Roleplaying to Improve Resilience

ABSTRACTOne of the most challenging issues concerning the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is ‘who should intervene’ in case of gross violations of human rights. After the intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been increasingly considered a legitimate actor to fulfil the duty to intervene for humanitarian reasons. In 2011, the first military intervention inspired by the R2P in Libya reinforced the appreciation of NATO as a viable enforcer of the doctrine. The paper problematizes the idea that NATO could be a straightforward solution to the problem of who should intervene. NATO's constitutive nature comprises aspects that are at odds with R2P as a normative scheme. In this regard, the paper delves into three aspects: (a) the controversial issue of ‘delegated authority’ from the UN to NATO; (b) the tension between the universalistic character of the R2P and the particularistic nature of NATO and (c) the military nature of the alliance and its consequent focus on security/military considerations that rarely, or just occasionally, match with humanitarian concerns. Finally, the paper analyses the intervention in Libya assessing the incongruities between NATO's military operations and the normative framework of R2P.

Neither NATO nor the EU are full-spectrum security providers. They are complementary institutions with offsetting strengths and weaknesses. The EU, unlike NATO, has treaty-based legislative prerogatives enabling it to implement common policies on a pan-European basis that touch upon both internal and external components of security. It also commands substantial technical and financial resources devoted to coherent regional security strategies. But if the EU is the more capable actor where security threats have a substantial civilian component, it is NATO that retains an unchallenged primacy on matters of collective defense and deterrence. Together, the two organizations function as agents of collective securitization across a wide range of issues to shape the security agenda and the allocation of national resources. The institutional interlocking of NATO and the EU has evolved over the course of the post–Cold War period. In most cases, the development of the EU as a security actor has not impeded NATO or undermined the cohesion of the alliance. Such complementarity can be demonstrated by reference to defense-related institutions within the EU that reinforce NATO efforts, the emergence of a “fuzzy” division of labor between both bodies, and an operational level of ambition derived from their security strategies. Institutional complementarity is evidenced by two empirical cases: the eastward and southern enlargements of the EU and NATO and out-of-area military and civilian operations beginning with the Balkan wars in the mid-1990s.

ABSTRACTThis article investigates the connection between invitations to intervene and the creation of legitimacy for European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations. By tracking the incidence and source of pleas for an intervention, this study finds that invitations are associated with most EU and NATO interventions, and identifies three different types of invitations – true, collaborative, and rigged – which denote greater or lesser degrees of demand for Western security services. This variability in demand for Western security services signalled by the three types of invitations impacts the level of legitimacy associated with an EU or NATO operation: true invitations confer the greatest amount of legitimacy, collaborative invitations generate weaker legitimacy, and rigged invitations create low levels of legitimacy. Moreover, both organizations have, at times, coerced external political actors into offering an invitation to intervene in order to manufacture stronger legitimacy for their interventionist designs. Ultimately, because invitations play such a large role in prompting EU and NATO interventions, international relations scholars and political leaders should carefully consider their quality and influence on the decision-making process when determining the initial legitimacy for an interventionist operation.

: Ever since deployments into the Balkans in the mid-1990s the involvement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in military operations beyond the territories of its members has posed both challenges and opportunities for the increasingly numerous post-Cold War Alliance partners, a number of whom have since acceded to full membership. Broadly what kinds of lessons have new NATO members and partners drawn from these expeditionary operations? And how have these experiences influenced ongoing efforts aimed at transforming their defense postures? NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina concluded only at the end of 2004. While building their forces either from Warsaw Pact legacy capabilities or from scratch NATO aspirants and partners learned that conscript-based forces that had utility for territorial defense had serious limitations for expeditionary operations. These Central and East European governments recognized that they needed rapidly deployable forces with independent logistics and a sufficient cadre of well-trained English- speaking military personnel for effective involvement in peacekeeping and related operations. The Bosnia experience thus became the catalyst for more realistic defense reform among then-NATO aspirants.

