Self-awareness, social intelligence and schizophrenia

Objectives Aging is associated with declines in theory of mind – the ability to infer the mental states of others. We examined whether priming theory of mind mindsets actively (Study 1) and passively (Study 2) improved older adults’ performance. Method Across two studies, participants completed a novel question-and-answer theory of mind task using the television show Nathan for You® in a mindset or no mindset condition. In Study 1, participants (N = 324, 18–84 years) completed a similar task related to a different show prior to the Nathan for You task (active mindset). In Study 2, young (N = 235; MAge = 20.47) and older (N = 193, MAge = 74.48) adults made continuous ratings of awkwardness of different episodes of Nathan for You before completing the question-and-answer task (passive mindset). We also measured executive function and episodic memory. In both studies, the same tasks were performed in reverse order for the control conditions (no mindset). Results Mindsets were associated with small-to-medium increases in theory of mind performance. Cognitive ability did not explain these improvements. Conclusion These findings suggest that theory of mind performance can be improved through motivation (e.g. mindsets); cognitive function (e.g. ability) does not moderate this relationship.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer the mental states of others, is integral to facilitating healthy social interactions. People can reason about the mental states of others even with limited or (sometimes) inconsistent information. However, little is known about how people make inferences about the mental states of others under uncertainty, and what features of information are important in aiding mental state reasoning. In the current study, we conducted three unique experiments that alter participant's uncertainty when engaging in ToM tests. In Experiment 1, we simultaneously manipulated both the amount and consistency of information available in social stimuli presented to 59 participants. In Experiments 2 and 3, we aimed to decipher which feature of social stimuli is more conducive to mental state reasoning. Experiment 2 manipulated only the amount of information available to 47 participants, while Experiment 3 manipulated only the consistency of information available to 46 participants. Using both frequentist and Bayesian statistics, results confirmed that manipulating the amount and consistency of information alters ToM performance. Exploratory analysis comparing the effects of the amount and consistency of information suggests that the effects of the consistency of information seem to be stronger than those of the amount of information. Taken together, all three experiments suggest that while both the amount and consistency of information are important features of social stimuli-the consistency of information available is more salient when inferring mental states of others. These findings are discussed in relation to information theory and have important implications for creating enriched social stimuli, which may enhance mental state reasoning in individuals with social deficits.

Perception of other people’s mental states affects humor in social anxiety

Rater gender and symptom ratings of patients with schizophrenia

Structural and functional brain correlates of theory of mind impairment post-stroke

Oxytocin Improves “Mind-Reading” in Humans

Humans live in complex social environments. By the time they reach adulthood, most people have developed highly sophisticated social skills, including the ability to infer the 'invisible' mental states in others, and to act upon those inferences; they have become experts at 'social chess'. This paper draws upon research from developmental and evolutionary psychology, primatology, as well as studies of autistic children, to explore the processes by which children acquire the complex skills underpinning social interaction. It also examines obstacles to social skill acquisition. In light of ethological studies of social play in humans and other primates, it is argued that play is a fundamental medium for acquiring social skills.

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to reason about the mental states of others. An increasing number of studies have revealed that working memory (WM) plays an important role in ToM. The present study applied WM loads to adults during a ToM task in order to investigate the impact on mental‐state reasoning performance. The task required participants to estimate the probabilities of several possible behaviours for a protagonist following the presentation of a ToM story. Participants were also required to maintain a meaningless two‐ (light WM load) or seven‐letter English alphabet string (heavy WM load) during story comprehension and mental‐state reasoning. The results show that the combination of light WM load applied during story comprehension with heavy WM load during mental‐state reasoning results in an overestimation of the probability that the protagonist's behaviour will accord with a participant's knowledge. Conversely, a heavy WM load applied during story comprehension, regardless of the type of WM load during mental‐state reasoning, did not result in this probability estimation bias. We discuss these findings from the perspective of a WM representation account.

The human ability to make inferences about the minds of conspecifics is remarkable. The majority of work in this area focuses on mental state representation (‘theory of mind’), but has had limited success in explaining individual differences in this ability, and is characterized by the lack of a theoretical framework that can account for the effect of variability in the population of minds to which individuals are exposed. We draw analogies between faces and minds as complex social stimuli, and suggest that theoretical and empirical progress on understanding the mechanisms underlying mind representation can be achieved by adopting a ‘Mind-space’ framework; that minds, like faces, are represented within a multidimensional psychological space. This Mind-space framework can accommodate the representation of whole cognitive systems, and may help to explain individual differences in the consistency and accuracy with which the mental states of others are inferred. Mind-space may also have relevance for understanding human development, intergroup relations, and the atypical social cognition seen in several clinical conditions.

Humans live not only in a physical world but also in a mental world. Theory of mind reflects the understanding that the mind is comprised of different mental states, such as intentions, desires, and beliefs. This conception of the mind is a critical achievement in human development because it directly impacts effective communication and social interaction. It allows for the understanding of others’ behaviors by inferring their mental states. The formation of a theory of mind has been a central topic in psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy. It impacts related processes, such as communication skills, perspective-taking ability, and social cognition. Across the life span, the understanding of the mind becomes increasingly complex. Early in development, infants and toddlers can discern the intentions of others. Later, more sophisticated reasoning about the mental states of others becomes possible. For instance, the ability to follow and understand the recursive thought that “Sam believes, that Mary said, that Jose wanted . . .” develops. Additionally, within distinctive developmental time periods, people differ in their ability to take into account mental states. Once people’s beliefs, including their misconceptions, are identified, it is possible to generate effective communication strategies designed to teach, learn, and even reduce risk-taking behaviors.

