Simple normative rules imply simple positive rules

We have observed that some recent results cast serious doubts uponthe applicability of majority rule as a device for forming a group-willout of individual wills. On the other hand, majority rule has manyproperties to recommend it. Especially, the decisiveness propertyshould please anyone interested in efficiency considerations. How-ever, when it comes to the second major criterion, consistency, major-ity rule with pairwise comparison of alternatives often leads to diffi-culties. Indeed, we have seen that there is typically no core or Con-dorcet winner when the policy space is multidimensional real space.And when there is no core, the situation looks grim indeed for major-ity rule: literally any outcome may become the majority winner. Somerelief of this very strong result is provided by the fact that no majoritycycles can go through the outcomes that belong to the M2 bargainingset. This finding, of course, solves the problem facing majority rule onlyinsofar as a method can be devised by which the M2 bargaining set out-comes can be determined in a reliable way. Here, thus, we are con-fronted with the sincerity problem. The absence of the core can lead to chaotic trajectories of votingoutcomes in multidimensional space. However, there are ways of over-coming the difficulties if a sufficient amount of flexibility is allowedin institutional design. If we consider the various nonequilibrium solu-tion concepts, and the minimax set in particular, we can always designa decision rule which (under mild restrictions) makes the vote-maximiz-ing outcome trajectory enter the solution set. The flexibility needed isgreat, indeed: the decision rule, λ-majority, must be alterable for eachvoting situation. The determination of the winner in a pair-wise comparison of alter-natives is not the main source of the difficulties surrounding majorityrule. As a matter of fact, the method of building the agenda is the mostcrucial part of the problem of cyclical majorities. In multicandidatecontests the occurrence of cyclical majorities has motivated the studyof other.decision procedures in addition to the majority comparisonof alternatives. The most recent proposal, approval voting, is morestrategyproof than its competitors in the class of single-ballot, non-ranked voting systems. At the moment the relationships betweenapproval voting and majority rule are not clear. It seems that furtherstudy of the interrelationships of these procedures is called for. Thefeatures in which approval voting is superior to majority comparisonof pairs of alternatives, however, are not, strictly speaking, procedural,but are external to the method of making collective decisions.

We consider the elections of a seat-posted committee, and investigate the propensity of seat-wise majority voting to choose a committee that fulfills the majority will with respect to preferences over committees. Voters have seat-wise preferences and preferences over committees are derived from seat-wise preferences by means of a neutral preference extension. Neutrality means that the names of candidates do not play any role. The majority committee paradox refers to a situation where a Condorcet winner exists for each seat, and a Condorcet winner committee also exists but does not coincide with the combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners. The majority committee weak paradox refers to a situation where the combination of seat-wise Condorcet winners is not a Condorcet winner among committees. We characterize the domains of preference extensions immune to each of the paradoxes.

The Evolution of Collective Choice Under Majority Rule

A sufficient condition is derived for a policy y to be a Condorcet winner, when the set of feasible policies is some subsety ofR N with non-empty interior. Voters are assumed to differ in some scalar characteristic w. The sufficient condition refers only to voters' preferences over the set of preferred policies (of the various other voters). This set is a one-dimensional curve inR N> . The condition is that the indifference curves of each typew through the preferred policyy* (v) of any typev all be collinear. If the condition holds, then the preferred policyy* (m) of the median type of voter will be a Condorcet winner. If there are only three types of voter, then the above condition is also necessary for the existence of a Condorcet winner.

Equilibrium in a system of communities with local public goods

On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data

Chapter 15 - Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy

Condorcet's paradox for weak preference orderings

The evaluation of majority rules in a legislative bargaining model

In Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities, Professor Saul Levmore explores the “division of labor” between the various thresholds of agreement required for collective action—supermajority, simple majority, or plurality rule. His particular emphasis is on the choice between the last two options. To improve our understanding of this choice in various settings, Professor Levmore considers the relationship between two well-known contributions to the study of group decisionmaking, namely, the Condorcet Jury Theorem and the Condorcet Criterion, which have not generally been treated together. This essay explores the relationship between these two insights in the context of judicial decisionmaking. Counterintuitively, the essay demonstrates that while the Condorcet Criterion continues to hold great promise as a tool of decision in en banc appellate courts, the Condorcet Jury Theorem is most appealing in judicial contexts that appear less collegial and thus less like a jury. In contexts in which jurists engage in deliberation and in which they anticipate that their outputs will have precedential effect, the Jury Theorem has little if any role to play. In contrast, the Theorem might prove more useful in evaluating low-level judicial outputs or decisions that otherwise are not expected to be treated as precedent. Thus, common law trial court decisions and civil law court decisions are more likely to be useful benchmarks in a Condorcet Jury Theorem analysis. It is because such courts do not anticipate that their decisions will have the force of precedent that they are more likely to be derived from governing legal texts, and thus more prone to characterizations of accuracy, than are judicial outputs that are driven by policy concerns and are generated with the understanding that they will be treated as precedent.