The general objective of this section is to present the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as an international organisation showing great potential with regard to disaster risk reduction (DRR) and shaping national security. The foundation of NATO revolves around political and military operations and missions. However, some parts of the organisational domain can be used for DRR purposes. In the context under consideration, the most significant parts are civilian contingency planning, communication and information systems, education and training, logistics, meteorology, and research and technology. NATO’s current activities highlight the Alliance's openness to civil–military cooperation in building resilience to disasters (due to military and non-military threats).

This paper explores the European Union’s (EU) security relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States (US) through the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Skeptics have decried the rise of CSDP as a new security pillar, arguing that it is an attempt to balance against NATO and the US. I argue that this criticism is false. A comparison of two CSDP military operations, European Union Force Chad/CAR (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) and European Union Force Althea (EUFOR Althea), shows that operational success is heavily dependent on the EU’s ability to use NATO assets through the Berlin Plus agreement. While EU security integration has progressed, it continues to suffer from a significant capabilities gap; without access to NATO capabilities, CSDP military operations face many challenges. I conclude that CSDP is not threatening the transatlantic relationship because the EU remains a limited hard power actor in promoting and securing international security

The ability of tracked fighting vehicles (e.g. tanks) to cross bridges is a critical aspect of military operations. Military vehicles, specifically tanks, are continuously increasing in mass, while bridge infrastructure capacity remains relatively unchanged. This can significantly affect mobility on military operations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) utilizes a Military Load Classification (MLC) system that provides a method to compare the load effects of vehicles to the capacity of bridges in order to determine the feasibility of crossing. Tracked vehicles exhibit significantly different behavior than wheeled vehicles; yet frequently the MLC system is applied using the same vehicle-related factors when determining the capacity for both wheeled and tracked vehicles. One of these factors, Dynamic Load Allowance (DLA), is not based on recent research for modern tracked vehicles. Bridge load testing was carried out with one tracked vehicle and three wheeled vehicles. Results of the dynamic effects generated on a smooth surface are presented and indicate that a lower DLA for tracked vehicles, than wheeled vehicles, is likely appropriate. A lower DLA for tracked vehicles would result in increased bridge capacity for tanks.

During the last decade many European and North American countries have focused their military troop contributions to operations in Afghanistan. Mindful of the austere economic situation for most of these countries, the announced plans for withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops is likely to generate a fresh perspective on future engagement in military operations. The United States (US) political and economic situation suggests that their military involvement is likely to be vetted against national interests more than that has been the case. In a similar vein, the United Kingdom (UK) is struggling with economic reforms on top of the combat fatigue that more than a decade of sustained operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has generated. France has similar challenges, albeit on a limited scale. As a consequence, the likelihood of new and ambitious North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union (EU) operations is slim, unless European and/or American vital security interests are at stake.

This article discusses the use of computer games in cybercartography and how computer game characteristics can enhance the design of cybercartographic products. We focus on investigating multiple perspectives through role play in a geospatial virtual environment. The ways in which literature and film support multiple perspectives can guide us in our design efforts for developing cybercatographic atlases. We explore the potential of games for presenting multiple points of view in an environmental context through the modification of an existing computer game that includes quest narratives and character interaction as well as role play. Active engagement with different characters and the environment in role-playing games encourages exploration and learning, and these interactions give a player the opportunity to discover diverse points of view and develop different ways of solving problems. Multiple points of view in cybercartography can offer a plurality of voices on critical issues. In particular, information presented in maps can stimulate ideas and encourage critical thinking. This leads us to conclude that the engaging and emotional dimensions of computer games can be combined with the multiple perspectives they offer to attract new atlas users and to provide them with a more critical perspective on geographic and environmental information.

The article examines possible geopolitical changes in the current 2023 and beyond, as well as directions for the transformation of the world order. Of course, all geopolitical forecasts are given mainly from the point of view of the results of Russia’s Special Military Operation in Ukraine (SMO). The article examines questions such as: Why could 2023 be a turning point? How useful is the conflict for the USA in the context of the upcoming presidential elections? How will the elections in different countries affect their political course? Will the Western alliance be stronger in 2023? How will the US–China relations develop? Are the greens/globalists against the war and what can they do? We also consider different scenarios for the course of war/peace/truce and possible political changes in some countries. But it is obvious that in 2023 the political aspects of life in many countries will be painted in Ukrainian tones, that is, they will be directly related to military operations and their results, on which the attitudes and position of different political forces, as well as their actions, will depend.

