Sequential games with turn selection process and fuzzy utility functions

The control of construction activities usually involves monitoring and manipulating multiple attributes at the same time. A multi-attribute real-time fuzzy controller is presented. The proposed system monitors and controls two or more attributes, utilizing a set of single-attribute control systems operating in parallel. The proposed system includes a conflict resolution unit which is responsible for resolving any conflicting commands resulting from the individual parallel control systems. The conflict resolution unit should result in a compromise control action that satisfies all the involved attributes as closely as possible. A fuzzy utility function is utilized in rating all potential alternatives. Then, a utility ranking is performed to select the compromise or best alternative. The selection of this alternative is based on the maximization of the corresponding utility rank. >

Optimum allocation of monitoring wells around a solid-waste landfill site using precursor indicators and fuzzy utility functions

Recently it has become important to establish the local environmental preservation level based on the Agenda 21 including the local energy system In this study we examined the improvement techniques on an urban energy system in snowy cold region. We surveyed the possibility of new urban energy system like waste heat from incineration plants and sewage plants. We analyzed the results using fuzzy utility function and structural modeling. We simulated several scenarios on the urban new energy system which can be introduced and evaluated by using cost-performance with environmental cost. We proposed the rational energy system in a residential area in Sapporo practically.

A logic Petri net model for dynamic multi-agent game decision-making

We study the economic interests of a wireless access point owner and his paying client, and model their interaction as a dynamic game. The key feature of this game is that the players have asymmetric information - the client knows more than the access provider. We find that if a client has a utility function (a temporal utility function that grows linearly), it is a Nash equilibrium for the provider to charge the client a constant price per unit time. On the other hand, if the client has a utility function (a utility function that is a step function), the client would be unwilling to pay until the final time slot of the file transfer. We also study an expanded game where an access point sells to a reseller,which in turn sells to a mobile client and show that if the client has a web browser utility function, that constant price is a Nash equilibrium of the three player game. Finally, we study a two player game in which the access point does not know whether he faces a web browser or file transferor type client, and show conditions for which it is not a Nash equilibrium for the access point to maintain a constant price.

I Foundations, Concepts, and Structure.- Stable Schedule Matching under Revealed Preference.- Banzhaf Permission Values for Games with a Permission Structure.- Moral Hazard in Teams Revisited.- Endogenous Determination of Utility Functions: An Evolutionary Approach.- N-person Prisoner's Dilemma with Mutual Choice by Agent-based Modeling.- Randomly-Furcating Stochastic Differential Games.- On Modulo 2 Game.- Bargaining in Dynamic Games.- II Equilibrium Properties.- Extensions of Hart and Mas-Colell's Consistency to Efficient, Linear, and Symmetric Values for TU-Games.- On the Stability of Cooperation Structures.- Time-Consistent Imputation Distribution Procedure for Multistage Game.- Rationality of Final Decisions Leads to Sequential Equilibrium.- The Core in the Presence of Externalities.- Network Topology and the Efficiency of Equilibrium.- Essential Components of the Set of Weakly Pareto-Nash Equilibria for Multiobjective Generalized Games.- III Applications to the Natural and Social Sciences.- Discretization of Information Collecting Situations and Continuity of Compensation Rules.- Some Variation Calculus Problems in Dynamic Games on 2D Surfaces.- On The Chinese Postman Game.- Farsighted Stability in Duopoly Markets with Product Differentiation.- International Emissions Trading with Agent-Based Simulation and Web-Based Gaming.- Comparison of two Economic Models for a Business-to-Business Exchange.- IV Computational Aspects of Games.- Computability of Nash Equilibrium.- Numerical Algorithm for Solving Cross-Coupled Multiparameter Algebraic Riccati Equations of Multimodeling Systems Related to Nash Games.- Effects of Symmetry on Paradoxes in Non-Cooperative Distributed Computing.- Computation of Stackelberg Trajectories in a Class of Linear Differential Games on Plane.- A Game Theoretic Approach to Value Information in Data Mining.

Experimental evidence has repeatedly shown that the widely used principle of maximization of expected utility has serious shortcomings. Non-expected utility theory suggests more adequate models. However, in these models utility functions and probabilities are mainly considered as real-valued functions whereas in reality human preferences are imprecise being described in natural language (NL). Nowadays a methodology for dealing with second-order uncertainty, or uncertainty2 is not available, whereas, real-world uncertainties mainly fall into this category. In this paper we present an effective decision theory under uncertainty2 when the environment of fuzzy events and fuzzy states are characterized by imprecise probabilities. The proposed theory includes a non-expected fuzzy utility function represented by a fuzzy integral with fuzzy-number-valued fuzzy measure generated by imprecise probabilities. The suggested theory encompasses the classical utility based decision analysis, cumulative Prospect theory and Choquet expected utility on bipolar scales. We apply this methodology for solving a real-life business problem.

