Single round vs. runoff elections under plurality rule: A theoretical analysis

Most elections, public and private in the United States or abroad, provide that to be declared elected, a candidate must receive either more than half of the valid votes cast in the contest (majority) or more votes than any other candidate (plurality). If there are only two candidates, the two rules are the same, but if there are more than two, the rules differ. Under the majority rule, if no candidate receives a majority, a run-off election or some other procedure is required to choose between the two candidates who lead on the first ballot. Since elections are time consuming and popular elections especially are expensive, investigation and comparison of alternatives seems worthwhile. The author has made a modest investigation, both deductive and inductive, having in mind particularly the proposed amendment to the U. S. Constitution providing for the popular election of the President. The rule put forward here and even more the method of analysis are applicable to a broader set of circumstances, however. The proposed Constitutional Amendment in the form in which it passed the House of Representatives in 1970 is interesting because it is a hybrid between the majority and plurality rules. It provides for election by plurality provided that the leading candidate receives more than 40% of the total vote. If no candidate receives more than 40% of the vote, a run-off election is called for. This rule seems reasonable if the leader receives, say, 49% and the runner-up 41% with 10% going to other candidates. It seems less reasonable if the leader receives 41% and the runner-up 40% with 19% to other candidates. An alternative which appeals on grounds of reasonableness and yet is simple is-

Robust Political Equilibria Under Plurality and Runoff Rule

Political candidates use a variety of negative campaigning strategies, and these attacks have different degrees of success. To explain this, I first introduce a formal model of campaign strategy to show when candidates will engage in negative campaigning and how it can affect election results. Whether candidates choose negative campaigning depends upon three factors: the voters' preconceptions about political candidates' the voters' preferred dimension, and the candidates' character traits. I show that eliminating negative campaigning has an ambiguous effect on voter welfare. Then, I extend the formal model of campaigning to include situations in which candidates campaign dishonestly. I find that allowing this is strictly inferior for voter welfare. Often this is because whenever lying becomes more probable, all campaigns start to look the same. In order to understand the implications of the formal model, I use multiple empirical testing methods. I use laboratory experiments to test how voter beliefs and voter behavior affect the frequency and content of candidates' negative campaigning. I find support for the above comparative statics hypothesis about when candidates are more likely to negatively campaign. Furthermore, the laboratory results are better explained by a quantal response equilibrium model in which voters are risk averse and are more naive than sophisticated in their Bayesian updating ability. I next consider how negative campaigning translates into votes. From survey responses, I show empirical support for candidate tactics that target specific segments of voters based upon their predilections toward accepting negativity in campaigns. One way candidates attack their rivals is by trying to make voters afraid of them. From a laboratory experiment in which subjects made social judgments about pairs of candidates who ran against each other in real elections, we found that the candidates chosen by subjects as more physically threatening had actually lost 65% of the real elections. Such correlation could arise from common neural mechanisms engaged when viewers make social judgments about faces, and when voters evaluate candidates. This was shown in two independent fMRI studies in which subjects again made judgments about images of unfamiliar politicians who had run in real elections. We found that for judgments of threat, election loss correlated with activity in the insula and ventral anterior cingulate cortex, structures known to be involved in processing negative emotions. These findings suggest that voters are influenced by negative emotions elicited by a candidate’s mere appearance. Finally, we examine the role of candidate fear in explaining voter choice in presidential elections using ANES data from 1980-2004. We find that certain groups of voters are more susceptible to fear appeals. After controlling for the factors commonly thought to affect voter decision-making, we also find further evidence that fear of presidential candidates directly affects vote choice. The results have implications for future research on negative political communication, as they suggest that threatening first impressions can harm a candidate's electoral chances. They also show that candidates who wish to successfully utilize negative campaigning must tailor their campaigns not only to reflect the weaknesses of the opponent but also to insure that their message is salient to the specific group of targeted voters.

A discussion is presented regarding the single-stage election procedures Plurality, Negative Plurality, and Borda Rules; with an emphasis on their Condorcet Efficiency, which measures their propensity to elect the Condorcet Winner. A theoretical analysis shows how the Condorcet Efficiency of these voting rules change as the various measures of group mutual coherence change. Both Plurality and Negative Plurality Rules are found to perform very poorly over identifiable ranges of the defined measures of group mutual coherence. While Borda Rule is not always found to be the most Condorcet Efficient single-stage rule in all scenarios, it never performs poorly under any scenario. These theoretical results are then reinforced by empirically-based analysis to show very solid support for using Borda Rule, despite some concerns that have been expressed that Borda Rule requires voters to rank candidates, while Plurality and Negative Plurality Rules do not.