Background: Theory of Mind (ToM) impairment has repeatedly been found in paranoid schizophrenia. The current study aims at investigating whether this is related to a deficit in ToM (undermentalizing) or an increased ToM ability to hyperattribute others’ mental states (overmentalizing). Methods: Mental state attribution was examined in 24 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia (12 acute paranoid (APS) and 12 post-acute paranoid (PPS)) with regard to positive symptoms as well as matched healthy persons using a moving shapes paradigm. We used 3-T-functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to provide insights into the neural underpinnings of ToM due to attributional processes in different states of paranoid schizophrenia. Results: In the condition that makes demands on theory of mind skills (ToM condition), in patients with diagnosed schizophrenia less appropriate mental state descriptions have been used, and they attributed mental states less often to the moving shapes than healthy persons. On a neural level, patients suffering from schizophrenia exhibited within the ToM network hypoactivity in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and hyperactivity in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) as compared to the healthy sample. Conclusions: Our results indicate both undermentalizing and hypoactivity in the MPFC and increased overattribution related to hyperactivity in the TPJ in paranoid schizophrenia, providing new implications for understanding ToM in paranoid schizophrenia.

Some researchers have claimed that theory of mind or 'mind reading' ability, necessary for inferring the mental states of others, depends on language ability. However, previous tests of theory of mind were verbally demanding, and high correlations found might have been an artifact. This paper reports the performance of 22 children with autism, with varying degrees of dysfunction, on a test devised by Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, and Robertson (1997), based on a relatively nonverbal theory of mind. The test involved inference of mental states from photographs of human eyes. Results indicated that mind reading ability was independent of language ability, general intelligence, or mental age. Test scores were, however, strongly related to the severity of autistic disorder. These results suggest both the independence of mind-reading ability from language ability and general intelligence, and a strong relationship between theory of mind deficit and the autistic disorder.

Weak theory of mind (ToM) ability is a core deficit in children with autism. A growing body of work has found that there is a close relation between complement syntax and ToM in autistic children. However, researchers have not yet investigated whether other linguistic components may explain the difficulties in ToM reasoning in autistic children. To determine whether verb factuality (i.e., mental and action verbs) is related to ToM ability, as measured by a false belief understanding (FBU) task after controlling the effect of complement syntax for Mandarin-speaking autistic children. Participants were verbal autistic children, aged 4-7 years. Their IQ performance (verbal, performance and total IQ) and the comprehension of complement syntax were evaluated. A total of 38 children scoring over 9 points in complement syntax test and 90 points in the verbal IQ test were selected to complete verb factuality and FBU task. The χ2 tests and correlation analyses were carried out on two relations: (1) ToM ability and understanding of verb factuality; and (2) ToM ability and comprehension of complement syntax. A total of 11 autistic children completed the action verb factuality task, while 14 completed the mental verb factuality task and 13 completed both tasks. Participants performed well on the verb factuality task, and their ToM performance appeared to be related to their linguistic ability, regardless of the type of verb (i.e., action or mental verb). However, complement syntax scores did not significantly predict the success of the FBU task for the autistic children. The results of this study link weaker ToM ability with the understanding of verb factuality among autistic children aged 4-7 and provide new evidence for the view that the development of language facilitates improvement of ToM skills. The findings shed new light on how language affects or determines social interactions. What is already known on the subject ToM ability is crucial for social interaction. It has been claimed that mental verb factuality (e.g., think, had thought) may play a role in the development of ToM reasoning in typically developing children, but whether there is a link between the mastery of verb factuality and ToM skills in autistic children is still unclear. What this study adds to existing knowledge Correlational analysis revealed links between verbal ToM measured by unexpected location task and factuality test of mental verbs as well as action verbs. More importantly, this study confirmed the extra role of verb factuality in explaining ToM ability after excluding the influence of the complement syntax. What are the potential or actual clinical implications of this work? This study suggests that the factuality of verbs could serve as a tool for autistic children to infer the mental states of others. Thus, training on this linguistic structure could be taken into consideration when improving the social skills of autistic children.

Why are humans so clever? The ‘Social intelligence’ hypothesis explores the idea that this cleverness has evolved through the increasing complexity of social groups. Our ability to understand and control nature is a by-product of our ability to understand the mental states of others and to use this knowledge to co-operate or deceive. These abilities have not emerged out of the blue. They can be found in many social animals that co-operate and compete with one another, birds as well as mammals. This book brings together contributions from an impressive list of authorities in the field, appropriately concluding with a chapter by Nick Humphrey (one of the pioneers in this field). This volume examines social intelligence in many different animal species and explores its development, evolution and the brain systems upon which it depends. Better understanding and further development of social intelligence is critical for the future of the human race and the world that we inhabit. Our problems will not be solved by mere cleverness, but by increased social co-operation.

We hypothesise on a number of grounds that the personality dimension of Agreeableness may be associated with inter‐individual differences in theory of mind (ToM) functioning. However, it is important to distinguish social‐perceptual from social‐cognitive ToM. Previous findings on ToM in psychopathic individuals, sex differences in ToM and the associations between ToM and social relationships, all suggest that social‐cognitive ToM is more likely than social‐perceptual ToM to relate to Agreeableness. In separate empirical studies, we find that Agreeableness is substantially correlated with social‐cognitive ToM performance, but uncorrelated with social‐perceptual ToM performance. We suggest that the propensity or motivation to attend to the mental states of others may be central to the personality dimension of Agreeableness. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.