Reverse analysis of secure communication protocol based on taint analysis

Ensuring the security and privacy of patient data is a critical concern in the healthcare industry. The growing utilization of electronic data transmission and storage in medical records has amplified apprehensions about data security. However, due to varying stakeholder interests, not all data can be freely shared, necessitating the development of secure protocols. This study presents a highly secure protocol that integrates blockchain technology, patient biometric information, and robust cryptographic algorithms (elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and advanced encryption algorithm (AEC)) to facilitate data encryption and decryption. The protocol encompasses secure login, secure key sharing, and data sharing mechanisms among miners, offering comprehensive security measures. To validate the effectiveness of the proposed protocol, both informal and formal security analyses are conducted. The security protocol description language in Scyther is utilized to evaluate the protocol's resilience against attacks. The culmination of this research is a secure protocol that leverages blockchain technology and ECC for the secure storage and sharing of medical records. The protocol covers all stages, including system setup, user registration, login mechanisms, key exchange between users and blockchain, communication between blockchains, and interaction with other miners, with a steadfast emphasis on security. Furthermore, the protocol's communication and computation costs are assessed, with a comparison to existing blockchain-based schemes. Informal proofs establish the protocol's security against common attacks faced by medical institutions. Formal simulation of the protocol using the Scyther tool provides definitive evidence of its resistance to attacks. As a result, this protocol presents a viable real-time implementation solution for safeguarding patient data within the healthcare domain, representing a significant contribution to data security.

Wireless local area networks (WLANs) are become popular as they are fast, cost effective, flexible and easy to use. There are some challenges of security and for IT administrators the choice of security protocol is a critical issue. The main motive of this paper is to make the non-specialist reader knowledgeable about threats in the wireless security and make them aware about the disadvantages of wireless security protocols. WEP (Wired Equivalent privacy), WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) and RSN (Robust Security Network) security protocols are defined and examined here. This security protocols are compared with the common. This paper is a comparative analysis of WEP, WPA and WPA2. We have tried to perform and check authentication of all 3 protocols by implying the legendary attack vector scripts i.e. Air crack set of tools. The test was conducted on Back Track operating system which is considered as dedicated pentesting operating system. In the test result, we found out that WEP is the weakest, to which WPA was a temporary solution and WPA2 is a very solid and long term solution. This paper is a mixture of wireless security weaknesses and counter measures to the problems faced until recently. After reading this paper the non specialist reader will have complete review and awareness about the wireless security and vulnerabilities involved with it.

Recent technologies have cleared the way for large scale application of electronic communication. The open and distributed nature of these communications implies that the communication medium is no longer completely controlled by the communicating parties. As a result, there has been an increasing demand for research in establishing secure communications over insecure networks, by means of security protocols. In this thesis, a formal model for the description and analysis of security protocols at the process level is developed. At this level, under the assumption of perfect cryptography, the analysis focusses on detecting aws and vulnerabilities of the security protocol. Starting from ??rst principles, operational semantics are developed to describe security protocols and their behaviour. The resulting model is parameterized, and can e.g. capture various intruder models, ranging from a secure network with no intruder, to the strongest intruder model known in literature. Within the security protocol model various security properties are de??ned, such as secrecy and various forms of authentication. A number of new results about these properties are formulated and proven correct. Based on the model, an automated veri??cation procedure is developed, which signi ??cantly improves over existing methods. The procedure is implemented in a prototype, which outperforms other tools. Both the theory and tool are applied in two novel case studies. Using the tool prototype, new results are established in the area of protocol composition, leading to the discovery of a class of previously undetected attacks. Furthermore, a new protocol in the area of multiparty authentication is developed. The resulting protocol is proven correct within the framework.

