Republican Democracy

Developments in contemporary analytic political theory have called for political theory to situate itself near political science, to pay attention to political institutions, to follow the research output of the social sciences, and to present sensitivity to method. This empirical and methodological turn has brought about a debate regarding the form and desirability of such empirically grounded political theory. We aim, first, to clarify what the empirical turn in political theory implies for research in political theory. We shall situate such empirically grounded political theory in contemporary analytic political theory, in contemporary analytic political theory’s descriptive and prescriptive steps, and also examine how this turn complements contemporary analytic political theory’s evaluative step. Second, to suggest a defense of this empirical development, as if properly understood, it would assist empirically grounded contemporary analytic political theory to achieve its own stated goals. Third, to provide a template for a research design in empirical contemporary analytic political theory.

This thesis offers a positive reinterpretation of the relevance of Isaiah Berlin’s political thought. It re-examines his work hermeneutically with the double aim of claiming its intrinsic relevance as a work of political theory beyond what most critics have acknowledged, first; and second, with the intention of using it to draw conclusions that will address some of the most pressing discussions found in contemporary liberal political theory, such as the conflicting link between value pluralism and liberalism, or the recent confrontation between political moralism and political realism. This is achieved by reading Berlin hermeneutically, and thus transcending the categorical differentiation between historical and philosophical methods in his work. The argument is presented in three sections. The first one is a biographical introduction that acts as a methodological statement. In it, the dilemma on the nature of values that sits at the heart of Berlin’s work is defined by reference to his biographical context. The second section of the thesis is formed by three chapters that look at the central philosophical aspects of Berlin’s political thought: value pluralism and a neo-Kantian normative ethical theory that emerges in relation to it. By claiming a relationship between Berlin and Kant, and by presenting value pluralism as a meta-ethical theory, the thesis offers an alternative reading of Berlin’s work that deviates substantively from most existing scholarship. The third section of the thesis compares Berlin’s political interpretation of value pluralism with that of Bernard Williams and John Rawls, in order to claim that liberal theory demands a hermeneutic method in its justification. This will show the enduring relevance of Berlin’s contribution to political theory as one that expands beyond his own historical moment, against what many commentators have argued. It also raises a strong claim on the crucial implications of method in political theory, calling for a more hermeneutic approach.

The problem ofjustifying democracy arises when a society sees the need for cooperative, collective action. Collective action may be needed to solve coordination problems, public goods problems, Prisoner's Dilemmas, and other structural problems of human interaction or perhaps to realize common ideals of justice in concrete political institutions. Once the need for collective action is established, one must ask how the goals of a cooperative endeavor are to be secured. Cooperation requires that individuals, at least over a specified range of activity, pursue a joint strategy. To assure voluntary compliance in a joint venture, cooperation must be to each person's advantage. However, each person may have an incentive to induce others to cooperate and to defect from the joint strategy in the hope of enjoying the fruits of cooperation without incurring the opportunity costs of compliance. This is the essence of the Prisoner's Dilemma, and considerations of this sort suggest that if collective action is to succeed, policies or strategies formed collectively must be coercively enforceable. Coercion, however, requires justification. Because solving the problem of rational noncompliance requires that collective decisions be coercively enforceable, the rules by which collective decisions are reached require justification. Douglas Rae neatly puts the problem of justification that emerges when political solutions are coercively enforceable as follows: "Once a political community has decided which of its members are to participate directly in the making of collective policy, an important question remains: 'How many of them must agree before a policy is imposed on the community?"" This is essentially the question to which the principle of democratic rule provides an answer: by what process are collective decisions to be made? Answering Rae's question requires a normative framework. We could say that a procedure for making collective decisions is justified if and

This paper aims to advocate a Williamsian approach to political realism and contends that contemporary realist political theory is built on an ‘a-theoretical core’ that the paper will call ‘political realism’ in the broader sense (for a very different approach to Williams, see Hall, 2013). The central tenet of this thesis is that contemporary realist political theory fundamentally differs from mainstream political theory not only in its political outlook, but also in its views about the tasks and prospects of theorizing. In other words, ‘political realism’ imposes severe constraints on theorizing in a realist key and makes contemporary realist political theory especially vulnerable to criticisms coming from mainstream political theory. This paper contends, however, that the inherent limitedness of contemporary realist political theory is a fair price that is worth paying for a more realistic understanding of politics.The argument of the paper is built on the Williamsian assumption that mainstream political theory is ultimately a sort of ‘applied morality’ and that the fundamental problem with mainstream political theory as ‘applied morality’ is not so much its strong commitment to pre-political moral principles as its being fundamentally shaped by an ethical theory.

