Resilience Optimization of Post-Quantum Cryptography Key Encapsulation Algorithms

Modern cryptography pushed forward the need of having provable security. Whereas ancient cryptography was only relying on heuristic assumptions and the secrecy of the designs, nowadays researchers try to make the security of schemes to rely on mathematical problems which are believed hard to solve. When doing these proofs, the capabilities of potential adversaries are modeled formally. For instance, the black-box model assumes that an adversary does not learn anything from the inner-state of a construction. While this assumption makes sense in some practical scenarios, it was shown that one can sometimes learn some information by other means, e.g., by timing how long the computation take. In this thesis, we focus on two different areas of cryptography. In both parts, we take first a theoretical point of view to obtain a result. We try then to adapt our results so that they are easily usable for implementers and for researchers working in practical cryptography. In the first part of this thesis, we take a look at post-quantum cryptography, i.e., at cryptographic primitives that are believed secure even in the case (reasonably big) quantum computers are built. We introduce HELEN, a new public-key cryptosystem based on the hardness of the learning from parity with noise problem (LPN). To make our results more concrete, we suggest some practical instances which make the system easily implementable. As stated above, the design of cryptographic primitives usually relies on some well-studied hard problems. However, to suggest concrete parameters for these primitives, one needs to know the precise complexity of algorithms solving the underlying hard problem. In this thesis, we focus on two recent hard-problems that became very popular in post-quantum cryptography: the learning with error (LWE) and the learning with rounding problem (LWR). We introduce a new algorithm that solves both problems and provide a careful complexity analysis so that these problems can be used to construct practical cryptographic primitives. In the second part, we look at leakage-resilient cryptography which studies adversaries able to get some side-channel information from a cryptographic primitive. In the past, two main disjoint models were considered. The first one, the threshold probing model, assumes that the adversary can put a limited number of probes in a circuit. He then learns all the values going through these probes. This model was used mostly by theoreticians as it allows very elegant and convenient proofs. The second model, the noisy-leakage model, assumes that every component of the circuit leaks but that the observed signal is noisy. Typically, some Gaussian noise is added to it. According to experiments, this model depicts closely the real behaviour of circuits. Hence, this model is cherished by the practical cryptographic community. In this thesis, we show that making a proof in the first model implies a proof in the second model which unifies the two models and reconciles both communities. We then look at this result with a more practical point-of-view. We show how it can help in the process of evaluating the security of a chip based solely on the more standard mutual information metric.

Introduction. Widespread use of unmanned aerial vehicles in the civilian and military spheres requires the development of new algorithms for identification friend or foe of targets, as used in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) devices of the "Parol" system are designed to service approximately 110 objects military equipment. AFU automation systems allow the use of additional sources of information about various objects from civil or special data transmission networks, which can be the basis for building a networked multi-level system of state recognition. Predictions of the development of quantum computers foresee the possibility of breaking modern algorithms for information security in polynomial time in the next 5-10 years, which requires the development and implementation of new encryption algorithms and revision of modern parameters. The purpose of the article is to develop a new algorithm for state recognition of objects, which can be scaled to process the required number of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles. Potential threats to classical cryptographic protection algorithms for data networks, which will result in the execution of algorithms such as Grover and Shore on quantum computers, were also discussed. Results. The article proposes a new multilevel algorithm of state recognition based on modern cryptographic methods of information protection, which allows to perform reliable automated identification of objects, scale systems using data on potential targets from other sources through secure special networks. Grover's search algorithm does not give a strong increase in key search performance for symmetric encryption algorithms, so there is no need to increase the key lengths for this type of information security algorithms. Post-quantum asymmetric encryption algorithms require additional study and comprehensive testing of information security or increasing the key lengths of cryptographic algorithms, which corresponds to the number of qubits, i.e. more than twice. The most promising is the family of asymmetric post-quantum cryptographic algorithms based on supersingular isogenic elliptic curves. Conclusions. The developed algorithm of identification friend or foe of objects is more secure compared to existing algorithms and is focused on the use of modern on-board computers and programmable radio modems. Shore's algorithm and the like will be a significant threat to modern asymmetric cryptography algorithms when the number of qubits of quantum computers exceeds the number of bits in public keys more than twice. Keywords: identification friend or foe, symmetric encryption, asymmetric cryptography, quantum computer, post-quantum cryptography.