The article aims to identify the specifics of the position of Germany on humanitarian intervention in Libya in 2011. Germany abstained from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1973. Germany did not support a military solution to the conflict as provided for in paragraphs 4 and 8 of the Resolution. Germany did not intend to sponsor foreign troops. It has taken a different position than its main allies – France, Great Britain, and the United States. The reason is not due to disagreements with allies in the Alliance, but due to domestic political pressure on the coalition government. Another interesting explanation for government policy is the economic indicators according to which Libya did not play an important role in the German economy.It can be concluded that the USD / FDR government decided to abstain from the UN vote on Resolution 1973 because it was not a priority for Germany and because Guido Westerwelle believed that the goals of France, Britain and the United States could be achieved without intervention, only through sanctions. Germany's limited role in the Libyan crisis and its special NATO policies suggest that German politicians, faced with the financial crisis and its potential consequences in Europe, deliberately sought to limit Germany's international obligations and therefore refused to participate in securing the no-fly zone. However, Germany's reputation among its Western allies was almost shattered. The Merkel government's retention has surprised not only its closest allies – France, Britain and the United States – but also accused Berlin of playing on Russia's side. Germany became considered an unreliable ally. However, the decision not to take part in the operation in Libya indicates that Germany will continue to evaluate each military operation on its own terms, rather than reflecting British and French policies.

Defense ministers meet regularly in the Nuclear Planning Group to discuss specific policy issues relating to nuclear forces, such as safety, deployment issues, nuclear arms control and proliferation. The Secretary-General proposes items for NATO consultation and is generally responsible for promoting consultation and co-operation in accordance with the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty. In April 2007 NATO ministers responsible for foreign affairs held immediate discussions following an announcement by Russia's President that it intended to suspend unilaterally its implementation of CFE obligations. In November 1991 NATO heads of government, convened in Rome, Italy, recommended a radical restructuring of the organization in view of the fundamental changes then taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. In March 2003 protocols of accession, amending the North Atlantic Treaty, were adopted by the then 19 NATO member states with a view to admitting Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to the organization.

Key Points The judicious use of decisive force against and their support structures is a vital component of the U.S. strategy to defeat global terrorism. Another component is the development of a consensus that terrorism is contrary to international norms of behavior. Achieving such a consensus will be possible only if the United States can convince the world community that the counterterrorist struggle is being conducted in accordance with these norms. The United States, therefore, needs to articulate a strong case for the right of antiterrorist intervention based on three concepts adapted from international law: * the classification of as the common enemy of humankind * a renewed emphasis on sovereign responsibility as the corollary of sovereign rights * application of the logic of the inherent right of self-defense to the realities of 21st-century terrorism. Achieving global consensus on a doctrine based upon these points will not be easy. But by articulating these principles and building on such steps as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Organization of American States characterizations of the 9/11 strikes as armed attacks, the United States and its allies can create a body of customary international law around which global consensus in support of a right of antiterrorist intervention can coalesce. ********** The nature and capabilities of 21st-century terrorists, especially those such as al Qaeda and its allies who pursue an apocalyptic agenda, make it essential that governments can take decisive preventive action, including the use of force, rather than waiting to respond to attacks after the fact. In certain circumstances, this means being able to conduct military operations on the territory of foreign countries without their consent. Immediately after 9/11, there was little need to ponder the legitimacy of such action; global opinion expected--indeed, demanded--a robust response to the attacks that took place. Three years later, however, a worldwide consensus can no longer be taken for granted. Increasingly, voices are heard arguing that the United States lacks a sound legal basis for resorting to force in its global campaign against terrorism. Maintaining international support for the war on terrorism demands that the United States confront head-on the complex issues raised by critics by articulating and generating support for an unassailable, legitimate basis for current and future action. In fact, the United States has a strong case that operations against on foreign soil are justified under international law and consistent with the United Nations (UN) Charter. A Different Threat Today's terrorist threat is decidedly different from that of the late 20th century. The radical Islamist who constitute the gravest danger operate from different motivations than their predecessors of 20 to 30 years ago, or even more territorially motivated jihadists of today such as Hamas and Hezbollah. As Bruce Hoffman observed several years before the attacks of September 11, terrorism motivated by extreme interpretations of religious doctrine assumes a transcendental dimension, and its perpetrators are consequently unconstrained by the political, moral or practical constraints that may affect other terrorists. (1) No longer can we take for granted, as Brian Jenkins put it, that terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead. (2) Some terrorists, at least, want thousands of people dead, and the fruits of globalization have afforded them such extraordinary reach and lethality that they can now make that wish come true. A different threat implies a different strategy for combating it. It is not enough to plan defensive measures premised on raising the risks to would-be attackers if they are bent on killing themselves as an integral part of the terrorist act. …