There is no question Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is an engaging and powerful book which will inform legal philosophy, particularly Kantian theories, for years to come. The text explores with care Kant’s legal and political philosophy, distinguishing it from his better known moral theory. Nor is Ripstein’s book simply a recounting of Kant’s legal and political theory. Ripstein develops Kant’s views in his own unique vision illustrating fresh ways of viewing the entire Kantian project. But the same strength and coherence which ties the book to Kant’s important values of independence blinds the work to our shared moral ties grounded in other political values. Ripstein’s thoughts on punishment are novel in that he embeds criminal law, both in its retributivist and consequentialist facets, into Kant’s overarching political philosophy to show how criminal law can be seen as one aspect of the supremacy of public law. But a criminal law solely focused on the preservation of freedom takes little notice of the ways criminal law need expand its view to account for how a polity can restore the victim of a crime back to civic equality, reincorporate offenders after they have been punished and cannot leave past offenders isolated and likely to reoffend, resulting in the rotating door prison system and communities of innocents who remain preyed upon by career criminals. Lastly, a political theory that does not prize our civic bonds will ignore the startling balkanization of our criminal punishment practices, where policing, arresting and imprisonment become tools of racial and social oppression. In illustrating the benefits in viewing criminal law as a coherent part of Kant’s political theory of freedom, Ripstein also highlights what is absent. It then becomes clear that though Kant presents one important facet of punishment, only a republican political theory can meet the most pressing moral demands of punishment by reminding us that criminal law must be used to preserve and strengthen civic society.

L'A. evalue l'importance de l'idee de la difference dans la theorie et la pratique politiques contemporaines. Tandis que l'accentuation de la difference est un antidote utile contre le faux universalisme de maintes theories d'emancipation, il est difficile de determiner sa signification au sens large

Over the last few decades, the neologisms social imaginary and political imaginary have become ubiquitous in the jargon of the humanities and the theoretical social sciences. And yet, despite the pervasive use, there is remarkably little convergence on what these terms mean. How have they captivated the vernacular of contemporary social, cultural, and political theory? Tracing the sources of the idiom imaginary to phenomenological studies of psychology in 1940s France to the present, this article examines two key historical junctures: the moment when imaginary morphed from an individual to a collective category in 1960s French philosophy and its translation and insertion into anglophone cultural and political theory in the 1980s and ’90s. In contemporary anglophone theory, imaginary has become a proxy for the concepts of ideology and utopia in the wake of the culturalist turn of the 1990s and 2000s. As such, the sprouting of imaginaries is inseparable from an increasingly consensual cultural idealism that dominates contemporary cultural and political theory.

This ambitious and lively book argues for a rehabilitation of the concept of 'human needs' as central to politics and political theory. Contemporary political philosophy has focused on issues of justice and welfare to the exclusion of the important issues of political participation, democratic sovereignty, and the satisfaction of human needs, and this has had a deleterious effect on political practice. Lawrence Hamilton develops a compelling positive conception of human needs: the evaluation of needs must be located within a more general analysis of institutions, but can in turn help to justify forms of coercive authority that are directed toward the transformation of political and social institutions and practices. His argument is animated throughout by provocative and original discussions of topics such as autonomy, recognition, rights, civil society, liberalism and democracy, and will interest a wide range of readers in political and social philosophy, political theory, law, development and policy.