Security protocols (cryptographic protocol) have been widely used to not only achieve traditional goals of data confidentiality, integrity and authentication, but also secure a variety of other desired characteristics of computer-mediated transactions recently. To guarantee reliable protocols, a great deal of formal methods has been undertaken not only to develop diverse tools with specialized purpose or general purpose, but also to apply them to the analysis of realistic protocols. Many of them have been proved to be useful in detecting some intuitive attacks in security protocols. In many cases, a useful feedback is supplied to designers in order to improve the protocol’s security. For both beginners and experienced researchers, this book will present useful information on relevant technologies that can be extended or adapted. A comprehensive introduction to the basic concepts and core techniques will be presented. In this chapter, we explain what is security protocols and how they can be used to ensure secure transactions, what challenging issues in e-commerce (electronic commerce) are, why security protocol analysis important, how they are performed, and what are the ongoing efforts and relevant work. We will also explain the limitations in previous work and why it is important to develop new approaches. These questions will be briefly answered. In particular, we will focus on the discussion regarding secure transaction protocols. Finally, some emerging issues and the ways they are being met are also described.KeywordsModel CheckFormal MethodTemporal LogicSecurity ProtocolLinear Temporal LogicThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Security protocols over open networks and distributed systems: formal methods for their analysis, design, and verification

With current tools and technology, someone who has physical access to a chip can extract the detailed layout of the integrated circuit (IC). By using advanced visual imaging techniques, reverse engineering can reveal details that are meant to be kept secret, such as a secure protocol or novel implementation that offers a competitive advantage. A promising solution to defend against reverse engineering attacks is IC camouflaging. In this work, we propose a new camouflaging technique based on the threshold voltage of the transistors. We refer to these cells as threshold dependent camouflaged cells. Our work differs from current commercial solutions in that the latter use look-alike cells, with the assumption that it is difficult for the reverse engineer to identify the cell's functionality. Yet, if a structural distinction between cells exists, then these are still vulnerable, especially as reverse engineers use more advanced and precise techniques. On the other hand, the proposed threshold dependent standard cells are structurally identical regardless of the cells' functionality. Detailed circuit simulations of our proposed threshold dependent camouflaged cells demonstrate that they can be used to cost-effectively and robustly camouflage large netlists. Corner analysis of process, temperature, and supply voltage (PVT) variations show that our cells operate as expected over all PVT corners simulated.

Security protocols often involve loops, such as for ratcheting or for manipulating inductively-defined data structures. However, the automated analysis of security protocols has struggled to keep up with these features. The state-of-the-art often necessitates working with abstractions of such data structures or relies heavily on auxiliary, user-defined lemmas.

Security protocols have been analysed using a variety of tools and focusing on a variety of properties. Most findings assume the ever so popular Dolev-Yao threat model. A more recent threat model called the Rational Attacker [1] sees each protocol participant decide whether or not to conform to the protocol upon their own cost/benefit analysis. Each participant neither colludes nor shares knowledge with anyone, a feature that rules out the applicability of existing equivalence results in the Dolev-Yao model. Aiming at mechanical validation, we abstract away the actual cost/benefit analysis and obtain the General Attacker threat model, which sees each principal blindly act as a Dolev-Yao attacker.The analysis of security protocols under the General Attacker threat model brings forward yet more insights: retaliation attacks and anticipation attacks are our main findings, while the tool support can scale up to the new analysis at a negligible price. The general threat model for security protocols based on set-rewriting that was adopted in AVISPA [2] is leveraged so as to express the General Attacker. The state-of-the-art model checker SATMC [3] is then used to automatically validate a protocol under the new threats, so that retaliation and anticipation attacks can automatically be found.KeywordsModel CheckSecurity ProtocolCryptographic ProtocolThreat ModelGeneral AttackThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

RFID security protocol is one of the most important ways to solve security problems of RFID system and it is the focus of current research. This article summarized and classified the common security protocols, then proposed a new mutual authentication protocol without the back-end database which aimed at the actual need of military applications and proved the correctness of the new protocol by GNY logic. Safety analysis shows that the new protocol can effectively protect privacy, prevent tracking and avoid synchronization attack and such common problems. The protocol has not only high security, but also the obvious advantage of flexibility.