The art of effective teaching requires guidance, practice and feedback. The 2000+ undergraduates who enroll in our introductory Human Anatomy and Physiology (PSIO 201/202) courses each year deserve an optimal educational experience; similarly, the Graduate Teaching Assistants (GTAs) who teach the associated labs deserve the professional training to optimize their teaching and presenting skills to further their careers. At University of Arizona, we have developed a three‐pronged approach to enable success in both. 1) The Physiological Sciences Teaching Workshop (PS 697A&B) is a year‐long course designed to help new GTA’s develop and fine tune their teaching techniques by focusing on ‘best practices’ through guest lectures, peer observations and group discussion. This prong emphasizes the development of a teaching philosophy, provides helpful ideas for engaging students and creating an active learning environment in the lab, and provides training in professional skills related to presenting and communicating. 2) Weekly content‐based sessions led by the 201/202 course instructors and lab coordinators focusing on the course‐specific material and experiments to be covered in the upcoming week’s lab, with additional insights and handy hints provided from seasoned TA’s. During these 2–3 hour meetings, GTAs receive lab outlines (prep notes), template slides, perform dissections and experiments, and review slides and anatomical models. They also have the opportunity to give feedback on the previous week’s lab and ask questions about the upcoming lab, enabling continuous fine‐tuning of the labs used each year. Both the Teaching Workshop and the 201 or 202‐Specific Preparation begins each fall with an intensive orientation the week prior to the semester to insure the teaching team is well‐versed with university and department policies and resources, course specific policies and problem solving and are certified in CPR and First Aid. The TW and weekly preparation meetings complement each other to provide a well‐rounded training program for the GTAs fully preparing them to meet the demands of teaching 2 labs of 25–30 students each about the intricacies of the human body. 3) The 3rd prong is the Physiology Forum, a bimonthly seminar series, now in its 10th year, which hosts research presentations required of all our Physiological Sciences graduate students (MS and PhD candidates). Each student presentation is provided with post‐hoc critiques from the full cohort of graduate students and 2 faculty selected on a 2 year rotating basis, resulting in remarkably high quality presentations across the board. Each of these 3 venues provide preparation with respect to content and format, presentation skills and formative feedback. Using student teaching evaluations for the labs, analyses by TA’s on the benefits of the Prep and Workshop sessions, and comments from intra‐ and extramural faculty where our students have presented their work suggests that this combination of hands‐on practice paired with constructive feedback has served our graduate students well as they proceed onto the next steps in their professional careers. Here, we describe the implementation of the specific activities, goals, and learning outcomes that drove the design of our GTA training program.

The monograph is dedicated to the publication of the results of scientific reports announced at the 1st International Scientific and Practical Conference "The monograph is devoted to the publication of the results of scientific reports announced at the 1st International Scientific and Practical Conference "Overcoming ecological risks and threats to the environment in emergency situations - 2022" in the areas of: - Global and regional environmental threats; - Ecological and technogenic security of territories; - Renewable energy. The collective monograph from the standpoint of ensuring environmental security presents the results of environmental research with an emphasis on establishing environmental risks and threats to the environment in emergency situations and military operations. The problems of global and regional ecological threats, issues of ecological and man-made security of territories, developments in the field of renewable energy were considered. Some intelligence on the consequences for the environment of military actions related to the invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine is given. It is intended for scientists, teachers, managers and specialists of state administration bodies, ecologists, graduate students, students and everyone who is interested in the issues of preservation, restoration and rational use of environmental resources.