A Busy March Meeting Is Brewing in Seattle

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) has emerged as a response of the cryptographic community to the danger of attacks performed using quantum computers. All PQC schemes can be implemented in software and hardware using conventional (non-quantum) computing systems. PQC is the biggest revolution in cryptography since the invention of public-key schemes in the mid-1970 s. Lattice-based key exchange schemes have emerged as leading candidates in the NIST PQC standardization process due to their relatively short public keys and ciphertexts. This paper presents novel high-speed hardware architectures for four lattice-based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) representing three NIST PQC finalists: NTRU (with two distinct variants, NTRU-HPS and NTRU-HRSS), CRYSTALS-Kyber, and Saber. We benchmark these candidates in terms of their performance and resource utilization in today's FPGAs. Our best architectures outperform the best designs from other groups reported to date in terms of the area-time product by factors ranging from 1.01 to 2.88, depending on the algorithm and security level. Additionally, our study demonstrates that CRYSTALS-Kyber and Saber have very similar hardware performance. Both outperform NTRU in terms of execution time by a factor 36-62 for key generation and 3-7 for decapsulation, assuming the same security level.

Information security in the post quantum era for 5G and beyond networks: Threats to existing cryptography, and post-quantum cryptography

A roadmap from classical cryptography to post-quantum resistant cryptography for 5G-enabled IoT: Challenges, opportunities and solutions

The emergence of large-scale quantum computing presents an imminent threat to contemporary public-key cryptosystems, with quantum algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm capable of efficiently breaking RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). This vulnerability has catalyzed accelerated standardization efforts for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and global security stakeholders. While theoretical security analysis of these quantum-resistant algorithms has advanced considerably, comprehensive real-world performance benchmarks spanning diverse computing environments—from high-performance cloud infrastructure to severely resource-constrained IoT devices—remain insufficient for informed deployment planning. This paper presents the most extensive cross-platform empirical evaluation to date of NIST-selected PQC algorithms, including CRYSTALS-Kyber and NTRU for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), alongside BIKE as a code-based alternative, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon for digital signatures. Our systematic benchmarking framework measures computational latency, memory utilization, key sizes, and protocol overhead across multiple security levels (NIST Levels 1, 3, and 5) in three distinct hardware environments and various network conditions. Results demonstrate that contemporary server architectures can implement these algorithms with negligible performance impact (<5% additional latency), making immediate adoption feasible for cloud services. In contrast, resource-constrained devices experience more significant overhead, with computational demands varying by up to 12× between algorithms at equivalent security levels, highlighting the importance of algorithm selection for edge deployments. Beyond standalone algorithm performance, we analyze integration challenges within existing security protocols, revealing that naive implementation of PQC in TLS 1.3 can increase handshake size by up to 7× compared to classical approaches. To address this, we propose and evaluate three optimization strategies that reduce bandwidth requirements by 40–60% without compromising security guarantees. Our investigation further encompasses memory-constrained implementation techniques, side-channel resistance measures, and hybrid classical-quantum approaches for transitional deployments. Based on these comprehensive findings, we present a risk-based migration framework and algorithm selection guidelines tailored to specific use cases, including financial transactions, secure firmware updates, vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, and IoT fleet management. This practical roadmap enables organizations to strategically prioritize systems for quantum-resistant upgrades based on data sensitivity, resource constraints, and technical feasibility. Our results conclusively demonstrate that PQC is deployment-ready for most applications, provided that implementations are carefully optimized for the specific performance characteristics and security requirements of target environments. We also identify several remaining research challenges for the community, including further optimization for ultra-constrained devices, standardization of hybrid schemes, and hardware acceleration opportunities.