The literature of competitive arms accumulation based on the intertemporal optimization model has in recent years received considerable attention. For example, some models study the strategic aspects of arms accumulation in a dynamic game [1; 11; 6; 14; 15],' others examine the economic effect of consumption, military spending, and arms accumulation in the presence of a foreign threat [5; 6]. However, these studies focus their attention on the stability, the steady-state effect, and the short-run adjustment of military spending and the domestic arms stock following an unanticipated permanent rise in the foreign military threat.2 It seems that very few efforts have been made to analyze the effects of an anticipated foreign military threat on the defense spending and home weapon stock. As a consequence, the first purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature of competitive arms accumulation through examining the impact of an anticipated foreign threat. There are several examples motivated for such a study. The Middle East is a case in point. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia face the anticipated military threat from Iraq since the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991. Recently, the peace talk between Israel and Arabs is often held, which makes their people anticipate that the enmity between both sides may be lessened and that the military conflicts in the Middle East may be lowered in the future. The South Asia is another case in point. As India insists on developing their nuclear weapons, the public in Pakistan anticipate that the military threat will be increased and hence will engage in an arms race action. Most studies on military spending use two alternative specifications in the utility function. Brito [1], Simaan and Cruz [11], Deger and Sen [5; 6] assume that the utility function is nonsepara-

Sequential Games with Finite Horizon and Turn Selection Process

We formulate the Malthus-Hardin tragedy of the commons as a special case of dynamic game between tribes. At each date a member of a tribe desires more newborns of her/his type and more current consumption, harvested from the commons. Equilibrium in the dynamic game yields steady state level of per capita consumption for each person and a steady population level for each tribe (births equal deaths). We obtain four outcomes, depending on our assumptions about the discount rates of members of a tribe and about the mode of competition for large for each tribe. We compare Nash open loop and Nash feedback solutions with a quadratic current utility function and observe a larger populations under the feedback solution. The classic tragedy of the commons solution obtains as a special case of the open loop solution, one with an infinite rate of discount for players.

The method for portfolio investment, allowing the formation of the optimal portfolio structure considering degrees of satisfaction of requirements of stakeholder groups, risks and uncertainty of external and internal environment, was proposed. The model that represents a fuzzy nonlinear programming problem was considered. The weighted average of project utility is used as objective function. The utilities of projects are multiplicative Cobb-Douglas type functions using, along with financial indicators, expert verbal evaluations of qualitative indi­cators of satisfaction of stakeholder requirements, converted into fuzzy numbers. Exponents in this function reflect the significance of stake­holders for the organization in terms of the existing resource sharing between a company and a stakeholder and the degree of mutual influ­ence. Quantitative accounting of risks is implemented based on the H. Markowitz approach and the scenario-based method. Uncertainty and lack of information for the indicator of economic efficiency of projects is modeled through the use of the fuzzy approach. Constraints in the model are also fuzzy. The transforming from a fuzzy optimization problem into a crisp problem is performed by assigning the satisfac­tion degrees for an objective function and the constraints. The choice of a certain satisfaction degree also makes it possible to some extent to take into account uncertainty, which, in turn, affects the composition of the portfolio. The solution to the model is found numerically using the proposed method, which allows, based on fuzzy utilities, finding fuzzy objective function and constraints, and transforming a fuzzy model into a crisp quadratic programming problem at specified satisfaction degrees. The example of the formation of an optimal portfolio of investment projects of a fishing industrial enterprise was explored.

In this paper, we develop a distributed adaptive radio transmit resource allocation based on game theory in the orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) cellular systems. In this regard we consider power of each user as a resource and then solve power control problem based on the idea of the nash equilibrium (NE) from non-cooperative game. Based on game theory, a utility function is proposed that each user tries to maximize its own utility by adjusting the transmit power on every of its subcarriers. According to defined utility function, each user tries to maximize his transmitted data rate while minimize allocated transmit power. In comparison with other references the behaviors of each user and subcarriers is illustrated clearly that how they act and also here more data rate is attained for each allocated subchannel. Simulation results show that the proposed dynamic power control game satisfies fairness among users at NE.

The optimal portfolio selection is one of the most investigated problem in Investment Theory. When randomness is introduced in return rates, one has to take into account the risk associated to each investment. The set of admissible portofolio becomes a two dimensional set and utility function has to be modified introducing risk which, in a rational market, is directly proportional to return. When it is possible to find a line of efficient portfolios the investor uses subjective preference to choose a particular point on it. The tools to tackle uncertain situation span from mathematical programming to stochastic optimal control, referring in any case to uniqueness of the decision maker. Aim of this paper is to imbed portfolio selection in a dynamic cooperative game framework and qualify the choice of an optimal portfolio as the corresponding bargaining solution.KeywordsOptimal PortfolioPortfolio SelectionExpected ReturnEfficient FrontierBargaining SolutionThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The Pridneprovsky Chemical Plant was one of the largest uranium processing enterprises in the former USSR, producing a huge amount of uranium residues. The Zapadnoe tailings site contains most of these residues. We propose a theoretical framework based on multicriteria decision analysis and fuzzy logic to analyze different remediation alternatives for the Zapadnoe tailings, which simultaneously accounts for potentially conflicting economic, social and environmental objectives. We build an objective hierarchy that includes all the relevant aspects. Fuzzy rather than precise values are proposed for use to evaluate remediation alternatives against the different criteria and to quantify preferences, such as the weights representing the relative importance of criteria identified in the objective hierarchy. Finally, we suggest that remediation alternatives should be evaluated by means of a fuzzy additive multi-attribute utility function and ranked on the basis of the respective trapezoidal fuzzy number representing their overall utility.

In this paper, we consider the problem that a group of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) seek to maximize their payoff by selecting a proper charging station and the charging stations try to maximize their revenue by adjusting the electricity price according to the total demands they received. Since both the decisions of the charging stations and the PEVs should be made dynamically under competition environments, we propose a two-level game framework to model this issue. At the lower level, the PEVs need to adapt their strategies, i.e. the charging station selection, according to the service they can get from each charging station, and we formulate it as an evolutionary game and use replicator dynamics to model the charging station selection process. Also, we propose an algorithm to arrive at the evolutionary equilibrium. At the upper level, each charging station needs to set the electricity price appropriately to maximize its revenue according to the received total amount of electricity requirement from PEVs. We formulate a differential game to describe the competition among the charging stations and analyze the Nash equilibrium for both open-loop strategies and closed-loop strategies. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can gain a higher profit and faster convergence speed than static control.