Bernard Williams’s “Realism and Moralism in Political Theory” is without question one of the central texts of liberal political realism. The success of the text is due to its influential critique of dominant liberal approaches – primarily that of John Rawls –, and in its distinct approach to the grounding of liberalism itself. Even though Williams’s text had a great impact on contemporary political theory, understanding its philosophical foundations is unfairly neglected in academic discourse. The aim of this paper is to show the fundamental view behind Williams’s rejection of moralism that dominates political thinking. The strength of Williams’s approach is that it makes it clear that rationality has a limited authority in morality as well as in politics, and that it redefines the relation between morality and politics. Williams’s view has its own set of challenges, which come forward expressly in his account of legitimacy. Nevertheless, Williams’s realist arguments are indeed compelling for contemporary theorists.

1. IntroductionRichard Rorty's place in contemporary political theory is contentious. He has and continues to be a figure that inspires strong reactions. However, reasons for this have not remained constant. While Rorty in past has been understood both as a dangerous philosophical radical, undermining grounds of Western thought and politics, and as a myopic apologist for status quo, disagreement around reading him today surrounds his relevance. Rorty was once incendiary and dangerous. Presently however, he seems commonplace and uncontroversial. While many would still strongly agree or disagree with his ideas, they would not feel need to engage with him in any detail. Consequently, outside pragmatism, Rorty has generally fallen out of wider conversation of social and political thought. While he is often mentioned, he is rarely seriously engaged on any issue. He is a common object of casual dismissal but an infrequent subject for productive engagement. However, when approached in a certain way, engagement with Rorty can yield fundamental critical and reconstructive resources for thinking politics in present.This article confronts this critical situation by arguing for necessity of reading Rorty into contemporary political theory. However, point is not simply to read Rorty but to read him in a certain manner, in relation to a certain question. Against typical readings of him as an end-of-philosophy anti-theorist, we must examine Rorty exactly in terms of sphere that he considered most important for philosophy: metaphilosophy - that is, reflection on activity of philosophy and its role and capacities in human life (Bernstein 2010, 11; West 1989, 199).Rorty uniquely confronted crisis in philosophical foundations and resulting question of role and capacities of a philosophy without grounds in wider political and cultural life. His work was thus consistently oriented to this widest of all philosophical issues. Such a project increases his significance not only because of his ability to engage such intractable issues but for his skill at speaking across traditional boundaries in constellation of Western Political thought (and beyond as well) while doing so. Rorty engaged Analytic thinkers, Pragmatists, Critical theorists and Continental philosophers (amongst others) in an inclusive philosophical dialogue that managed, simultaneously, to speak to all these groups. It is in this sense that he was accurately described as the most influential contemporary American philosopher (Klepp 1990).However, Rorty's importance goes beyond addressing wide issues and many groups. Both of these reasons speak to his relevance only if those issues and groups are still important to political thought.1 Rorty does offer a path away from crisis in foundations which confronts that problem without ignoring it or slipping back into some appeal to a neutral perspective. Further, he does do this by engaging and drawing on many perspectives and attempting to speak to all aforementioned groups. However, how he achieves both these aims is important point, especially for his relevance to contemporary thought. Rorty reorients thought to present. It is both subject and object of his philosophy; that which it speaks to and about. His perspective attempts to subsist without grounds by directly engaging present social and political world, its assumptions and limitations.Further, unlike genealogical approaches which also claim such an orientation, Rorty's does so without an explicitly critical orientation to present. Rather, as will be demonstrated below, Rorty's thought summarizes present. It theorizes it and renders explicit its own self-justification. Due to this unique relation, whereby he draws out and reveals philosophical content underlying much of contemporary liberal democratic politics, Rorty's work offers a distinctive critical and reconstructive site for political and social theory. …