This article mainly discusses the history of progress regarding the legislation and updates through scrutiny, its current architecture, and its standards applied around the world, such as eIDAS and eIDAS 2.0, which are used not only as technical but also as purely political standards. The penetration of the digital economy has largely promoted the evolution of cyber platforms for public and private use, so that e-signatures have become one of the pillars in the national IT architecture. 1) Legislation The e-signature operations in Türkiye are regulated by Electronic Signature Law No. 5070 and its secondary regulations. However, today, the infrastructure groundwork relies heavily on RSA-based cryptography. RSA is attracting greater and more debate these days, with concerns about whether it will continue to be useful given the increasing importance of security requirements for mobile devices, performance expectations, and the threat posed by quantum computing. This article also examines the extent to which Turkish law is compatible with the EU regulation of compliance. In this paper, we study whether the Turkish legislation complies with the European legislation. This covers security, performance, key size, and support for RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) algorithms. This paper discusses technical, institutional, and legal requirements for the transition of the national e-signature infrastructure to ECC. Furthermore, ECC’s contribution is evaluated in terms of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), and a roadmap is suggested for transitioning to hybrid (ECC + PQC) architectures. Finally, policy and technical suggestions are proposed to facilitate international electronic and mobile signature interoperability under eIDAS 2.0.

Quantum computing has quickly become at the vanguard of many computer science fields today. This is motivated by quantum computers ability to perform computational tasks with efficiencies that are not possible with classical computers. Quantum computing technology has a lasting potential impact on society and a broad implications on many aspects of our lives. Communications Industry Researchers (CIR) estimates that the global quantum-computing market is expected to reach $1.9 billion in 2023, increasing to $8 billion by 2027, in spending on associated software and services. Although quantum computing has several advantages, it threatens the current cryptographic techniques, which are necessary for today’s Internet standards like the Transport Layer Security (TLS). This is due to its ability to perform infinite complex computations in parallel. Therefore, it is expected that quantum computers will be able to solve the key distribution problem and break every single cryptography and authentication algorithm based on Asymmetric cryptography, such as: RSA, ECC, and Diffie-Hellman. New emerging technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT), blockchain, autonomous vehicles, 5G, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics all rely on cryptography for their secure operation. Although quantum computing supports technological evolution and growth, it will pose a threat to the current progress and future development of these technologies. Therefore, cryptography and authentication techniques need improvements as introducing quantum computing would put today’s cybersecurity in serious risk. NSA and NIST proposed solutions to tackle these challenges. However, these solutions are still immature as they need major upgrade of hardware implementation. Instead, the recommendations focus on what is called post-quantum, quantum-proof, quantum-safe or quantum-resistant cryptosystems. This talk outlines how the impact of quantum technologies on authentication, data exchange, and data storage, as well as areas where cryptography plays an essential role, such as: blockchain, 5G, IoT, and AI technologies. It investigate the possible impact of quantum technologies on these emerging technologies. Finally, it discusses some of the current quantum security solution that are devoted to protect the devices and systems in the quantum era, and mitigate quantum attacks.

Post-quantum cryptography aims to find quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic schemes, that is, schemes which remain secure against both quantum and standard computers. In fact in 1994, Shor published an algorithm [85] breaking the nowadays used public-key cryptoschemes in polynomial time on a quantum computer. The security of public-key algorithms is based on computationally hard mathematical problems. Among the post-quantum proposals there is the Multivariate Problem: Solving a multivariate polynomial system over a finite field. The general and the most computationally efficient method for solving such systems is computing a Groöbner basis of the ideal they generate. In 2021, Beullens [22] used a strategy involving the MinRank Problem for breaching the most promising multivariate scheme at the time. All the details regarding public-key schemes and in particular the multivariate one can be found within the Introduction. The thesis is divided into three blocks. The goal of Chapter 1 is twofold. It is a collection of algebraic concepts and classical facts that are used through these pages, in particular, Section 1.1 serves this scope. In addition, the problem of solving polynomial systems via Gr¨bner basis is fully explained in Section 1.2. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I present the two main works of my PhD, during which I mainly focused on the analysis of multivariate cryptoschemes twofolds. Firstly, together with my advisor Elisa Gorla, we propose a new definition of ‘random system’ using the concept of generality mutued from algebraic geometry. The details of this work are given in Chapter 2. On the other hand, with the help of Daniel Cabarcas (Universidad Nacional de Colombia), we investigated the SupportMinors Modeling, which is a method for modeling the MinRank Problem used by Beullens in his attack. The specifics of this work can be found in Chapter 3.