Purpose This paper aims to examine how disruptive presidential leadership reshapes the business–government nexus by analyzing the Trump administration as a critical case of political and economic transformation. It explores how unilateral governance, policy volatility and weaponized interdependence compelled firms to adopt short-term, defensive and state-contingent innovation strategies. Through a comparative analysis of the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations, the study seeks to clarify how differing leadership styles influence corporate behavior, policy uncertainty and long-term institutional resilience. Ultimately, the paper reframes presidential power as a structural force shaping corporate adaptation, innovation trajectories and the stability of capitalist governance. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a comparative qualitative design, integrating theoretical analysis with empirical evidence across the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations. It combines insights from presidential power theory, institutional economics and business strategy to construct an analytical framework linking leadership style to corporate adaptation under policy uncertainty. Data sources include policy documents, economic policy uncertainty indices and secondary literature on trade, innovation and regulation. Comparative case analysis is used to trace causal mechanisms connecting disruptive governance to firm-level strategic responses. This multi-level approach allows for identifying both short-term adaptive behaviors and long-term institutional consequences within the evolving business–government nexus. Findings This study finds that the Trump administration’s disruptive leadership produced policy chaos that often operated as administrative incompetence, forcing firms into defensive, opportunistic and state-contingent innovation. Executive orders, tariffs and regulatory reversals aimed less at creating opportunities than at protecting existing hierarchies. Short-term gains in sectors like semiconductors came alongside fractured supply chains and declining predictability. Firms either aligned with shifting state priorities or diversified abroad to manage volatility. Ultimately, chaotic governance accelerated adaptation, but eroded the coordination, regulatory stability and institutional trust needed for long-term competitiveness. Originality/value This paper reframes presidential power by linking disruptive leadership, and the chaos that signals Trump’s administrative incompetence, to firm-level strategic behavior. Instead of treating policy uncertainty as external, it shows how leadership style and governance design actively produce it. Integrating theories of presidential power, business influence and institutional resilience, the study bridges political science and corporate strategy. A comparison of the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations reveals how politically generated chaos becomes a structural force shaping innovation, exposing the trade-offs between short-term adaptability and long-term institutional stability.

A marketing planning framework to aid political parties in improving their image and co‐ordinating election campaigns has been developed to reflect the changing nature of electoral campaigning in the developed world towards the need for more long‐term planning; together with the development and implementation of marketing models in a wider sphere of social situations. The planning model has been developed using both a hypothetico‐deductive and an inductive approach, incorporating recent developments in US and UK political campaign management and depth interviews with political strategists in the UK. Suggests that national political parties need to co‐ordinate their election campaigns more effectively in order to strengthen their image among key citizen and voter groups by determining which target areas are most in need of resources. Further research is needed to determine how to position the party and to select and place advertising in the relevant media. Concludes that local election campaigns are becoming more co‐ordinated by national parties but that such co‐ordination neglects to provide local area research and telemarketing campaigns, and post‐election analysis exercises to monitor strengths and weaknesses in party strategy and campaign plan implementation.

Online advertising is an important component of political campaigning. With microtargeting techniques, voter groups who have shared concerns about specific issues can be identified and, subsequently, targeted with posts addressing those issues. This paper aims to provide an initial investigation into the dynamics and effects of targeted issue ads. We study whether these targeted persuasion efforts influence which issues matter to voters and, vice versa, if voters are more likely to receive ads about issues that they deem important. We take a comparative approach by collecting data in the run-up to the 2021 Dutch general election ( N = 103) and during the 2022 United States midterm election ( N = 31). To test the effects of ads that individual voters were exposed to during these times, we use a novel combination of methods, namely, mobile experience sampling, screenshot data donations, and content analysis. In both countries, we find that exposure to online ads increases the salience of issues among voters. We did not find evidence for successful targeting on issue preferences in the United States or the Netherlands. We discuss possible explanations and implications of these findings.

This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on political platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of political equilibria with two competing parties and with one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, the distance between both platforms is always positive but limited, in contrast to the median voter model and the citizen candidate model. In one-party equilibria, the median voter can be worse off than in all equilibria with two competing parties. (JEL D71, D72)

The electoral success of an extremist party usually attracts considerable attention. Yet, they rarely have an opportunity to directly influence policy as they are, more often than not, shut out of the policy-making process by mainstream parties. Extremist parties may, however, influence policy indirectly by inducing mainstream parties to adjust their electoral strategies. I consider a model of electoral competition between an expressive extremist party and two mainstream parties in first-past-the-post and majority runoff elections. The presence of an extremist party results in an equilibrium policy outcome that is further away from the extremist’s preferred policy but the magnitude of the effect is shown to depend on the type of electoral system.