Demand of direct democracy

The language tools offered in common word processors use dictionaries and simple grammatical rules. They cannot detect errors such as a wrong preposition, interchanged words, or typos that result in a dictionary word. However, by comparing the user's text to a large repository, it is possible to detect many of these errors and also to suggest alternatives. By looking at full sentences, it is often possible to get the correct context. This is important in detecting errors and in order to offer valuable suggestions. These ideas have been implemented in a prototype system. We present examples in English and Norwegian, but the method, that of following a “majority vote,” can be applied to any written language.

Support vector machines (SVMs) has been accepted as a fashionable method in machine learning community. However, it cannot be easily scaled to handle large scale problems for its time and space complexity that is around quadratic with respect to the number of training samples. This paper proposes to combine distributed SVMs by simple Bayesian formalism rules (B-SVMs). B-SVMs randomly decomposes a large-scale task into many smaller and simpler sub-tasks in training phase and uses simple Bayesian formalism rules to make decision for final classification in test phase. B-SVMs was compared with single SVMs that is trained on entire training data set, parallel SVMs combined by majority voting (MV-SVMs), and one kind of fast modular SVMs (FM-SVMs). Experimental results on four problems show that B-SVMs can get higher accuracy than MV-SVMs and FM-SVMs does, the proposed algorithm can significantly reduce training and test time. More importantly, it produces test accuracy that is almost the same as single SVMs does.

Purpose This paper aims to estimate a New Keynesian small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for Egypt using Bayesian techniques and data for the period FY2004/2005:Q1-FY2015/2016:Q4 to assess monetary and fiscal policy interactions and their impact on economic stabilization. Outcomes of monetary and fiscal authority commitment to policy instruments, interest rate, government spending and taxes, are evaluated using Taylor-type and optimal simple rules. Design/methodology/approach The study extends the stylized micro-founded small open economy New Keynesian DSGE model, proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), by explicitly introducing fiscal policy behavior into the model (Fragetta and Kirsanova, 2010 and Çebi, 2011). The model is calibrated using quarterly data for Egypt on key macroeconomic variables during FY2004/2005:Q1-FY2015/2016:Q4; and Bayesian methods are used in estimation. Findings The results show that monetary and fiscal policy instruments in Egypt contribute to economic stability through their effects on inflation, output and debt stock. The monetary policy Taylor rule estimates reveal that the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) attaches significant importance to anti-inflationary policy and (to a lesser extent) to output targeting but responds weakly to nominal exchange rate variations. CBE decisions are significantly influenced by interest rate smoothing. Egyptian fiscal policy has an important role in output and government debt stabilization. Additionally, the fiscal authority chooses pro-cyclical government spending and counter-cyclical tax policies for output stabilization. Again, past values of the fiscal instruments are influential in the evolution of the future fiscal policy-making process. Originality/value A few studies have examined the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy in Egypt within a unified framework. The presented paper integrates the monetary and fiscal policy analysis within a unified dynamic general equilibrium open economy rational expectations framework. Without such a framework, it would not be easy to jointly analyze monetary and fiscal transmission mechanisms for output, inflation and debt. Also, it would be neither possible to contrast the outcome of monetary and fiscal authorities commitment to a simple Taylor instrument rule vis-à-vis optimal policy outcomes nor to assess the behavior of monetary and fiscal agents in macroeconomic stability in context of an active/passive policy decisions framework.

What explains the choice of corporate political strategy in environmental politics? Drawing on recent models of actor strategy formation in political economy, this article argues that basic material interests of firms are translated into strategies in the context of institutional environments. I advance a typological model that posits how distributional effects—positive versus negative—and perceived regulatory pressure—low versus high—interact in leading firms to adopt one of four ideal-type strategies: opposition, hedging, support, and non-participation. This article examines the model through the case of corporate strategies in the making of the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme. The article contributes to theory-building on business strategy in environmental politics by offering a probabilistic explanatory model, and it flags hedging strategies as an increasingly prevalent form of business behavior.