SafeSearch: Obfuscated VPN Server using Raspberry Pi for Secure Network

The Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) is being standardized in IETF, which separates the IP address functionality into routing locators (RLOC) and endpoint identifiers (EID). LISP is applicable for instant Virtual Private Network (VPN) services because it has IP tunneling features. However, there are two main issues with application to VPN. One is a Map server/Map resolver (MS/MR) basically allows any third party to know a mapping table even if it is irrelevant to the VPN. The other is an MS/MR should identify the VPN to which the requested site belongs because the requested EIDs can be private addresses and may overlap with other VPN sites. A simple solution is to deploy an independent MS/MR for every VPN. However, this is undesirable from a cost perspective. We present a new LISP-MS/MR that provides a large number of VPN services using a single set. This MS/MR creates a logically separated EID-to-RLOC mapping table for each VPN and selects an appropriate type according to the requesting VPN site. To ensure this, our scheme uses Authentication data included in the Map register for an initial VPN identification of the registering site and associates the identified VPN ID with the registered RLOC. In following Map requests, the appropriate mapping table for the requesting VPN site is selected based on its RLOC. We confirmed the basic network functions of VPN using the prototype system. The results of scalability tests show that our MS/MR completes the transaction for nearly-simultaneous 10,000 Map registers or requests within three seconds.

MPLS technology has recently been widely adopted, not only in large-scale IP backbones, but in metro and enterprise networks as well. Among the merits of MPLS, effective and efficient support of TE (traffic engineering) and VPN (virtual private network) services is the most influential factor that has facilitated the diffusion of the technology. However, although MPLS itself has become a currently operational technology, issues regarding the management of various services that are built on top of individually operating MPLS capable network elements have not been well identified or solved. These service level management issues arise, not only under heterogeneous conditions, but even when the target network is homogeneously composed. The paper discusses the requirements and architectural aspects of an integrated service management system for MPLS TE and VPN services. The discussion encompasses fault and performance management issues and information models which should be flexible to support newer services that can be rendered by merging TE, VPN, and QoS technologies. We also examine performance, fault tolerance, and scalability issues that cannot be neglected when such systems are deployed in a real-world environment.

Virtual private networks (VPNs) enable companies to connect geographically dispersed offices and remote workers via secure links to the private company network, using the public Internet as a backbone. Specially, VPN service in the broadband data communication network is very important and necessary to take in users who want to specify group communication. VPN mechanisms are needed which work over existing deployed backbones, and which can also be migrated to new backbones like MPLS (Multi-Protocol Label Switching). MPLS is the latest step in the evolution of multi-layer switching in the Internet. In this paper, we clarify how MPLS can be applied to creating VPNs. For this, we researched an architectural model for building VPNs in an MPLS domain. The proposed model takes advantage of both network layer peering and packet switching, and link-layer circuit and per-stream switching. It comes with a design scheme and an implementation procedure for VPN services in MPLS systems. Then we describe MPLS-based VPN service procedures and we describe MPLS VPN schemes that must be accommodated with existing network backbones and must also provide for a full range of QoS characteristics.

Global Internet users increasingly rely on virtual private network (VPN) services to preserve their privacy, circumvent censorship, and access geo-filtered content. Due to their own lack of technical sophistication and the opaque nature of VPN clients, however, the vast majority of users have limited means to verify a given VPN service's claims along any of these dimensions. We design an active measurement system to test various infrastructural and privacy aspects of VPN services and evaluate 62 commercial providers. Our results suggest that while commercial VPN services seem, on the whole, less likely to intercept or tamper with user traffic than other, previously studied forms of traffic proxying, many VPNs do leak user traffic---perhaps inadvertently---through a variety of means. We also find that a non-trivial fraction of VPN providers transparently proxy traffic, and many misrepresent the physical location of their vantage points: 5--30% of the vantage points, associated with 10% of the providers we study, appear to be hosted on servers located in countries other than those advertised to users.

With the rapid development of Virtual Private Network (VPN), many companies and organizations use VPN to implement their private communication. Traditionally, VPN uses security protocols to protect the confidentiality of data, the message integrity and the endpoint authentication. One core technique of VPN is tunneling, by which clients can access the internal servers traversing VPN. However, the tunneling technique also introduces a concealed security hole. It is possible that if one vicious user can establish tunneling by the VPN server, he can compromise the internal servers behind the VPN server. So this paper presents a novel Application-layer based Centralized Information Access Control (ACIAC) for VPN to solve this problem. To implement an efficient, flexible and multi-decision access control model, we present two key techniques to ACIAC—the centralized management mechanism and the stream-based access control. Firstly, we implement the information center and the constraints/events center for ACIAC. By the two centers, we can provide an abstract access control mechanism, and the material access control can be decided dynamically by the ACIAC's constraint/event mechanism. Then we logically classify the VPN communication traffic into the access stream and the data stream so that we can tightly couple the features of VPN communication with the access control model. We also provide the design of our ACIAC prototype in this paper.

