is a case that raises delicate issues of ‘factual’ versus ‘procedural’ information, or ‘statics’ versus ‘dynamics’. What does intuitionistic logic, perhaps the earliest source of informational and procedural thinking in contemporary logic, really tell us about information? How does its view relate to its ‘cousin’ epistemic logic? We discuss connections between intuitionistic models and recent protocol models for dynamic-epistemic logic, as well as more general issues that emerge.

This paper studies the logical features of social group creation. We focus on the mechanisms which indicate when agents can form a team based on the correspondence in their set of features (behavior, opinions, etc.). Our basic approach uses a semi-metric on the set of agents, which is used to construct a network topology. Then it is extended with epistemic features to represent the agents’ epistemic states, allowing us to explore group-creation alternatives where what matters is not only the agent’s differences but also what they know about them. We use tools of dynamic epistemic logic to study the properties of different strategies to network formations.

We explore when finite epistemic models are definable up to simulation or bisimulation, either over the basic multi-agent epistemic language L or over its extension L-C with common knowledge operators. Our main results are the following: (1) Bisimulation to finite epistemic states (i.e. pointed models) is not definable in L. (2) Global bisimulation to finite epistemic models is definable using model validity in L. (3) Simulation by finite epistemic states is not always definable, even over L-C. (4) We identify a class of epistemic models called well-multifounded for which simulation to finite epistemic states is definable over L. The first two results contrasts with that of van Benthem that finite epistemic states are definable up to bisimulation in L-C by so-called characteristic formulae. Our results have applications in the logical specification of multi-agent systems. Characteristic formulae, which define states up to bisimulation, fully capture all modally definable properties of models, and can for example be used to give complete calculi for validity over fixed structures. Meanwhile, simulation is a 'substructure' relation that is appropriate for epistemic logic, as it preserves positive existential formulae. Simulation formulae are useful in giving a dynamic description of models subject to epistemic actions.

In ‘belief revision’ a theory \( \mathcal{K} \) is revised with a formula ϕ resulting in a revised theory \( \mathcal{K}*\phi \). Typically, ¬ϕ is in \( \mathcal{K} \), one has to give up belief in ¬ϕ by a process of retraction, and ϕ is in \( \mathcal{K}*\phi \). We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory \( \mathcal{K} \) wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., wherein B¬ϕ is true. The revision with ϕ is a program *ϕ that transforms this information state into a new information state. The transformation is described by a dynamic modal operator [*ϕ], that is interpreted as a binary relation 〚*ϕ〛 between information states. The next information state is computed from the current information state and the belief revision formula. If the revision is successful, the agent believes ϕ in the resulting state, i.e., B ϕ is then true. To make this work, as information states we propose ‘doxastic epistemic models’ that represent both knowledge and degrees of belief. These are multi-modal and multi-agent Kripke models. They are constructed from preference relations for agents, and they satisfy various characterizable multi-agent frame properties. Iterated, revocable, and higher-order belief revision are all quite natural in this setting. We present, for an example, five different ways of such dynamic belief revision. One can also see that as a non-deterministic epistemic action with two alternatives, where one is preferred over the other, and there is a natural generalization to general epistemic actions with preferences.