Freedom concept in the perspective of (Arendt)’s political philosophy and theory has a place and a special important, that in the way of (Arendt)’s thinking in political appearance’s Greece and Romanian ancient, criticism in the ancient philosophy about view, cristian philosophy, westerns philosophy custom, political theory and moderns phenomenon concerning freedom concept formalized. (Arendt)’s freedom passes the philosophical picture to freedom, all beliefs metaphisics about this concept are neglected, philosophical freedom as will freedom is pictured far from inner feeling in the political really world. In the opposite, (Arendt) sees action and speech as political freedom activity in the way individuals meeting in the public sphere is produced in the opposite problem and general issues. In this way, revolution as an arena, or public sphere in the doing politica freedom has crucial importance in the Arendt’s perspective, and in here political theory especially about American and French revolution has stood; in this way, the aim of this research is to answer and deal research main problem in the way of this question: what is the act of the revolution as arena in doing political freedom in Arendt political theory? We can to the conclution that revolution is like an arena in Arendt’s perspective, so new beginning foundation and public sphere of doing political freedom, which in it relation, discussion, and exchanging different opinion among equal individuals should provide, and participation of political citizenship afford in it.

Ethics and the Orator: The Ciceronian Tradition of Political Morality

Politicaltheory is not an independent realm of thought. Ultimately it must always refer back to some metaphysical presuppositions ofWeltanschauungthat is not in itself political. This does not imply that every metaphysical position entails logically necessary political consequences. But it does mean that implicitly or explicitly political theories depend on more general religious, epistemological, and moral considerations. This condition of political thinking serves to explain much of the narrowness of contemporary political theory. For the dominant currents of philosophy neither can, nor wish, to provide a basis for political speculation, which is increasingly regarded as an undisciplined form of self-expression. On the other hand, the naive hope that political studies might fruitfully emulate the methods of the natural sciences, and so share their success, has all but evaporated. The result is that political theory is now concerned to insist on its own limitations, to be critical and even negative in character. This is not a new thing. The lack of philosophical inspiration combined with the decline of “scientific” aspirations has plagued politically sensitive minds at least since the very beginning of the present century. And, from the first, one of the responses to this frustration has been the effort to escape philosophical difficulties by grasping at intuitive short-cuts to truth. The most remarkable of these flights to intuition was political Bergsonism. Moreover, this is not an entirely closed chapter in the history of ideas. Even if Bergson no longer enjoys his earlier popularity, he is still widely read, especially in America. Again, the recent vogue of existentialist “politics” points to an analogous trend, while the penchant for “action,” which is inherent in intuitive politics, is as strong as ever among French intellectuals.

The editor ofPolitical Theory asked us to respond to the question, ‘What is political theory?’This question is as old as political theory or political philosophy. The activity of studying politics, whether it is called science, theory, or philosophy, always brings itself into question. The question does not ask for a single answer, for there are countlessways of studying politics and no universal criteria for adjudicating among them. Rather, the question asks, ‘What comparative difference does it make to study politics this way rather than that?’Political theory or philosophy not only spans three millennia of studying politics in innumerable ways but also threemillennia of dialogues among practitioners over various approaches, their relative merits, and the contestable criteria for their comparison. Because there is no definitive answer, there is no end to this dialogue. Rather, it is the kind of open-ended dialogue that brings insight through the activity of reciprocal elucidation itself. Dialogue partners gain insight into what ruling, being ruled, and contesting rule is through the exchange of questions and answers over different ways of studying politics and different criteria for their assessment in relation to how they throw light on different aspects of the complex worlds of politics—and what counts as the ‘different aspects of the complexworlds of politics’is also questioned in the course of the dialogue. With this horizon of the question inmind, Iwish to respond by introducing one amongmanyways of studying politics and to initiate its reciprocal eluci-

Contemporary political thought is deeply divided about the role of ontology in political thinking. Famously, political liberal John Rawls has argued that ontological claims are best to be avoided in political thought. In recent years, however, a number of theorists have claimed that ontology is essential to political philosophy. According to the contributors to this ‘ontological turn’, ontological investigations may foster the politicisation of hegemonic political theories and can highlight new possibilities for political life. This essay aims to contribute to the debate about ontology in political philosophy by arguing that a compelling case for ontology can also be made in light of Rawls’ political liberalism itself, in particular, by taking seriously Rawls’ commitment to the politicisation of justice and the task of orientation of political philosophy. To make this case, the paper brings Rawls' perspective in conversation with the critical methodology and the ontology of agonism and reflections on parrhesia or frank truth-telling of Michel Foucault.