The cost minimization of virtual private networks (VPN) that use the resources of an underlying transport network is the key factor for their successful implementation. The investigation in this paper is focused on 'network based VPNs', where the operation of the VPN is outsourced to an Internet Service Provider (ISP). The interest in such solutions is generated both by customers seeking to reduce support costs and by ISPs seeking new revenue sources. Solving the cost minimization would allow Internet service providers (ISPs) to define and deploy new VPN services. The basic building block of VPN is the tunnel. A tunnel operates as an overlay across the backbone, and the traffic sent through the tunnel is opaque to the underlying backbone. A VPN end point can terminate multiple tunnels or forward packets between different tunnels. Different tunnels can share the same physical link and traffic belonging to the same VPN tunnel can be carried along different physical links. The multiplexing and management of the VPN tunnels is made possible by core routers supporting the VPN of the underlying network. The novelty of the presented work is the network flow model of VPN mapping on the underlying ISP network. We assume that the VPN topology, the topology of the ISP network and the total utilization cost for all underlying links are known parameters. Based on this, we propose a network management system based on a network flow optimization in order to define the minimal cost link allocation for the VPN tunnels. We provide a simulation of the proposed optimal establishment of VPN tunnels and performance evaluation of the simulation results.

In recent times, secure communication protocols over web such as HTTPS (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure) are being widely used instead of plain web communication protocols like HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol). HTTPS provides end-to-end encryption between the user and service. Nowadays, organizations use network firewalls and/or intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) to analyze the network traffic to detect and protect against attacks and vulnerabilities. Depending on the size of organization, these devices may differ in their capabilities. Simple network intrusion detection system (NIDS) and firewalls generally have no feature to inspect HTTPS or encrypted traffic, so they rely on unencrypted traffic to manage the encrypted payload of the network. Recent and powerful next-generation firewalls have Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) inspection feature which are expensive and may not be suitable for every organizations. A virtual private network (VPN) is a service which hides real traffic by creating SSL-protected channel between the user and server. Every Internet activity is then performed under the established SSL tunnel. The user inside the network with malicious intent or to hide his activity from the network security administration of the organization may use VPN services. Any VPN service may be used by users to bypass the filters or signatures applied on network security devices. These services may be the source of new virus or worm injected inside the network or a gateway to facilitate information leakage. In this paper, we have proposed a novel approach to detect VPN activity inside the network. The proposed system analyzes the communication between user and the server to analyze and extract features from network, transport, and application layer which are not encrypted and classify the incoming traffic as malicious, i.e., VPN traffic or standard traffic. Network traffic is analyzed and classified using DNS (Domain Name System) packets and HTTPS- (Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure-) based traffic. Once traffic is classified, the connection based on the server’s IP, TCP port connected, domain name, and server name inside the HTTPS connection is analyzed. This helps in verifying legitimate connection and flags the VPN-based traffic. We worked on top five freely available VPN services and analyzed their traffic patterns; the results show successful detection of the VPN activity performed by the user. We analyzed the activity of five users, using some sort of VPN service in their Internet activity, inside the network. Out of total 729 connections made by different users, 329 connections were classified as legitimate activity, marking 400 remaining connections as VPN-based connections. The proposed system is lightweight enough to keep minimal overhead, both in network and resource utilization and requires no specialized hardware.

Needs for internetworking private networks over a commonly shared public network have expanded the usage of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Customers, through the use of a RFC 4364 VPN, use service provider (SP) backbones to establish private connectivity between geographically disparate networks. As a direct result of SPs migrating towards an Internet Protocol (IP) over a Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) infrastructure, as observed within the Defense Information Switched Network (DISN) of the Global Information Grid (GIG), SPs have also begun to transition from providing traditional circuit-switched leased permanent virtual circuits through a layer two (L2) protocol (e.g., Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) or Frame Relay (FR) to providing layer three (L3) VPN services. Currently, requirements for securing the GIG control plane traffic are undecided. A potential solution for protecting the GIG control plane includes instantiating Internet Protocol security (IPsec) Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Transport Mode across all GIG routers on a router-to-router basis. Although the use of IPsec has been proven to provide effective data confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication to devices operating on the data plane, both routing vendors and SP operators have shared concerns regarding network performance degradation associated with the use of IPsec on the control plane. This paper will investigate the performance implications of applying IPsec ESP Transport Mode to routers participating in 4364 VPNs, given a typical GIG scenario. Testing has been recently completed to determine the impacts of using IPsec protection on 4364 VPNs, specifically in a simulated GIG operating environment.

Reliability and security concerns have increased demand for Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). Ideally, a VPN service should offer autonomous overlay networks with guaranteed bandwidth allocations over a shared network. Network providers seek an automated VPN creation and management process, while users of a VPN would greatly benefit from secure control over the handling of their traffic. Currently, network infrastructure does not support such partitioning services and, due to its static nature, it cannot be adapted to meet such new demands. Active and Programmable Network research has developed a number of adaptable architectures. However, its current focus is on theoretical service deployment rather than on applicability to large and shared networking environments. This paper presents the application of a new programmable architecture to enable on-demand VPN construction, bandwidth management, and secure autonomous VPN control onto shared commercial infrastructure.