The appearance of quantum computing in the short foreseeable future and its capability to break conventional cryptographic algorithms forces to change the paradigm of secure real‐time communications. Thus, government organizations, data centers, and enterprises among others are migrating their public key infrastructure towards using post‐quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms in order to mitigate the security threats posed by quantum computers. This letter presents the first quantum resilient secure end‐to‐end communication link based on PQC algorithms operating between two data‐processing units DPU. Both data‐processing units employ on‐board ARM processors to perform the computationally expensive cryptographic building blocks—in that case CRYSTALS‐Kyber as a key encapsulation mechanism and CRYSTALS‐Dilithium for digital signature scheme in combination with advanced encryption standard with 256‐bit key.

Conventional cryptographic approaches face increasing insecurity because quantum computing and attacks enabled by AI operate at a rapid speed of technological advancement. The review analyzes IEEE research activities on progressive cryptographic methods consisting of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) in addition to zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) and AI-augmented cryptographic models. We explore both advantages and limitations in addition to applicable uses for protecting modern digital frameworks which include blockchain, IoT and 5G networks. Standardization efforts as well as hybrid crypto framework trends receive analysis in the article to establish long-lasting secure systems.

In the modern world, the financial sector faces a wide range of extraordinary events, from market shocks and geopolitical tensions to pandemics and cyberattacks. These diverse challenges significantly impact banks. Recently, particular attention has been drawn to the influence of artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing (QC) technologies on the stability of the financial system. This article analyzes the potential areas of impact of quantum technologies on the financial sphere in general and the resilience of financial institutions in particular.It's determined that quantum technologies can simultaneously pose both threats and new opportunities. Specifically, the article analyzes the potential of quantum technologies to break existing cryptographic algorithms that protect the confidential data of financial institutions' clients. This threat is exacerbated by the possibility of "harvest now, decrypt later" attacks, where malicious actors intercept data today with the intention of decrypting it in the future. This presents challenges and threats for online/mobile banking, payment operations, and corporate communications. Among the positive impacts of quantum technologies on banking, the article highlights improved financial risk assessment, particularly enhanced accuracy in stress testing, portfolio management, and derivatives pricing, by solving problems inaccessible to classical computing. The potential of quantum machine learning for fraud detection is also noted. Attention is given to the financial sector's response to these challenges. Initiatives for developing quantum-resistant (post-quantum) cryptography are considered as the primary method for mitigating the risks associated with the proliferation of quantum computing, along with new cryptographic protocols and quantum key distribution as a new opportunity to enhance security. The article emphasizes the responsibility of central banks in forming quantum-readiness strategies, including investments in post-quantum cryptography, expertise development, and the adaptation of regulatory frameworks. The conclusion drawn is that although the immediate benefits of quantum technologies may be modest, their long-term transformative potential for the financial sector is immense.

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has emerged as a quantum-resilient class of cryptography that will be able to withstand attacks from quantum computers. Among the PQC family, the isogeny-based scheme, i.e., Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) protocol, an alternative candidate in Round 3 of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), has the advantage of a shorter public-key length. However, longer computational time and larger area overhead are the main constraints for its practical applications. In this brief, we proposed a SIKE accelerator with optimized multiplier and adder designs achieving the lowest area-time (AT) product with high operating frequency. The proposed SIKE accelerator for four different security levels has the highest frequency of 303.0-322.5 MHz with 4.0-21.0% improved AT in comparison to the state-of-the-art designs.

Since Diffie and Hellman's pioneering work on asymmetric cryptography in 1976, digital signature technology has evolved through three phases—theoretical foundation, standardization, and diversified innovation—emerging as a cornerstone of trust in digital societies. Theoretically, foundational frameworks were established by RSA, DSA, and Schnorr algorithms. Standardization efforts, including NIST DSS, ISO/IEC series, and national systems (e.g., China's SM2/SM9, Russia's GOST), fostered a multipolar ecosystem. Extended-attribution technologies (blind, group, and ring signatures) addressed privacy and scenario-specific demands. Current challenges, such as quantum computing threats and privacy-regulation trade-offs, drive advancements in post-quantum cryptography (lattice-based signatures, hash-based XMSS) and privacy-enhancing mechanisms (verifiably encrypted signatures, homomorphic signatures), guided by ISO/IEC redactable standards and NIST's post-quantum initiative. Moving forward, digital signatures will deepen capabilities in provable security, quantum resistance, and adaptive policy control, underpinning trust architectures for emerging ecosystems like Web3 and the metaverse.