The analysis of security protocols is of great significance to ensure the safe communication of computer networks. Using formal methods to analyze security protocols has been a research hotspot in this field. Based on the run modes method and Petri net, this paper presents a specific method for analyzing security protocols. Firstly, the concepts of basic Petri net model (BPN) and attack Petri net model (APN) of protocol run modes are given, then the algorithm for constructing APN through BPN is proposed. Finally, the effectiveness of this method is illustrated by analyzing Helsinki protocol.

Many security protocols rely on the assumptions on the physical properties in which its protocol sessions will be carried out. For instance, Distance Bounding Protocols take into account the round trip time of messages and the transmission velocity to infer an upper bound of the distance between two agents. We classify such security protocols as Cyber-Physical. Time plays a key role in design and analysis of many of these protocols. This paper investigates the foundational differences and the impacts on the analysis when using models with discrete time and models with dense time. We show that there are attacks that can be found by models using dense time, but not when using discrete time. We illustrate this with a novel attack that can be carried out on most distance bounding protocols. In this attack, one exploits the execution delay of instructions during one clock cycle to convince a verifier that he is in a location different from his actual position. We propose a Multiset Rewriting model with dense time suitable for specifying cyber-physical security protocols. We introduce Circle-Configurations and show that they can be used to symbolically solve the reachability problem for our model. Finally, we show that for the important class of balanced theories the reachability problem is PSPACE-complete.

A method for symbolic analysis of security protocols

With the rise of the Internet and other open networks, a large number of security protocols have been developed and deployed in order to provide secure communication. The analysis of such security protocols has turned out to be extremely difficult for humans, as witnessed by the fact that many protocols were found to be flawed after deployment. This has driven the research in formal analysis of security protocols. Unfortunately, there are no effective approaches yet for constructing correct and efficient protocols, and work on concise formal logics that might allow one to easily prove that a protocol is correct in a formal model, is still ongoing. The most effective approach so far has been automated falsification or verification of such protocols with state-of-the-art tools such as ProVerif [1] or the Avispa tools [2]. These tools have shown to be effective at finding attacks on protocols (Avispa) or establishing correctness of protocols (ProVerif).KeywordsOperational SemanticSecurity ProtocolAttack TraceComputer Security Foundation WorkshopSecurity ClaimThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Side-channel analysis has become a well-established topic in the scientific community and industry over the last one and a half decade. Somewhat surprisingly, the vast majority of work on side-channel analysis has been restricted to the case of attacking cryptographic implementations through the recovery of keys. In this contribution, we show how side-channel analysis can be used for extracting code from embedded systems based on a CPU's electromagnetic emanation. There are many applications within and outside the security community where this is desirable. In cryptography, it can, e.g., be used for recovering proprietary ciphers and security protocols. Another broad application field is general security and reverse engineering, e.g., for detecting IP violations of firmware or for debugging embedded systems when there is no debug interface or it is proprietary.A core feature of our approach is that we take localized electromagnetic measurements that are spatially distributed over the IC being analyzed. Given these multiple inputs, we model code extraction as a classification problem that we solve with supervised learning algorithms. We apply a variant of linear discriminant analysis to distinguish between the multiple classes. In contrast to previous approaches, which reported instruction recognition rates between 40--70%, our approach detects more than 95% of all instructions for test code, and close to 90% for real-world code. The methods are thus very relevant for use in practice. Our method performs dynamic code recognition, which has both advantages (only the program parts that are actually executed are observed) but also limitations (rare code executions are difficult to observe).

In this paper, security vulnerabilities that can be found in hybrid apps, by which important data are downloaded from a web server, were analyzed and HIGHT algorithm based on OTP delimiter modification and bit slicing was proposed to enhance security of hybrid apps. The hybrid app, to which the proposed method was applied before analysis, is a medical app for research and monitors biometric data of patients in the healthcare field. This app is monitoring patient's biometric data continuously. Thus, this app generates considerable mobile traffic and transmission delay. After installing the app in a mobile device, reverse engineering was used to check the address from which the app requests important data, and a web server analysis tool was used to obtain important data that enables security attacks including the sitemap, type and version of application, and open source. To solve these problems, the security protocol proposed in this paper was applied, as a result important data were protected without transmission delay and it shows that proposed protocol can adopt high speed mobile communications.