Chapter 59 - Virtual Private Networks

Recently, there has been rapid development and deployment of virtual private network (VPN) services. There are wide varieties of IP-based VPNs and optical VPNs (OVPNs) proposed in the literature and readers could easily get confused with so many different types of VPNs. The purpose of this paper is to present a comprehensive overview of the VPN and discuss the main issues associated with the design of IP VPN and OVPN. We first present a classification of the VPNs including CE-based, network based, customers provisioned, provider provisioned, connection oriented, connectionless oriented, port based, connection based, layer 1 VPN, layer 2 VPN, and layer 3 VPN, and describe different VPN protocols such as IPSec, GRE and MPLS. We then review the recent work on OVPN by different standard bodies, and outline the key requirements for OVPN service providers and customers. Finally, we describe several OVPN architectures appeared in the literature, highlight the future work in OVPN.

Due to increased inspection of internet traffic and the pervasive surveillance practices put in place by many organizations, virtual private networks (VPNs) are now frequently used to safeguard online privacy and circumvent censorship. However, existing VPN protocols are susceptible to methods of detection and blockage employed by network administrators, internet service providers, and in certain cases, governments. Stealth protocols and proxying techniques have therefore been presented as potential means of hiding VPN activity and avoiding discovery. Therefore, the purpose of this work is to assess how well stealth protocols and proxying work to hide the use of VPNs using a thorough experimental setup (i.e., evaluate how well-known stealth VPN protocols like Obfsproxy, Shadowsocks, and WireGuard perform against different detection techniques like deep packet inspection (DPI)). Furthermore, examine the effects of using proxy servers in conjunction with VPN connections in order to further obfuscate traffic signatures and improve privacy. The results center on how well various stealth protocols and proxying techniques defy detection attempts, offering insightful information to VPN users and developers. Thus, the outcomes help strengthen censorship resistance and online particularity in keeping pace with the development of monitoring technology. Also, analyze the efficiency of Obfsproxy, Shadowsocks, and WireGuard to provide comprehensive comparisons of current capabilities and potential enhancements. Finally, a discussion for future VPN design is conducted, focusing on the importance of adaptability in keeping secure communication channels among increasingly sophisticated surveillance measures. Received: 18 June 2024 | Revised: 2 August 2024 | Accepted: 20 August 2024 Conflicts of Interest The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest in this work. Data Availability Statement Data available on request from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. Author Contribution Statement Mohammad Shehab: Conceptualization, Methodology, Validation, Investigation, Resources, Data curation, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing, Visualization, Supervision, Project administration. Lial Raja Alzabin: Conceptualization, Methodology, Formal analysis, Resources, Writing – review & editing, Visualization.

A virtual private network (VPN) is an overlay network that uses the public network to carry data traffic between corporate sites and users, maintaining privacy through the use of tunnelling protocols and security procedures. In the network-based model, VPN-aware network elements are placed within the network to set up concatenated tunnels between the user/site and enterprise resources to offer intranet VPN and remote access VPN. This paper identifies the important differences between a traditional VPN and the mobile VPN and proposes a hierarchical network architecture to efficiently realize network-based mobile VPNs. We address the problem of optimally provisioning VPN-aware devices, called IP service gateways (IPSGs), in the hierarchical network architecture for mobile VPNs, while taking into account of (1) the cost of links over which VPN tunnels are established, (2) the cost of provisioning a VPN customer on an IPSG, and (3) redundancy in IPSG provisioning for fault tolerance. We develop generic yet powerful problem formulations for different scenarios described above while considering practical requirements of the network elements and business requirements of the VPN service provider. The formulation becomes a set of integer programming problems. We solve several instances of the problem for a few practical cases and discuss their applications in the overall network design.

Virtual Private Network, Its ‘Virtual', Its ‘Private' and it's a ‘Network'. A virtual private network (VPN) provides a secure connection between a sender and a receiver over a public non-secure network such as the Internet. A secure connection is generally associated with private networks. (A private network is a network that is owned, or at least controlled via leased lines, by an organization.). We can define a VPN by the following relationship: VPN = Tunneling + Security + QoS Parameters. This Chapter deals with Advantages of VPNs, Types of VPNs, VPN Architectures, VPN Models, VPN Devices, Technologies and Protocols Used to Enable Remote Access VPNs.

The idea of using a low-cost public network such as the Internet to build a private network is intriguing. In this article, we will focus on virtual private networks (VPNs), which leverage the Internet to provide cost-effective, secure communications. We will discuss the challenges of implementing VPNs based on the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Internet protocol security (IPSec) standards. We will cover various aspects including encryption, authentication, Internet key exchange (IKE), and public key infrastructure (PKI) as they relate to IPSec-based VPNs. We will discuss the major issues facing enterprises, service providers, and end-users in implementing intranets, extranets, and remote access VPNs. We will elaborate by discussing how the Lucent VPN firewall handles the various issues and scenarios described here, and how customers in implementing robust VPNs, use it in practice. We also will touch on other VPN solutions and product architectures, and briefly mention other Lucent VPN products. In closing, we will discuss future VPN challenges, including the impact of Internet protocol version 6 (IPv6).3