This dissertation consists of two original studies in social networks and one original study in political economy. In the first two chapters, I study (i) how social networks form, and (ii) how economic agents optimize their behaviors for a given network structure. In the last chapter, I examine how election rules affect individual voting decisions and ultimate election outcomes. In Chapter 1, Social Network Formation and Strategic Interaction in Large Networks, I present a dynamic network formation model that aims to explain why some empirical degree distributions exhibit the increasing hazard rate property (IHRP). In my model, a sequentially arriving node forms a link with one existing node through a bilateral agreement. newborn node prefers a highly linked node; however, the more links an existing node has, the more the marginal return from an additional link diminishes. I prove that the IHRP emerges if and only if the latter effect prevails over the former. I present two implications of the IHRP for strategic interactions in networks. First, when there is uncertainty about neighboring agents' connectivity, the IHRP guarantees that a unique Bayesian equilibrium exists in a network game with strategic complementarities. Second, the IHRP characterizes a monotone revenue-maximizing mechanism with allocative externalities. In Chapter 2, Monopoly Pricing and Diffusion of a (Social) Network Good, I present a model of dynamic pricing and diffusion of a network good sold by a monopolist. In the model, the network good is a subscription social network good. This means that in each period, each consumer has to pay a subscription price to use the good, and the utility derived from subscribing to the good increases as more of her neighboring consumers subscribe. Consumers myopically optimize their subscription decisions, and the monopolist chooses a sequence of subscription prices that maximizes his discounted sum of per-period profits. Three main results emerge. First, I characterize a unique steady state of the monopoly market. Second, I find that optimal sequences of subscription prices oscillate around the subscription price at the steady state as time passes. Third, I analyze how changes in the monopolist's discount factor and the density of the social network affect the subscription price, subscription rate, and deadweight loss at the steady state. In Chapter 3, A Model of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation, I study how two different election rules, simple plurality (e.g., as in South Korea) and two-round runoff (e.g., as in France), affect political candidates’ incentives to form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs). In my model, three candidates compete for a single office, and two candidates can form a PEC. Since the candidates are both policy- and office-motivated, one candidate can incentivize the other candidate to withdraw his candidacy by choosing a joint policy platform. I find that PECs are more likely to form in plurality elections than in two-round runoff elections. I further examine how other electoral environments, such as ideological distance and pre-election polls, influence incentives to form PECs.

Due to the enormous energy consumption and the wide geographic distribution, Electrical Vehicle (EV) charging stations are believed to have great potential in Emergency Demand Response (EDR) participation. However, EDR limits the electricity drawn from the power grid by the charging station, and can pose threats to satisfying EVs’ charging demand. In this paper, in order to complement the charging station’s energy supply to meet the dynamic EV charging demand, we formulate an online EV charging scheduling problem under EDR as a non-linear mixed-integer program, and propose a novel polynomial-time online algorithm and auction mechanism to jointly incentivize EVs with energy to sell their energy and utilize the charging station’s local generator to produce energy. Our approach conducts an auction in each single round based on a primal-dual method and ties these auctions over time to optimize the system’s long-term social cost, while accommodating the local generator’ on/off-state control, each EV bidder’s cumulative energy budget constraint, and the power grid’s EDR energy cap. Our approach achieves the economic properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, and computational efficiency simultaneously for each auction, and a parameterized-constant competitive ratio for the long-term social cost. By rigorous theoretical analysis and trace-driven experimental studies, the results exhibit that our approach outperforms multiple alternative algorithms regarding the social cost, attains the economic properties, and also executes efficiently in practice.

Sanctioning institutions are of utmost importance for overcoming free-riding tendencies and enforcing outcomes that maximize group welfare in social dilemma situations. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the endogenous formation of institutions in public goods provision. Our theoretical analysis shows that players may form sanctioning institutions in equilibrium, including those governing only a subset of players. The experiment confirms that institutions are formed and that it positively affects cooperation and group welfare. However, the data also shows that success is not guaranteed. Players are unwilling to implement equilibrium institutions in which some players have the opportunity to free ride. Our results emphasize the role of fairness in the institution formation process. (JEL C72, D02, H41)